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Abstract
This thesis examines technology diffusion within the UK NHS. Motivated by increasing 
health expenditure over the last years, it is important to understand the diffusion process 
of medical technology in order to determine the factors that enhance or delay the 
incorporation of technologies into common practice. Given the uncertainty inherent in new 
technology and its presupposed competitive advantage, the diffusion process is 
approached through the informational sources available to agents as a mechanism to 
overcome uncertainty. Information increases physicians’ knowledge on product quality 
and consequently influences technology choice. The set of regulatory and financial 
incentives provided by the health care system are also considered. Throughout the thesis 
dynamic panel data methods are used to estimate technology demand equations. The 
first case study looks at diffusion within the primary care sector of three drug groups at the 
therapeutical class level using prescription data from IMS Health. The second empirical 
case explores within-group therapeutical diffusion with emphasis on competition amongst 
branded products. The question addressed relates to the informational and product 
characteristics that consolidate different prescription trends and product uptake. Results 
suggest that prescription experience is the most important source of information; however, 
physicians access additional informative channels when the technology is a breakthrough 
innovation. Additionally, drug diffusion is unaffected by the health system organisation. 
The final empirical work addresses diffusion of two surgical procedures in the secondary 
care sector using HES data. Specifically, it considers the impact of competition introduced 
by the NHS reforms initiated in the 90s. Patient follow-up also allows exploration of the 
impact that surgical innovation has on patients’ health outcomes using a competing risk 
model. Findings suggest higher diffusion in less concentrated markets, with specialised 
and university providers having faster uptake. Moreover, diffusion presents long-term 
effects on improved quality of care.
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Introduction
This thesis examines the diffusion of technologies within the health care sector. The 
increase in health care expenditure and the identification of technological change as the 
main determinant of the medical spending growth have boosted the interest for the 
analysis of medical innovation diffusion. Some studies have estimated that the association 
between technological change and medical expenditure represents half of the increase in 
expenditure (Newhouse, 1992; Cutler, 1995). The recognition of technological change as 
being responsible for spending growth raises the question of the mechanisms at work 
which allow new medical innovations to penetrate the health care market and how these 
innovations become part of common practice. Technological change involves different 
steps, from the development of the technology to the placement of the technology in the 
market. New technologies contribute to economic growth because of their superior 
competitive advantage generating more efficient production processes. Consequently, it is 
only through the adoption and diffusion of these technologies that benefits for the 
consumers will be materialised. The present research is focused on the analysis of the 
diffusion stage of technological change in the health care sector.
In particular, the research is aimed at identifying the elements that shape the diffusion of 
medical technologies and frame the process within the regulatory and organisational 
context in which diffusion takes place. This is thus an empirical analysis of the diffusion of 
medical technology in the health care sector. The case of the UK NHS is used to 
exemplify and examine the diffusion process. Two different technologies are explored and 
these are both product innovations that represented a breakthrough in the treatment of 
specific medical conditions. These innovations are also a good case-study for the 
relevance of the health sector absorbing them and because they diffuse in health markets 
that represent a large share of the total expenditure bill. Note that although the motivation 
for this thesis was the relevance of medical technology in expenditure growth, the 
research is not aimed at the quantification of this relationship but to the understanding of 
the mechanisms through which diffusion takes place. A priori one would expect adoption 
to be driven either by production cost reductions or higher profitability. In the health care 
sector new technology appears to be largely cost increasing and third-party payment 
would be expected to place a constraint on demand expansion. In this context much 
remains to be explained regarding the forces behind technology diffusion as this is an 
area with limited empirical contributions.
The empirical analysis here is of two distinct case studies. The first empirical analysis 
corresponds to the diffusion of new prescription drugs and the second type of technology 
analysed is surgical innovation. These two technologies represent examples of medical 
innovations that are different in their nature, in the stakeholders involved in their 
development and market introduction and finally in the sub-sectors in which diffusion 
occurs. Initially, there are differences in the characteristics of these two types of product 
innovations that are expected to determine the diffusion process in different ways. In 
addition, within each type of technology different groups of drugs and surgical procedures 
are examined in order to delineate any similarities and specificities of their diffusion 
process that could be extracted from their analysis. The general context in which diffusion 
is explored is the NHS; however, for each type of technology the uptake occurs in 
different health care sectors. As such, the first empirical analysis considers new drugs 
diffusion framed within the context of the primary health care, while the second empirical 
analysis is concerned with diffusion of surgical procedures within the secondary health 
care sector. Differences between these two sectors lie in their structure and the set of 
reforms they experienced, thus the diffusion process across sectors is also expected to 
follow different acceptance paths.
In accordance with diffusion analysis in economics, diffusion accounts for an increasing 
acceptance of a new technology within a pool of potential adopters in the market. 
Diffusion accounts for at least two levels of analysis that deal with the acceptance of a 
new technology at different points in time. First, inter-firm diffusion accounts for the 
increase in the number of adopters within the group of prospective users in the time 
elapsed between when the innovation becomes available and the adoption time. Adoption 
here refers to the first contact with the technology and diffusion represents the growth in 
the number of adopters. However, the inter-firm diffusion path is restricted to explain 
delays in adoption. After the initial acceptance there is an integration of the technology in 
the production process, whereby the innovation sequentially replaces the old technology 
used as an input in the production function. It is initially assumed that there is an existing 
old technology competing with the new one; however, if the technology is a breakthrough 
in the market it may not be replacing any existing technology. The analysis of this process 
is termed as the intra-firm diffusion analysis and acts as an indicator of the individual firm 
acceptance of the technology (Stoneman, 1983; Stoneman, 2002). The analysis of 
diffusion in this thesis builds upon the intra-firm diffusion framework to explore the 
increasing acceptance of medical technologies.
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The thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 1 outlines the general motivation for the diffusion 
analysis in health care and brings together some of the evidence supporting the 
relationship between technological change and medical expenditure growth. The two 
components of expenditure, prices and quantities, are examined to detect which of these 
factors is most important in determining the growth in expenditure. As supported by 
empirical evidence, quantities are identified as the main driver of expenditure growth 
(Cutler and McClellan, 1998; Cutler et al., 1998). This motivates the approach taken 
throughout the thesis to examine diffusion as acceptance measured by increasing 
volume. Conceptual aspects of diffusion are considered in this chapter and a detailed 
presentation of the differences between the inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion analysis are 
also discussed. The interest in this aspect of diffusion, in conjunction with the recognition 
of volume as responsible for expenditure increases, serves as the basis to set the intra­
firm context outlined above as the framework for the empirical analysis of health 
technology diffusion.
The first chapter starts with definitional aspects of diffusion as they are presented in 
economics. It also describes the two types of technologies that may be considered for the 
diffusion analysis. Process innovations refer to any development that introduces changes 
in equipment, input bundle or organisational structure that involves lower production 
costs; product innovations are new products in themselves (Stoneman, 2002). These 
concepts are then translated into the health care market context to highlight the 
differences and the aspects that make the health care sector an interesting sector for 
examination. The relevance of the two types of technologies examined in this thesis and 
the sectors in which they are placed are described to emphasize the significance for the 
examination of these innovations. After giving the basis for the empirical analysis of the 
diffusion of medical innovations in health care, the chapter ends with the particular 
aspects of diffusion that are examined throughout the thesis and specifically sets the 
research questions pursued.
Before undertaking the empirical analysis of diffusion, Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature on diffusion. Literature on both theoretical and empirical aspects of 
diffusion is reviewed. The review is not only focused on research limited within the health 
care sector but it starts with the evidence of the advances and approaches undertaken in 
economics and the empirical findings given in the diffusion of innovations in non-health 
sectors. The economic modelling of diffusion started with the seminal work by Griliches 
(1957) and Mansfield (1963). They introduced epidemic models to represent the diffusion
11
process. In these models diffusion was approached as the increase in technology users 
and the mechanism of diffusion was the dissemination of information through the contact 
of users with non-users. In modelling this process the logistic function, which can be 
characterised by an S-shaped curve, was observed to best represent the diffusion path 
followed by different technologies. These models were criticised for their simplicity and the 
lack of specification of the aspects leading to the adoption process. From that point 
onwards the development of several streams of analysis departed from the epidemic 
models based on the differential aspects that were held to explain why the diffusion 
process occurs. The uncertainty embedded in new technology is an important aspect of 
technology diffusion that generally motivates much of the literature.
Following the review of the theoretical research, empirical contributions to the diffusion 
literature are examined. The evidence comes from a variety of industries such as banking, 
food and the energy industry. The main common elements throughout this empirical 
analysis highlight the relevance of the Schumpeterian hypothesis of the role of the firm 
size and competition in the diffusion process. Both conceptual models and empirical 
findings have been largely devoted to the analysis of the inter-firm diffusion of process 
innovations. More recently, some models of intra-firm diffusion have been developed; 
nevertheless, the modelling and empirical aspects of this level of diffusion are still not very 
well documented. In an attempt to identify similarities and differences with the general 
economic literature, applications to the health care sector are then reviewed. The 
modelling of the diffusion process in the health care sector is very limited. Part of this work 
is focused on the interaction between insurance and technology choice. The analysis of 
the individual decision to adopt and to incorporate the technology as part of standard 
practice has been largely ignored. Nevertheless, there are a number of contributions 
modelling new drug diffusion as a physician learning process using a Bayesian approach.
The limited number of empirical contributions are mainly devoted to specific technologies 
such as MRI or new heart attack treatments. These have attracted the attention of 
researchers as they clearly represent a medical breakthrough with different implications in 
terms of cost and production development for the providers. The empirical evidence 
mostly refers to the US context. In general, competitive aspects arising from the insurance 
aspect within the health care sector are examined. For instance, commercially-oriented 
insurance or publicly funded health care provision systems are among the main variables 
examined in these studies. The specificities of the health care sector in this country makes 
it an interesting case for study but other organisational structures are analysed to test the
12
consistency and generalisation of the results obtained. After a close examination of the 
diffusion literature, contributions from the intra-firm diffusion level of analysis are found to 
be limited. Both non-health and health contributions are mainly constrained to the inter- 
firm level. This literature is thus mainly country and technology-specific. Therefore one of 
the objectives of this thesis is to contribute to the analysis of diffusion with the empirical 
examination at the intra-firm level of product innovations in an environment in which 
health services are mostly publicly provided. The technologies examined here also differ 
to the technologies generally studied in the literature.
After reviewing the relevant literature, the following chapters present the empirical 
analysis of diffusion in the UK health care sector. Chapter 3 is the first of the empirical 
chapters analysing the diffusion of new prescription drugs. This chapter deals with the 
diffusion of three therapeutical classes of drugs (statins, proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) and 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)) within the primary care sector. Statins are 
a type of cholesterol-lowering drugs, PPIs are among the group of ulcer-healing drugs and 
SSRIs are a class of drugs to treat depression. Each of these drug groups represent good 
examples for diffusion analysis given that they account for a large share of the 
pharmaceutical bill and also because they are used to treat common conditions among 
the population. The case of drug diffusion is of special interest given the interactions 
among the stakeholders involved in the process of development and market introduction. 
This follows from the number of external forces affecting the individual decision to 
gradually accept the prescription of a new drug. For instance, the manufacturer has strong 
incentives to promote the product.
With the exception of a few studies, drug diffusion has been generally examined from the 
overall market perspective using macroeconomic variables to estimate elasticities of 
demand. This leaves a relatively unexplored area for the analysis of diffusion at the 
microeconomic level. This chapter moves from the aggregated perspective and uses a 
microeconomic approach the prescription behaviour of the physician. Differences in these 
aggregation levels may give raise to different mechanisms of diffusion. At the market level 
the forces that move prices and quantities might be of relevance to give an overall picture 
of the trends detected on the demand for new drugs. However, it is the aggregation of 
individual demands that comprise the market demand. The influences that may operate at 
the individual physician level either might not be captured by macroeconomic variables or 
may consist of a different set of covariates. For instance, the evolution of the statins 
market in the UK might be examined following their sales and analysing the
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responsiveness of demand to prices and marketing. At the individual physician level, 
prices might not be of relevance in prescription choice as shown in Chapters 3 and 4.
It is generally accepted that new technology presents a competitive advantage with 
respect to the existing technology. However, especially during early periods of diffusion 
there is an intrinsic element of uncertainty with respect to the technology. The uncertainty 
and the newness of the product characterise diffusion as a dynamic learning process in 
which information plays a central role as a mechanism to overcome the uncertainty 
associated with innovations. There are four informational factors identified as driving the 
process. The first one is the personal experience. Drugs are defined as experience goods, 
that is, goods whose quality can be learnt after consumption. Only through repetitive 
prescription doctors will be able to assess the benefit for the patient of the prescription of 
the new drug. Secondly, observed external acceptance of the drug by the physician may 
modify his own acceptance and this mechanism may correct any deviation in his 
prescription from standard practice. This effect is labelled as consumption externality and 
may be analysed at two levels: market externality derived from the overall market 
acceptance and practice externality originated from the acceptance by physicians 
practising in the same practice.
A third informational mechanism is the publication in scientific journals of the clinical 
evidence derived from randomised control trials. Finally, the last informative channel 
included is the marketing effort by the manufacturer. Advertising is used by the 
manufacturer as a tool to maximise the returns to the investment in R&D. The informative 
role of marketing is subject to discussion in the literature with some researchers arguing 
that marketing is aimed at prescription habit generation. As discussed below the 
informative-persistency dichotomy in the role of marketing will be empirically tested in the 
following chapter. All these four mechanisms have been individually examined in earlier 
research but they have not been accounted for simultaneously to examine their 
confounding controlled effect. The individual analysis of these mechanisms may introduce 
some bias in the results as a consequence of omitted variables in the specifications. 
Consequently, this chapter gives a complete picture of the informative mechanisms that 
physicians may have access to.
Diffusion of innovations does not occur in isolation but within a context defined by the 
health care system in which physicians operate. In addition to the informational factors
14
there are a number of organisational factors examined to verify whether the incentives 
provided by the health care system have an effect on diffusion. Chapter 3 deals with 
diffusion at the therapeutical group level. As a drug class these technologies are all 
treated as having aggregate competitive advantage that overall brings higher benefit to 
patients. The fact that the analysis is undertaken at the therapeutical level introduces 
some limitations to the analysis, for example in the examination of the role of marketing. 
Over time as the therapeutic group progressively becomes established, marketing efforts 
may decrease as the therapeutic group’s acceptance increases for instance. It becomes a 
matter of interest to examine the existence of diminishing returns to marketing.
Generally, empirical research has approached diffusion using logistic analysis, binary 
dependent variable techniques or duration methods. However, new econometric methods 
in the analysis of dynamic behaviours using longitudinal data allow the use of efficient and 
more sophisticated methods. Dynamic panel data methods of the type depicted in 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are used. These are recent 
developments in panel data econometric analysis that allow introducing a dynamic 
element in the diffusion modelling. The advances in dynamic panels allow dealing with 
endogeneity problems using the additional moment conditions available by having 
observations for the same cross-section for a number of periods. As such the thesis 
provides empirical evidence on technology diffusion mechanisms in the health care sector 
using newly developed econometric techniques. The data used was provided by IMS 
Health from one of their databases IMS Disease-Analyzer. It consists of prescription data 
collected from a number of GP practices taken as a representative sample throughout the 
UK during the period 1991-2004. This is supplemented with additional data from a variety 
of other sources. In general, and noting some of the data constraints imposed, the results 
obtained show the importance of the physicians experience as the main driver of diffusion. 
Clinical evidence and consumption externalities only have an effect on the diffusion of 
statins and PPIs. Increasing returns to marketing are observed and marketing behaviour 
points towards an informative role of marketing in early stages of diffusion. On the 
contrary, organisational variables do not appear to have any significant effect on the 
demand for new drugs.
From the therapeutical group analysis depicted above the research in the following 
chapter moves to a more disaggregated level and concentrates on the diffusion of 
individual drugs within the statins group. Within each therapeutical group there are a 
number of drugs that are introduced overtime sequentially. Although they are different in
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composition they can be considered as close substitutes. The competition faced by similar 
compounds within the same therapeutical class opens the analysis of the mechanisms 
that explain different diffusion rates for new compounds. There are observed differences 
in the prescription of each individual drug showing some degree of within-class 
competition that merits further research. There is observed first-mover advantage that 
seems to prevail until the fourth drug enters the market. At this point this entrant gains a 
fast dominance of the market share and reaches similar prescription levels to those of the 
first entrant. Thus, Chapter 4 builds upon the framework outlined in Chapter 3 to model 
diffusion against a background of prescription competition, specifically first-mover 
advantage and market dominance.
Chapter 4 thus analyses diffusion process to identify the factors that consolidate the 
different observed prescription patterns. The main question to arise is whether the 
informational channels discussed in Chapter 3 present at the therapeutical level also hold 
at the individual drug level. Because the level of analysis is at the individual drug level, 
product characteristics and product competition now become a matter of interest. 
Together with informational channels there are a number of quality characteristics that 
may justify the dominance of specific drug. The main goal in this chapter is to find 
evidence that explains whether the distribution of the market share is the result of the 
establishment of an asset based on prescription persistence and/or product quality. The 
empirical specification presents pair-wise comparisons of the dominant drugs with respect 
to the competing drugs. Dominant drugs are defined as those drugs with the highest 
market share. Prescription data from IMS Disease-Analyzer is again analysed for the 
period 1991-2004. Dynamic panel data is used to capture the underlying dynamics of 
diffusion. Overall, the findings support the results in Chapter 3 in that the diffusion process 
is largely drive by the physician’s own experience. First-mover advantage seems to arise 
because of product familiarity and the fourth entrant captures part of the market mainly 
because of product superiority. In accordance with what is anticipated in the previous 
chapter, the marketing evidence for the first-mover points towards an informative role of 
marketing. In response to the threat introduced by competitors, overtime the objectives of 
the manufacturer change and advertising follows the consolidation of persistence in 
prescription.
The previous two empirical chapters deal with the diffusion of new drugs at two levels of 
aggregation. Chapter 5 introduces a different technology and health care sector in which 
diffusion is occurring. Interest is now on surgical technology and specifically the chapter
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looks at two types of surgeries: carotid endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy. Carotid 
endarterectomy is a type of procedure that removes fatty clots from the carotid artery. 
Knee arthroscopy is a minimally invasive procedure to diagnose and treat problems in the 
knee joint. The interest in these two technologies lies in the different characteristics that 
define them. Carotid endarterectomy is a surgical procedure that entails a certain degree 
of risk to the patient as it is performed to prevent development of different forms of severe 
cerebrovascular disease. Conversely, knee arthroscopy is a day-case procedure and a 
commonly performed type of surgery with little risk for the patient. The risk that each type 
of surgery entails and the frequency of the cases that require these types of treatments 
may shape different diffusion paths. This chapter consists of two parts. The first one 
examines the diffusion of surgical innovations. The second part consists of the analysis of 
the impact on health outcomes of the diffusion of the new surgery.
Surgical innovations are introduced as part of the provision of hospital services. In looking 
at surgical innovations the set of incentives to develop and introduce this type of 
technology into practice are entirely different to the case of new drugs. Yet being a new 
technology means that there remains uncertainty regarding the characteristics of the 
technology and thus there is an intrinsic learning process whereby surgeons learn about 
the technology. The specification of the diffusion equations shares with the empirical 
specifications in Chapters 3 and 4 experience acquisition as an informative source. 
However, in this chapter the unit of analysis is the provider/hospital level based on the 
interest discussed below in examining competitive issues. As surgical innovations have 
different risk associated, if any adverse outcome is detected there may be an expectation 
generation process based on the outcome observed in previous periods. This is an 
indication of the product quality and a realisation of the potential advantage of the new 
technology.
The hospital sector in the UK has been under a regulatory environment characterised by 
constant change. Since the early 1990s a number of reforms were designed to enhance 
the efficient provision of hospital services and restructure the hospital sector into a quasi­
market. The main goal was to establish a competitive environment in the hospital care 
sector, dividing the role of the buyer and seller of services. This sector has been under 
regular scrutiny and as such provides the chance to examine the effect of market-oriented 
set of incentives established by the regulator. The impact of competition on diffusion is 
thus analysed to detect whether a competitive environment may deter or boost the use of 
the state-of-the-art technology. Two sets of competition variables are defined. The first
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one relates to the number of providers competing to provide services to the same buyer 
(PCT). The second set of competition variables concerns competitors in the provision of 
services defined by the geographical area. These different variables are defined to test 
whether the proximity of the competitor is an element that may modify the diffusion 
process. In line with the analysis of the organisational factors outlined in previous 
chapters, Chapter 5 also considers the potential influence of organisational factors in the 
uptake of surgical innovations.
The second part of Chapter 5 concerns the effect of the diffusion of new surgeries on 
patient’s health outcomes. The analysis is based on hospital admission data and allows 
for patient follow-up to the end of the study period. This part of the analysis is restricted to 
carotid endarterectomy procedures. Information on readmission and mortality rates are 
used as proxies for improved health outcomes. The extension of this analysis to the knee 
arthroscopy case was not considered appropriate because the nature of the procedure 
means that any health improvements would not be reflected in readmission or mortality 
rates. This aspect of the research is interested in whether the intra-firm diffusion (volume) 
of procedures will have a positive impact on the patient health outcome. In this context the 
volume of surgeries accounts for the experience gained through the increasing number of 
surgeries performed. Case-mix variables and provider characteristics are also accounted 
for.
For the purpose of the empirical analysis Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) data are 
used. These contain records of all in-hospital admissions in England and cover the period 
1996-2006. Dynamic panel econometric methods are used for the first part of the 
analysis. The second part considers limited dependent variable methods, Cox 
proportional hazard models and a competing risk methods framework. The last are based 
on the model presented by Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989) that represents a marginal 
approach to the multiple failure types. The results obtained confirm some of the results in 
previous chapters. The experience attained in previous periods is a relevant factor 
affecting the diffusion of both surgical technologies. Overall, providers do not seem to use 
the observed adverse outcomes that patients may experience as an indicator of quality. 
Competition on the other hand appears to have a negative impact on diffusion and the 
findings support less competitive environments as diffusion promoters. As opposed to the 
chapters on drug diffusion, organisational factors in the diffusion of surgical procedures do 
seem to influence their uptake. In addition, the analysis of the impact of diffusion on health
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outcomes reveals that the effects are materialised only in the long-term through a 
decrease in readmission rates.
Finally, Chapter 6 brings together the results obtained in each of the empirical chapters. 
The aim is to identify any common patterns across technologies and health sectors that 
could be extracted from the empirical analysis. Comparisons at different levels are 
established. Firstly, from the differences in the characteristics of the therapeutical groups 
the role of informational mechanisms might be generalised according to these 
characteristics. Similarly, in the case of the analysis of drug diffusion within the statins 
therapeutical level there are differences in prescription patterns that can be explained by 
order of entry and product characteristics. The definition of the two surgical innovations 
also delimits the characterisation of diffusion paths that are shaped by the technology’s 
intrinsic risk. Common patterns are derived from the elements shared between the 
diffusion of new drugs and surgical technologies and across health sectors. Limitations of 
the empirical analysis are outlined as well as some policy recommendations that can be 
derived for future policy-making. In addition there is a discussion for future research that 
would complement the existing literature with a richer analysis embracing different 
technology types and other health contexts.
19
Chapter 1 
Technological Change and Expenditure, Technology 
Diffusion in Health Care and Conceptual Aspects
“In health care, Invention is hard, but dissemination is even harder”
(Berwick, 2003)
Diffusion of new technologies in the general economic context has been extensively 
analysed and there is comprehensive empirical evidence from various sectors in the 
economy. The introduction of new technologies in the economy is generally assumed to 
provide competitive advantages to the adopters under the assumption that these 
innovations are superior to the existing ones. Technological change in the health care 
market over the past decades has been rapid, broadening the capacity of patient 
treatment. One manifestation of this technological change is the actual number of drugs, 
surgical procedures and medical devises that are introduced every year in the global 
health care market. However, the introduction of such innovations does not necessarily 
lead to instantaneous widespread diffusion and there is usually a lapse between an 
innovation introduction and its extensive use. The analysis of the diffusion process of 
medical innovations in the health care market remains preliminary and the understanding 
of the mechanisms underlying this process are still unclear.
The relevance of technological change in the health care sector has received attention 
recently as it has become commonly accepted that this is the main component driving the 
increasing growth in health care expenditure. In order to identify which factors are behind 
the expenditure increase it is important to consider individually its components: price and 
quantity. Based on their evolution, quantity of services is recognised as the principal 
mechanism of the increasing expenditure trend. It is the empirical examination of the role 
of technological change in health care that has motivated the analysis of diffusion of new 
technologies. The diffusion process plays a key role in that it delineates a change in 
preferences expected to modify the provision of health care services. Despite the 
significance of the diffusion process as the aspect of technological change that places the 
innovation into use, diffusion analysis in health care has not received much economic 
attention. Nevertheless, before dealing with the mechanisms that drive the diffusion stage 
some conceptual and definitional aspects are considered in this chapter. These aspects
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will be useful to set down the conceptual underpinnings of how the diffusion affects the 
health production function. Given the limited research in this topic, this will set the 
framework of diffusion analysis in health care as examined in this thesis into the context of 
the economic diffusion theory.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the motivation for 
diffusion of new technologies based on the relevance of the technological change as the 
leading factor in the increase of medical expenditure. This section also discusses the 
mechanisms responsible for driving up medical spending based on the expenditure 
decomposition. Section 1.2 defines diffusion and the two different approaches that can be 
used to examine diffusion. This section also distinguishes between types of innovations 
and it also describes the specificities of the health care market. Section 1.3 extends the 
definition of the intra-firm diffusion level and gives a brief description of its representation. 
Section 1.4 refers specifically to the definition of technology in health care. In this section 
there is also a brief description of the innovations examined in this thesis as well as the 
market in which they are developed. Section 1.5 finally sets the research questions being 
under scrutiny throughout the thesis. The final section presents some concluding remarks.
1.1 Medical Technology and Expenditure
Technological change boosts economic growth through increases in productivity. The 
effect of technological change in the health care sector may be different however. The 
increasing expenditure in developed countries over the last decades has been one of the 
major issues on the agenda of governments. Health care expenditure has been increasing 
at a rate greater than the annual increase in GDP over the last few decades. In countries 
such as the UK and the US with different health markets, medical expenditure increased 
at an annual growth rate of 3.6 and 4.3% during the period 1980-2000, well above their 
GDP growth figures of 2.3 and 2.16%, respectively. Given this increase in medical 
expenditure there has been a growing interest among scholars in determining the factors 
explaining this continuous increase. Factors such as population aging, expansion of 
insurance coverage or increased per capita income have been typically argued to be 
contributors to the increase in health expenditure. It is currently agreed among economists 
that they account only for a small proportion of the growth and technological change has 
been identified as the major factor in explaining the increase in medical expenditure 
(Aaron, 1991; Newhouse, 1992; Fuchs, 1996; Newhouse, 1993).
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The expansion of health care costs led to the development and introduction of new forms 
of third-party reimbursement payment systems aimed at the cost-containment of medical 
spending (Weisbrod, 1991). In identifying technology advances as responsible for the bulk 
of medical cost growth these new types of reimbursement schemes, mainly an evolution 
from retrospective to prospective payment systems, are likely to modify the incentives in 
the adoption of new technologies given that they will be costlier than existing 
technologies. Changes in payment systems through the implementation of cost- 
containment policies will also have implications in terms of the signal given to the several 
stakeholders in the market. For instance, from the supply-side the change in 
reimbursement policies may suggest to manufacturers a portfolio of investment in 
research and development oriented to innovation that is likely to be quickly and easily 
adopted. Although the diffusion process is concerned with the spread of an innovation 
over time, ultimately this may have influences on the health insurance market and 
subsequently the development of new technologies themselves (Weisbrod, 1991).
Table 1.1 Per Capita Total Health Care Expenditure Growth (%)
Australia 6.3 1.1 2.6 2.3 3.5 5 3.3
Canada 2.9 2.7 4.7 3.3 0.9 2.7 3.8
Finland 6.2 3.1 4.6 4.7 -1.4 2.6 5.8
France 6.7 5 3.7 3.6 4.1 1.8 4
Germany 9 3.6 2.4 1.4 2.7 2.3 1.2
Ireland 11.3 5.7 -0.2 0.5 6.2 7 9.3
Sweden 4.3 4.6 0.9 1.4 -0.6 3.9 4.5
UK 5.9 2.4 2.7 3.5 4.4 3.8 4.5
US 4.1 4.9 5.1 5.8 3.4 2.9 4.2
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
Notes: 1970 figure for Australia corresponds to 1971, 2000 GDP price level
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Table 1.2 Per Capita GDP Growth (%)
Australia 0.8 1.9 1.5 1.3 2.1 2.7 2.1
Canada 2.7 2.5 1.7 1.5 0.6 3.2 1.5
Finland 3.9 2.7 2.2 3 -1.2 4.5 2.3
France 3.1 2.9 1.1 2.7 0.7 2.4 1
Germany 2 3.5 1.5 2.6 -1.3 1.9 0.5
Ireland 3.4 3.1 1.7 4.9 4.1 8.3 3.7
Sweden 2.2 1 1.8 2 0.1 3.2 2.2
UK 1.9 1.7 1.9 3 1.4 2.9 2
US 1.8 2.6 2.3 2.3 1.2 2.9 1.3
Source: OECD Health Data 2008 
Note: 2000 GDP price level
Table 1.1 shows the annual growth in total health care expenditure per capita in some of 
the OECD countries for the period 1970-2005. Table 1.2 shows their growth in GDP per 
capita experienced for the same period. Increases in per capita health care expenditure 
have been over the corresponding increases in GDP per capita. In the UK, only in the 
period 2000-05 there has been an annual increase of 4.5%  in per capita expenditure that 
is above the 2% increase in the per capita GDP. A similar picture can be obtained in 
looking at the percentage of the total health care expenditure as a proportion of the GDP, 
as shown in Table 1.3. The UK had an annual rate of growth over the period 1980-2005 of 
around 1.5%.
Table 1.3 Total Health Care Expenditure as Percentage of GDP
Australia 6.3 6.6 6.9 7.4 8.3 8.8 1.3
Canada 7 8.1 8.9 9 8.8 9.9 1.4
Finland 6.3 7.1 7.7 7.7 7 8.3 1.1
France 7 8 8.4 9.9 9.6 11.2 1.9
Germany 8.4 8.8 8.3 10.1 10.3 10.7 1
Ireland 8.3 7.5 6.1 6.7 6.3 8.2 0
Sweden 8.9 8.5 8.2 8 8.2 9.2 0.1
UK 5.6 5.9 6 6.9 7.2 8.2 1.5
US 8.7 10 11.9 13.3 13.2 15.2 2.3
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
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Given the recognized importance of medical technology in health care expenditure 
growth, the question arising concerns the contribution of technology to this increase. 
Some empirical studies have quantified this relationship using one of the following two 
approaches. The first one is the residual approach1 and measures the technology impact 
on the average annual growth rate as the residual of the following expression
G = ' £ e l g l + R
i=1
Where si is the expenditure elasticity of factor i assumed to be a determinant of health 
care expenditure growth, gt is the average annual growth rate of factor i and R is the
residual growth rate attributable to technology. Among some of the elements that have 
been considered to affect the annual growth rate are the population ageing, income or 
changes in insurance demand. An alternative method is the so called direct approach and 
quantifies the relationship between expenditure and the factors considered to determine 
expenditure using proxies to quantify the technological change factor2. Recently, a report 
by Productivity Commission in the Australian Government (2005) attempted to link the 
contribution of technology to expenditure not only at the aggregated level but also the 
individual contribution of particular technologies on expenditure. This report included a 
review of the existing empirical evidence. Some of the studies using the residual approach 
report that technology accounts for more than 50% of the health care expenditure. Studies 
reviewed included Newhouse (1992), Oxley and MacFarlan (1994) and Cutler (1995)3. In 
using the direct approach similar conclusions are drawn. Okunade and Murthy (2002) use 
R&D as a proxy for technological change finding a long-term relationship between 
expenditure and innovation.
In the UK the Wanless (2001) report estimated that in the future the contribution of 
medical technology into health care expenditure growth would be between two and three 
percentage points. This seems to contrast with the evidence of the impact of technology 
on expenditure growth observed in other countries. However, international comparisons
1 Fuchs (1972) already pointed out the role of the “technology imperative" in the increased demand for health 
care services using the residual approach to explain demand growth.
2 A description of the two methods can be found in the Productivity Research Report by the Australian 
Government (2005). The advantages of each method are discussed in the report. The report also offers a 
summary of the empirical evidence found in studies using these methods.
3 Similarly, a very recent report by the US Congressional Budget Office (2008) reported that the expansion of 
treatment possibilities was responsible for half of the increase in medical expenditure.
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may not be appropriate as the UK appears not to have a leading position with respect to 
technology uptake. Evidence from the Technological Change in Health Care (TECH) 
research network shows differences across countries in how fast they are in adoption and 
diffusion speed (TECH, 2001). The UK is among a group of countries (together with 
Finland and Norway) that not only has delays in adoption of new technologies but also 
shows a slow uptake.
The components of medical expenditure are two: price and quantity. The increase in 
expenditure is the result of either increases in the price of health care services or an 
increase in the quantity of services provided or the combination of both. However, prices 
have been growing well below the increase in expenditure. The case of pharmaceuticals 
serves to exemplify the differences in prices and quantities. Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 show 
the annual growth of pharmaceutical expenditure and the price index from 1970 to 2005  
for some OECD countries. There has been a considerable growth in expenditure on 
pharmaceutical goods in many O ECD countries. However, pharmaceutical price indexes 
show an overall common decreasing growth trend. For instance, the UK shows a drug 
expenditure growth of 11% over the period 1990-1995 compared to a growth in the price 
index of 5.3%. Differences in pharmaceutical spending growth thus cannot be solely 
explained by increases in prices.
Table 1.4 Pharmaceutical Expenditure Annual Growth (%)
Australia 11.8 7.7 13.0 13.3 10.9 12.5 7.4
Canada 9.1 11.8 15.1 12.8 7.8 8.4 9.1
Finland 19.3 10.9 12.1 10.5 8.0 8.1 7.9
France 13.5 10.7 14.0 8.6 5.3 6.0 4.9
Germany 12.6 7.0 6.1 5.3 9.2 3.8 4.6
Sweden 18.3 11.2 11.0 11.9 13.2 7.6 6.1
UK 14.9 19.4 12.1 9.1 11.0
US 8.1 10.9 11.6 10.7 6.6 11.7 9.2
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
Note: Growth in price for Australia corresponds to 1971-1975. 
Expenditure in million national currency units 
Expenditure also includes other medical non-durables
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Table 1.5 Pharmaceutical Price Index Annual Growth
Australia 11.0 9.1 7.8 6.5 2.2 0.6 1.1
Canada 2.2 6.9 11.2 7.5 2.2 1.4 1.1
Finland 11.3 6.7 9.1 7.7 6.7 1.7 2.7
France 2.6 6.1 5.0 0.3 0.6 0.04 -1.0
Germany 4.4 3.2 6.7 3.1 4.9 2.5
Ireland 6.1 15.6 12.5 3.7 2.9 2.5 3.5
Sweden 8.9 13.0 3.4 2.2 2.7 1.2
UK 9.2 15.1 8.4 8.2 5.3 2.2
US 2.8 7.2 8.8 7.3 4.6 3.1 3.0
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
Note: Growth in price for Australia corresponds to 1971-1975. 
Price index (2000=100)
Changes in quantity may arise through two different mechanisms. Because advances in 
medical care open new treatment possibilities for existing and new patients there are two 
possible mechanisms at work, the substitution and expansion effect (Cutler and Huckman, 
2003). On one hand, there might be a substitution effect in that patients using the 
incumbent technology will switch to the new treatment, particularly if lower unit costs 
characterise this new technology. Taking as an example the pharmaceutical market, 
drugs tend to be introduced at higher prices (unit costs), as a profit incentive to maintain 
R&D within the sector. Therefore, it is likely that new pharmaceuticals will increase 
expenditure in the short-term reflecting this higher unit cost. Note that such substitution is 
not based on the classical reduction of resource inputs used in the production function but 
in the substitution of one type of input by a new and innovative input in the production 
process. However, in the long-run this may turn into cost savings derived from improved 
health outcomes due to the high effectiveness of the innovation in reducing disease 
morbidity and mortality. On the other hand, there could be an expansion effect whereby 
the new technology is used by a new group of patients. This is driven by the opening of 
treatment possibility to patients that were not previously eligible. This effect brings an 
overall increase in total costs.
The opposite trends between prices and expenditure observed in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 
could thus be capturing increases in quantities, mainly through the combination of the 
expansion and substitution effect, as the channel through which new technologies affect 
expenditure in the first instance. Note that this does not rule out the impact of other factors 
such as increased demand derived from higher income, expansion of insurance coverage
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or aging of the population. It simply recalls the minor effect on the increased quantity of 
non-technological factors. The combination of the substitution and expansion effects 
obviously pulls the demand for the new technology giving rise to an overall increase in 
absolute terms of the quantity of services demanded. Nevertheless, the final balance will 
be determined by the magnitude of each of these effects.
Although the extent of price changes cannot be responsible for the increase in 
expenditure this does not preclude this variable to contribute to the raising growth rates. In 
combination with the quantity impact, input price will also contribute to the expenditure 
increase. Generally new technologies have a higher cost and the overall contribution of 
technology quantity as a driver of medical spending growth will also be through the higher 
technology price, with the magnitude of this effect on expenditure depending on the price 
elasticity. Cutler and McClellan (1998) and Cutler et al. (1998) (cited by McClellan and 
Kessler (2002a)) find that the vast majority of the growth in expenditure in the treatment 
for heart attack is derived from the use of new technologies or increasing quantity of 
existing technologies. In fact, they show that prices are fairly stable for some of the 
treatments.
Whereas the examination of the impact of prices and quantities on expenditure has been 
at the centre of the attention, the welfare implications to patients have not generally been 
considered. Assessing only diffusion as it relates to the dissemination of technology does 
not give the entire picture of the process and leaves an important component of the 
diffusion analysis unexplored: the actual impact of technological change on quality of care. 
Cutler and McClellan (2001) assess the treatment and expansion effect of technology for 
heart attack. They show that spending increases are mainly explained by increases in the 
number of patients receiving treatment rather than by price changes. However, they 
confirm that “clearly technological change in heart attack care is worth the cost. [...] 
Technology increases spending, but the health benefits more than justify the added costs” 
(Cutler and McClellan, 2001, pp. 18). New drugs have also been shown to bring health 
improvements in other disease areas (Lichtenberg, 2001).
The effects of price and quantity as contributory factors in expenditure growth can also be 
seen graphically. These two variables are decision variables in production theory analysis. 
In a context in which the production of health services is linked to a cost function and the 
objective is to minimise cost, the introduction of a new technology will bring changes in the
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production-cost relationship. McGuire and Serra-Sastre (forthcoming) analyse the effect of 
a new technology on the composition of the input bundle quantities and the potential 
changes in prices. Consider the case of the simple model in production theory with the 
output being the result of the combination of two input factors y -  f ( x x,x2) and the
corresponding cost function is c = wxxx + w2x2, where wx and w2 are the prices of inputs 
xx and x2, respectively. If technology is understood as a new input in the production of 
health care services, the relationship between input and output is not expected to suffer 
any fundamental change and the production function to remain fairly similar to the pre­
technology introduction stage. This type of technical change is called disembodied 
technical change and will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.4.
This relationship is depicted in Figure 1. Following the example in McGuire and Serra- 
Sastre (forthcoming), assume that the production of health care is the result of the 
combination of two input factors, medical management (MM) as represented in the y-axis 
and surgery (S) as depicted in the x-axis. It is further assumed that there is a new surgery 
that requires less recovery time in such a way that the post-surgical medical management 
is reduced. The new surgery will have cost implications through a reduction in costs due 
to shorter length of stay. Before the introduction of new surgery, the tangency point 
between the isocost and isoquant give the equilibrium point xx. With the new technology 
there is a change in the relative price of new surgery that changes the slope of the isocost 
curve and shifts the isocost to a new equilibrium point in tx. This movement represents 
the substitution effect.
The new surgery opens new treatment possibilities and expands the capabilities for the 
provision of health services, i.e. more patients are suitable for treatment with the new 
technology. The isoquant y x shifts outwards to the production level depicted by the
isoquant curve y2. The level of output that can be produced is thus increased from tx to 
the new equilibrium point x2. Now the new equilibrium involves higher resource use 
derived from the increase in the number of patients receiving treatment. This is the 
representation of the expansion effect. There is an additional shift in the isoquant curve as 
a result of the change in the inputs’ marginal costs. Changes in the level of input usage 
derive in changes in the inputs’ marginal cost. The magnitude of the change in the input 
utilisation will depend on the change of the relative input prices. At the same time this will 
have an effect in the marginal cost. However, the impact of this change is subject to the
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production function. If the marginal cost decreases (increases) this induces higher (lower) 
output. The example depicted in Figure 1 shows the case of a fall in the marginal cost. 
The decrease in marginal cost induces the isocost to shift outwards and the new 
equilibrium moves from x 2 to x2.
MM
Figure 1.1 Changes in Isocost and Isoquant Curves Introduced by New Technology
Despite the price and quantity effect involved in the figure discussed above there is a 
dynamic effect on the growth of uptake of the new technology. The present representation 
of technological change does not capture this growth over time. Given the recognition of 
technology being the major motor of the health expenditure this thesis is not aimed at the 
quantification of the association between spending and technological change but to the 
examination of the drivers that induce higher quantities of technology utilisation.
1.2 Aspects of Technology Diffusion
1.2.1 Definition of diffusion and technology classification
Diffusion of new technologies has been extensively studied in neoclassic economics. It is 
defined as the spread of the use of the technology across the relevant market in which 
prospective users (firms) operate. As pointed by Stoneman (2002, p.9) “diffusion concerns 
issues that are among the more difficult to analyse adequately. Time is involved.
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Uncertainty is inherent. Change is the main topic. Imperfect markets abound. All such 
characteristics mean that the analysis of diffusion stands apart from much of the economic 
textbooks where perfect competition, full information, static models tend to hold sway”. By 
definition diffusion is hence inherently dynamic not only in terms of the time path but also 
in terms of likely modifications to the technology and changes in the market/industry. In 
order to understand the nature of diffusion in itself it is important to define first the concept 
of diffusion.
Following the definition given by Stoneman (1983) diffusion is the process by which the 
new technology is converging towards a threshold. Let x * be the post-diffusion 
technology level and xt represents the technology usage in period t , thus diffusion is the 
process and elements that drive this process whereby xt tends to x * .  If xt = x * for any 
period t the diffusion is instantaneous. Diffusion can be approached as the accumulation 
of goods or as the population that owns the technology. If diffusion refers to goods, y * is 
the convergence stock of technology and diffusion considers the process by which the 
stock of technology products y t moves towards the convergence level. If diffusion is seen 
as the rate at which individuals purchase the new technology, n * is the maximum number 
of individuals in the pool of potential adopters and nt is the number of individuals owning
the technology at period t , the diffusion is the process by which nt converges to n * .
This definition of diffusion serves as the basis to differentiate between the diffusion at the 
market level and diffusion at the individual level. In other words, it differentiates between 
diffusion as the number of potential adopters that purchase the technology and diffusion 
as the degree to which the new technology is being used over time by each individual. 
The first case can be considered as the number of firms adopting the technology in a 
given market, that is, it represents the first contact of the user with the technology. This 
defines the inter-firm diffusion. The second case refers to the intra-firm diffusion and it 
measures the intensity of technology use. Using the terminology above the inter-firm level 
captures the proportion of firms or individuals that have adopted the technology over the 
total pool of adopters, nt I n * . Intra-firm diffusion refers to the rates at which different firms
produce goods using the new technology, yt / y * A.
4 In addition to these two concepts of diffusion, there is also a concept of economy-wide diffusion that involves 
the analysis as an aggregation of all the industries that could adopt the technology.
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Apart from the definition of diffusion according to the level of analysis adopted it is also 
important to define the types of technologies. Technologies are differentiated according to 
the nature of the innovation and whether the production function is modified. An 
innovation is classified as process innovation if the technology introduces a change in the 
production process. Stoneman (2002) refers to process innovation as any change in 
equipment, factory structure, inputs used or management methods. It generally involves 
lower costs. A product innovation is a technology that is a new product in itself. When 
discussing about health technologies in Section 1.4 they will be also classified as product 
and process innovations. As it will be noted in Chapter 2, whereas most of the work on 
diffusion relates to inter-firm diffusion of process innovations, there is a limited amount of 
evidence on intra-firm diffusion.
Empirical observations of diffusion patterns in several industries have shown that diffusion 
is generally S-shaped. There is an initial time span where diffusion happens at a slow rate 
and only a reduced number of early adopters use the technology. The next stage is 
characterised by quick general adoption with the number of adopters increasing gradually 
and a final levelling phase. The seminal work by Griliches (1957) on the diffusion of hybrid 
corn in the US and the research by Mansfield (1961, 1968) on the diffusion of several 
industrial technologies first noted the S-shaped diffusion pattern. Griliches (1957) and 
Mansfield (1961) highlight the significant impact that economic incentives and innovation 
profitability have in technology adoption; however, over time other factors, such as the 
role of marketing, barriers and regulatory constraints have been incorporated.
1.2.2 The health care market and technology diffusion
New health technologies present a diffusion path initially presumed to follow the same S- 
shaped pattern. This will be illustrated in the following empirical chapters with the 
increasing path followed by the demand of the technologies examined in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. Despite the similarities between other industries and the health care market, there 
are differences between the health sector and other industries that reflect the particular 
characteristics of demand and supply side in this sector: in the first place, the decision 
unit; secondly, how the demand curve is specified; and finally the characteristics of the 
health care market in general.
As for the decision unit, in contrast with other markets where firms or agents may be 
motivated uniquely by economic incentives in the decision to adopt, the case of physicians
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represents an example of an agent whose decision choice may not be driven by purely 
economic motives (Scott, 2000)5. The time elapsed between the introduction and common 
use of the technology shows that even in cases of new products presenting obvious 
competitive advantages the adoption and diffusion are not instantaneous. After the 
technology has been introduced there might be a lack of robust evidence (and 
uncertainty) on the product that generates a slow process at early stages. As soon as the 
diffusion takes off there will be mechanisms that bring more evidence and decision­
makers may be able to acquire better information regarding the medical treatment. The 
profit maximising assumption embedded in economic diffusion models thus may not apply 
to the physician case and would not be a good predictor of the diffusion mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the presence of third-party reimbursement systems defines a different role of 
prices in this market because of the lack of price awareness and because the 
particularities of the health care bring to some extent factors as altruism or ethics involved 
in the production function.
Demand in the health care sector does not lie within the standard definition of demand for 
good and services whereby the demand curve represents a relationship between prices 
and quantities. Demand for medical services reflects the decision of physicians not the 
demand by the final consumer, the patient. Because of the asymmetry of information in 
the doctor-patient relationship the patient seeks physician’s advice on medical treatment. 
The information regarding treatment refers to issues of safety and tolerability as well as 
treatment issues relating to efficacy. Issues of service provision and quality are therefore 
affected by this asymmetry of information. The perfect information assumption in 
microeconomic theory does not hold in this context. Hence the medical services 
demanded by the patient are a reflection of the physician’s decision and will not reflect the 
standard quantity-price relationship depicted by the demand curve.
When a new technology is introduced there is an additional aspect of imperfect 
information originated from the uncertainty attached to the new medical innovation. 
Physicians will not have perfect information on the technology characteristics as a 
consequence of the uncertainty attached to the innovation. However, imperfect 
information is mainly restricted to early stages of innovation diffusion and as time is 
passing by imperfect information is diluted. The information asymmetry between physician 
and patient still holds. Demand from the patient side is constrained to technology in as 
much as the physician’s uptake of the innovation. Moreover, in general patients do not
5 Scott (2000) provides a review of the different studies that modelled the physician behaviour and the range 
of arguments that have been included as arguments in the utility function. As he points out, “common to many 
models is a basic income-leisure framework” (Scott (2000), pp.1184). Other elements such as ethical reasons, 
patient’s utility or reputation have been analysed as additional arguments in the physician’s utility function 
(Feldstein, 1970; Evans, 1974; Dionne and Contandriopoulous, 1985).
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bear the full cost of the service provided; instead there are third-party payers in charge of 
the reimbursement for the services. This may induce some degree of moral hazard not 
only from the patient-side but also from the supplier-side. As argued in Weisbrod (1991) 
this could be a mechanism through which technological change is generating expenditure 
growth. The implications for health insurance demand derived from the insurance 
coverage are not clear. Weisbrod (1991) argues that technological change may not modify 
demand for insurance as the changes derived from technological developments are 
illness specific and the overall demand for insurance will not be altered.
On the supply-side, there are clear differences across types of technologies in relation to 
their development, introduction and regulation. These differences will be discussed in 
more detail in section 1.4 but as an anticipation take the example of the pharmaceutical 
market. New medicines emerge from the R&D efforts of manufacturers and once in the 
market they are protected by patents that ensure a minimum return on the R&D 
investment. The market for pharmaceuticals is based on a strong patent system and 
characterised by restrictive regulatory policies regarding pre-marketing approval and 
reimbursement systems (Grabowsky, 1991). The vast majority of countries have 
regulatory bodies in charge of pharmaceutical pricing policies either directly through price 
controls or indirectly through profit controls. Moreover, new ethical drugs are required to 
go through a process to prove safety and efficacy before their approval and in many 
countries there is an increasing tendency to create independent bodies that set cost- 
effectiveness recommendations (i.e. NICE in the UK). It is only after this process is 
completed and the drug is placed in the market and made available to physicians that the 
diffusion process takes off and brings welfare gains derived from the superiority of the 
new technology.
The seminal work by Arrow (1963) highlighted the key role of uncertainty within the 
medical sector. Uncertainty is present not only in terms of the unexpected nature of 
occurrence but also on the effectiveness of treatment due to the heterogeneity of patients. 
In the particular case of diffusion, uncertainty is the main attribute of the diffusion process 
due to the unknown performance of the new technology. Although uncertainty has been 
linked to early stages of diffusion, it is still present over the diffusion path. Improvements 
and refinements in the technology are likely to arise as the technology is integrated in 
common practice. In the pharmaceutical sector there are numerous examples of 
medicines that suffer changes in the indications before the drug is approved or after 
acquiring experience through use that leads to the emergence of contraindications not 
previously shown. New surgical procedures may also suffer some alterations in the way 
they are performed over time. The introduction of percutaneous transluminal coronary
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angioplasty (PTCA) for heart attack treatment had some risks associated with outcome 
during early stages of diffusion. However, learning and complementary technology 
developments (such as stenting) allowed this procedure to improve its performance 
(Cutler and Huckman, 2003).
In the presence of uncertainty, information is a key player in the diffusion. The process of 
information acquisition involves time and simultaneously acts as a barrier for a fast 
diffusion. Since uncertainty involves risk, differences in attitudes and preferences of the 
individual doctors will define the demand for information through different mechanisms. 
Self-experience is one of these mechanisms. For instance, drugs and surgical innovations 
lie within the category of experience goods: the “quality” of the good or the service is not 
known ex-ante. Experience goods were first defined by Nelson (1970) as those goods for 
which only repeated demand for the product provides information to consumers regarding 
the attributes. Thus greater experience leads to information acquisition and lowers the 
degree of uncertainty. Additional information channels coexist with experience and all of 
them have in common the fact that information gathering is not free; there is a cost in the 
time and effort spent in collecting evidence on the drug’s functioning. Nonetheless, on the 
technology provider side there will be different costs and incentives to supply the correct 
information6. In a context of rapid technological change, the process described for a single 
technology interacts thus with the simultaneous introduction of other technologies within 
the health care market creating a relationship between uncertainty and information not 
confined to a particular technology but involving also other innovations.
1.3 Intra-level Diffusion
After giving a brief account of the concept of diffusion as defined in economics in Section
1.2 this section describes the diffusion framework that motivates the present research. 
From the differences derived in the definition of inter- and intra-firm diffusion, there are 
two different levels of analysis attached to each that bring separate research questions7. 
The inter-firm diffusion analysis looks at the number of potential users that adopt the 
technology. This is equivalent to measuring diffusion as first contact with the innovation by 
the pool of potential adopters. Nevertheless, adoption itself does not necessarily explain 
how usage evolves after adopters have purchased the new technology. In analysing inter- 
firm diffusion the speed of diffusion might not provide an accurate picture of the process
6 For instance, there might be economic incentives to the producer of new pharmaceuticals to promote the 
product and disseminate the exact information (Leffler, 1981). This will be further discussed in Chapter 3 and 
4.
7 Note that the inter- and intra-levels definitions of diffusion analysis may refer both to individuals as well as 
firms.
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itself. Embedded in the definition of inter-firm is the notion of acceptance across the 
market. The economic literature is largely devoted to the analysis of inter-firm diffusion. 
Intra-firm diffusion however looks at the individual acceptance of the technology as the 
proportion of output produced with the new technology. The definition of intra-firm 
diffusion characterises the diffusion analysis as being a process undertaken by the firm 
and its individual acceptance.
The determinants of the market acceptance are likely to be different to the elements that 
determine individual process8. In both concepts the definition of diffusion is intrinsically 
linked to a time dimension; however, there are differences as to the point in the timeline 
where diffusion is located. The inter-firm concept is more related to the time elapsed 
between technology availability and time to adoption. Sequentially, after the technology is 
adopted, the intra-firm is related to the factors that foster an increasing acceptance over 
time until the technology is well established within the production function. The framework 
used in the empirical analysis is extracted from the intra-firm definition of diffusion 
analysis.
1.3.1 A representation of the intra-level diffusion analysis
The distinction between adoption and diffusion is of special relevance within the health 
care sector. Little attention has been paid to the possibility of firms or hospitals 
suspending the use of a new innovation. For example, as noted by Sloan et al. (1986) 
some hospitals disrupted technology use after adoption. As they argue, situations that 
involve changes in demand may also reflect changes in competitive advantage from 
superior innovations or changes in the overall market structure. This serves to highlight 
the definitional difference on the importance of separating adoption from diffusion. The 
interest in the diffusion process stems from the fact that analysis of adoption explains the 
timing to the first use of technology but is not indicative of the market, hospital or surgeon 
behaviour when the technology is absorbed by standard practice. Diffusion is defined as 
the follow-up from adoption to the clear establishment of the innovation.
Inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion have been shown to comprise different importance at 
different stages of the process (Battisti, 2000; Battisti and Stoneman, 2003). Inter-firm 
diffusion is dominant at early stages with a range of potential users adopting at different 
points in time. Once the number of adopters is approaching the total population of
8 These differences were already noted in the empirical analysis by Mansfield (1963) when aggregated 
measures of profitability were used as drivers for potential adoption (inter-firm diffusion) whereas individual 
firm management characteristics were examined to explain intra-firm diffusion.
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adopters, that is, at later stages of diffusion, the role of the intra-firm diffusion becomes 
more relevant because it indicates the extent of the utilisation of the innovation by each 
firm. At first, one could envisage a close relationship between the adoption decision that 
forms the inter-firm diffusion and the extension of innovation usage related to the intra-firm 
diffusion. However, the limited amount of empirical evidence suggests that this 
relationship does not hold9. Therefore it is reasonable to assume differences between 
diffusion stages.
As was presented in the previous section, intra-firm diffusion is defined as the proportion 
of output produced using the new technology (Stoneman, 2002). Despite the definitional 
differences, inter- and intra-firm diffusion share common features. The sigmoid shaped (S- 
shaped) curve that commonly represents inter-firm diffusion may also be representative of 
the intra-firm diffusion path. These stylised facts have been observed in different 
industries such as engineering, transport and agriculture. The S-shaped curve obtained 
when plotting time against diffusion shows an inflexion point from a concave to a convex 
function that captures a slow initial path followed by a faster process as seen in Figure 
1.2. The sigmoid diffusion curve represents the increase in the number of adopters over 
time when the inter-firm diffusion is under consideration. If the diffusion relates to the intra­
firm aspect, the sigmoid curve shows the proportion of output produced with the new 
technology.
Diffusion
Time
Figure 1.2 S-shaped Diffusion Curve
9 Battisti and Stoneman (2005) show that this assumption does not hold when examining the intra-firm 
diffusion of Computer Numerically Controlled Machine tools. Even though their results are for a technology- 
specific of a non-health related product it may be reasonable to generalise inter-firm results to the intra-firm 
context.
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If the number of individuals that adopt the technology is the first indicator of the diffusion 
process, the second stage, defined by the intra-firm diffusion as the speed at which the 
new technology penetrates into the production process, is an indicator of the degree of 
acceptance of the new technology. Assuming that the firm uses labour and capital as 
inputs in the production function to produce output Y
Y, =  where K t =  K ol+ K m
where K t is the total stock of capital comprised by K ot, the old technology capital used, 
and K nt, the new technology capital stock. A measure of the intra-firm diffusion is the
growth rate of the proportion of new capital over the total capital used in the production 
function10,
K„, / K, = K m l(K ol + K a ) (1.1)
Depending on the nature of the innovation the intra-firm diffusion will be an automatic or a 
progressive process. In the former case, the use of the innovation requires immediate 
substitution of the old by the new technology and output being produced uniquely with the 
new technology. In this case, the new technology capital will replace the total capital stock 
and K t = K nt. This scenario discards any coexistence of the old and new technology in 
the production function and leads to adoption and diffusion happening simultaneously.
The majority of technologies will involve a gradual process of substitution in which the 
new technology will progressively replace the old capital input in the production function 
according to expression (1.1). The share of the old technology might grow towards a 
convergence level in which the new technology completely replaces the old technological 
capital. In this case the following relation holds K nt /(.Kot + K nt) = 1 in t = T , where T  
represents the terminal date for the substitution process. Alternatively, the new technology
10 An example in the health sector would be the process by which PTCA is introduced as treatment for heart 
attack as opposed to the old technology CABG. Cutler and Huckman (2003) examine the process by which 
PTCA is replacing CABG. They also differentiate between the expansion and substitution effects discussed in 
Section 1.1.
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might not be designed to fully substitute old-type capital and a certain proportion of the old 
technology might remain as a requirement for the production process to take place. If this 
is the case, there will be growth over time in the share of the new capital in total capital 
and at the end of the intra-diffusion period K nt l(K ot + K nt) is bounded such that
K J K ,  e  [0,l]. In other words, there will be a substitution process that reaches a level in 
which the old capital cannot be completely replaced.
1.3.2 Origins and development of the intra-firm diffusion analysis
The limited but slowly increasing literature on intra-firm diffusion has relied mainly on 
epidemic learning models of the type first outlined by Mansfield (1963). In an attempt to 
provide a theoretical basis supported by empirical results of the intra-firm diffusion, 
Mansfield (1963) established that any increase in the proportion of the output produced as 
dependent on the profitability of the increase of output produced using the innovation. Let 
x, be the proportion of output produced with the new technology and define a
convergence point x . This represents the upper bound in new technology utilisation in the 
production function. For instance, in a case in which a firm completely replaces the old 
technology with the new one the upper bound will be unity. In his model, Mansfield (1963) 
argues that the rate of growth will be mainly a function of the profitability of the innovation 
and the level of uncertainty that brings the technology at each point in time,
x.  , — X.
-43*---------=
x - x t
Where n  is profitability and rt represents the uncertainty or risk inherent in the diffusion
process. The profitability is assumed to be fixed but the uncertainty is expressed as a 
function of the uncertainty present at period t = 0 as represented by r  and the distance to
the convergence point x  from the current proportion of output produced with the new 
technology. The rationale behind is that the closer the intra-diffusion process is to the 
convergence level, that is, the more advanced the intra-firm diffusion is, the lower the 
degree of uncertainty,
rt = h r , ~
v x j
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Using some mathematical manipulation the growth in proportion of the output produced 
with the new technology will be
~  = s (n ,r
X,
r x - x A
Under a set of assumptions the intra-firm measure of diffusion will follow a logistic function 
in time. Mansfield (1963) concludes that the growth rate is a positive function of the 
profitability and his empirical test supports these results. This model represents an 
epidemic type model that does not predict the mechanism by which diffusion takes place. 
Based on the profitability and uncertainty, and under an assumption that diffusion is 
mainly driven by a learning process, Stoneman (1981) modifies Mansfield’s model 
assuming a Bayesian type learning process using a mean-variance approach to calculate 
the returns on the new and old technology. In contrast to the Mansfield model, Stoneman 
(1981) explicitly models uncertainty.
The model considers two technologies, the new and the old one, with anticipated returns 
with the following distribution given by n(//„ ,,< t2 ) and Af(/y0,,cr2,), respectively, where
jj refers to the return average and cr2 is the variance of the returns. Let xt be the
proportion of output produced using the new technology and 1- x ,  the proportion
produced with the old one. The relevant decision variable is xt , with total returns
distributed according to N{jut,a f ) .  Then,
/u,=x, jum + { l - x , H ,  (1.2)
° f  = *,2of, + (l -  *, )2 o f + 2x, (l -  x, )cr„„, (1.3)
The decision problem is that of maximising the utility function given by U  =  ,
where C is the adjustment cost of the increasing use of the new technology in the output 
production process. Stoneman (1981) assumes the following profit function
If the agent maximises utility subject to restrictions (1.2) and (1.3) the optimal proportion of 
new technology used will be
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However, in the case of positive adjustment costs the maximisation problem yields the 
following condition
In this context firms update their initial beliefs on returns to adoption after observing the 
functioning of both the existing and the new technology, and the beliefs are adjusted 
through a Bayesian process. While the returns to the old technology are assumed to be 
fixed, there is an update in beliefs over the new technology’s performance. The approach 
to the problem of choice under uncertainty is simplified through using the return and the 
risk as the only variables of interest to the consumer. Arguments against the mean- 
variance approach have been given in the literature as this type of modelling is far from 
the observed stylised facts. As pointed out in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp. 402) the 
mean-variance approach is only valid under two of the following assumptions: a quadratic 
utility function or a return distribution that is normal. As they state the unattractiveness of 
the utility function and the non-normality of the return function means that “neither of these 
justifications gives much support to the approach”.
The diffusion literature has recently started to be analysed within a context of intra-firm 
diffusion although this is still in a very preliminary stage. The epidemic learning models of 
the Mansfield (1963) and Stoneman (1981) type were the first ones to be applied in the 
intra-firm case but other models such as the rank and order models have recently been 
examined at this level (Battisti and Stoneman, 2005)11. Although based uniquely on 
learning models, these two approaches offer a strong theoretical basis for intra-firm 
analysis and provide an analytical relationship between uncertainty and learning-by-doing 
within the context of diffusion. The pitfalls presented by the learning process approach 
have led to the development of additional approaches based largely on profitability 
considerations (Battisti and Stoneman, 2005) and strategic behaviour (Jensen, 2001).
11 Rank models explain diffusion based on different firms obtaining different levels of profitability in adoption. 
Order models argue that the order of adoption determines profitability. Rank and order models will be defined 
and further discussed in the next chapter.
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Embedded in the learning process approach in these models is the link between 
technology and information. The fact that some medical technologies are classified as 
experience goods implies that the diffusion process is accompanied by a process of 
information acquisition. Stoneman (2002) argues that information in itself is an asset 
characterised by non-rivalry and some degree of excludability. Non-rivalry arises because 
the information held by a person does not exclude anyone else to have access to that 
piece of information. It is excludable in the sense that the owner can protect the 
information and keep it secretly. The case of medical technologies are an exception to 
this. They are non-rivalrous because access to information is open to all individuals. 
However, the degree of excludability is very low as compared to other industries. Even in 
the case of products with high investment in R&D such as drugs, the developer has strong 
incentives to provide information and making knowledge part of the public domain. Thus 
information can be considered as a public good12.
1.3.3 The intra-level approach in the present analysis
The intra-level analysis as it was presented in Section 1.3.1 reflects a replacement 
process whereby the old technology is increasingly being replaced by the new technology. 
This process was represented by the following expression:
K J K , = K „ , / ( K a + K „ , )  (1.1)
Where K t is the total stock of capital, K nl is the new technology stock and K ot is the old
stock of capital. Under the strict definition of intra-firm diffusion the analysis would 
measure the proportion of new capital over the total capital that comprises the input 
bundle in the production process. This definition assumes there is an old existing 
competing technology for the new technology. However, the technology may represent a 
truly innovative technology. In this case, it does not replace any existing technology and it 
enters the production function as a new input. The intra-level diffusion analysis is then 
reduced to the analysis of the increasing demand for the new technology. In the 
terminology adopted in Section 1.3.1 prior to adoption output is produced only with labour 
Yt = f { L t ). After the innovation is introduced there is a type of capital that can be
combined with labour to produce the output level Yt = f ( L t ,K nt). In this thesis this is the 
approach taken.
12 The common definition of public good is based on non-rivalry and non-excludability. The most common 
example of public good is defence services.
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The reasons to adopt this version of intra-level analysis were two-fold. In the first place 
some of the technologies included in the present research did not face competition from 
an existing technology in the market13. Thus, this definition provides consistency in the 
framework analysis used throughout the thesis and diffusion is considered as the increase 
in volume of technology utilisation. Secondly, the objective of the research is to examine 
the mechanisms of the diffusion of a new product innovation rather than the measurement 
of the pure substitution effect. The intra-level analysis represented as the replacement 
process or as the individual acceptance of the technology examined in isolation responds 
to different research questions. If the interest relies on the factors and determinants of 
growth in the use of the new technology against the old technology the approach adopted 
is that of (1.1). If the interest lies on the mechanisms that allow diffusion to occur 
regardless of any other existing technology then the isolation from any other technology is 
valid.
Based on the reasons provided above the analysis will build upon this modified intra-level 
setting and approach the problem as the individual acceptance of the technology in 
isolation of any other technology. After giving the background on conceptual issues 
related to diffusion and technology as defined in economics the next section will give a 
brief description of the types of technologies as defined in the health care sector. Before 
setting the research questions in Section 1.5 the following chapter will also give a general 
description and motivation of the two types of innovations examined in the thesis.
1.4 Health Care Technologies
Zweifel and Breyer (1997) provide examples of what constitute a product and process 
innovation in health care. Although their definition of technology is based on the economic 
concept, they explicitly differentiate the case in which technology refers to an 
organisational innovation. Recall from Section 1.2 that Stoneman’s (1981) definition of 
process innovations included any management methods. Zweifel and Breyer (1997) 
separate this out as an additional category of technology. According to them technology 
can be classified as process, product or organisation innovation. The latter refers to the 
restructuring of the firm and they give as an example the generation of HMOs or the 
separation of two types of specialised care within a hospital. Organisational innovations 
share the characteristic with process innovation of being technologies that entail a lower 
cost of production. Drugs and clinical procedures are examples of product innovation.
13 For instance, one of the drug classes examined, statins, is effective in treating a specific condition that other 
existing drugs could not tackle. Also, one of the surgical innovations analysed in Chapter 5 did not have 
competitor as medical management was the only treatment available prior to diffusion. Thus, these two ways 
of treatment cannot be considered as substitutes in the technological sense.
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New product innovations in health care have generally higher costs than the alternative 
existing ones.
Technological change experienced in the health care sector implies that depending on the 
type of innovation the impact on the production function will be defined as embodied or 
disembodied technological change. Technological change is said to be embodied when 
the new technology defines a new input set and the production process is transformed. 
On the contrary, when the production function remains unaltered in the input vector 
technological change is said to be disembodied. The analytical computation of embodied 
technological change is complicated and the analysis in standard production theory is 
mainly devoted to disembodied technological change. Under the disembodied 
technological change case there is no major change in the production function such that 
there are no changes in inputs or in the production process. Disembodied technological 
change is approached introducing a temporal variable in the production function such that 
y = f ( x , t ) where y  is the output, x is the vector of inputs and t represents the time 
factor (Chambers, 1988). This specification has embedded the influence of time in 
technological change. When technological change is materialised in a specific technology, 
diffusion enters into play.
It is important to understand how the new technology might influence the production 
function. Health technologies differ in their nature but as an input in the production 
process, the effect of the technology might not be quantitative in terms of the amount of 
inputs required to produce health but introduce qualitative differences. Take the case of a 
new drug. If the aim is to achieve a specific level of output (health outcome) and the input 
requirement set includes medical management and drug prescription, the introduction of a 
new drug that improves the health outcome by being more effective does not change the 
amount or the type of input. The variation is in the input quality. As such studying 
technological change in health care as disembodied technological change does not 
represent a deviation from reality. Nevertheless, this will depend on the type of 
technology. Whereas this might be true for product innovations, it may not hold for 
process and organisational innovations.
Medical technologies also differ in the process they follow in their development, 
technology evaluation and degree of regulation during the introductory stage. Chang and 
Luft (1991) sum up the differences in several aspects for three different types of
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technologies: drugs, devices and procedures. They argue the cost of development is high 
for the development of drugs, whereas surgical procedures have a low cost as they are 
generally developed in an academic environment. Drugs and surgical devices are 
products that are patentable. On the other hand they are generally required to go through 
an approval process, in which the safety of the product is assessed. Chang and Luft 
(1991) also point that the diffusion of drugs and devices is at the corporate level whereas 
the diffusion of surgical procedures is professional14. Drugs are more costly to develop 
than the other technologies and also have a strongly regulated approval process but 
patentability provides them with the opportunities to obtain high return rates to investment.
1.4.1 The case of two product innovations
This thesis is focused on two product innovations: new drugs and new surgical 
procedures. There are several reasons why these two products have been selected. First, 
they are technologies that involve different sectors within health care. New drugs are 
studied within the primary care sector. Prescription drugs in this sector represent the vast 
majority of overall drug consumption as opposed to drugs administered in hospitals. 
Surgical procedures are analysed in the context of secondary care. Both sectors are 
conditioned by specific regulatory context and differences on the determinants of diffusion 
are likely to arise as a result of that. This provides the opportunity to test the impact of 
different economic and quality-enhancing incentives on diffusion. Although diffusion of 
these two types of product innovations is analysed in different settings there might be 
common conclusions to be drawn based on the potential objectives pursued by the 
regulator.
Secondly, in general the expenditure associated to these technologies accounts for a high 
proportion of the total health care expenditure. Among the different medical technologies 
in the health care market pharmaceuticals are of particular interest not only because they 
represent a sector with fast innovation rates but also because pharmaceutical expenditure 
accounts for a considerable portion of the health care expenditure. Spending in 
pharmaceutical accounts for a mean share of the GDP of 1.2% in OECD countries 
(Jacobzone, 2000). Pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of total health spending 
ranged between the 11.7% and 22.4% in 2000 as seen in Table 1.6. Pharmaceutical 
expenditure has been growing over the last decades in the majority of OECD countries.
14 The diffusion of drugs is corporate when it is considered to occur within a specific sector such as the 
primary care market. However, drug diffusion is also professional (individual) if the diffusion is assumed to be 
the result of a number of prescription choices by the individual physician.
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Even countries where the pharmaceutical bill is not excessive in absolute terms they have 
experienced an increase in the share over total health care expenditure.
Table 1.6 Pharmaceutical Expenditure over Total Health Expenditure
Australia 14.7 10.6 8.6 8.9 9.8 12.1 14.7 14.2
Canada 11.3 8.9 8.5 9.6 11.5 13.8 15.9 17.2
Finland 12.6 11.9 10.7 9.7 9.4 13 15.2 15.8
France 23.8 20.3 16 16.2 16.9 16 18.2 16.7
Germany 16.2 13.7 13.4 13.8 14.3 12.9 13.6 15.1
Sweden 6.6 7.9 6.5 7 8 12.3 13.8 13.7
UK 14.7 11.8 12.8 14.1 13.5 15.3
US 12.3 10.2 9 9 9.2 8.9 11.7 12.4
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
Notes: 1970 figure for Australia corresponds to 1971
Despite the importance of the pharmaceutical market within the heath care market there is 
still limited research on the diffusion of new drugs both in theory and empirical analysis. A 
more detailed review of the literature in that respect is presented in Chapter 2. The 
pharmaceutical market is typically characterised by fast technological change in which 
pharmaceutical companies compete in patent races to obtain a positive return on their 
investment in R&D and this is indicated by the rapid rate at which new drugs are 
introduced. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of the market share of new medicines 
launched between 1997 and 2002 in several OECD countries. New drugs are presumed 
to have an effect on the health care market both in terms of improving health outcomes 
and reducing other medical expenditures. The increase in the relative importance of the 
pharmaceutical sector in the health care market alongside with the increasing number of 
new medicines introduced into the market poses the question of what are the 
determinants driving the diffusion pattern of new pharmaceuticals?
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Figure 1.3 Demand of New Pharmaceutical Products over Total Demand
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Primary and hospital markets
In-hospital services also represent a large proportion of the total health care expenditure. 
Table 1.7 shows the public expenditure on inpatient care as a percentage of the public 
health expenditure. Depending on the country this percentage ranged between 30% and 
40%  of the total expenditure in 2005. The most recent data available for the UK shows 
that public inpatient care accounted for approximately 35% of public health care 
expenditure in 1995. The interesting aspect of the secondary health care sector in the UK 
is the number of reforms aimed at introducing more efficient resource utilisation through 
the introduction of market tools.
Table 1.7 Public In-patient Care Expenditure over Public Health Expenditure
Australia 52 49.2 60.1 50.8 47.5 42.6 35.9 39.8
Canada 67.9 64.3 62.3 59.7 57.4 53.9 38 34.8
Finland 55.8 52.6 53.9 53.2 51.4 48.1 46.5 45.7
France 46.8 51.3 56.8 54.7 53.3 46.7 42.8 43.8
Germany 33.7 35.8 36.1 37.6 39.1 39.2 38.4 38.3
Ireland 64.9 67.2 59.8 77.9 80.1 80.4 70.4
Sweden 69.5 72 74 59.1 55.5 62.4 60.3 31
UK 56.3 40.3 41.9 37.2 34.9 34.8
US 59.4 57.7 57.6 54.5 47.4 42.3 37.1 34.3
Source: OECD Health Data 2008
Notes: 1970 figure for Australia and Ireland correspond to 1971 and 1972, respectively
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These two types of technologies are a representative case-study for the analysis of 
diffusion. The case of drugs is a good example based on the share that they represent 
generally as percentage of the total health care expenditure and the share that individual 
drugs may have on the pharmaceutical bill when they are taken individually. If drugs are 
an important share of total health care expenditure and the specific drugs selected for 
examination also represent a significant share of the pharmaceutical bill as it will be seen 
in Chapter 3, it is important to understand the mechanisms under which diffusion of these 
technologies proceeds. The interest in the diffusion of surgical innovations also relies in 
the expenditure share they represent but also in the contextual differences in which the 
uptake of new technologies occurs. Note at this stage that the present research does not 
aim at linking the diffusion of these technologies to health expenditure. In recognising the 
influence of technological change as leading the growth in expenditure, the interest lies in 
understanding the mechanisms in place when medical innovations are introduced.
1.4.2 Market definition in the pharmaceutical sector
It is worth defining at this stage the different terminology that relates to the discussion of 
the pharmaceutical sector. The term pharmaceutical comprises a broad range of products 
including branded or generic medicines, drugs, serums and vaccines (OECD Health Data 
definition, 2008). This includes not only preparations for human use but also for animal 
use. Thus the delineation of the borders of what constitutes the pharmaceutical industry 
are difficult to draw. The discussion here is focused on pharmaceutical preparation for 
human use (Scherer, 2000). A drug is considered a product in itself but they can be 
grouped and classified according to different markets. In the first place a drug will belong 
to a therapeutical group defined as the set of drugs that are prescribed for the same 
condition (Sutton, 1998).
In the present research as therapeutical group or therapeutic class we will consider the 
aggregation of drugs within the classes of statins, PPIs and SSRIs. The therapeutic group 
defines the area of treatment for which they are prescribed. Each therapeutic group will be 
comprised by a number of drugs that are chemically related but with a different chemical 
structure. The molecular characteristics of each drug within each therapeutical group will 
define product differentiation. To make the exposition throughout the thesis clear, the term 
drug will denote any of the different products within each of these therapeutical groups. 
For instance, the statins therapeutic group is composed of six drugs: simvastatin, 
pravastatin, fluvastatin, atorvastatin, cerivastatin and rosuvastatin. Each of them has 
different chemical structure but are indicated to treat cholesterol and further prevent
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cardiovascular disease. Thus, each drug is exclusive in its chemical composition but not 
the unique treatment for the specific condition.
In each therapeutic class, the first drug introduced defines the therapeutical classification 
and also represents the first drug approved to target a specific condition. The number of 
drugs within the same therapeutical class will increase overtime as drugs are introduced 
sequentially. Each of these drugs may be under legal patent protection but after patent 
expiry they face generic competition. The main characteristic of the pharmaceutical 
market is that branded names are in oligopolistic markets. Although each drug has some 
patent protection, competition arises from products being close substitutes but not 
bioequivalent products, as it would be the case of a branded and generic name of the 
same molecule.
When talking about statins, PPIs and SSRIs the market definition for each group can be 
broad and comprise all other drugs designed to treat a common condition. For instance, 
the more aggregated definition of market for statins includes other therapeutical groups all 
under the heading of drugs to treat cardiovascular disease. When talking about the drugs 
in a particular therapeutical class the market will be delimited by the therapeutical group in 
which they are classified. For example, the definition of statins market is comprised by the 
six drugs that were introduced over time in this therapeutical class. The last definition of 
market is the relevant for the present research. The analysis includes first the diffusion at 
the therapeutical level in Chapter 3 and then Chapter 4 considers the analysis of diffusion 
of the individual drugs within the therapeutical group. Differences in analysing diffusion at 
the therapeutical level or at the individual level may be important as different mechanisms 
could be in place.
1.5 Research Questions
Despite the importance of the pharmaceutical sector and the in-hospital services share 
over the total health expenditure and the fast technological change happening in the 
health care market there is a rather limited evidence to ascertain the mechanisms that 
shape the diffusion process both at the theoretical and empirical level. The particular 
characteristics of health care means that standard economic principles may not apply to 
diffusion: agents taking the decisions are not the final consumers and prices do not have 
the same role as in classic demand theory. This thesis examines empirically the diffusion 
of medical technology. Technological change in health care and medical technology
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diffusion has attracted the interest of scholars and policy-makers for their great impact on 
the increasing health care expenditure experienced by many developed countries over the 
last few decades.
As was discussed in Section 1.1 the impact that the introduction of technology could have 
on expenditure has been identified to be mainly generated by increases in the quantity of 
services provided. The diffusion analysis is focused on the dynamics that influence the 
acceptance of the technology by the service provider. Based on this interest, the intra- 
level analysis is used as the framework for the identification of the elements that drive the 
diffusion process. The empirical specification assesses the increasing demand for new 
technology by considering the following two research questions:
• What are the determinants of technology diffusion in health care?
• How important are organisational and regulatory environments in the diffusion 
process?
As it has been mentioned in the previous sections the intra-level diffusion of product 
innovations has not been extensively examined within the diffusion literature. The 
contribution of this research will not only shed light into the mechanisms driving diffusion 
within health care but also will contribute to the general economics literature with evidence 
of a market with different nature and product definition. Under the heading of the two 
research questions above there is scope for the examination of the diffusion behaviour at 
different levels across technologies and sectors. Despite the common elements shared 
across the empirical chapters there will be specific aspects characterising the diffusion 
process that will be of particular interest. The first part of the research relates to the 
diffusion of new pharmaceutical drugs examined from the perspective of the individual 
physician behaviour. Being Chapter 3 the first empirical piece of work, the chapter will 
identify the factors responsible for drug diffusion at the therapeutical level. If medical 
technology is inherently characterised by uncertainty, the chapter will address the 
following aspects:
• How does information affect physicians’ uptake of new prescription drugs?
• Are these informational sources equally important to physicians across drug 
classes?
• Are organisational aspects of the drug prescription process an influence on 
diffusion? Do particular schemes provide efficient incentives for demand for new 
drugs?
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The analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 will provide evidence of the acceptance of 
therapeutical drug classes taken as an overall group. The underlying assumption is their 
benefit for improvements in patients’ health outcomes. However, under the same 
therapeutical group there are several drugs that are close substitutes. There is some 
degree for product differentiation across drugs despite the fact that they are close 
substitutes. These drugs were introduced sequentially in time and they present different 
prescription shares in the market. It is observed that there is a first-mover advantage that 
is threaten by the entry of a much later entrant. In order to explain the dynamics of the 
market, research in Chapter 4 will deal with the following questions:
• Are the same informational flows detected in the therapeutical level of diffusion 
analysis present within a therapeutical class? If so, can they help to explain the 
observed differences in prescription across drugs over the diffusion process?
• Is product quality a determinant in the consolidation of the individual prescription 
share?
• Are organisational factors also influencing individual drug uptake?
Chapter 5 will examine the uptake of surgical technologies within the secondary care 
sector. The unit of analysis is the hospital or provider site. The approach to the diffusion 
process differs in several aspects. The main one is related to the stakeholders involved in 
the development and introduction of the technology. Surgical innovations follow a process 
in which the introduction of technologies is less formalised and subject to no technology 
evaluation. Yet it is subject to a certain degree of uncertainty that is overcome overtime. 
This chapter shares with the previous ones an informational aspect required to become 
familiar with the technology. But most importantly it differs from the other chapters in that 
diffusion has been subject to a strong regulatory context that was aimed at introducing 
competition in the provision of health care. The next research questions outline the 
objectives followed in Chapter 5.
• What factors determine surgical technology uptake?
• What is the impact of competition amongst providers on technology uptake?
• How are the characteristics of the provider related to technology diffusion?
• Is the nature of the surgical innovation a determinant in technology uptake?
• Does increasing demand for new technology bring any improvement in quality of 
care?
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
Previous sections have discussed conceptual issues regarding the definition of diffusion 
and the different levels of diffusion analysis. This chapter has provided the basis for the 
empirical analysis of diffusion in health care motivated by the accepted role of 
technological change as main driver of the increase in health expenditure. The definition 
of diffusion and the inter-firm and intra-firm level of analysis have been presented. After an 
examination of the conceptual aspects of diffusion, the intra-firm level serves as the 
conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of the technology diffusion in health care. 
In addition, the motivation for the selection of the two types of technologies examined in 
the analysis has also been discussed. This has lead to the examination of the research 
questions that are being examined throughout the thesis. The main goal is to determine 
the mechanisms that drive the uptake of new technologies within the health care. Two 
main aspects are examined: the informational aspect of diffusion and the impact of 
regulatory and organisational elements.
Before the empirical analysis is undertaken there is a review of the relevant literature in 
the next chapter. The review considers empirical and theoretical contributions both 
generally and applied to the health care market. Chapter 3 discusses the elements that 
enhance the diffusion process based on the main characteristics that defines innovation: 
uncertainty. The analysis is considered at an aggregated level in the definition of 
pharmaceutical market. The chapter studies the diffusion of three new classes of drugs. 
Chapter 4 further analyses the behaviour of the different drugs within the statins 
therapeutical groups to specifically examine the diffusion behaviour at the individual 
product level. This allows the examination of product differentiation and order of entry of 
the drug as potential factors in the market dominance of specific molecules. Chapter 5 
examines diffusion of two different surgeries and it also carries out an assessment of the 
impact of diffusion on welfare gains derived from quality improvements. Chapter 6 
summarises and draws the final conclusions of the thesis. Some policy implications and 
some areas for future research are also discussed.
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Chapter 2
Technology Diffusion: Evidence from the Literature and 
Implications for the Health Care Sector
This chapter presents a review of the literature on the theoretical and empirical sides of 
technology diffusion in both non-health and health markets. First the non-health 
approaches are explored in order to determine common grounds with applicability to the 
heath care sector. The general literature has a more extended analysis of technology 
diffusion than the literature devoted to medical technology diffusion. Still diffusion analysis 
in economics is very limited. As it will be discussed in the next section epidemic models 
started the analysis of technology diffusion. Economists have developed refinements and 
extensions to these models identifying a number of elements that capture the elements 
involved during the diffusion process. The empirical contributions also identify the 
common components of diffusion leading the diffusion in several industries. Despite the 
larger amount of research in a general economics context and elements in common 
across industries, the examination of diffusion in the health economics literature has not 
been based much on the economics literature. One of the aims of this chapter is to 
identify the aspects discussed in the general economics literature that are extensible to 
the case of medical technology diffusion. This will provide the basis to outline the diffusion 
process in a health care context.
The application to the health care market is more recent. As it was argued in Chapter 1, 
technology diffusion analysis has been motivated by the increasing expenditure growth 
experienced by developed countries over the last decades. The theoretical background 
for the technology diffusion in health care is fairly limited although part of the research can 
be considered as refinements of the diffusion theory adjusted to the peculiarities of the 
health market. As it will be discussed in Section 2.3, the theoretical contributions are 
mainly focused on the interaction of health insurance, technological change and the 
adoption of medical innovations. The restriction of the analysis to such a specific part of 
diffusion leaves scope to incorporate other aspects of diffusion not covered by these 
models. Empirical evidence from the determinants of technology adoption and diffusion is 
more extensive than the conceptual literature. The empirical contributions are mainly 
country-specific and restricted to a number of medical innovations. The results are 
generally bounded by the characteristics of the market in which diffusion occurs. This 
chapter will also contribute to a detailed revision of the health economics literature to 
highlight the limited work within this discipline. This will allow the identification of the
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potential areas for research and will discuss how the present thesis will contribute to the 
diffusion analysis in health care.
In this chapter the objective is to draw on the main theoretical and empirical aspects of 
diffusion in a health care context. The first section reviews the theoretical contributions 
from the economic literature following a chronological order that emphasizes the evolution 
of the diffusion theory analysis over time. The second section reviews some of the 
empirical contributions from different industries. It identifies the main elements that have 
attracted most of the attention in the econometric analysis of diffusion. The third section 
reviews the theoretical contributions related to the understanding of the diffusion process 
in health care. Section 2.4 summarises the empirical evidence on the diffusion of several 
types of health innovations. The final section discusses the elements shared by non­
health and health diffusion analysis and concludes stating how research in the health 
economics literature can benefit from the existing contributions.
2.1. Theoretical Literature on Technological Diffusion
2.1.1 Approaches to the analysis of diffusion
The analysis of technological change can be attributed to Schumpeter (1934) (cited by 
Sarkar (1998) and Stoneman (2002)) who firstly differentiated between the three parts 
that characterise technological change: invention (basic research aimed to generate 
ideas), innovation (application of those ideas to commercial use) and diffusion (adoption 
by the potential agents). The first two stages have received most of the attention in the 
literature however the diffusion stage remained largely unexplored until the 1950s when 
economists and sociologists began analysis of diffusion. The perspectives they adopted 
were completely opposed, although both disciplines were supporting points of view that 
could be conciliated and complement each other to reinforce the diffusion analysis. The 
general departure point was based upon the fact that it is only through the diffusion 
process that the use of the innovation is spread through the market and the real welfare 
gains resulting from the use of the new technology are materialised.
The diffusion analysis has been developed in other disciplines such as sociology and 
marketing in parallel to the development brought in the economics literature. Their 
approach to diffusion differs in the mechanisms that explain how diffusion proceeds. 
Sociologists focus their research into the role of interpersonal relationship and the position 
of the individual in the social network. Marketing literature is oriented towards the analysis 
of new product acceptance. In general, there is a division between innovators and 
imitators being the innovators those reached by the media. Imitators learn about the new
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product from the innovators through word-of-mouth. Both disciplines share the common 
characteristic of being based on the communication side of the diffusion process. A more 
extensive review on the early developments in both areas and their evolution is included 
in Appendix 2.1. This section will focus on the advances contained in the economics 
literature.
Section 1.2 in the previous chapter gave the definition of diffusion. It also distinguished 
between each level of diffusion analysis that can be considered and the types of 
technologies that can be under consideration. Recall the distinction between product and 
process innovation. Similarly, to the definitions provided in the last chapter product 
innovations are new goods or services, while process innovations are changes in the 
production that reduce the cost of producing existing goods (Stoneman, 2002; Tirole, 
2002). The distinction between inter-firm diffusion, referring to the number of firms using 
the technology, and intra-firm diffusion, addresses the internal process within a firm by 
which the new technology substitutes the old one. Additionally, economy-wide technology 
diffusion has been defined as the diffusion across different industries.
The distinction between inter- and intra-firm diffusion is relevant in order to put into 
context the factors that are selected to determine the diffusion process. Research in 
general has been focused on the inter-firm diffusion of process innovations and has left 
scope for research within the intra-firm research areas. Only recently, the latter has 
attracted some attention (Battisti and Stoneman, 2003; Battisti, 2005). Also, the diffusion 
analysis on product technologies has been examined as part of inter-household diffusion 
analysis. This leaves scope for research not only of diffusion at the intra-firm level but also 
regarding the diffusion of product innovations. The evidence presented in this section and 
Section 2.2 mainly refers to the inter-firm diffusion of process innovations. The intra-firm 
literature has been already presented in Chapter 1 and thus will not be presented here.
Theoretical literature provides an insight into the process through which a new technology 
spreads over time. Diffusion analysis started with the epidemic models presented in the 
seminal work by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961), partly discussed in the previous 
chapter within an intra-firm diffusion level. The economic modelling of diffusion has 
evolved through the incorporation of different parameters as drivers of the process. 
Research has focused mainly on the demand-side of diffusion and supply-side factors, 
such as the cost or performance of innovation, are given as exogenous. However, for a 
better understanding of diffusion and to provide a global picture of the process it is 
important to incorporate supply-side factors (Stoneman and Ireland, 1983). The use of
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the innovation obviously depends to a large extend on the demand-side; nevertheless, the 
supplier can influence some of the factors that make the technology attractive to the 
individuals15 (Hall and Khan, 2002).
Technological diffusion analysis has its origins in the epidemic models. These models 
were initially developed to study how infectious diseases spread across population 
(Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995). Epidemic models are based on the contact that user 
have with non-users within a pool of potential users. Over time there is a declining number 
of non-users and an increasing growth of users. The underlying assumption is that the 
diffusion process is the result of the distribution of information. Information is transmitted 
by users to non-users leading to a higher spread of information and hence to adoption. 
These models generate a diffusion path such that when plotting the count of users that 
adopted the technology against time the resulting curve follows an S-shaped 
representation. Following the notation in Stoneman (2002) this can be expressed 
mathematically by a logistic curve. Let N  be the pool of potential adopters and M {t) the 
number of users at tim er. If at each period non-users are assumed to be in contact with 
S ' M ( t ) /  N  users and y is the probability that contact will end in adoption, then the 
number of adopters at time t is
d M (f) ld t  =  $ - M ( f ) I N - { N -  M (t ) }
Where </> = S -y  is the probability that the contact results in adoption. This is generally 
referred to as the diffusion speed. This first order differential equation can be re-written as
M {t )  = N /(1 + exp{- 7 -  (j> • r})
In the first epidemic diffusion models there is already embedded the definition of inter-firm 
notion of diffusion whereby diffusion refers to the number of users that adopt the 
technology. In this context of inter-firm diffusion, diffusion and adoption are used 
interchangeably to denote the number of individuals that adopt the technology. Mansfield
15 This relationship between demand and supply side is relevant for instance in the case of new 
pharmaceuticals for which the developers of the innovation have incentives for promotion activities. This is a 
supply-side variable that will somehow influence the demand-side. This will be explicitly discussed in Chapters 
3 and 4 when examining the role of marketing in the demand for new pharmaceuticals.
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(1968) formally explores an extension of the epidemic model in which the proportion of 
firms adopting is a function of the current number of users, profitability and the investment 
required to adopt16.
Several limitations of the epidemic models are discussed in Stoneman (2002). The 
adoption is the result of the contact between users and non-users and this is the only 
source of information. Epidemic models thus disregard any additional sources of 
information that might be available and there is no clear definition of information. Another 
limitation of these models is that there is no consideration regarding the individuals’ 
economic behaviour and the pool of potential adopters is fixed and equal to N . Finally, 
the technology is assumed to be constant overtime; however, technologies are likely to 
suffer changes in terms of prices and quality improvements as the diffusion process 
proceeds.
Although the early work based on the epidemic models helped to establish the basis for 
diffusion research, the limitations outlined above helped to redirect the analysis towards 
more sophisticated models that considered different aspects influencing the adoption 
decision17. These models try to explain the differences in time of adoption among potential 
adopters and are more focused on the adoption decision of the firm18. Karshenas and 
Stoneman (1995) review the three different approaches other than the epidemic theory 
that emerged in diffusion theory. Differences among them arise in the mechanism used to 
explain different adoption rates or timings. The following three model types have been 
identified19:
- Probit or rank models explain differences in diffusion assuming that firms are 
heterogeneous and hence obtain different profitability from adoption (David, 1975 (cited 
by Karshenas and Stoneman (1995)); Davies, 1979; Ireland and Stoneman, 1986).
16 These factors are empirically tested and proved to be significant. Additional factors are also included in the 
specification (durability of the equipment replaced, firm’s expanding rate, increasing rate of imitation, business 
cycle) but they are not statistically significant.
17 The review of literature in this section has been focused on the neoclassical equilibrium approaches to 
technology diffusion. For a review of the evolutionary models of diffusion please refer to Sarkar (1998).
18 The importance of information dissemination embedded in epidemic models has thus been partially left 
aside.
19 Note that these models are demand-side diffusion models. As it has been discussed at the beginning of this 
section there might be supply-side factors that are of high relevance in order to have a global picture of 
diffusion. For instance, as discussed in Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) the order effect models rely on 
technology changing as diffusion evolves. This may include price changes that that demand-side take as 
exogenous but that are explained by improvements experienced in the supply-side.
56
Order effects models assume that the benefit from adoption depends on the order of 
adoption (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).
Stock effects models maintain that the higher the number of adopters the lower the 
benefits from adoption (formulations used in Reinganum 1981a, 1981b, 1983 and 
Quirmbach, 1983).
These models differ in the source of the benefits gained from adoption. These are 
neoclassical equilibrium approaches to diffusion modelling drawing on the fundamental 
neoclassical theory characterised by being models of equilibrium, infinite rationality and 
full information (Sarkar, 1998)20. Geroski (2000) presents two additional diffusion models: 
the density dependent growth and informational cascades models. The former model 
assumes technology adoption in the presence of decreasing returns to innovate. The 
latter model applies when innovations arise with a variety of forms, the information 
spreads based on the potential adopters’ experiences and late adopters use the 
information to choose variety. Information cascades and the mechanisms that may lead to 
the adoption of the technology adopted by the leading individual/firm have also been 
examined in the literature (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1998). 
Information cascades arise when individuals follow the behaviour they observe from 
others. When individuals decide sequentially, they observe the decision of the 
predecessor and weight it against private information. Under this setting Bikhchandani et 
al. (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1998) show that individuals may ignore their private 
information and follow the decision adopted previously by other individuals. This has 
interesting results in terms of behavioural adoption patterns as the release of information 
can target adoption leaders in order to change general behaviour21.
In the first type of approach taken by researchers, probit or rank models, it is assumed 
that there is a heterogeneous population of size N . These types of models consider 
individual firms or agents comparing the costs and benefits to decide whether adoption is 
profitable. Let Il(r) be the benefit of technology adoption and c(t) the cost of adoption at 
time t . At each period the proportion of individuals adopting the technology are those for 
which n(r) > c{t) . Heterogeneity among firms may affect the benefit obtained from 
adoption. For instance, geographical location, organisational factors, market demand 
growth of the operating firm or recently purchased technology may generate that firms
20 The four models above have been analysed in Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) to empirically test which 
model is close to the actual diffusion of innovations. They found evidence to support the rank and epidemic 
effects but not the stock and order effects.
21 Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1998) use a medical case to exemplify the adoption of 
surgeries as a case in which imitation may occur and boost the popularity of a surgical procedure.
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obtain different profit gains (Stoneman, 2002). Whereas the first probit models were 
based on heterogeneity (David, 1975), models of the type depicted by Davies (1979) 
included uncertainty regarding pay-offs such that the firms decision was based on 
expectations (Sarkar, 1998). Stoneman (1980) and Stoneman and Ireland (1983) follow 
Davies model to approach to examine the effect of uncertainty in pay-offs under a context 
of profit maximising behaviour in models of learning (Sarkar, 1998).
In the second type of models, order models, different diffusion patterns are articulated 
through different benefits gained in accordance to the order of adoption. That is, early 
adopters will obtain a higher benefit of adoption than late adopters such that, as the 
number of adopters increase, both the benefits and costs decrease. The total number of 
adopters will be determined by the point at which benefits are equal to costs. The 
justification for the presence of higher benefits for high-order entrants may be justified for 
instance on the grounds of obtaining advantage with respect to geographic location or 
highly skilled labour (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Ireland and Stoneman, 1986).
The expected effect of process technology is to reduce the firm’s cost. The cost reduction 
also leads to changes in outputs. At the same time this is leading to reductions in prices. 
The combination of all these factors affects how profitable future adoptions will be. Stock 
models depart from differences in output before and after adoption. Within this dynamic 
context and leading the research on diffusion as stock models, Reinganum (1981a) uses 
a game-theoretic approach to explore the adoption of a cost-reducing innovation by a two- 
firm industry. Under complete certainty about payoffs, decreasing costs of implementation 
and decreasing profits, there is a symmetric Nash equilibria in which one firm adopts 
earlier than the other. Reinganum (1981b) considers the effect of market structure (i.e. 
number of firms) on the diffusion of a cost-reducing innovation under perfect information 
on payoffs and a homogeneous good. The result is an asymmetric Nash equilibria that 
drives diffusion overtime. The general finding is that concentrated markets will experience 
faster diffusion. However, these findings are bounded by the specification of the demand 
and cost functions and also depend on the profit structure immediately before and after 
adoption. The common element in Reinganum’s models is that diffusion flows even with 
perfect information and identical firms. In contrast, Quirmbach (1986) argues that adoption 
of a capital-embodied, cost-reducing technology is the result of decreasing incremental 
benefits and the costs of adoption for late adopters, and not the result of strategic 
behaviour as discussed in Reinganum (1981 a, 1981 b). Diffusion is articulated through the 
asymmetry in pay-offs and this holds both for single decision-makers and non-cooperative
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games, as opposed to Reinganum (1981) in which the equilibria exists only for non- 
cooperative cases.
The models depicted above are defined basically including profit and cost functions that 
are used to evaluate whether adoption is profitable. They serve as the basis of other 
theoretical contributions to include refinements in the specification of the model with 
respect to the uncertainty regarding the technology or changes related to the profit or cost 
function. The contributions by Reinganum (1981a, 1981b) and Quirmbach (1986) do not 
introduce uncertainty on the profitability to adopt the innovation. However, imperfect 
information is explored by Jensen (1982), modelling the decision to adopt under uncertain 
profitability as a stopping problem in which diffusion is explained by the differences in 
beliefs. Firms start with initial beliefs and create expectations. Waiting provides 
exogenous and costless information. In particular, a firm is more likely to accept the 
innovation, the more optimistic its initial beliefs are. In his model positive initial beliefs or 
favourable information regarding unprofitable technologies can yield to adoption.
McCardle (1985) follows Jensen (1982) and introduces costs of gathering information into 
the analysis. The firm has beliefs about the value of the innovation and updates these 
beliefs after a sequential information collection process. The more information gathered 
the lower the firm’s anticipated return. Again unprofitable adoptions will take place in this 
model due to uncertainty of the innovative technology and the costly information required 
in order to adopt. The case of imperfect information is also analysed in Reinganum (1983) 
as it relates to a cost-reducing technology. The uncertainty arises regarding to the 
magnitude of the cost reduction. There is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The main 
result is that if initial costs are very dissimilar, then the high-cost firm will adopt while the 
other will not. The reason for this is that if the low-cost firm has an initial cost close to the 
lowest cost level attainable with adoption, then adoption may bring only minor 
modifications to the cost function.
The observed delay in adoption and the common shape found to graphically describe the 
S-shaped diffusion curve are among the stylised facts that have boosted the analysis of 
diffusion (Mansfield, 1968; Rosenberg, 1972; Stoneman, 2002; Tirole, 2002). The delay 
between the time when the innovation is available to the point when it is widely used has 
been argued to be the results of an expectations generation process. Rosenberg (1972, 
1976) discusses the importance of taking into account improvements in inventions along
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the diffusion path in order to capture the entire nature of this process. Technological 
change should not be associated to technology that remains with the same characteristics 
overtime. Instead, innovations are likely to undergo improvements alongside its diffusion 
path. Thus, if firms foresee that technology will be improved over the diffusion path there 
might be a slow process that will speed up when the technology has suffered some 
changes. Technological expectations regarding the innovation are formally examined by 
Balcer and Lippman (1984). They focus on the demand-side of technology expectations. 
Their model suggests that firms will adopt when the adoption waiting period is beyond a 
given threshold. This threshold will be moved in time as potential improvements are 
expected. Moreover, they find that as time passes by the firm’s profitability increases 
when adoption is postponed based on perceived higher innovation performance.
Other aspects of the diffusion process have been included in diffusion analysis. The 
models described above generally assume that firms are compelled to adopt at a 
particular point in time (Scherer, 1967; Reinganum 1981a; Reinganum, 1981b). However, 
firms may adopt a pre-emption attitude and act under a strategic behaviour to maximise 
the profit flows. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) analyse the case of pre-emption in which 
there is no commitment on adoption. The model is based on the assumption that firms 
respond immediately to the rival’s action and perfect information about the payoffs. They 
show that diffusion is faster, relative to the pre-commitment situation because of the threat 
of pre-emption. Some research has additionally examined technology diffusion in a 
context of network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1986) and diffusion of innovations with 
horizontal product differentiation (Stoneman, 1990).
The diffusion analysis approached from a theoretical perspective is an area of economic 
modelling that is still under expansion. The different models presented above articulate 
the diffusion process using different mechanisms and place the process under different 
contexts. The models above are basically inter-firm diffusion models that explain the 
diffusion process as an adoption decision based on the assessment of benefits and costs 
of adoption. There are a number of common themes identified across these studies that 
could be extensive to other contexts and different types of technologies. The uncertainty 
of the technology is a feature of technological change that is intrinsically attached to the 
definition of technology. These models identify a dynamic aspect of diffusion brought by 
uncertainty in the production cost function and the revenue function as well as the 
uncertainty related to improvements in the technology. In addition, some models also 
explore the context of imperfect information and the need to access information for the 
diffusion to proceed. As it will be discussed in Chapter 3 the informational aspect of
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diffusion will be one of the aspects examined in the empirical model specification of this 
thesis.
2.1.2 Policy implications of the economic diffusion analysis
The understanding of firm behaviour when facing the adoption decision is relevant to 
identify the channels through which diffusion takes place. Once these factors are defined 
they can be included in policy-making strategies to intervene in the diffusion process to 
achieve welfare gains at earlier stages than without any intervention. David (1986) argues 
that identifying the key supply and demand factors of the diffusion process may well serve 
to set the directions of the policies aimed to enhance diffusion. There has been a lack of 
attention in technology diffusion policy by scholars in comparison with the attention that 
policy discussion of R&D receives (David, 1986; Greenaway, 1994). Nevertheless, it is 
highly important to integrate the development and diffusion processes in order to reach 
the optimal policy-making over diffusion and uptake.
The characteristics of the diffusion process will depend not only on the type of technology 
but also on the type of industry. The assumptions and contexts outlined in the models in 
the previous section that explain diffusion through different mechanisms would require the 
policy-making approach to be adjusted to the diffusion process definition accordingly. As 
such, Geroski (2000) argues that information provision and subsidies are the main tools 
for policy drawing on epidemic and probit models. On the other hand, density dependent 
growth and information cascade models require selective policies focused on market- 
specific issues that influence the choice of technology. Stoneman and Diederen (1994) 
approach the policy debate focusing on why and how policy intervention should be 
handled by the government and what the impacts of actual policies are. They define three 
market failures through which the diffusion pattern may differ from the optimal welfare 
path: imperfect information, market structure and externalities. Policies have a complex 
impact on the diffusion process because they might influence expectations about the 
technology and retard adoption.
A good knowledge of the market and the elements at hand is required to set the basis of 
the policies. The role of government to speed up diffusion of newly released technologies 
is specifically examined in Stoneman and David (1986) and Stoneman and David (2002). 
They examine two policies commonly used by governments and assess their impact on 
social welfare: information provision and subsidies. In a model of a process technology 
adoption information provision is generally boosting demand and increasing welfare 
whereas subsidies may lead to decreasing welfare as subsidisation may lead to
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unprofitable adoptions. When the technology supplier is a monopolist, the impact on 
welfare of information policies is unclear as the monopolist might react to this type of 
policy. In general, subsidies under supply monopolist will lead to increase demand and 
welfare.
Diffusion policy and expectation issues are analysed in Ireland and Stoneman (1986). 
Supply and demand aspects are included alongside the role of expectations on price and 
technology. The threat of obsolescence is used as a proxy of expectations on technology. 
Two expectations on price are considered: myopic and perfect foresight case. Their 
results suggest that myopic buyers adopt at a higher rate under monopoly than under 
oligopoly. Also, adoption under a perfect foresight situation is higher, the greater the 
number of firms there are. When analysing welfare it turns out that the optimal diffusion 
path is the same as that obtained under myopia. Perfect foresight buyers are closer to the 
optimal path as the number of firms increases.
The models that consider the potential areas to derive policy implications are thus based 
on a number of different assumptions that lead to determine different policies to improve 
diffusion. This may suggest that tailor-made policies are required in order to interfere in 
the process according to the different diffusion contexts in which diffusion may flow. This 
is an extension to examine market interventions in the diffusion process to increase 
welfare gains. Whether the diffusion is too fast (in the case when the technology is being 
adopted fast when profitability is not clear) or too slow will define an optimal diffusion 
growth that maximises welfare (Stoneman and Diederen, 2002).
2.2. Non-Health empirical literature
The adoption of innovations has been empirically analysed with respect to different 
industries. The papers discussed below attempt to shed light on the factors behind the 
diffusion process of a wide range of new technologies in different industries. A common 
set of features have been tested, particularly the Schumpeterian hypothesis of the effect 
on the adoption of firm size and market concentration. Other firm- and market-specific 
characteristics have also been incorporated. The empirical analysis of diffusion has its 
origins in the seminal works by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961,1968). These early 
studies used the epidemic models described in the previous sections with the aim to 
analyse the differences across adopters. Griliches takes into account the fact that slow 
adoption might be due to non-availability of the product and thus examines both the 
“availability” and the “acceptance” of the innovation. The logistic function was used to 
estimate the rate of acceptance and the process is depicted as one in which there is a
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convergence or ceiling point. His findings suggested that profitability is the major factor for 
adoption22.
Mansfield (1961) formally modelled diffusion as a rate of imitation formulated through the 
logistic curve that represents epidemic models. He studied the diffusion of twelve 
innovations in four different industries. In addition to the profitability assumption outlined 
by Griliches as the motor of diffusion, Mansfield argued that the imitation process also 
depends on the number of current users and the investment required to install the 
innovation23. The larger size of firms and the profitability derived from the innovation use 
are the main factors yielding shorter waiting time before adoption (Mansfield, 1963a)24. 
However, faster adoption times by larger firms it is not a priori indicative of how intense 
the use of the technology is.
Whereas in his first analysis the rate of imitation was capturing the diffusion speed across 
a number of firms in a particular industry, Mansfield also considered the factors affecting 
the timing of adoption and the elements that determine the intra-firm diffusion path25. 
Mansfield (1963b) explored the intra-firm diffusion as the measure of how fast the old 
technique was being substituted by the new one26. Size, return derived from the 
replacement process, degree of riskiness and firm’s liquidity are among the factors 
showed to affect the intra-firm diffusion27. Size turns out to be non-significant whereas the 
other variables are significant and with the expected sign. Mansfield thus offered a 
complete picture of the different levels of diffusion analysis. As he argues the implications 
of the results point towards a common model representing both the inter- and intra-firm 
diffusion rates and the relevance of the size and the profitable aspect of diffusion.
22 Some years later, Dixon (1980) showed that the Gompertz function is a more appropriate function for the 
rate of acceptance using profitability as the factor driving diffusion.
23 Although other variables such as the expansion rate of the firm, durability of the old equipment or simply 
imitation driven by the passage of time were tested, they were not significant.
24 Again other factors were considered but were not significant. The firm’s overall profitability, firm’s growth, 
liquidity, profit path or age of the firm's president were not statistically significant.
25 Mansfield was a precursor as far as the intra-firm diffusion process is concerned. The intra-firm diffusion 
analysis departs from his seminal work in 1963. As it was discussed in Section 3 in the previous chapter, 
similarly to the case of inter-firm diffusion, epidemic models serve as the departure point for further theoretical 
and empirical analysis.
26 He focused on the intra-firm diffusion of diesel locomotives as compared to the steamed locomotives.
27 For the intra-firm diffusion process in Mansfield (1963b) the additional factors tested were the age of the old 
technology, the number of technology units required to replace the old ones (as a measure of the annual 
investment required), the characteristics of the production levels to be achieved and the firm’s profitability. 
Similarly to the inter-firm analysis, these factors were not statistically significant.
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Following Mansfield (1961, 1963a, 1963b), Romeo (1975) uses the logistic curve to 
approach the three levels of diffusion, inter-industry, inter-firm and intra-firm, of 
numerically controlled machine tools (NC) in ten different industries. Similar variables are 
considered in his study but in the inter-industry analysis the two main differences arise 
from the inclusion as explanatory variables of the structure of the market and the 
industry’s R&D expenditures as proxy for the industry ability to accept innovations 
(Romeo, 1975; Romeo, 1977). In general, the results suggest that the higher the 
competition and the larger the firm size, the higher is the diffusion rate. Larger firms also 
have shorter adoption times but they have slower intra-diffusion rates. According to 
Mansfield results, the profitability of investing in the innovation yields not only faster 
diffusion but also faster adoption times.
Later studies shift the approach from the logistic function diffusion analysis depicted 
above to the analysis of the factors influencing technology adoption timing. The approach 
of the empirical evidence is thus examined within the intra-diffusion analysis framework. 
These studies are mainly focused on the firm size and the degree of market concentration 
within a range of different industries. Benvignati (1982) and Hannan and McDowell (1984) 
examined the probability of technology adoption within the textile industry and the 
adoption of automatic teller machines in the banking industry, respectively. Higher firms 
are associated with higher probabilities in both studies. Benvignati (1982) complemented 
her empirical research examining the role of the business cycle in adoption and her 
findings supported the fact that good economic conditions favour adoption. Hannan and 
McDowell (1984) also find that more concentrated markets were more likely to adopt 
ATMs. Similar results regarding size and concentration are found in Levin et al. (1985) in 
their analysis of the adoption of optical scanners in the US food store industry. 
Interestingly, whereas Levin et al. (1985) seem to find evidence supporting a higher 
likelihood of adoption in markets experiencing higher demand growth, Hannan and 
McDowell (1984) do not find any significant effect of this variable on the probability of 
adoption.
Levin et al. (1987) use a proportional hazard rate framework to analyse the effects of 
structural elements on the rate of adoption of optical scanners. In contrast to the above 
studies, their results suggest a positive effect of both the absolute firm size and the seller 
concentration on the adoption of the new technology. The size effect is thus ambiguous in 
that there has been mixed evidence regarding the effect of the firm’s size on diffusion. 
Along these lines, Oster’s (1982) analysis of the diffusion of the basic oxygen furnace
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within the steel industry put forward a negative effect of size on the probability of adoption. 
The decision of adoption of two coal-fired steam-electric technologies in the electric utility 
industry is explored in Rose and Joskow (1990). Their findings suggest that the ownership 
has an influential effect on adoption with utilities under private control having an 
associated higher likelihood of adoption. They also support the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
of the effect of firm size on adoption probability. The evidence for capital-intensive 
industries shown by Oster (1982) and Rose and Joskow (1990) present mixed results 
regarding the effects of firm size on adoption. Oster’s results are also supporting Levin et 
al. (1985) in that there is a positive effect of demand growth on a higher probability of 
adoption.
Although size and market competition have captured most of the attention in the empirical 
analysis of diffusion, alongside with these two elements there are some further issues that 
also have attracted the interest of the research. As such some authors have examined the 
presence of network externalities (Saloner and Shepard, 1995; Goel and Rich 1997). 
Network externalities arise when the users of the product or service will obtain higher 
value the more extended is the presence of the innovation in the market. Goolsbee and 
Klenow (1999) looked at the importance of local spillovers in the diffusion of home 
computers in the US. Findings suggest that internet and e-mail networks are important to 
the diffusion and that the larger the number of users in the social network of the individual 
the higher the likelihood of a first purchase in the next year. An additional aspect that has 
been also covered in the literature is the influence of the rival precedence on the 
likelihood of adoption. Although there are arguments supporting a positive and negative 
association of rival precedence with adoption, Hannan and McDowell (1987) found a 
higher probability of adoption enhanced by rival precedence in the adoption of ATM 
systems28.
The majority of the studies were approaching the diffusion from the firm perspective; 
however, the individual adoption decision is also examined by Huffman and Mercier 
(1991) in the joint adoption of different technologies29. Education is shown to positively 
affect the probability of adoption whereas age and firm complexity have a negative effect. 
Socio-demographic characteristics of the agent responsible for the management of the
28 The results support the findings in Hannan and McDowell (1985), showing a positive effect of firm size on 
the probability of adoption and less concentrated the market the more likely the response to rival precedence.
29 They investigate the diffusion of microcomputers and computer services by farmers focusing on the role of 
farmer’s characteristics and farm-specific variables.
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firm were also studied in the early studies by Mansfield (1963) and Romeo (1975)30. 
Another perspective brought into the literature concerns comparisons across countries. As 
opposed to the studies above mainly focused on specific industries, countries and 
technologies, evidence on international comparisons is rather limited. However, observed 
differences across countries have been shown to be a reflection of the differences in 
highly-skilled human capital (Caselli and Coleman, 2001 )31.
Similarly to the theoretical contributions discussed in the previous sections, the review of 
the empirical literature presented above has examined the diffusion process mainly from 
the inter-firm level. These studies have in common the analysis of the size and market 
competition effect on adoption. These and other factors (i.e. network externalities) are 
examined in both the theoretical and empirical literature. However, some of the aspects 
discussed in the previous section as being elements that characterise the diffusion 
analysis have been largely unexplored in the empirical evidence. Uncertainty and the role 
of information are aspects of diffusion not well represented in empirical research. As it will 
be discussed in the next chapter these are two elements that will define the diffusion 
framework outlined for the empirical analysis of medical technology innovation. Prior to 
that, it is important to examine the evidence on diffusion analysis brought in the health 
care arena. This will identify the characteristics of technologies and the market that will 
shape the empirical specification of the diffusion process.
2.3. Theoretical Analysis of Health Technology Diffusion
Not surprisingly, the formal analysis of the diffusion pattern that follows the introduction of 
a new technology in the health care sector is even scarcer than the theoretical evidence 
that follows from the economics literature. Differences in the types of technologies and in 
the definition of health care market have motivated different approaches. The evidence 
provided does not concentrate on a specific adoption decision unit or type of innovation. 
Instead, theoretical models include a variety of aspects of technology adoption and refer 
to the decision adopted both at the physician and hospital level. The next sub-section 
presents the analysis of diffusion of various research contributions discussed from the
30 In Mansfield (1963) the age of the firm’s president was not found to be significant in the length of time 
before adoption. On the contrary, Romeo (1975) considered age and education of the manager as relevant 
characteristics not only as potential user of the technology, but also as affecting the time to adoption and the 
intra-firm diffusion. Firms with younger and more educated managers were more likely to use the innovation.
31 Caselli and Coleman (2001) contributed to this research area undertaking a cross-country analysis of the 
diffusion of computers. Their main results suggest that human capital is an important factor in the level of 
computer investment. There is “evidence that recent technological developments have had a skill-biased 
component” (Caselli and Coleman, 2001, pp. 10). Furthermore, the country’s openness is positively related to 
the OECD manufactured imports. They also find evidence that high investment rates, property rights and a 
small share of the agricultural sector in GDP encourage the investment in computing equipment.
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perspective of the physician and the hospital. The few modelling contributions to drug 
diffusion could be easily identified and they are presented in Section 2.3.2. Generally, the 
models presented in this section adopted the inter-level diffusion approach and examine 
technological change as a decision process based on profit and cost of the type described 
in Section 2.1.
2.3.1 General approaches
Part of the research presented here is not technology-specific but related to technological 
change in general where the relationship between technological change and welfare 
under different forms of insurance contracts is explored (Godderis, 1984; Godderis, 
1984a; Baumgardner, 1991). These approaches consider patient individual behaviour 
under the standard economic utility function representation. The optimal choice is the 
result of a maximisation problem given the health production function. Technology enters 
the maximisation problem through the changes that innovation introduces in the 
production function to induce improvements in the individual’s health.
Goddeeris (1984) examines the relation between medical coinsurance contracts and 
technological change, and the welfare implications of these two aspects. The individual 
maximises the expected utility function to choose the optimal coinsurance rate. 
Technological change enters the utility function through a function that relates medical 
expenditure with improvements in health. There is an analysis of the dynamic aspect of 
moral hazard that shows that there might be welfare-reducing effects from technology 
adoption derived from moral hazard present under insurance contracts. Following 
Goddeeris (1984), Baumgardner (1991) studies the interaction between medical 
innovations, different types of insurance contracts and welfare. The insurance contracts 
considered are coinsurance plans and prepaid health care plans. These two insurance 
contracts provide different incentives in the demand for technical advances. Moral hazard 
will be starker under coinsurance contracts. The implication for hospital technology 
decisions is that adoption will depend upon the percentage of patients in each type of 
insurance. This study offers a complete picture of the inter-related effects of technological 
change and insurance. However, this and Goodderis (1984) research are related to 
technological change enhanced by insurance from the patient’s decision on technology 
demand as reinforced by the insurance contract of their choice.
Along the same lines, Zweifel and Breyer (1997) analyse the optimal allocation of 
process, product and organisational innovations. This model does not specify any
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insurance contract arrangement as it was in the case of the previous two models. This is a 
two-stage problem in which individuals decide in the first period how much to spend on 
innovations. The realisation of the health technology use will be channelled through better 
health outcome in the second period. The optimal allocation of spending on each type of 
technology requires that the marginal health improvement brought by the technology 
demand will be larger than the utility loss from the lower consumption derived from 
devoting part of the budget to acquire medical technology. This model is again 
approached from the patient optimal allocation of resources to purchase technology to 
improve his health status. Although representative of the individual optimal allocation of 
resources to medical innovations, the models presented above do not approach the 
decision from the perspective of the provider to adopt a new technology. These are 
approaches more representative of health markets dominated by private insurance 
contracts rather than markets highly represented by public insurance coverage.
Turning to the perspective of the diffusion process as seen by the health provider, 
diffusion analysis approached from the physician side is not very well documented. On 
that front, Klausen et al. (1992) examine physicians’ adoption decision32. The process of 
adoption by physicians is modelled as a dynamic investment problem. The model is 
based in the assumption that the old technology represents an opportunity cost when 
investing in the new one. They show that adoption is positively influenced by the 
incremental income gained from the technology adoption, the number of consultations for 
which the technology will be of use and the reimbursement of the new technology.
There are few approaches dealing with the hospital attitude to the adoption and diffusion 
of technologies. In this context, Zweifel (1995) uses this approach to examine differences 
in hospital adoption of product and process innovations as a joint decision by hospitals 
and physicians. Two different settings are examined, the US in which there is a 
maximisation goal in the provision of health care services and the Western European 
context in which hospitals operate under a not-for-profit setting although they receive 
subsidies from the government. In both type of settings, the adoption of product 
innovations will be more profitable than the adoption of process innovations.
From the combined interaction of physicians and hospitals, other types of models look at 
the behaviour strictly from the hospital side. A strategic timing, game-theoretic approach is 
used in Schmidt-Dengler (forthcoming) to model the diffusion of magnetic resonance
32 They consider the process of adoption of dry chemical laboratory equipment by Norwegian physicians 
within the primary health care sector.
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imaging (MRI) with respect to the degree of competition existing in the market33. This 
model suggests that the return to adoption is higher, the fewer the number of adopters. 
On the other hand, the reduction in costs overtime may enhance longer adoption waiting 
time. In a more general context, Miraldo (2007) looks at the relationship between the 
incentives provided by different hospital reimbursement schemes and diffusion, and the 
influence that this exerts over the R&D process. The model proposes a mixed or 
prospective scheme as the optimal reimbursement systems in order to enhance the 
development and adoption of quality increasing and cost decreasing technologies. This 
paper along with Godderis (1984) and Baumgardner (1991) represent the literature that 
examines technology development, insurance market and technology adoption.
2.3.2 Pharmaceutical diffusion
The demand for new pharmaceuticals remains unexplored from the theoretical 
perspective and again the evidence is restricted to specific aspects of the diffusion 
process. This is mainly due to the mix of forces and interests that interact in the market 
when a new drug comes into force. In general, drug diffusion analysis has been analysed 
from two levels of aggregation: at the market/industry level or from the individual decision­
maker perspective. At the individual level the focus is on the understanding of the 
physician behaviour, as driven by the physician’s characteristics and organisational- 
related factors. At the aggregated level modelling of the diffusion process focuses on 
macroeconomic variables. There are differences between the macro and microeconomic 
approaches to demand for new pharmaceuticals that lie in the aggregation of preferences 
in drug choice. According to the characteristics of the health care market there will be 
forces that are not relevant at the market level that may become significant at the 
individual level34.
Despite the numerous factors that have been listed as impacting on diffusion, the 
superiority of the drug appears to be the key determinant on the uptake process. It is the 
evidence on the medical advantages of the new drug that will shape their use. The 
dissemination of information regarding the drug attributes plays a key role in the diffusion 
process. There are several mechanisms available to disseminate information but these
33 In each period, firms decide whether or not to adopt and they move sequentially. The hospital faces a trade­
off between adoption and waiting.
34 A good example to illustrate the difference is that of drug prices: in countries with a national health care 
system in place the price of the drug is likely not to be a relevant variable taken into account by physicians in 
the prescription decision process as there is a third party purchaser responsible for price setting and 
reimbursement. The overall market demand will be affected by the prices which are the product of 
negotiations between the manufacturer and the regulator. Thus price may be a relevant variable at the market 
level but not at the individual decision-making level.
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are mainly examined from the empirical perspective. As an example of the role of 
information in diffusion, Berndt et al. (2003) model diffusion at the market level as the 
increase in sales towards an equilibrium market. They give an interesting perspective to 
the analysis of diffusion using the concept of consumption externalities as a mechanism to 
spread information on the drugs’ attributes35. Alongside these types of externalities, 
product characteristics and advertising help to drive the diffusion process. In their model, 
demand at the macro level addresses the issue of how current drug consumption conveys 
information for future prescription.
When the diffusion analysis shifts from the market behaviour to the analysis at the 
physician level, the theoretical examination is still very restricted. Recently, a growing 
body of literature has approached the problem of the demand for new drugs as a 
consumer learning process. The sources of information available to physicians vary in the 
degree of experimentation required to obtain information on the product quality. As such 
advertising efforts or clinical evidence on scientific journals provide indirect and rather 
notional information whereas the actual prescription of the drug will provide with direct 
evidence on the product attributes. As it was noted in the first chapter, drugs are 
experience goods. As such these learning models focus on the information obtained 
directly through experimentation that reduces the uncertainty attached to technology. 
Diffusion is articulated as a Bayesian learning process in which physicians get feedback 
from the prescription of the new drug through the signals observed from the patient’s drug 
consumption (Coscelli and Shum, 2004; Crawford and Shum, 2005)36.
In particular, Coscelli and Shum (2004) examine the case in which physicians obtain utility 
from prescription, being the utility derived from new drug prescription different from that 
gained with the prescription of the existing drug. The probability of prescribing the new 
medicine is thus a function of the update of beliefs on the unknown quality of the new 
drug. In these models the learning process is related to the characteristics of the new 
product whereas the characteristics of existing medicines are assumed to be known by 
doctors with certainty. Crawford and Shum (2005) examine the case that uncertainty 
refers to both types of drugs. In their approach they model diffusion as a matching 
process between patient and drug. The information retrieved from the prescription allows 
for informational spillovers across patients of current consumption in future drug choice37.
35 Consumption externalities are modelled as the effect on the current level of sales of the previous period 
sales level. The presence of consumption externalities will be examined in Chapters 3 and 4 as part of the 
diffusion framework outlined in these chapters.
36 Note that the definition of diffusion as a dynamic process is inherent in these models because the process 
runs in a time line in which the increase in experimentation reduces the degree of uncertainty.
37 This is important because of the heterogeneity of patients and highlights the fact that diffusion does not take 
place in a homogeneous context in which there is perfect information on drug characteristics. Instead it allows 
for some degree of uncertainty regarding the performance of both the new and the old drug and highlights the 
fact they might both go through a process in which drugs undergo improvements or changes.
70
An additional factor that has been examined as part of the physician behaviour is the 
influence of the professional network. In an attempt to explain variation in medical practice 
in a diffusion context, Bikhchandani et al. (2001) use a Bayesian approach to introduce 
imitation among physicians as a means to acquire information regarding the treatment 
choice. Bikchandani et al. (2001) show an alternative way to propagate diffusion of 
technologies based on colleagues’ information derived from self-experimentation38. When 
technology choice is over a continuous treatment of the type of drug prescription choice 
there is a convergence towards a common standard. Physicians learn about colleagues’ 
choice among dosage decisions that can be weighted to converge to a routine practice 
through the constant learning by physicians.
Aspects such as the product quality, consumption externalities, learning process and 
information cascades identified in the models above are elements that will be identified in 
Chapters 3 and 4 as characterising the diffusion process. The modelling of prescription 
demand is very much restricted to the market approach analysing the presence of 
externalities and the physician learning process. In both cases, the role of information 
remains crucial for the diffusion to proceed. Although there are other aspects of 
information that are not included in these models, there are a number of empirical 
research papers covering other informational aspects in drug diffusion that will be 
discussed in the next section.
2.4. Evidence on Medical Technology Diffusion
As discussed in the first section of Chapter 1 the increasing interest in technology 
diffusion analysis was motivated by the identification of technological change as main 
factor explaining health care expenditure growth. Technology does not preclude other 
factors such as population aging, expansion of insurance coverage or increased per 
capita income to also explain expenditure growth but they are held to account only for a 
small proportion of the increase (Schwartz, 1987; Aaron, 1991; Newhouse 1992; 
Newhouse, 1993; Fuchs, 1996). Newhouse was the first to quantify the contribution of 
new medical capabilities in increasing health care expenditure and he estimated this to be 
approximately 50%. Several mechanisms have been identified as contributing to the 
increase in medical expenditure. Gelijns and Rosenberg (1994, p.34) argue that the 
channels through which this relationship is associated are: “intensity of use of existing
38 A major breakthrough in their contribution is the distinction between discrete versus continuous treatment 
choice. As such when the choice is discrete, for instance, whether or not to perform a diagnostic test, 
treatment or procedure, individuals will calibrate alternatives that are dual: the choice here is a yes/no answer 
to whether undertake it or not. In this case, the information derived from colleagues under the assumption that 
physicians weight their colleagues’ decision to be as valid as their own decisions. However, their model allows 
for the perpetuation of the wrong pattern through an informational cascade if the aggregated knowledge 
displayed by early adopters is based on erroneous initial choice.
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technologies, introduction of new or modified technologies and expanded application of 
these new technologies”. As discussed in Chapter 1, the introduction of new technologies 
will contribute to the expenditure growth through the expansion and substitution effect 
(Cutler and Huckman, 2003). Furthermore, new technologies will affect medical costs not 
only through the price of the innovation but also by offsetting savings and inducing costs 
(Neumann and Weistein, 1991).
The health care sector is constantly under rapid technological change. Newhouse (2002) 
argues that “rapid change makes knowledge quickly obsolete and places a heavy burden 
on mechanisms that enable physicians and other health professionals to keep up”. In 
addition to the rapid technological change, new medical technology is characterised by 
uncertainty. Usually this uncertainty has been linked to the early stage of adoption; 
however, this uncertainty may persist after initial adoption as new technologies may 
experience incremental improvements along their paths of diffusion. Hence, technological 
change cannot be considered as a static issue but as an evolutionary process of learning 
(Gelijns and Rosenberg, 1994; Gelijns et al., 2001).
Once the technology is introduced in the health care market there must be a 
dissemination of information about the new technology in order to reach potential 
adopters, make them aware of the availability of the innovation and reduce the degree of 
uncertainty. Information seems to play a key role in diffusion as differences in practice 
variability are explained by differences in information across regions (Phelps, 1992). 
Differences in the type of technology and stakeholders involved in the development, 
approval and technology introduction will carry a different set of incentives for the 
production and information dissemination process. Medical device innovation is 
characterised by the diversity of devices produced (Foote, 1991). R&D in the device 
market is mainly carried out in small companies, where the innovator is typically the 
decision maker (Kahn, 1991). The market for pharmaceuticals is based on a strong patent 
system and characterised by restrictive regulatory policies regarding pre-marketing 
approval and reimbursement systems (Grabowski, 1991). Finally, surgical procedure 
innovation is carried out in a context not driven by profit-maximising purposes and 
regulation is scarce or inexistent, it has a low cost of development and is not patentable 
(Chang and Luft, 1991). Inventors of drugs and medical devices have economic 
incentives to produce this information and publish it in order to promote their product. In 
contrast, the research of new “strategies of treatment” is not as profitable since they 
cannot be patented. Hence, the production and dissemination of information will only
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provide indirect benefits, e.g. in terms of better reputation among peers and patients 
(Phelps, 2000).
There are different factors that have been identified to affect the dissemination of medical 
innovations. Cutler and McClellan (1996) find six categories to explain technological 
diffusion: organisational factors, insurance generosity, technology regulations, malpractice 
pressure, provider interactions and demographic factors. In addition to these factors, 
Berwick (2003) also identifies the perception of the innovation by the potential adopter as 
a driver of diffusion. Thus, apart from the contextual factors outlined above the degree of 
innovativeness of the technology may also be a key factor for diffusion. There are other 
factors such as the complexity of the medical condition for which the technology was 
designed. Warner (1975) examines the process of adoption for the case of a low-cost 
innovations designed to treat severe medical conditions. Three stages are identified in 
what he calls a “desperation-reaction” model: pre-experimental stage, adjustment period 
in which agents find out about the true efficacy of the innovation, and a final stage of 
“informed decision-making”.
The empirical literature has been largely devoted to the diffusion analysis of product and 
process innovations rather than organisational innovations. In general, the literature has 
been devoted to the analysis of physical capital, surgical procedures and new drugs 
Physical capital technology refers to capital-embodied innovations. Most of the research 
on physical capital and surgical innovations has been approached as a hospital decision 
process. The diffusion of drugs is either examined at the market level, as discussed in the 
previous section, or from the perspective of the individual physician. Aspects of the type 
above-mentioned have been emphasized as being key elements behind this form of 
diffusion. Variables such as socioeconomic factors of patients, insurance variables or 
hospital characteristics are frequent in diffusion analysis. As this represents a relatively 
large literature an outline of the relevant papers is presented in the next sub-sections. It is 
divided according to the three types of technologies mentioned above. Tables A.2.2.1 to 
A.2.2.3 in Appendix Chapter 2 summarise the main features of some important papers on 
diffusion of the three types of technologies.
2.4.1 Main factors explaining diffusion of physical capital
The majority of the studies presented here examine the diffusion process as an inter-firm 
diffusion process. The different types of physical capital technologies have been generally 
categorized according to their acquisition costs and classified as being “little-ticket” or 
“big-ticket” technologies. The early work by Russell (1977) examines the diffusion rate of
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five little-ticket technologies using epidemic theory as a diffusion framework and showing 
that the technologies analysed were fitting the S-shaped adoption pattern. Diffusion of 
physical capital has been primarily devoted to big-ticket technologies of the type 
represented by computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)39. 
The diffusion of these types of costly technologies has been shown to be faster for larger 
hospitals (Baker, 1979; Banta, 1980; Globermann, 1982). Other factors have been shown 
to also affect the diffusion of capital-embodied technology. Technological value, safety 
and efficacy, incremental profitability gained from adoption, communication channels and 
the structure of the medical system account for the bulk of factors explaining MRI diffusion 
(Hillman et al., 1984). Differences in technology costs and regulatory environments have 
been identified as factors leading to a slower diffusion path (Hillman and Schwartz, 1985).
The role of the third-party payer in the adoption and diffusion of new medical technologies 
has focused most of the attention in the research addressing capital-embodied 
technologies. In general, the generosity of the insurance coverage is positively associated 
with adoption (Chou et al., 2004). The increase of health care expenditure has generated 
the adoption of new insurance payment systems from retrospective to prospective 
reimbursement schemes. Under the last type of reimbursement system there may be 
incentives to reduce costs and consequently affecting the adoption decision of new 
equipment. Some evidence suggests that prospective systems restrict technology 
adoption; however, this also depends on the characteristics of the innovations (Romeo et 
al., 1984; Lee et al., 1985)40. The restrictions introduced by prospective systems may 
change the type of technologies that hospital will adopt. Lee et al. (1985) find stronger 
evidence about prospective reimbursement making cost-reducing innovations more 
attractive.
Along the same lines, some research has focused on the effect of managed care on the 
adoption of medical innovations. As defined by Baker and Phibbs (2000), managed care 
refers to schemes designed to reduce utilisation and high costs associated with fee-for- 
service plans. Managed care activity is usually measured as the market share of the 
HMO. Empirical evidence has shown a consistent and systematic negative relationship 
between managed care and new capital-embodied technologies. Hence, higher presence 
of managed care implies lower MRI adoption hazard rate and availability (Hill and Wolfe, 
1997; Baker and Wheeler, 1998; Baker and Phibbs, 2000; Baker, 2001). The effect of
39 International comparisons have also been undertaken regarding the studied the diffusion of big-ticket 
technologies in the OECD countries (L£zaro and Fitch, 1995). Technologies included in the analysis are CTs, 
MRIs, extracorporal shockwave lithotripters (ESWLs), cobalt units (CU), and linear accelerators (LAs). Their 
findings suggest that countries with similar national income and health expenditure have different distribution 
of technologies and there are within-country differences across technologies.
40 Romeo et al. (1984) consider the effect of prospective reimbursement system on technology adoption in a 
context of intra-firm analysis.
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managed care may have indirect costs to patients not enrolled in this type of insurance 
arrangements. Markets with high proportions of HMO share may slow down adoption by 
health care providers with different financing system (Baker, 1999). In general, managed 
care has been shown to achieve the cost-containment objective and to reduce the level of 
health care expenditure. Nevertheless, evidence on the effect of managed care on health 
care cost growth is mixed (Chernew et al., 1997; Cutler and Sheiner, 1997).
2.4.2 Evidence on new pharmaceuticals diffusion
The work published in the sociological literature in 1966 by Coleman et al. on medical 
innovation diffusion was the culmination of an extensive and earlier research on the 
diffusion path followed by a new antibiotic. The authors examined drug acceptance in four 
Midwestern cities and despite a high rate of adoption after a year after introduction there 
were still differences in adoption rates. This raised the question of which factors 
determined those differences. The degree of integration of the doctor in the social 
community happened to have an important impact on adoption and informal networks 
were effective in speeding up the adoption. In contrast to the sociological view, the 
seminal work by Griliches (1957) argued that economic incentives and profitability were 
the drivers of the diffusion. Taking this as starting point Skinner and Staiger (2005a, 
2005b) studied the existence of persistency in adoption patterns observed by Griliches. 
They examined a group of four technologies, among them the adoption of beta-blockers 
for the treatment of heart attack. They observe a high state-dependency on the use of 
new technologies given that states that were early adopters of hybrid corn in the 30s and 
40s were also leaders in the adoption of beta-blockers41.
Generally, the analysis of demand for pharmaceuticals has been studied from the 
perspective of drugs that are usually established in the market and in relation to 
competitive market issues arising after patent expiration. The literature has been largely 
devoted to the competition between branded and generic drugs mainly motivated by the 
observed low generic penetration in the pharmaceutical market. The dynamics that 
characterise drug choice have been under scrutiny largely because of the importance of 
this market in any health care system. The prescription choice has been modelled as a 
two stage process in which firstly the doctors make a decision over an array of drugs that 
are therapeutically similar for a given condition and secondly a choice between the 
branded drug and the generic equivalent (Ellison et al., 1997).
41 Skinner and Staiger (2005b) further study whether this state dependency translates into convergence in the 
productivity of medical care from heart attack in the US. Their findings reveal non-convergence across states 
regarding mortality, costs or quality-adjusted price. This reveals not only the fact that there might be a 
prevalence in trends across agents in the adoption and diffusion but also the presence of variation in the 
individual performance in the demand of new technologies.
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For diffusion of a new drug to take place the product should offer a set of attributes that 
assure the higher quality and permanence in the market. Usually the superiority of new 
drugs take the form of less side-effects, less interactions or an advantage in the approved 
indication. It is expected that the size of the market will hence be determined by product 
quality attributes as it has been the case in several markets such as the antidepressants 
and anti-ulcer drug market in the US (Berndt et al., 1997; Berndt et al., 2002). However, 
these characteristics are unknown to the decision-maker. New product quality can be 
revealed through different mechanisms. This implies there is a learning process whereby 
the information will be disseminated. There a number of mechanisms that have identified 
as informational sources.
The most polemic source of information is marketing. Marketing has been usually used as 
the main driver of information and determinant of increases in the market share of the new 
drug (Berndt et al., 1995). Marketing promotion has been identified as the mechanism 
used to advertise not only the availability of the new drug but also any improvement the 
product may undergo. The actual role of marketing has been the object of discussion 
among researchers and has divided the opposed interpretations. On one hand, the 
advertising activity is seen as a pure informational dissemination process. On the other 
hand, advertising is said to be used as strategic tool to generate persistent habit 
prescription. Empirical evidence shows mixed results on that respect (Leffler, 1981; 
Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). There are different types of promotion such as advertising in 
scientific journals or direct-to-consumer advertising but visits by sales representatives is 
the marketing activity with the higher influence (Berndt et al., 1995). As the number of 
drugs in a therapeutical market becomes large the role of marketing to expanding the 
overall industry demand will have decreasing returns. As a consequence, marketing 
activity will become more rivalrous and focused on the advertising of the differential 
attributes of the molecules (Berndt et al., 1995; Berndt et al., 1997).
Despite the fact that advertising has engaged most interest in the literature there are other 
sources of information available that could influence the diffusion process. For example, 
the dissemination of information using the evidence extracted from clinical trials is also a 
channel available to doctors. This information is made available even before the drug 
starts being marketed and it has been shown to be an extra information mechanism that 
complements the promotion efforts (Azoulay, 2002). An additional information reference 
may be derived from the observed market behaviour. Berndt et al. (2003) argue that 
consumption externalities act as the market signal regarding the drug acceptance that can 
be also used to alter the quality perception of the drug. The informational elements
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depicted above are channels targeting the individual decision-maker as a user of this 
information. Interestingly, the analysis of these factors have focused on the market 
behaviour as a response to macroeconomic variables that may not be in the catchment 
area of the underlying factors explaining diffusion from the perspective of the physician.
If the physician is identified as the key decision-maker in drug choice, socio-economic 
characteristics are likely to determine demand for new pharmaceuticals. Empirical 
evidence suggests that variables such as gender or years of experience are not good 
predictors of attitudes with respect to new products (Coscelli, 1998). Instead, preferences 
and habit persistence formed through past prescription seems to be a strong indicator of 
the demand for pharmaceuticals (Hellerstein, 1998; Coscelli, 2000; Lundin, 2000). The 
market for new drugs faces the existence of barriers to entry due to habit generation with 
respect to demand for existing drugs (Johannesson and Lundin, 2001 )42. In addition to 
prescription habit, uncertainty and risk attitudes may also be included as part of barriers to 
entry to new drugs. As it has been discussed in previous sections, the majority of 
approaches to individual diffusion have explained diffusion as a learning process. 
Uncertain quality of the new product in conjunction with physician’s risk aversion prevents 
the increase of new drug demand. It is only through first-hand experience that enhances 
an increase of the new drug prescription share (Coscelli and Shum, 2004)43. The own 
prescription experience thus opens an extra channel of information available to physicians 
to overcome uncertainty.
Together with the analysis of the factors driving diffusion it is important to examine the 
impact of new drug diffusion on the costs of the demand for new drugs as well as quality 
improvements derived from diffusion. There are no precise quantitative estimates of the 
relationship between new drug diffusion and increase in drug expenditure. The overall 
impact on cost will be influenced by the weight given by the physician to the cost 
implications that prescription choice has on pharmaceutical spending. In general, the 
evidence regarding physician lack of awareness of drugs costs or some degree of moral 
hazard arising from the presence of insurer is ambiguous (Dranove, 1989; Hellerstein, 
1998; Lundin, 2000). However, new drug prices have been shown not to influence new 
drug prescription choice (Johannesson and Lundin, 2001). After the examination of 
diffusion on cost, the other aspect of interest is whether diffusion is accompanied by 
improvements in long-term health outcomes. General measures of health outcomes such
42 Habit dependence has also been shown to exist from the patient side (Coscelli, 2000). If it is the case, habit 
persistence showed by the principal and the agent combined with the uncertainty that accompanies the 
introduction of new drugs may well act as an established barrier to diffusion, and therefore explain the slow 
uptake path showed in the pharmaceutical markets.
4 This is of special importance because their results are derived from the introduction of the molecule 
omeprazole, the first to be introduced into the PPIs therapeutic market representing a true learning process.
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as in-patient hospitalisation or mortality rates have been positively affected by 
consumption of newer drugs (Lichtenberg, 1996; Lichtenberg, 2003). The use of new 
technologies may also have spillover effects on demand of disease-related services that 
will decrease the total cost of treatment (Lichtenberg, 2001). Finally, there is mixed 
evidence on the cost-effectiveness of new drug uptake (Duggan, 2005; Duggan and 
Evans, 2005).
2.4.3 Perspectives on diffusion of surgical procedures
The part of the literature devoted to the analysis of surgical procedures is mainly focused 
on the hospital decision to adopt. Few studies have examined technology adoption 
decision by the surgeon, despite the shared importance of diffusion analysis examining 
both hospital and surgeon determinants (Lewit, 1986). Regardless of whether the analysis 
is at the hospital or surgeon level, the empirical literature has adopted the inter-firm level 
approach. From the surgeon perspective, Escarce et al. (1995) and Escarce (1996) 
examine the timing of adoption of laparoscopic cholecystectomy using socio­
demographic, practice and market characteristics. The main results suggest that 
economic incentives lead to earlier adoption. The role of information externalities is 
examined in Escarce (1996) and his results point towards the presence of informational 
spillovers articulated through early adopters leading to faster adoption by surgeons in the 
same hospital.
Sloan et al. (1986) pioneered the analysis of surgical technologies innovations through the 
examination of the diffusion pattern of five surgical procedures. They study the effect of 
insurance, demography, regulatory factors and competition on adoption. They find that 
diffusion is greater the more commercially oriented the insurance market, larger hospitals 
tend to adopt faster and more competitive markets tend to slow diffusion44. Diffusion 
analysis has been largely focused on the introduction of minimally invasive surgeries that 
offered improvements with respect to open procedures in terms of shorter length of stay 
and better product performance. The introduction of the less invasive procedure has led to 
an increase of the total demand due to an increase in the population eligible for treatment
44 The regulatory environment and the reimbursement system have been shown to influence diffusion is 
several directions. Under prospective payment systems there may be incentives to invest in less invasive 
procedures in order to increase the margin between the payment per procedure and the actual hospital cost 
(Greenberg et al., 2001). There are other restrictions imposed by the regulator that may affect the adoption 
and diffusion. Some US states have Certificate of Need (CON) legislation whereby new investments in 
hospitals need approval from a review board. CON has been shown to change hospital investment 
composition but not leading a reduction in technology spending (Salkevenerand Bice, 1976). CON legislation 
has been shown to slow diffusion (Caudill at el., 1995); however, this type of regulation does not seem to 
change technology diffusion in those US states in which this type of legislation has been removed (Conover 
and Sloan, 1998).
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(Legorreta et al., 1993). Other characteristics as hospital size, location or university 
affiliation have been shown to have a positive impact on adoption (Fendrick et al., 1994)
The case of surgeries to treat heart attack has been largely analysed with the aim to 
identify the source of its expenditure growth, the factors of diffusion and the impact on 
health outcomes. Diffusion of angioplasty (PTCA) is mainly analysed as an alternative to 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), the former being a less invasive and costly 
procedure than the latter. Expenditure growth in heart attack care has been attributed to 
an increase in the number of intensive procedures rather than to an increase in treatment 
costs (Cutler and McClellan, 1996; Cutler and McClellan, 1998). Cutler and McClellan 
(1996) identify insurance variables, technology regulation and provider interactions as the 
factors influencing the diffusion of PTCA. The introduction of PTCA has brought 
improvements in mortality and morbidity rates that offset the overall expenditure on heart 
treatment (Cutler et al., 1998; Cutler et al., 1999). However, increases in expenditure have 
been articulated to operate at two levels: treatment substitution, referring to the 
substitution of CABG by PTCA, and expansion effect, that concerns PTCA treatment to a 
segment of the population not suitable for surgical treatment prior to technological change 
(Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Cutler and Huckman, 2003)45.
Literature presented above refers to adoption of surgical procedures in a given country. 
Currently, a cross-national comparison of the determinants of technological change for the 
case of heart attacks is being carried out by the technological change in health care 
(TECH) research network46. The objective is to study the effect of payment systems, 
technology regulation, competition and physician supply on the adoption of high- (surgical 
procedures) and low-tech treatments (drugs) and how this affects health outcomes and 
medical expenditure growth (McClellan and Kessler, 1999; McClellan and Kessler, 2002; 
TECH, 2001). There have been three different patterns of diffusion identified. The first one 
defines early adoption and fast growth and it is represented by the US and Japan. A 
second group covers those countries with late adoption and fast growth (Canada, France,
45 Cutler and Huckman (2003) estimate the degree of treatment expansion and substitution of PTCA in New 
York State for the period 1992-2000. There is a growth in PTCA in the 80s interpreted as treatment expansion 
while during the 90s there is an improvement in PTCA performance which leads to treatment substitution. 
Increases in PTCA volume implied better health outcomes. Cost-wise, they find that cost increases arise due 
to PTCA volume increase that was offset by the cost reduction due to the substitution of CABG for PTCA. 
McGuire et al. (forthcoming) extend Cutler and Huckman’s (2003) work to examine the UK case. Two 
improvements are introduced: the use of medical management to control for the potential bias due to the 
correlation of unobserved factor with CABG and PTCA and the hospital as the unit of analysis under 
consideration. Their findings suggest that UK has had lower treatment substitution and higher expansion than 
in the US.
46 Nystedt and Lyttkens (2003) also undertake an international comparison across countries to compare the 
diffusion trends of carotid endarterectomy use among the elderly. They compare the Swedish system with the 
US and Canada. Overall patterns show similar procedure rates suggesting that differences in health care 
systems do not affect the pattern of procedure rates.
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Italy, Singapore and Taiwan). The third group comprises those countries with late 
adoption and slow growth. The UK, Scandinavian countries and Ontario are among the 
countries that form part of the third group. Taking as an example two opposed cases 
represented by the US and the UK, there has been a positive effect on health outcomes in 
the US whereas this effect is minimal in the UK. Moreover, it is shown that the use of high- 
tech procedures is the cause of the expenditure growth in the US with a minimal effect of 
regulatory and financial incentives on uptake (McClellan et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 
2002).
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has reviewed the literature related to the analysis of technological diffusion 
both in health care and other industries. Technology diffusion has been generally 
approached using the inter-firm level of analysis, although recently there has been some 
developments in the analysis at the intra-firm level. The review of the economic literature 
on diffusion provides a picture of technology analysis and the elements identified to drive 
this process. Despite the specificities of the health care market, there are common 
aspects with applicability to the health care sector. Theoretical models of technology 
diffusion analysis started with epidemic models; however, there have been recent 
developments that incorporate a number of factors that capture the process under a 
different array of contexts. Uncertainty has been identified as a general characteristic of 
diffusion as the new product has attributes that are unknown to the adopter. This 
uncertainty may take different forms. Technology may introduce changes in the 
production process that affect the benefit or the cost function. Uncertainty may also take 
the form of improvements in the invention along the diffusion path. This uncertainty 
requires information gathering that is costly to the adopter. This implies there is a learning 
process involved in diffusion generating a number of interactions that may affect uptake 
speed. The diffusion process is inherently characterised by being a dynamic process in 
which the realisation of all factors abovementioned takes a lengthy period of time. This 
justifies the S-shaped curve followed by technology in many industries.
Empirically, diffusion research has been mainly focused on the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
regarding the effect of firm size and market competition on the adoption of technologies. 
However, additional elements identified by the theoretical literature have been examined 
to test their presence in the diffusion process. The profitability of the technology as well as 
network externalities have been identified to enhance diffusion. The modelling and 
empirical analysis are mainly focused on the analysis of process innovations. The 
general economics literature thus provides with some aspects of diffusion pertinent to the
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analysis of health technology diffusion. The uncertainty and the informational aspect of 
diffusion seem to be applicable to medical innovation diffusion.
The modelling of technology diffusion in health care is limited to few contributions that 
mainly incorporate the interactions between insurance, technology adoption and welfare. 
These models are approached as the patient maximisation problem. The modelling of 
individual behaviour is almost non-existent with the exception of some research on new 
drug uptake approached as a Bayesian learning process. Other modelling approaches 
have adopted the perspective of the hospital decision to adopt a new technology. These 
approaches are mainly taken as decisions to adopt in health care contexts where there is 
a clear market orientation in the provision of health care services. The mechanics and 
interactions may derive in other diffusion processes when one considers the diffusion 
process under health systems in which there is still a high degree of public funding and 
provision and where the explanation of diffusion cannot be solely determined as a profit or 
utility maximisation problem. It is thus important to extend the theoretical modelling to the 
analysis of diffusion under this setting.
The empirical evidence on medical diffusion has been more extensive than the theoretical 
contributions. The majority of evidence has been based on technology diffusion in the US. 
It is important to understand the mechanisms through which diffusion is enhanced; 
however, market specificities may provide a number of incentives to the stakeholders that 
will differ according to the definition of health system. Thus, there is scope for research to 
shed light on how diffusion proceeds in different health contexts. From the evidence 
presented it is interesting to see that the degree of competition and the type of 
reimbursement scheme are among the elements that have captured the attention of 
researchers when examining the diffusion of capital-embodied and surgical technologies 
by hospitals. The diffusion of new drugs has been examined at an aggregated level 
looking at the factors that lead to overall market diffusion. Several of the informational 
factors that have been individually examined have been identified to form the 
informational package required for drug diffusion. In addition the evidence on the factors 
affecting physician’s technology choice has also defined the diffusion process as a 
learning process based on the physician’s own experience.
The objective of this analysis is to shed light on the diffusion process of new drugs and 
surgical procedures in the NHS. With the aim to define the factors affecting this process, 
the overall literature assessment has allowed to draw technology diffusion in health care 
as a dynamic process in which uncertainty and information play a key role. Different 
informational mechanisms have been examined; however, they have been individually
81
explored. The present research will examine the relationship between uncertainty and 
information and their effect on drug diffusion. This will be partly applicable to the analysis 
of surgical technologies. Differences across technologies and the markets in which they 
diffuse imply there are differences in the factors that define the diffusion specification. 
Overall, the current research will contribute to the diffusion literature with the analysis of 
technologies in a different context, the UK, and different technologies to the ones 
generally used as case-studies. It also presents the novelty of approaching diffusion as an 
intra-firm analysis problem, a perspective that has been largely ignored in technology 
diffusion. Finally, drug diffusion analysis is approached here to offer a complete picture of 
the different information mechanisms. This approach is unique in that diffusion is 
explained through a bundle of information mechanisms that have been examined 
individually in the existing literature.
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Chapter 3
The Determinants of Diffusion of New Prescription 
Drugs: Evidence from the UK Primary Care Sector
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 gives the general motivation for the analysis of the diffusion in health care and 
outlines some of the main approaches taken in the economic literature. It also frames the 
diffusion analysis within the health care context and discusses the particularities of health 
care technologies. Against the rising interest in health technology as a contributory factor 
driving health care expenditure and in the process of diffusion itself this chapter focuses 
on the up-take of new prescription drugs within the UK in the primary care sector. The 
empirical analysis in this chapter builds on the intra-firm diffusion process discussed in 
Chapter 1 as the part of the technology diffusion analysis which measures the volume of 
health services provided with the new product technology.
The purpose of the present chapter is to disentangle various factors affecting diffusion 
and provide evidence on the determinants of diffusion of new drugs from a micro 
perspective. The literature has provided some evidence on the diffusion of 
pharmaceuticals; however, research is generally presented from a market or supply-side 
perspective. Different factors have been shown to be determinant aspects in the sales 
trends observed within the pharmaceutical industry. Demand for both new and old drugs 
has been expressed as a function of economic variables such as prices, quality of the 
product, advertising efforts or prescription externalities have proven to have influenced the 
sales rate (Berndt et al., 2003; Ellison et al., 1997, Hellerstein, 1998). This perspective 
gives an overall picture of the market in terms of those supply-factorsthat are strategically 
set to capture higher demand rates. Notwithstanding, there are a number of factors and 
interactions at the individual level that cannot be captured using such an aggregated 
market approach.
This chapter aims to study the diffusion of new medicines from the perspective of the 
agent that is responsible for the drug choice: the physician. The empirical analysis 
combines an individual micro approach with respect to the demand for new 
pharmaceuticals. There is a certain degree of uncertainty associated with the new 
technology in that individuals will not be familiar with its characteristics. In the first place,
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the diffusion process is analysed as a continuous information seeking process whereby 
information is obtained through different channels. The analysis covers from the early 
stages where the drugs have just been placed into the market to a later stage of diffusion 
in which the demand is well established and part of common practice among doctors. At 
the early phase little is known about the characteristics of the drug and its performance in 
a non-trial environment. Nevertheless, with the passage of time the use of these drugs by 
the consumers will provide evidence on their mode of action, efficacy and safety. This 
information acquisition process will increasingly overcome the uncertainty associated to 
the technology. Four main informative channels are identified: learning by prescribing, 
consumption externalities, access to clinical evidence and marketing. In addition to that, 
diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation is taking place within an institutional setting 
characterised by a number of regulatory and organisational factors that might provide 
economic incentives to physicians. In conjunction with the information dissemination 
process the elements that define the practice environment might act as an activation or 
deterrent factor in the demand of the new pharmaceuticals.
The prescription diffusion process is examined empirically in the primary care sector using 
three groups of drugs: statins, proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) and selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Statins are a type of drug aimed to lower cholesterol, PPIs 
are ulcer-healing drugs and SSRIs are a type of antidepressants. These are groups of 
drugs that belong to different therapeutical classes addressed to treat different conditions. 
They have in common the high incidence and prevalence of the condition they are 
prescribed for and entail an important burden of disability. These are drugs commonly 
prescribed in the primary care sector representing a high share of the pharmaceutical bill. 
The prescription data used comes from IMS Health and records all the prescriptions of 
these drugs recorded from 1991 to 2004 in GP practices in the UK.
Given the dynamic nature of the diffusion process the model is specified as a dynamic 
demand equation to capture the learning by prescribing effect as well as the other 
informational and organisational characteristics. The main objective is to quantify these 
relationships and bring empirical evidence on the mechanisms that move the uptake of 
new pharmaceuticals. To adjust for the dynamic element the model estimation is carried 
out using dynamic panel data methods. The main findings support the role of the 
informative channels to prompt the diffusion process. However, the need for information is 
more pronounced in the case of truly innovative technologies. Those technologies for 
which there are alternative prescription options are mainly subject to a process driven by
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the learning by prescribing process. On the other hand, there is no evidence to support 
any effects of the organisational factors on the uptake of new prescription drugs.
Chapter 3 is organised according to the following structure. Section 3.2 provides a 
description of the diffusion process focusing on the mechanisms driving the demand for 
new pharmaceuticals. This section is mainly designed to outline the informational factors 
behind the process as a mean to reduce the uncertainty associated with new product 
innovations. Section 3.3 describes the three groups of drugs and their importance in the 
UK market. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical specification linked to the diffusion process 
as defined in Section 3.2. Section 3.5 describes the dataset generally as well as the 
particular structure of the longitudinal panel constructed for each drug group. Section 3.6 
describes the econometric specification and Section 3.7 presents the econometric models 
used to approach the diffusion process. Section 3.8 presents the results and discusses 
the findings. The final section summarises and extracts the conclusions that can be 
derived from the results obtained.
3.2 Drug Diffusion: Uptake as an Information Seeking Process
Demand for pharmaceuticals has been studied in the literature analysing factors such as 
the decision of generic versus trade-name prescription, the presence of doctor habit 
persistence or the existence of moral hazard in the prescription of drugs (Hellersterein, 
1998; Lundin, 2000; Johannesson and Lundin, 2001). The drugs that were analysed are 
products that have already a market trajectory at which the drug is partly consolidated and 
their introduction in the market is assumed to be at an exogenous stage of drug demand. 
Before reaching this stage there is a process whereby drugs are new entrants and start a 
process of being gradually accepted within standard practice47.
PatientPhysicianManufacturer Regulatory Body
Figure 3.1 Agents in Place as a New Drug Enters the Market
47Prior to entry into the market prescription drugs have been subject to a process of research and 
development in the pharmaceutical sector. The drug is launched and protected by a patent in order to obtain a 
return of the investment effort made by the pharmaceutical company. The dynamics characterising these 
phases have been widely studied in the literature (see Sutton (1998)) and as such they will be considered 
exogenous. Throughout the thesis, drugs are considered to be new entrants either as a new therapeutical 
group or as a new drug within a specific therapeutical group.
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Figure 3.1 shows the agents involved in the process and their interactions. The process of 
technological change starts with the research and development of new drugs by the 
manufacturers. The drug approval process is negotiated between the manufacturer and 
the regulatory body which essentially deals with the drug price setting. Once the drug is 
available in the market, physicians are the agents responsible for the prescription of this 
drug. The influences from the supply-side arise from the incentives from manufacturers to 
advertise its product: the product will be promoted in order to inform48 doctors about the 
drug’s performance and characteristics. The regulator stands between the manufacturer 
and the physician to delineate the set of regulatory structures under which physicians 
operate and determine the demand for new pharmaceuticals. In addition, the sector in 
which new pharmaceuticals are introduced has the special feature of being a market in 
which the physician is the agent for both the regulatory body and the patient. There is also 
an interaction between the regulatory body and the patient based on the patient’s 
contribution against the drugs cost. The interest on this chapter lies primarily on 
physician’s behaviour with respect to the demand of new prescription drugs. However, the 
interactions with the manufacturer and the regulator are also incorporated into the 
analysis. The patient side is left unexplored as the data restrictions do not allow to explore 
the cost that patients bear and any improvements on patient’s health derived from the 
drug prescription.
The doctor-patient relationship is framed within the principal-agency theory as postulated 
by microeconomic theory. The physician acts as the agent of the patient who delegates 
the power to the physician to make decisions on the best treatment available. This 
relationship arises because the principal lacks the clinical knowledge required to take 
well-informed decisions on the appropriate drug therapy. There is a potential conflict of 
interest if the agent and the principal differ in their objectives. In a perfect agency 
relationship, the agent would take the same decision as the principal had the principal the 
information required to choose the most appropriate treatment. Therefore, physicians are 
the pool of potential adopters of the new drug since they are responsible for the 
prescription drug choice49.
48 Emphasis added. The informative role of advertising is discussed below in this section.
49 Physicians work in a context characterised by an increasing introduction of medical technology that widens 
the availability of therapies to treat specific conditions. The analysis of the diffusion of new medicines is 
focused in one or few medicines: however, physicians face a wide spectrum of medicines available to treat 
different health problems and also among the classes of drugs there are products with different active 
ingredients. Hence, there is a vast array of products available that makes difficult to be fully informed about 
the indications and relative performance of all products. The fast technological progress in combination with 
the high number of drugs available in the market makes it difficult for doctors to keep up-to-date with the latest 
medical technologies.
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In general, as discussed in Chapter 2 the uptake of new medical technologies is 
characterised by uncertainty. Usually this uncertainty has been linked to early stages of 
diffusion; however, uncertainty may extend beyond initial adoption. New technologies are 
likely to suffer changes along their paths of diffusion. Incremental improvements will arise 
as a consequence of using these technologies in practice, and the degree of uncertainty 
will gradually decrease as users become more familiar with the technology. Thus the 
process of diffusion should be considered as a dynamic process characterised by strong 
learning effects in which there are a number of informational flows required to convert 
availability into widespread acceptance of the new drug. The introduction of a new drug is 
consequently associated with an information seeking process.
3.2.1 The physician as the decision-maker
Uncertainty is likely to be the main factor explaining the initial delay in diffusion. This might 
be a feature especially at early stages when the lack of information may act as a 
restriction in the spread of drug usage. Risk aversion to uncertainty by the decision-maker 
will indicate individual attitudes towards the risk of using the new drug (Coscelli and 
Shum, 2004). Ideally faster uptake rates by leaders -  those with lower risk aversion -  
would signal market acceptance that followers would observe and consequently decrease 
the degree of uncertainty regarding the drug50. With the introduction of a new drug there is 
a process whereby physicians become informed not only regarding the availability of the 
drug but also with respect to the performance of the drug and this can boost the diffusion 
among other users.
There are a number of incentives for an efficient use of the limited resources provided by 
the health care system in which physicians operate that may also affect the diffusion 
pattern. Hence, the economic incentives provided individually to practices and GPs are 
likely to determine the uptake of pharmaceuticals. The GP reimbursement system in the 
UK is a combination of salary, fee-for-service, capitation and reimbursement based on 
reaching health targets (Scott, 2000). The economic incentives provided by the first three 
reimbursement types are known and they imply different degrees of supply-cost sharing
50 This will be one of the informational factors discussed in this section as a form of consumption externalities.
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by the physician: the lower the cost sharing, the higher the incentives to provide any level 
of care (Ellis and McGuire, 1993)51.
If physicians operating under the same health care context (hence they are reimbursed 
under the same system) have different acceptance to new drugs, the question to resolve 
is to identify the mechanisms that explain how diffusion is progressing. The uncertainty of 
the new technology seems to partly explain differences in individual diffusion. The 
approach taken in this chapter is that diffusion is characterised as a learning process in 
which physicians seek information related to the new drug’s performance. There are costs 
and benefits to the access to information that will depend upon the risk attitudes and 
efforts required to acquire the information. These are generally aspects that are not 
observed to the researcher. Thus the diffusion is examined as the effect that a number of 
informational sources will have on the uptake of new drugs. Indirectly, this will respond to 
the physician’s capacity to process information.
As it was discussed in Chapter 1, the intra-firm diffusion framework is used to construct 
the empirical setting of the current chapter. As it was outlined the intra-firm approach 
accounts for the percentage of output produced with the new technology. The intra-firm 
definition is used to approximate diffusion in this case using the prescription volume, 
rather than accounting for the replacement process through which the new technology 
captures the old drug prescription volume. As it was discussed in the first chapter, the 
reasons for not comparing prescription volume of the new drug with the prescription 
volume of existing products are two-fold. First, the interest does not lie in the substitution 
of the old technology by the new one but to examine the relationship between diffusion 
and the set of factors that induce the process. Secondly, not all the technologies 
examined in this study had an existing technology that could represent any degree of 
competition. They were technologies that represented a real breakthrough that introduced 
a new treatment in an area for which there was no technology that could be considered 
substitutable in a technological aspect.
51 The incentives provided by prospective reimbursement systems have been analysed as a problem based 
on the optimal choice of service provided. This is set up in a context in which physicians weight their profits 
and the benefits to the patient according to the degree of cost sharing established (Ellis and McGuire, 1986; 
Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). In Ellis and McGuire (1986) the physician acts as 
the decision-maker for both the hospital and the patient and weights both the profits to the hospital and the 
benefits for the patient.
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3.2.2 Information channels behind diffusion
Information is defined as any flow of knowledge that reaches individuals informing them 
on the attributes and characteristics of a new product. Several informative channels have 
been examined in the literature. Among these sources, there are differences regarding the 
effort required to gather and assess the information. These channels have been studied in 
the literature individually without accounting for additional informative sources. If they are 
not taken globally there is a risk of overestimating the effect of each informational variable 
under consideration due to the lack of control of other informative covariates. The four 
different channels under explicit consideration here are the following:
1. Advertising: It is one of the factors claimed to be highly influential in the demand 
for prescription drugs. It is one of the first informative sources likely to reach the 
doctor. Pharmaceutical companies spend high percentages of their sales in 
medicines promotion and this is likely to be greater the more innovative the drug 
is. Journal advertising, sales representatives or direct mailing are different 
marketing mechanisms used by the pharmaceutical companies to promote their 
products. Of all these tools, detailing minutes by representatives is the most 
widely instrument used by companies to advertise the drug. Berndt et al. (1995) 
note that the proportion of marketing spending devoted to the latter is 
approximately 70-80%.
There is a clear profitability to the producer in advertising the new product. This 
type of non-price mechanism is of particular interest in the case of a new drug 
under patent where a monopolist will have incentives to promote the product. 
What is the long-term effect of advertising on the demand of the product? As 
noted in the early work by Kaldor (1950, pp.4) “this distinction is persuasive in 
intention (i.e. it is supplied with a view to finding prospective buyers), and all is 
informative in character (in the sense that it supplies some information, even if it is 
only the name of some firm or product)”. The advertising efforts might thus 
respond to two opposed objectives that have polarised the discussion among 
scholars: advertising as a pure informative activity or advertising as a 
consolidation of brand-loyalty by current users. From this it can be derived that in 
the short-term there is to some degree an informative role inherent in the 
advertising activity, the inflexion point may occur in the long-term if this informative 
role does not persist and it turns into product-loyalty generation. In any case, the 
effects of advertising when a new product is introduced may enhance a quicker
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adoption provided that there is a faster dissemination of information than in the 
absence of any promotional efforts (Kaldor, 1950).
Empirically pharmaceutical sales have been clearly shown to be positively related 
to the degree of advertisement and a large effect of advertising campaign on sales 
of new entrants has been shown (Gonul et al., 2001; Azoulay, 2002; Berndt et al., 
2002; Berndt et al., 2003). However, the division of opinions in the role of 
advertising between being informative or persuasive cannot be clearly supported 
by empirical evidence. Empirical research is not only inconclusive but there is also 
evidence that the two effects coexist. Several studies support the informational 
role of marketing as a means to expand the market through the dissemination of 
the mode of action of the drug (Leffer, 1981; Berndt et al., 1997; Rizzo, 1999; 
Azoulay, 2002; Currie and Park, 2002). Other studies found that the role of 
marketing as generating habit persistence outweighs any informational factor that 
could be attributed to promotion efforts (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Windmeijer et 
al., 2006).
There has been some discussion regarding the incentives of the manufacturer to 
provide the right information about the product. On one hand, there might be 
cross-product effects in promotion. If the firm provides negative information about 
one product, demand for the other products produced by the manufacturer may be 
increased. This is channelled through doctors experiencing less adverse effects 
on the drugs than expected (Leffler, 1981). It could also be the case that the 
manufacturer may have the right incentives to provide the correct information on 
the product characteristics and performance when the firm anticipates the entry of 
competitors in that specific drug market (Klein and Leffler, 1981).
Analysis of diffusion at the therapeutical level imposes a restriction with regards to 
the exploration of the role of advertising. In this chapter the analysis covers all the 
prescriptions of any of the molecules within each therapeutical group. Each 
molecule within a therapeutical market is produced by different manufacturers but 
as they are prescribed for the same indication it is initially reasonable to assume 
that they do not compete in terms of the main drug characteristics52. Given that
52 As it will be discussed in the next chapter the promotion by each of the manufacturers will rely on 
highlighting the specific attributes that differentiate each molecule from the rest of products.
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each manufacturer has different advertising strategies subject to the timing of 
entry in the market, it is difficult to capture the behaviour of each manufacturer 
under the same marketing variable. Thus the focus in the current chapter will be to 
explore the overall effect of marketing for each therapeutical group and the 
existence of diminishing marginal returns to advertising expenditure. The analysis 
of the differences in the informative and persuasive role of marketing will be 
relegated to Chapter 4 where the diffusion problem is examined at the individual 
drug level.
As the number of competitors in the market increases it is anticipated that the 
market expanding advertising will decrease and firms will engage more in 
targeting the rivalrous type of marketing that induces prescription habit. There has 
been some evidence on the presence of marketing diminishing returns to scale 
arising in the pharmaceutical market (Berndt et al., 1995; Berndt et al., 1997). 
However, the analysis of the therapeutical level does not allow the analysis of the 
individual products. It is still of interest to test for the presence of diminishing 
returns to marketing in the overall market. In terms of the individual manufacturer 
behaviour, the first entrant in the therapeutical market may promote heavily as 
compared to future entrants in order to overcome some of the barriers from being 
the first product in a pioneer therapeutical market. With the passage of time and 
the entry of competitors within the therapeutical group, the return to an extra 
pound invested by individual manufacturers may decrease over time. This would 
be a consequence of the establishment of the knowledge that physicians require 
during the prescription decision process. Thus a decreasing effect of marketing 
returns could be expected at the therapeutical market. The analysis of the 
possible existence of diminishing returns in this chapter is complementary to the 
informative versus market expanding effect of advertising to be explored in 
Chapter 4.
2. The clinical evidence provided in specialised journals is also likely to help 
physicians to judge the attributes of the new medicine. This mechanism might be 
publicly available even before the drug is being marketed. Trials or studies in 
periods in which the new drug is still being tested will be gradually published 
regardless of the approval stage of the drug. Evidence regarding the efficacy and 
safety available in randomised trials will help physicians to determine the cases for 
which the prescription of the new pharmaceutical is appropriate. Azoulay (2002)
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finds a positive relationship between the diffusion of pharmaceuticals and scientific 
evidence53. The growing role of independent organisations responsible for health 
technology assessment in the information provision regarding the cost- 
effectiveness of drugs can be thought to currently be a key source of information 
for the prescription drug choice. There is however a timing problem generated by 
the gap between the early stage of diffusion of a drug and the publication of official 
guidelines enhanced by these types of organisations54.
3. The personal experience gained through repetitive prescription over time will also 
provide the knowledge required to judge the quality of the drug. The physician will 
learn about the safety and efficacy of the drug through its own prescribing 
experience and follow up of the patient. It is a process of “learning by prescribing”. 
This type of information arises due to the characteristic of drugs as products 
classified as experience goods. As it was discussed in Chapter 1, the definition of 
this type of goods was first introduced by Nelson (1970) whereby experience 
goods are products whose quality is revealed to the consumer only after purchase 
or consumption. Note that there is a difference between experience goods in a 
health context compared to other contexts: physicians corroborate the product 
quality observing the patient’s health outcome. The physician, acting as the 
patient’s agent, is the individual who observes and assesses quality.
Bayesian approaches are often used to deal with the update of beliefs in models 
of learning by doing. In a general setting, Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) explore a 
one-agent Bayesian model of learning-by-doing and choice of technology in which 
the use of technology is led by the accumulation of experience. In a health care 
context and specifically in the diffusion of new prescription anti-ulcer drugs, 
Coscelli and Shum (2004) use a Bayesian model to describe the learning process 
whereby physicians update their beliefs on the quality of the new drug. Empirical 
evidence shows that increases in the use of the drugs can be explained by the 
experience obtained directly through prescription (Currie and Park, 2002; Coscelli
53 Azoulay (2002) uses the stock of scientific information as proxy to study the relationship between clinical 
evidence in the sales pattern in the anti-ulcer drug market.
54 In the UK, the publication of National Service Frameworks in the area of heart disease and mental health is 
very recent. The publication of guidelines by regulatory bodies in charge of technology assessment of the type 
represented by NICE has also been recent. Although NICE guidelines have been shown to influence 
prescription patterns of specific drugs (Sheldon et al., 2004), there is a long time spanned between 
introduction of the new drug and the guideline publication. For instance, statins were introduced in the UK in 
1991 but the publication of the NICE guideline was in 2006. This delay imposes a restriction in the analysis of 
the impact that this would have in the diffusion process.
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and Shum, 2004) and hence support the hypothesis that continued learning will 
confer first-hand knowledge on the quality of the product55.
4. Information dissemination can be also spread through consumption externalities 
which operate through various mechanisms according to the body that originates 
them. First, the market behaviour may signal the general acceptability among 
physicians. Consumption externalities will thus arise offering to individual decision­
maker an extra informative source based on overall peer acceptance as an 
indicator of the drug’s good performance and effectiveness56. Market externalities 
will derive from the observation of the market behaviour. If the individual physician 
looks at the market performance the observed acceptability may indicate standard 
practice and could modify any deviation from the average prescription behaviour. 
There is empirical evidence on the existence of consumption externalities in the 
demand for antiulcer drugs in the US market (Berndt et al., 2003). The wide use of 
a particular treatment provides a sign of the prescription behaviour accepted by 
the community of physicians and these informational externalities will reflect the 
behaviour in common practice that may help to lessen the exposure to malpractice 
laws (Rizzo, 1999; Berndt et al., 2003).
Secondly, the decision process involved in technology diffusion might also be 
based on a type of herd behaviour. In addition to the consumption externalities 
derived from the market, there might also be consumption externalities originating 
from the interaction with peers under the same practising environment. They will 
be called practice externalities. These externalities may occur through informal 
professional meetings in the physician’s environment which enhance the 
exchange of information. Herd behaviour has been illustrated in the literature as 
informational cascades in which individuals make decisions sequentially according 
to the signal revealed by the predecessor. This does not mean that the optimal 
product is being diffused, it is only indicative of the power of informational 
cascades that consolidate the demand of a product57. This situation can of course 
lead to efficient or non-efficient equilibrium as the first to decide may reveal the
55 Other models have used behavioural models of consumer choice to explain brand choice (Erdem and 
Keane, 1996; Ackerberg, 2003). These are models that examined current choice as a function of past 
purchases.
In general, network externalities arise when the use of a good provides more value to the consumer the 
more consumers use the same technology. In the health care market consumption externalities arise in terms 
of information and general acceptance by the community of peers.
57 Bikhchandani et al. (1992, pp.994) define informational cascade as occurring “when it is optimal for an 
individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behaviour of the preceding 
individual without regard to his own information”.
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wrong signal (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani etal., 1992). It has also been argued 
that if decisions are taken independently of any signal, herd behaviour can be 
justified through interpersonal communication among individuals (Shiller, 1995).
The four information sources are included as mechanisms to disseminate knowledge in a 
learning process. The part of the research that was modelling diffusion as a learning 
process was including only experience to explain the process. As opposed to that, the 
definition of the learning process in the present chapter is broader and includes also 
marketing, externalities and clinical evidence. The experience obtained through all these 
different informative channels reduces uncertainty: the more advanced the diffusion stage 
the lower the degree of uncertainty. The information gathering cost will also classify the 
informative mechanism as low- and high-cost seeking process. For instance, in promoting 
the medicine, the pharmaceutical company spends a high proportion of their expenditure 
in detailing minutes by the sales representatives who visit the physician’s practice and 
give information on the features of the drug, indications and contraindications. In that 
sense, physicians are passive agents in the reception of information. Physician’s own 
experience is also a low-cost informative source. Within their working hours and as part of 
their practice they extract information via the observation of the health outcomes obtained 
through routine process of drug prescription. Alternatively, the information obtained 
through clinical evidence or absorbing the information derived from the observation of the 
market behaviour via consumption externalities will have a higher cost since they require 
physicians to spend time and effort in data gathering.
The mechanisms discussed above can be also classified as those obtained via direct 
information such as direct prescription experience or indirect information from promotion, 
clinical evidence or demand externalities. The order in which the channels will be used will 
differ according to the individual physician’s utility function. Clinical evidence will start 
accumulating even before the product enters the market but most likely only technology- 
oriented physicians are likely to be up-to-date with the publication of these clinical studies. 
When the drug starts being marketed the manufacturers’ advertising efforts largely 
through sales representatives will act as probably the first contact with the new product 
innovation58.
58 Although it would be interesting to explore the interactions and mechanisms whereby the physician has the 
first contact with a particular informative source, this goes beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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This chapter will therefore examine new drug diffusion as a learning process in which the 
informative mechanisms outlined above are in play. The objective is to test which of the 
information aspects are relevant to diffusion and quantify the effect of each source on 
diffusion. The contribution to the limited body of literature on drug diffusion of the model 
specified in this chapter is two-fold. First, diffusion analysis is focused on a different type 
of drugs than the drugs usually examined. In addition, diffusion is examined in the context 
of the UK primary care sector as opposed to the examination of diffusion in the US 
market. Secondly, the specification of the model as including the four informational 
mechanisms will offer a complete picture of the role of information in the diffusion process. 
The specification will add to the existing literature a joint analysis of information that brings 
an improvement to the model specification of the individual information factor analysis 
carried out in the existing literature.
3.3 Overview of the Market for Statins, PPIs and SSRIs
Diffusion is explored at the therapeutic class level without the specification of the molecule 
that was prescribed. Differences among them have their origin in the specific aspects of 
their composition that gives them the status of a different molecule. Because molecules 
within therapeutical class share the basic features and there are no major differences, 
informative inter-molecular spillovers are assumed to exist: once the first molecule within 
the same therapeutical group is marketed in the UK, information will spill over subsequent 
molecules. Thus the information that physicians need to learn is marginal as compared to 
the bulk of information required to become familiar with the first drug. Because molecules 
are introduced sequentially over time by the time a new molecule is introduced, 
physicians may be still under the process of gaining knowledge on the efficacy and side 
effects of the drug already in the market. This originates the definition of the diffusion 
process of new drugs as learning process in which there is a continuous information 
seeking process. This section describes the characteristics of each therapeutical class.
3.3.1 Statins
Treatment of heart disease has changed drastically over the past 30 years. A wide range 
of new treatments and forms of care for heart disease have been introduced, making this 
a prime area for the analysis of medical technology diffusion. Amongst these new 
treatments statins are of particular importance. Statins are a class of drug within the 
cholesterol-lowering drugs. Patients with high cholesterol are at risk of developing 
atherosclerotic vascular disease. Its main manifestation is coronary heart disease (CHD)
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followed by cerebrovascular disease (CVD) and periphereal vascular disease. Statins 
have been proven to reduce all atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease events, and total 
mortality associated with them. They are recommended both as medical management for 
the prevention of cardiovascular events and treatment for patients with history of 
cardiovascular disease.
Coronary and cerebrovascular events are two of the diseases that account for the main 
burden of mortality and disability in the UK. They account for almost £5 billion in annual 
direct health care costs and cause 11% and 19% deaths in England and Wales, 
respectively (National Audit Office, 2005). Ischemic heart disease and cerebrovascular 
disease are the first two leading causes of death not only in the UK but also worldwide. 
Statins represent the group of drugs with the highest pharmaceutical spending growth 
(Carter et al., 2003). The cost of statins has been estimated to increase from £700 million 
to £2100 million by 2010 (Wanless, 2001).
Before the development and introduction of statins fibrates were among the most common 
lipid-lowering drugs used to treat hyperlipidaemia during the early 80s. Fibrates were 
effective in controlling triglycerides and HDL-cholesterol. The introduction of the first statin 
in the late 80s and early 90s had a revolutionary impact on the treatment of CHD. Statins 
offered new treatment possibilities for patients with cholesterol in that they were highly 
effective in reducing LDL-cholesterol and total levels of cholesterol.These were condition 
for which the existing lipid-lowering drugs were not indicated for. The fact that statins were 
indicated for specific conditions that could not be treated with the existing drugs 
determines that statins did not have any direct competitor in the market. In general, there 
has been a growth in the lipid-lowering drugs category driven mainly by an increase in the 
utilisation of statins rather than a shift in the pattern of prescription from fibrates and other 
lipid lowering drugs to statins (Dickson and Jacobzone, 2003).
The evidence regarding statins is incontrovertible59. Their effectiveness in reducing total 
and LDL-cholesterol has been extensively shown in the literature. Several clinical trials 
showed a positive effect of statins in lowering the onset of patients with high risk of 
coronary events and stroke in primary prevention. Moreover, statins demonstrated to 
reduce cerebrovascular disease and cardiovascular events in patients in secondary 
prevention. Overall, statins are well tolerated with no differences in safety (Maron et al., 
2000; Palmer et al., 2003). In 2000 the National Service Framework for Coronary Heart 
Disease was launched in which statins were indicated to target the population diagnosed
59 There are three reference studies published in the mid-90s that are considered to give the first evidence of 
the effectiveness of statins: the Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S) (Scandinavian Simvastatin 
Survival Study Group, 1994), the West of Scotland Coronary Prevention Study (WOSCOPS) (Shepherd et al., 
1995) and Cholesterol and Recurrent Events (CARE) (Sacks et al., 1996).
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or at risk of CHD. Most recently, NICE has provided guidelines that highly promote the 
prescription of statins as a prevention and treatment of patients diagnosed with CHD  
(NICE, 2006).
Figure 3.2 Persons Prescribed Statins
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Figure 3.2 shows the trend in the rate of prescription of statins for males and females in 
England and Wales. Figure 3.3 shows the total number of prescription statins dispensed 
in the community in England from 1991 to 2004 according to the Prescription Pricing 
Authority (PPA). There has been an increasing trend in the demand for statins as showed 
in Figure 3.3 confirms the trends in Figure 3.260. There is a slow process of diffusion at 
the early stage while the uptake rate is accelerated over the later years as seen in figure 
3.3. There is a shift to a faster diffusion in the years 1995 and 1996, which coincides with 
the publication of the first studies providing clear evidence on the competitive advantage 
of statins in lowering cholesterol (Shepherd et al., 1995; Sacks et al., 1996).
60 Note the difference in definition in Figure 3.2 and 3.3. The latter represents the actual number of 
prescriptions purchased by patients whereas the former refers to the prescription without follow-up. Although 
both graphs present the same increasing pattern in the demand for statins over time, these figures could 
actually differ according to non-compliance rates. It has been estimated that around one fourth of patients are 
not compliant. This compliance rates for CHD are high compared to other drugs and this is reflected in the 
similarities in Figure 3.2 and 3.3.
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Figure 3.3 Total Number of Statins Prescriptions Dispensed in the Community
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Within the group of statins there are six different molecules classified as belonging to this 
type of lipid-lowering drugs. The first statin to be marketed in the UK was simvastatin and 
it was introduced in 1989. Other statins like pravastatin and fluvastatin were introduced 
early in the 90s and during the second half of the 90s atorvastatin and cerivastatin 
emerged in the market. Cerivastatin was withdrawn from the market in 2001 because 
some deaths caused by renal failure were reported following the intake of cerivastatin. In 
2003 rosuvastatin was launched, this is a year before the end of the study period however 
its prescription is included into the analysis as part of the diffusion process.
3.3.2 PPIs
Proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) are a group of drugs that reduce the production of gastric 
acid in the stomach. They are prescribed to treat dyspepsia, the pain in the upper 
abdomen. Dyspepsia may be caused by gastro-oesophageal reflux disease (GERD) but it 
may cause peptic ulcer complications. PPIs are thus prescribed to heal the discomfort of 
dyspepsia and to prevent and heal stomach and duodenal ulcers. The most direct 
competitors as ulcer-healing drug type when PPIs were introduced were H2-receptor 
antagonists. However, their higher cost-effectiveness has been proven over time as 
highly effective ulcer-healer, surgical interventions and ulcer recurrence (Jonsson, 1996;
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Dekel et al., 2004; Leontiadis et al., 2005; Ford et al., 2006). Omeprazole was the first 
molecule within the group of PPIs to be introduced in 1989. The second PPI to be 
marketed was lansoprazole at the end of the first half of the 90s. The third and fourth 
molecules to emerge were pantoprazole and rabeprazole in 1996 and 1998, respectively. 
Finally, in 2000 the last PPI esomeprazole was introduced.
According to estimates by NICE dyspepsia affects almost half of the population and 
although it may not develop any additional serious problem, a proportion of those with 
dyspepsia may present serious problems caused by this condition (NICE, 2000: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/newsevents/pressreleases/pressreleasearchive/pressreleases200 
0/2000 022 nice issues guidance on proton pump inhibitors ppi for dvspepsia.isp). 
Each year about 40% of adults suffer from dyspepsia, 5% will consult their GP and 1% 
are referred for endoscopy. Of those patients who have dyspepsia investigated by 
endoscopy, 40% have gastro-oesophageal reflux disease (GORD), 40% non-ulcer 
dyspepsia and 13% some form of ulcer (Prescription Pricing Authority (PPA), 
http://www.ppa.nhs.uk//news/pact-082004.htm).The prescription of this type of drugs is so 
common that data extracted for the purpose of this chapter had to be limited to those 
patients that were prescribed PPIs and that had an ulcer in order to keep the size of the 
data manageable. The PPA calculates that the prescription of PPIs “has nearly doubled 
over the last 5 years. In the quarter to March 2006, PPIs account for 73% of items and 
92% of cost for all drugs used for dyspepsia”.
Overall PPIs are well tolerated with few side effects identified and they interact with a 
small number of drugs. They are considered effective drugs to treat acid-related 
conditions. The effectiveness among the different molecules in this therapeutic group are 
similar. All the molecules are pretty similar in safety and effectiveness and the differences 
between them are drawn from their interaction with other drugs and small differences in 
their mechanism of action. As for the case of statins, the diffusion of the PPIs will be 
taken at the therapeutic level under the assumption that there are spillovers effects after 
omeprazole was marketed at the end of the 80s.
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Figure 3.4 Total Number of PPIs Prescriptions Dispensed in the Community
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NICE launched clinical guidelines for the treatment of dyspepsia in primary care for which 
the prescription of PPIs was highly recommended (NICE, 2004a). The main difference 
between PPIs and statins is that the use of PPIs has been recently questioned. It has 
been argued that there is an over prescription which is responsible for an increasing 
spending where cheaper H2-antagonists could be of higher effectiveness (Forgacs and 
Logayaganam, 2008). Their effectiveness has been compared to existing competing 
therapeutical markets within the group of ulcer-healing drugs. The existence of competing 
drugs sets a new framework for the diffusion analysis compared to statins, in which case 
there was no old product that could be directly compared with.
3 .3 .3  S S R Is
Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are a widely used group of drugs used to 
treat depression. Depression is a common illness that may be easily life-disrupting and 
can affect people in all age spectrums and both genders. It is estimated that the 
prevalence of treated depression for males and females has increased 45%  and 40%  
respectively between 1994 and 1998 (ONS, Prevalence of treated depression, England 
and Wales, 1994-1998). In favour of SSRIs it has been claimed that lower toxicity in 
overdose and a high degree of tolerability makes them superior to tricyclic 
antidepressants. They have fewer interactions with other drugs. Nonetheless, individual
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SSRIs present differences in pharmacological characteristics with different responses to 
specific SSRIs.
Figure 3.5 Persons Prescribed SSRIs
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The use of SSRIs has been controversial in the UK (Song et al., 1993). Evidence in favour 
of the advantages and disadvantages has been made public. However, NICE published in 
2004 a clinical guideline for the management of depression in primary and secondary 
health care stating that SSRIs should be routinely prescribed since they are similarly 
effective as tricyclic antidepressants and have higher tolerability (NICE, 2004b). Data from 
the PPA reveals an increasing trend in the consumption of SSRIs. Even after the 
introduction of SSRIs, the most commonly prescribed class of antidepressants, tricyclics, 
were at the frontline for the treatment of depression. Despite the higher detection of 
depression this disease is still being underdiagnosed and it has been estimated that only 
5% of the cases are correctly identified. Fluoxetine was the first SSRIs to be marketed in 
the UK in 1987 followed by the introduction of sertraline, paroxetine and fluoxamine all in 
1991. Citalopram and escitalopram were introduced 1995 and 2002, respectively. Several 
meta-analyses have shown no differences in the efficacy of individual SSRIs (Anderson, 
1998). In Figures 3.5 and 3.6 it can be seen that SSRIs also experienced an increasing 
trend in prescription. The figures show that despite the earlier introduction of SSRIs there 
was a time gap between the SSRIs launch and the take off in prescriptions.
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3.4 Model Specification
Given the background provided above the diffusion process is tested against the 
information channels available to physicians to become familiar to the new product and to 
reduce the uncertainty attached to the technology. The diffusion process occurs in a 
market where there are a number of forces that may influence the diffusion. Thus in 
addition to the information factors, the model will test the impact that organisational 
elements will have on the process. The interest of the chapter relies in the analysis of 
technology diffusion of a new class of products that overall have a higher competitive 
advantage for the treatment of a particular condition. Thus the analysis of drug diffusion is 
undertaken at the therapeutical level. The perspective of the analysis also introduces a 
different angle in the examination of the diffusion process in looking at the physician’s 
acceptance of the technology. The vast majority of the literature has been examining the 
diffusion process at the market level. The individual behaviour in drug diffusion has been 
very limited to the research modelling diffusion as an individual learning process. In the 
current approach, the informational and organisational factors are used to examine the 
individual physician.
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Drug diffusion is empirically tested within the UK primary care sector. In this context, the 
GP is the decision-maker in prescription choice and the practice becomes the 
administrative unit in which physicians operate. The demand for new prescription drugs is 
modelled as a dynamic demand equation that includes three sets of explicative variables. 
The first one relates to the informational sources, the second refers to the organisational 
elements and the final one includes a number of controls. The dynamic aspect of the 
diffusion process comes through two different channels. The first one relates to the 
definition of diffusion as the acceptance over time of a new product that requires a follow- 
up in order to capture all the interactions affecting the process. The second dynamic 
aspect relates to one of the informational channels, the part of the learning process 
articulated via the physician’s own experience, that enters the demand equation as the 
past drug demand. For each therapeutical group -  statins, PPIs and SSRIs - the dynamic 
demand equation can be expressed as follows:
?« = «•?»-1 + 3  ■ I  „ + P x „  + r -d „  +c, (3.1)
Where qit is the quantity of the new drug demanded by physician in practice i at time t , 
qtt_x is the demand in the previous period representing the own experience as a source of 
information, I it represents other information channels as detailed in Section 3.2, xit are 
various organisational factors that affect the practice in which the physician is practising 
and the vector dit refers to demographic controls and time trend dummies that will
capture any shock that may affect demand. The final component c, in (3.1) captures the 
systematic unobserved heterogeneity of the average physician in practice i that 
represents a non-measurable time-constant aspect that is individual-specific.
3.5 Data
The data used for the empirical analysis is from Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS 
Health), a commercial company that produces reports and collects data for the 
pharmaceutical sector. Data was retrieved from one of their databases, IMS Disease- 
Analyzer, that contains prescription data from a sample of stable practices in the UK. IMS 
Disease Analyzer-UK consists of prescription data from a sample of over 130 practices 
throughout the UK covering over three million patients. The first data record was in 1991 
and the data collection runs monthly at the practice level. IMS collects electronically re­
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coded entries from collaborating practices. Due to data protection the doctor, practice and 
patient identifiers are re-coded. Quality and representativeness are checked on a regular 
basis. The demographics (age and gender) of the patients covered by the panel of 
doctors in Disease Analyzer are similar to the population demographics when figures are 
compared to the census population from the Office of National Statistics (ONS).
Each observation recorded in IMS Disease Analyzer is a patient visit and it tracks doctors, 
patients and therapies over time. The data contains information on practice-specific 
characteristics, patient demographics and diagnostic and therapy information. The 
prescription data includes the date of event, the anatomical therapeutic chemical (ATC) 
drug code, form, strength and manufacturer of the product and the quantity prescribed. 
The data was exported identifying the patients that were prescribed one of the drugs in 
the therapeutical groups included in the analysis. Hence, the datasets include all patients’ 
visits in one of the participating GP practices in which a statin, PPI or SSRI were 
prescribed. From the individual patient data in which each observation records a 
prescription, the data was transformed to account for prescription volume at the physician 
level for each time period. As a result, for each therapeutical group, a longitudinal 
database that includes the number of prescriptions of the new medicine was constructed 
for the period 1991-2004, grouping the data at the practice and year level. There is a 
count of the number of statins, PPIs or SSRIs prescription events in each practice by year.
Initially, there were 1,987,598 individual patient observations in the prescription of statins 
in Disease Analyzer-UK for the 14 years of the study period. The data was then 
manipulated to obtain the longitudinal dataset that includes the prescriptions per year of 
each practice and the final panel has 1758 observations. This is an unbalanced panel with 
information on practices that provided information during consecutive periods. The 
participation prescription patterns differ among practices in the number of periods 
available and in terms of the year they enter the sample. There are exactly 133 practices, 
however three of them do not have consecutive observations and could not be included in 
the estimation because of computational issues arising from the econometric methods 
used. The PPIs dataset initially had 255,016 individual observations. Differences in the 
number of initial observations between PPIs and statins and SSRIs arise because the 
PPIs dataset was limited to those patients who were prescribed a PPI and diagnosed with 
a peptic ulcer. As discussed in Section 3.3 this restriction was imposed due to the large 
amount of prescription data linked to PPI prescription that was generating data 
management difficulties. Again it is an unbalanced panel with some practices presenting
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gap years61. There were 1,974,233 observations in the initial data for SSRIs. After some 
manipulation the final longitudinal dataset had 1789 observations. Again this is an 
unbalanced panel with two practices with gap years that are excluded from the group of 
cross-sections.
There is a short gap period between the introduction of each of the three types of drugs 
and the first year of data collection; however, it is a negligible gap in data since the 
diffusion was at its very early stage. The first statin and PPI were first introduced in the UK 
in 1989 and the first SSRI in 1987. IMS Disease Analyzer collection data started in 1991, 
it was only two years after the introduction in the UK market of the first statin, simvastain, 
and the first PPI, omeprazole; it was four years later than the first SSRI to be introduced, 
fluvoxamine. Data in the sample indicates that despite the time spanned between the year 
these drugs were first marketed and the earliest entry available in IMS Disease-Analyzer 
in 1991, the demand for the new prescription drugs was still at a very early stage of 
adoption. Similarly, the national data in the figures showed in Section 3.3 also show that 
the diffusion process seems to actually take off during the first years of the data available 
for this study. The data covers only the prescription event but there is no follow up of the 
actual consumption by the patients. This restricts the analysis strictly to the diffusion 
process and does not allow the analysis to assess the impact of the diffusion on the 
health outcomes of the patients who are prescribed statins, PPIs or SSRIs.
3.6 Econometric Specification
This section outlines the empirical specification derived from the diffusion framework 
portrayed in Section 3.4. As it was described the model is estimated using the dynamic 
demand equation represented by expression (3.1) below. Here, there is a description of 
the dependant and independent variables used to measure the effects of the informative 
and organisational covariates of interest. The diffusion process is defined here as a 
dynamic information seeking process in which there are diminishing uncertainty levels 
associated with the new product as information disseminates. The diffusion process is 
approached using a dynamic equation for the demand of new drugs illustrated by 
expression (3.1) as given by:
= «•?„-! + 8 1 , ,  + f l-x „  + y-d„ + c,
61 The reasons behind the lack of data provision in the gap years are not known. It is suspected that this could 
be either no data collection for those years or it might be a consequence of the practice not prescribing any of 
the drugs of interest but other similar competing drugs. In any case, the fact that they present gap years 
makes them ineligible to be included in the sample due to econometric issues.
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where i and t index the practice where the prescriptions are issued and the year of 
prescription, respectively. The dependent variable qit (PRES) indicates the average
prescription volume per physician in practice i at year t . It was not possible to undertake 
the analysis of the uptake at the individual GP level due to coding issues. The physician 
identifier linked to each prescription could be misleading because prescriptions issued in 
practice i were under the identifier of the “leading prescriber”. Thus, a prescription event 
could be under the identifier of the chief GP but the prescription being actually written by 
one of the other GPs in the same practice. It is thus not possible to know exactly the 
number of drugs prescribed by each GP in the practice and therefore an average 
measure is calculated as a proxy for the number of prescription issued by each doctor in 
the practice62. The dataset provides the practice identifier where the prescription event 
took place as well as the number of GPs in the practice. The dependent variable is thus 
constructed as the total number of prescriptions in the practice in year t divided by the 
number of GPs in the practice. Also, the choice of examining the prescription volume per 
year was based on the description of the learning process outlined above. Since 
physicians go through a period of adaptation, capturing, processing and internalising 
information it is reasonable to consider yearly data. This time span gives physicians 
enough time to update information and apply this into practice in such a way that it is 
reflected in the prescription volume of the new drug. Furthermore, annual data will thus 
not be affected by any seasonal shocks on prescription occurring over the year.
The first component on the right-hand side of expression (3.1) represents the physician’s 
own experience through the learning process and is captured by the lagged value of the 
dependent variable qit_x (PRES(t-1)). The underlying idea is that the prescription issued in
the previous year will confer knowledge on the drug. This informative feedback from the 
past is possible because of the characterisation of drugs as being experience goods. The 
lag of the dependant variable also includes any adjustment costs that are revealed only 
through time. The second component in (3.1) /„ includes additional informative variables
(with the exception of the experience acquired through past demand qit_x) and it is 
represented by the following expression,
I it = (met ,pei ,cet,ml ) (3.2)
62 The underlying assumption when the average measure is accepted as a proxy for the individual volume of 
each GP in the practice is that physicians under the same practice will have similar practicing attitudes and 
behavior.
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The first component of equation (3.2) me, refers to the market externalities that provide
information regarding the general acceptability of the drug. This is captured as the log of 
the sales (SALESt) in the pharmaceutical retail market63. The practice externality is 
represented in (3.2) by pe, and represents the information derived from peers in the
same practice. This variable is expressed by the count of GPs in the same practice 
(NGPi). A higher number of GPs in the practice may indicate a greater interaction and 
sharing knowledge with respect to the experience obtained with statins prescription, for 
example. Table 3.1 shows the number of physicians in the same practice for those 
practices providing prescription data in the sample. Solo practices account for a small 
percentage among the practices in the sample whereas practices with two physicians 
account for a slightly higher percentage. Generally practices are comprised by GP teams 
that range between three and seven physicians. A team environment may generate 
externalities at the practice level.
Table 3.1 GP Count per Practice
1 5.26
2 8.27
3 11.28
4 16.54
5 15.04
6 15.04
7 15.79
>=8 12.78
Total 100
Source: IMS Disease-Analyzer, IMS Health.
The third factor in (3.2) ce, refers to the clinical evidence available. The influence of the
clinical evidence for statins, PPIs and SSRIs is measured according to the accumulation 
of scientific evidence. The definition of this variable comprises the general evidence on 
the three drug classes. In order to capture the effect of the scientific information two 
alternative indicators are introduced. The first one is the cumulative number of papers 
published since the drugs were launched into the market (CUM mt), where m=statins, PPIs
63 Sales refer to wholesaler and manufacturer distribution to retail pharmacy and dispensing doctors as 
collected by IMS Health. Sales are deflated by the CPI extracted from the IMF time series to express sales in 
real terms.
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or SSRIs and t=1991,..., 2004. In order to obtain the number of articles published the 
following strategy was followed. A search was carried out in PubMed looking for those 
papers that had any of the molecules belonging to any of the three groups in the title or in 
the abstract of the paper64. There is a differentiation between the flow and stock of clinical 
information. Following Azoulay (2002) the definition of the CE variable accounts for the 
stock of clinical evidence. As Azoulay (2002, pp.561) argues “since RCTs provide 
information about the existence and/or usefulness of a molecule, one would expect their 
effect to be long-lived”. Azoulay (2002) only considered a number of prestigious academic 
journals. On the contrary, the clinical evidence used here refers to any of the papers 
published65.
The second scientific evidence measure is defined as the cumulative number of scientific 
papers published for each molecule within any of the drug classes weighted by their 
market share. Although the CE variable intends to be a general measure of the clinical 
evidence, this second measure controls for the actual influence of each of the individual 
components within each group as indicated by their relative importance in the market. 
Ceteris paribus, it can be expected that any evidence supporting the superiority of one or 
more molecules within their therapeutical market will be reflected in their market share 
and consequently in the prescription volume. The index of the cumulative clinical evidence 
(ICEmt) is defined each year as:
k
IC E ml = (cumh + m s h a r e ) for t = 1991,. ..,2004
/ = i
Where m indicates the therapeutical class, k represents each of the molecules within each 
therapeutical group, six in the statins class, five molecules within the PPIs and six 
molecules in the SSRIs group. The cumulative number of articles published since the 
drug’s introduction is depicted by cum and mshare is the market share for each molecule. 
In addition to the expected long-term effects of scientific evidence argued by Azoulay 
(2002), there are several reasons for the use of the stock variable. Publications appear 
even before the introduction of the product and so the clinical evidence stock includes any
64 Azoulay (2002) labels the articles as “marketing-expanding science” to the articles that compare the drug 
with placebo and “comparative science” when they compare two or more drugs within the same group. The 
scientific indicators are then weighted according to a scale. This distinction is not made in the present chapter. 
Regardless of the comparative drug, the clinical article will be informative in nature. If there is no old product 
that competes with the new drug, articles will compare the new drug with respect to placebo or molecules 
within the same therapeutical group (within comparisons). If there is an existing competing product, in addition 
the articles may report results that are related to the comparison between the new and old drug (between 
comparisons).
65 Individual preferences will determine the access to journals of different prestige levels. Including any journal 
widens the type of physicians reaching information from clinical evidence published in a broader spectrum of 
journals.
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evidence previous to the year of entry in the market. The scientific information might be 
mixed and point towards different directions. These differences may appear in different 
time periods and under this definition the stock variable accounts for any mixed evidence 
published overtime. Thus the accumulation of evidence will confer an overall perspective 
that will give physicians the information based on clinical trials to assess the adequacy of 
the drugs in clinical practice.
The last of the informational variables in (3.2) mt is related to the marketing efforts made
by the manufacturers of new drugs. This is a polemic variable that has captured the 
attention within the pharmaceutical market. Empirical research has considered the effect 
of marketing on market behaviour and its strategic use by manufacturers to change 
demand. Published studies have generally used a specific data source that accounts for 
spending on detailing minutes as well as other marketing (Leffler, 1981; Hurwitz and 
Caves, 1988; Bemdt et al., 1995; Berndt et al., 1997; Azoulay, 2002). Such data was not 
accessible for the purpose of this study and alternative sources were accessed. The 
marketing variable was therefore defined using three different measures in order to test 
the robustness of the results. The first marketing variable is the number of employees 
(EMPt) in the entire pharmaceutical industry in the UK obtained from the Association of 
the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI). The second measure is the R&D employment 
over the total employment in the total pharmaceutical industry (R&Dt)66. The R&D variable 
is probably a better proxy for marketing that EMPt. Generally, the higher the proportion of 
employment devoted to research the greater the marketing efforts are to secure returns to 
research. This is based on the hypothesis that strong investment in R&D is expected to 
result in new products and this would be accompanied by higher advertising efforts.
In addition to these variables, there were a number of drug-specific variables retrieved 
from additional secondary data sources. In particular, Annual Accounts of all 
manufacturers of the molecules in each therapeutical group could be accessed from the 
Companies House. All companies operating in the UK are required to register and provide 
basic information on their accounts. There is a set of mandatory variables required from 
all companies. The specific aspect that was of interest refers to information on 
employment. Pharmaceutical companies offer different information on labour force. Many
66 These two measures are aggregated figures and do not distinguish across manufacturers or groups of 
drugs. These variables present variability across time to proxy the effort that the pharmaceutical industry is 
making in promoting their products. They are included in the analysis as changes in the employment could 
reflect how active the industry is regarding new products launched in the market but they are not product- 
specific variables.
109
only provide total employment figures but a few give a more detailed account of the 
number of employees broken down by activity. The retrieval of data is conditioned on how 
the companies were registered and the extent to which data on employment was very 
specific. The employment information is thus mixed across manufacturers67.
As an approximation to the marketing efforts, the third marketing proxy is derived from 
data on the employment in the distribution or sales/marketing department of each 
manufacturer as retrieved from the Annual Accounts. There might be differences in the 
definition and activity of these departments across manufacturers. Although I am aware of 
the drawbacks of these variables, the information retrieved from the Companies House is 
the closest representation of the marketing effort that could be accessed. The different 
variables used to define advertising effects are divided in two sets of indicators. The first 
measure relates to the use of the employment force of the first manufacturer to introduce 
the molecule in each therapeutic group (FIRST). Although this indicator refers to the first 
entrant in each therapeutical class it will partly capture the behaviour of the leading 
manufacturer which as first entrant is responsible for advertising a new product in a new 
therapeutical area68. The second measure is the percentage of the sales/distribution 
employment of each manufacturer within the therapeutical group as a proportion of the 
manufacturer’s total employment weighted by the market share for their product 
(EINDEX)69. This indicator is used to adjust the marketing effort by weighting employment 
in the sales/distribution department of each individual manufacturer to the success of the 
molecule as indicated by the market share.
k
eindexmt = ^ ( ' Voemploy  ^ + mshare h ) for t = 1991,...,2004
;=1
Where m indicates the therapeutical class (statins, PPIs or SSRIs), %employ is the 
proportion of the employment force devoted to sales/distribution by manufacturer 
producing drug k and mshareh is the market share of drug k at period t. As an example 
take the case of statins. FIRSTd indicates the percentage of employees in the distribution
67 This could also be originated due to differences in the registration by companies under the same brand 
name. Different company departments might be registered as differentiated filial of the main company as they 
carry out different activities.
68 The uncertainty associated to the first entrant is two-fold: it is drug-specific uncertainty as well as the 
uncertainty attached to the characteristics of the new therapeutical group defined.
69 The index has been generated using the information on sales force when available and total employment 
percentages otherwise.
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department of Merck, the company to introduce the first statin in the UK. The second 
measure of the advertising effects is the index that weights the proportion of employees in 
the sales/distribution department of the five companies that marketed statins weighted by 
their market share (eindexd)70. For the PPIs and SSRIs manufacturers there was no 
information on the sales/distribution employment. Thus, %employh refers to the total
number of employees employed by manufacturer k as percentage of the industry 
employment level as provided by ABPI. The total employment of the manufacturer was 
compared to the total pharmaceutical industry employment to capture the size of the 
manufacturer and its potential influence in the market. Hence, FIRSTte and eindexte 
indicators include employment figures that refer to the total employment in the company 
with respect to the industry total employment. Additional information on drug 
manufacturers and employment figures is available in Appendix 3.1. Henceforth, and 
according to the notation above, the subscripts d and te will refer to the distribution and 
total employment figures, respectively.
The vector of covariates represented in (3.1) by xit consists of the organisational factors 
that define a set of financial incentives such that
xit =(Jh i9ddi) (3.3)
where the first component of the right-hand side yfy is the fundholding status of the GP
practice. This variable captures whether the practice joined the fundholding (FHj) scheme 
in 1991 (the year when the data started being collected). In the UK, between 1991 and 
1999 practices could hold a budget for outpatient and hospital referral as well as 
prescribing costs. Any savings could be used to transfer the budget surplus from one 
category to another (savings in prescription costs could be used against any costs in 
specialist referral) or it could be used in the following year71. The incentives to prescribe 
the new prescription drugs are expected to differ for those practices that were
70 This index does not include the last statin to be introduced rosuvastatin (AstraZeneca) because it did not 
provide information on that specific variable. In any case, this molecule was introduced in 2003 which is the 
year prior to the end of our study period.
Studies published early after the scheme was introduced showed evidence of prescription cost containment 
for the first waves of fundholding practices (Maxwell et al., 1993; Bradlow and Coulter, 1993; Wilson et al., 
1995; Coulter, 1995 -  this study analyses in general the effect of fundholding practices not only to prescription 
costs). It was suggested that even though there was a general increase in prescribing costs, the growth rate 
was lower for the practices with fundholding status (Gosden and Torgerson, 1997; Wilson etal., 1997; Delnoij 
and Brenner, 2000).
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fundholders, especially during the early stage of the diffusion. Expensive new drugs might 
have slower uptake72. The second practice characteristic ddi relates to whether or not the
practice was drug dispenser (DDj). This variable captures the opportunities to generate 
additional income that could provide incentives to over prescribe as a means to capture 
additional revenues.
Finally, the specification (3.1) also includes a vector of controls dit for the strategic health
authority where the practice is located. It contains population structure of the strategic 
health authority where the practice is located: the percentage of population between 45 
and 64 (POP45_64it) and the percentage of population older than 65 (POP65it). These 
variables control for the population that present higher risk of developing the conditions for 
each of the three therapeutic groups prescribed. It also includes the number of GPs 
(GPSjt) in the strategic health authority in which practice i is located to control for any 
shock that may alter the provision of primary health care within the geographical market. 
As it was discussed in Section 3.4 equation (3.1) also includes time dummies to capture 
any time shocks on demand and an element that captures the unobserved heterogeneity 
of practice i . The last element is a time-constant characteristic of the practice that cannot 
be measured by the researcher and the captures attitude, preferences or behaviours that 
may affect the demand for new drugs.
Some of the molecules in the therapeutical groups analysed in this chapter have generic 
competitors at some point during the study period. For instance, generic competition for 
branded statins began in 2003, when patent protection for simvastatin expired. In 2004, 
generic products for pravastatin also started being marketed. PPIs started facing generic 
competition in 2002 with the introduction of the first generic for omeprazole. The generic 
competition picture is different for SSRIs. Given the earlier presence in the market of 
SSRIs there are generic products emerging in the market from 1997. Approximately ten 
years after drug approval, four out of the six molecules included in the analysis go off 
patent and face generic competition. Thus the second half of the data study period 
branded and generic drug names coexist in the market. The focus of the analysis in this 
chapter lies on the overall diffusion of these therapeutical groups as a whole rather than in 
competition issues between individual branded and generic products. The interest in 
diffusion is based on the assumed higher superiority of these three types of drug classes
72 The prescription of expensive drugs increases the likelihood of overspending the prescription budget and 
hence eliminating the possibility to allocate any savings that could be used in other health care services.
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and their welfare implications for patients. Thus, the analysis in this chapter is considered 
to be unaffected by any competition issues arising from the branded-generic dichotomy.
Descriptive statistics for the variables included above are available in Appendix 3.2. The 
average practice size is around five doctors per practice as seen in Tables A.3.2.1 to 
A.3.2.3. On average the consumption externalities from the market have a similar 
magnitude. The clinical evidence indicators reveal that the therapeutical group with the 
highest scientific evidence available is SSRIs. On the marketing variable, the variables 
proxied by the ABPI total industry employment and the percentage of the R&D employees 
over the total employment have the same average given that these are aggregated 
variables. As for the FIRST and EINDEX variables, they differ according to whether they 
account for the sales/distribution employment (as it is the case for statins) or the total 
employment (PPIs and SSRIs). The fact that the total employment has different ranges is 
a reflection of the differences across molecules in therapeutical groups. These 
therapeutical classes are produced by manufacturers that may differ in their weight in the 
industry. In the sample, approximately half of the practices have fundholding status and 
around one fifth of them are drug dispensers.
3.7 Panel Data Methods
There have been several theoretical developments that have enhanced the increasing 
number of studies on dynamic panel data models. In general, the number of empirical 
panel data studies has been increasing due to the number of panels available and an 
increasing tendency to use dynamic models of individual behaviour (Hsiao, 2005). Panel 
data methods combine two dimensions that for a long time had been only considered 
separately: cross-sectional methods and time-series econometrics. The advantages of 
panel data econometrics over the traditional individual or time-series methods have been 
highlighted by many. Hsiao (2003) and Baltagi (2005) list a number of benefits of panel 
data. Among them the fact that there are several data points for each cross-section that 
allows control for individual heterogeneity, “more informative data, more variability, less 
collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi, 
2005, pp.5). They also point out the possibility offered by such methods to explore any 
dynamics underpinning cross-sectional behaviour. This particular aspect is highly relevant 
for present purposes.
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In particular, the learning process discussed above is well suited to a dynamic approach. 
For that purpose, dynamic panel data methods are used. In this section, the dynamic 
panel data methods used to estimate the econometric specification are outlined. Given 
that the dynamics come from the introduction of the past prescription experience as 
explanatory variable the selection of an AR(1) model to estimate the coefficients of the 
variables seems appropriate. For ease of exposition this section describes an 
autoregressive-distributed lag model AR(1) in order to present the different estimation 
methods and assess their properties. However, the GMM estimators described for the 
AR(1) model can be easily extended to include a vector of additional regressors as 
outlined in Sections 3.4 and 3.6. The simple AR(1) model can be expressed as follows
y it =  a  • y it_{ +  c, + eit; i = 1,2,...,N ; t = 2,...,T  (3.4)
where y it is the series for individual i at time period t and y it_x is the lagged value of the 
dependent variable. The disturbance term has two components: c, denotes the 
unobservable individual-specific effect and eit is the idiosyncratic term. The individual 
effects are constant over time and capture any heterogeneity specific to each cross- 
section. It is assumed that c, and eit are independently distributed and also the 
disturbance is serially uncorrelated:
£ [c j  = 0, E[elt] = 0, E \e itct \ = 0 for i = and r = 2 ,...,r
and under the assumption of lack of serial correlation among the errors
E[ei(eis] = 0 for i = 1,...,N  and s * t
As discussed in Bond (2002) if we first apply OLS to expression 3.4 above we will obtain 
an estimator of a  that is inconsistent. The correlation between the lagged value of the 
dependent variable and the error component due to the presence of the fixed effect ct will 
generate dynamic panel bias and hence the estimator will be upward biased. By
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transforming the above equation to eliminate the individual effect the dynamic bias is 
removed. The Within Group estimator eliminates the individual effect by taking the 
deviation of each cross-section at time t from the mean across time for each cross- 
section. Applying OLS to the transformed equation gives the Within Group estimator. 
However, this transformation does not take into account the correlation of the 
transformation with the lagged value of the dependent variable: the transformed lagged
dependent variable is y,M - y t = y u_x -  * (y l2 + ... + y iT) and the error
eit - e i = e it +  — +  elT) . The element y it_x is negatively correlated with eit_x
making the estimator inconsistent and downward biased. The OLS and Within Group are 
inconsistent estimators and biased in opposite directions. Thus consistent estimates of 
the parameter a  should be in the range between the OLS and the Within Group estimator 
with the former being the upper limit and the latter the lower bound (Bond, 2002).
In order to obtain consistent estimators we need a transformation that removes the bias 
caused by the correlation of the individual effect and the lagged dependent variable. The 
most common transformation used is to first difference in order to eliminate the individual 
effect
Ay,, = a - A y it_l + A e it i =  1,2,..., N ; t =  3V..,T
where Ay„ = y it - y it_x and Aeit = e it - e it_x. But the first difference of the lagged
dependent variable is now correlated with the first differenced error component. 
Instrumental variables estimators can be used in order to obtain consistent estimates with 
the only assumption that y n is not correlated with future error terms
E{y„e ,,)  =  0 for t =  2,...,T  (3.5)
If there are at least three time periods, there are a number of valid instruments that can be 
used to consistently estimate a . For the case t = 3 , y n is a valid instrument since
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E (ynAei3) = 0 . If the panel contains four periods, y n is again a valid instrument when 
t = 3 but now y n and y i2 are also instruments when t = 4. If there are T  periods the 
vector of instruments available will be Hence, the assumption of no
serial correlation and the assumption (3.5) on the initial condition y n imply that there are
-^-(r -1X77 - 2 )  ortogonality conditions (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002):
E\yit_sAeit ] = 0 for t = and s >  2
As stated by Bond (2002, pp. 146) “the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), 
developed by Sargan (1982), provides a convenient framework for obtaining 
asymptotically efficient estimators in this context, first-differenced GMM estimators for the 
AR(1) panel data model were developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991)”. The moment conditions can be expressed in the following 
form:
£[z,Ae,] = 0 for i =  1,2,...,N
where the matrix Z, contains all the instruments used in the GMM
~yn 0 0 ... o ... 0
z = 0 y, i y,i ... o ... 0 (3.6)
0 0 o .. • y n ••• yn~2_
When extending the AR(1) model to the multivariate case the matrix of instruments may 
include additional elements. Additional moment conditions will be available depending on 
the assumptions of the correlation between the vector of explanatory variables and the 
error term. These variables can be both timed in the current period or expressed as 
lagged values. Particularly, this will depend on whether the additional explanatory
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variables are endogenous, predetermined or strictly exogenous. In general, when 
applying the above conditions to the AR(1) case, the following efficient estimator is 
obtained:
As argued in Bond (2002), if the error component is homoskedastic the weighting matrix 
WN has the following form
where H  is a square matrix with two’s in the main diagonal and ones on the first off- 
diagonal and zeroes elsewhere. However, the standard errors will not be robust to the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and H  can be replaced in the weighting matrix by
this is the two-step estimator since Ae, is a consistent estimator obtained previously from
the first-differenced approach. As discussed by Bond (2002) in applied work the one-step 
estimator is more commonly used given that the two-step procedure brings low gains in 
efficiency as compared to the one-step procedure and the weighting matrix is based on 
estimation that makes the asymptotic distribution less reliable73.
73 Windemeijer (2000) introduced a finite-sample correction for the standard errors in the two-step procedure.
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Persistent series
The use of the lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments in the first- 
difference GMM are likely to become weak instruments in two cases: when the series are 
highly persistent and when the variance of the unobserved individual-effect is high. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) examine the problem of weak instruments using the particular 
case of T  = 3. With only three periods the parameter a  is just-identified and y n is the 
instrument for the first-difference equation. The instrumental variable regression is
4 yl2 = n - y n + ri for i =  (3.7)
Inserting equation (3.4) in (3.7)
AVi2 = ( « - r)y,i + c, + el2 f° r i =
Under the assumption of stationary, the probability limit of n  is
p lim ^  = (a  - l )*7— t—\—^—7— rr where k = r-— —I t
v ’ (va r^ J /var{ett) ) + k  ( l - c r 2)
The p  lim^- will tend to zero as a  ->  1 or as var(c;) /  var(w;Y) ->  oo and the parameter a  
will be biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998). When y  is a random walk the lagged levels are 
weak instruments for the first-differences because past levels have little information on 
future levels and the difference GMM performs poorly.
If we are willing to further assume that the difference Ayit is uncorrelated with c; (note 
that it is assumed that the explicative variable is correlated with c ,) then there are 
additional moment conditions for the equations in levels
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E[Ay;,_!<?„] = 0 for i =  1,2,...,TV; t = 4,...,T
They also point that there is an additional restriction given that Ayi2 is observed and thus 
E[Ayi2ei3\ = 0 . However, for these conditions to hold Blundell and Bond (1998) require
additional conditions on the first observation of the series based on the first period for 
each cross-section having the following form
The extra condition will not be stated here but can be found in Blundell and Bond (1998) 
in pp. 124-125. The conditions for the equations in levels combined with the conditions 
applied on the first-difference equations form the so-called “system GMM” estimator. This 
was developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) based on the estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) who used the time lagged first-differences as instruments for 
the equations in levels. Monte Carlo simulations in Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that 
this estimator is more robust than first-differenced estimators to the presence of weak 
instruments when the series are highly persistent. The estimator has been found to have 
poor finite sample properties when the lagged levels are weakly correlated with the first 
differences. Using additional assumptions available in the system GMM can improve the 
estimator and return superior finite sample properties.
The matrix of instruments for the system GMM includes the lagged values of y  as 
instruments for the T = 2 equations in first-differences and differences Aytt_x as 
instrument for the T  = 2 equations in levels with the following form:
“ Z, 0 0 . 0
0 Ay, 2 0 . 0
0 0 Ay,3 • 0
. . . 0
0 0 o . . Ay;T_j _
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where Z, is the instrument matrix defined in the difference GMM as depicted by (3.6).
Consider the case of the autoregressive-distributed lag model presented above including 
additional explanatory variables. The model has the following form:
y it = a - y it_] +J3-xit+ c i + e it i = \ t = 2,...,T
where xit is the vector of additional explanatory variables. The first differencing 
transformation is used in order to eliminate any kind of correlation between xit or y it with 
ct . The exact form of the matrix of instruments will depend on the assumptions on the 
explanatory variables xit and the elements of the error component. There will be different 
extra moment conditions depending on whether xit is assumed to be endogenous, 
predetermined or strictly exogenous. If the vector xit is assumed to be endogenous, 
E(xiseit) >  0 for s > t .  Values of x dated t - 2  and earlier are instruments for the 
equations in differences and Axit_x are the instruments for the level equations. Hence, the 
vector of instruments used in the system GMM are
,Ax/m) for t = 3,4,..., T . We now turn to consider
the different tests available in the context of the GMM estimation method for the different 
assumptions made.
Tests for autocorrelation
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a test for the validity of the assumption of no 
autocorrelation among the idiosyncratic term eit. Initially, the full error component will be
correlated with past errors due to the presence of the individual effect. However, if eit are
serially correlated then the instruments used for the equations in differences will be 
correlated with the idiosyncratic error and the instruments will not be valid. Arellano and 
Bond test for the lack of second-order autocorrelation based on the difference in the 
residual. First-order correlation E(eiteit_x) = 0 is not required to be zero but the consistency
of the GMM estimator will rely upon the lack of second-order correlation E{eiteit_2) = 0. 
The residuals are given by
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where X  contains the lagged dependent variable in addition to other explanatory 
variables and p  is the vector of parameters estimated. Following the notation in Arellano
and Bond (1991) the test for second-order autocorrelation is built upon the first- 
differences residuals and given by the following expression:
-TT7T aiv(0 ,l)
where e_2 is the vector of residuals lagged twice and is vector of dimension qx  1 of e
to match e_2. Please refer to Arellano and Bond (1991) for the specific functional forms of 
these expressions and a more detailed discussion. The test is based on the one-step 
estimator that has a distribution asymptotically normal. Similarly, the test for first-order 
autocorrelation in the residuals in differences can be computed in the same manner
mt =
e_xe,
- J I T 2W(0,l)
The serial correlation tests ml and m2 test the null hypothesis of no first- and second- 
order correlation in the residuals of the equations in first-differences E(eiteit_l ) = 0 and
E(eitei,_2) = 0 , respectively.
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Specification tests
GMM estimation assumes exogeneity of the instruments. When the system is 
overidentified the valitidity of the additional moment conditions can be tested using the 
Sargan test (Sargan (1958), Sargan (1988) and Sargan (1982) cited by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) in pp.282) thus following a test of this assumption
S = e Z
v1
ZZ'e e'ZI I I ,
\  i= 1 J
Z e  a X 2p-k
where e = e - x ( p ~ p )  and p  is the two-step estimator of the parameter and p  refers to
the number of columns in Z . The Sargan test based on the one-step estimator has no 
robust chi-square asymptotic distribution. The one-step residuals will be valid if the errors 
are i.i.d. across individuals and overtime (Arellano and Bond (1991), pp. 282). The null 
hypothesis for the Sargan test upholds the validity of the over-identifying restrictions.
The assumptions on the correlation between the vector of explanatory variables and the 
error term eit can also be tested. The additional moment conditions introduced by
assumptions on the endogeneity of different explanatory variables are used in a GMM 
context as overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan difference test is used in this context to 
assess whether these assumptions are valid, specifically
d s - s - s  a y 2 ,
^  p - p
s is the Sargan statistic obtained after the estimation of the model under the stronger 
assumption and s' is the Sargan statistic under the weaker assumption. It follows a 
X 2 distribution, where p  is the number of columns in Z  and p  refers to the number of 
columns under the weaker assumption.
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Unit Root tests
Instruments used in the difference GMM may be weak instruments in presence of highly 
persistent series. Then the validity of the moment conditions is undermined and the 
estimator has poor finite sample properties. The system GMM includes additional moment 
conditions applied to the equations in levels that allow consistent identifications of the 
estimates. In order to test for non-stationarity there are several tests available. Bond et al. 
(2002) study the performance of different unit root tests and conclude that the t-test based 
on the OLS estimation of the parameter a  is robust for cases where the variance of the 
unobserved heterogeneity is low. The OLS estimator of the following first-order 
autoregressive model
y „ = a - y „ -  1+e* (3.8)
= ( l - « ) c ,  +u„
The simple t-test will tell us whether or not to reject the null hypothesis of unit root a  = 1.
a - 1 
7var(a)
under the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator is consistent. An alternative test was 
proposed by Breitung and Meyer (1994) and is based on the OLS estimation of the 
following transformed model:
y „ - y ,  i = « -G v i /= 3 ,...,r
e„ = u „ - ( l - a ) - ( y n - c l )
under the null hypothesis of a  = 1 the t-statistic is a valid test for testing whether the 
individual series are a random walk. Bond et al. (2002) discuss the power of these tests
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and conclude that the test based on the OLS estimation is robust when the variance of ct 
is low. The power of the test proposed by Breitung and Meyer does not depend on the 
variance of ci but it can have a low power. Thus, the preferred unit root test for the
estimation of the econometric specification depicted above is the test based on the OLS 
estimation of the AR(1) model depicted in (3.8).
Overall, the dynamic longitudinal methods have been applied in empirical research in 
several fields. Cigarette consumption has been explored using dynamic demand 
equations to assess the effect of increasing taxes on consumption (Baltagi and Levin, 
1992) and also to see the addictive effects of cigarette consumption (Becker et al. (1994) 
cited in Arellano (2003) pp. 130). The effect of persistent series in the estimation and the 
bias derived from the use of first-differences has been illustrated estimating the effect of 
productivity shocks on the production function and employment equations (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell and Bond, 2000; Blundell et al., 2000). 
The use of dynamic panel data models has been more restricted within health economics 
to represent dynamic demand for health care services. Thus this chapter introduces a 
new approach in the demand for new prescription drugs using recently developed 
dynamic panel data methods, an econometric methodology of limited application within 
the health economics arena.
3.8 Results
This section presents the results of the estimation of the diffusion equation (3.1) using the 
dynamic panel data methods described in the previous section. Inserting (3.2) and (3.3) 
into (3.1) the dynamic demand equation estimated has the following form:
qit = a 0qit_x + a x • meit + a 2 • pet + a 3 • cet + a A -m, + a 5 • fht + a 6ddt + y - d i t+ c i + ejt
(3.9)
where qit is the averaged-physician prescription volume in practice i in year t and qit_x 
is the lagged value of qit representing the information acquisition through own 
prescription experience. The terms meit and peit represent the market and practice 
externalities, respectively. The fourth term cet refers to the information accessed through
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the publication of scientific evidence. The following element mt represents the marketing
variable that controls for the impact of advertising in demand. The first five elements of the 
right-hand side of the dynamic equation (3.9) represent the informational aspects of the 
learning process involved during the diffusion process. The terms j7zf and ddt refer to the 
fundholding and drug-dispensing status of the practice, respectively. The vector of 
variables djt includes the population structure and the number of GPs in the 
administrative area where the practice is registered. It also contains a vector of time 
dummy variables. Finally, the error term is represented by eit and c, is the unobserved 
heterogeneity.
All results presented in this section refer to the estimates obtained using system GMM 
assuming endogeneity of the variables SALES and MKT. This estimation method was 
selected after inspecting the data to avoid finite sample bias. As it was discussed in 
Section 3.7 the OLS coefficients obtained to estimate a dynamic model with unobserved 
heterogeneity would yield an upward biased coefficient. The Within Group estimator 
would give a downward estimate of the lagged of the dependant variable. The coefficients 
obtained using GMM methods should be bounded between these two estimators. The first 
step was to estimate the demand equation using first-differenced GMM. However, the 
specification was tested and suggested endogeneity of the marketing and market 
externality variables presumably due to their simultaneity with prescription volume. The 
OLS, Within groups and GMM estimators both first-differenced and system GMM are 
reported in Appendix 3.2. As expected, the GMM estimators lie between the OLS and 
Within estimates. Given that the endogeneity of these variables imposes additional 
moment conditions, the Sargan difference test is used to test their validity. In all cases, 
the null hypothesis of the overidentifying restrictions validity is not rejected at any 
significance level. The prescription volume qit series are found to be persistent but they
do not appear to have a unit root, as shown by the rejection at any significance level of 
the null hypothesis of unit root. The OLS, Within, first-difference and system GMM 
estimators of the prescription volume series are presented in Appendix 3.2.
Tables 3.2 to 3.4 present the results of the system GMM for statins, PPIs and SSRIs74. 
The instruments used in the system GMM are the following:
74 Alternative specifications with one and two lags of the dependent variable (PRES(t-1) and PRES(t-2)) and 
sales (SALES and SALES(t-1)) were also considered to explore alternative dynamic specifications. They are 
presented in Appendix 3.3.
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(iqit_2,...,qn;met_2,...,me];ml_2,...,m]) for the equations in differences and
(Aqijt_x, , Amt_x) for the equations in levels. Given the different measures of clinical
evidence (CE) and marketing (MKT) tested, the top of each table throughout this section 
indicates the specific measures considered. In Tables 3.2 to 3.4, the clinical evidence 
variable is defined as the cumulative number of articles published over time (CUMt). The 
first two measures of marketing (MKT) are included in the demand equations. In all tables 
the first column considers the number of employees in the pharmaceutical industry 
(EMPt). The marketing variable in the second column refers to the proportion of 
employees in the R&D over the total employment in the pharmaceutical industry (R&Dt). 
Note that these pass the endogeneity test under the Sargan difference test.
Table 3.2 Demand Equations: Statins
Clinical Evidence CUMmt CUMmt
Marketing EMPt R&Dt
PRES(t-1) 0.636222*** 0.636175***
SALES 0.278949* 0.260339*
NGP -0.000014** -0.027890**
CE 0.000046 0.000047
MKT 0.002461** -0.011940**
FH -0.000009 -0.01735
DD 0.000047 0.093058
GPS -0.000046 -0.000046
POP45_64 -1.150507 -1.15118
POP65 1.002251 1.002882
N 1594 1594
ml 0 0
m2 0.04 0.04
Sargan 0.998 0.999
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
The estimates of the learning by prescribing effect are significant and strong in all three 
cases. The strongest effect is on the statins group, followed by SSRIs and PPIs. This 
order could be established as to correspond to the group of drugs that introduce the 
highest innovation. The case of statins is of interest given that it represents a truly 
innovative and breakthrough technology. Statins are a class of drugs opening a new area
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of treatment. SSRIs do have competition but their strong advantage is the lower side- 
effects compared to existing anti-depressants. On the other hand, PPIs although 
representing a new whole therapeutical class of drugs, do have closer product 
competition in the market that may have some type of spillover effects on the learning 
process of this product’s characteristics.
Table 3.3 Demand Equations: PPIs
Clinical Evidence CUMmt CUMmt
Marketing EMPt R&Dt
PRES(t-1) 0.554867*** 0.554807***
SALES 0.456004 0.478721
NGP -0.000015* -0.030172*
CE 0.000013 0.000013
MKT -0.001147 0.005723
FH 0.000044 0.088074
DD 0.000027 0.05362
GPS -0.000041 -0.000041
POP45_64 -2.121946 -2.122821
POP65 1.877374 1.878468
N 1587 1587
ml 0 0
m2 0.759 0.759
SaJ9an____ _______ 0.995 0.997
See notes to Table 3.2.
Market consumption externalities as captured by the covariate SALES seem to have an 
effect on the diffusion of statins as an additional information source. Coefficients for the 
SALES estimates for PPIs and SSRIs are not significant. The positive sign of the market 
consumption externality is a reflection of the importance given to the general acceptance 
of the physician community as to ensure individual practice does not deviate from the 
general practice and to protect from malpractice laws (Berndt et al, 2003). Across the 
three therapeutical groups there is a consistent negative and significant effect of the 
practice externality as indicated by the coefficient of the variable NGP. The externality 
derived from the interaction with peers seems to have the opposite effect to the expected 
sign. There is evidence of herd behaviour but it seems to deter demand rather than boost 
it. These results may be indicative that the effect of externalities works mainly at the 
market level. That is, physicians accept the market behaviour as an indication of the 
general standard practice to correct any deviation of the individual prescription pattern 
from general acceptance.
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Table 3.4 Demand Equations: SSRIs
Clinical Evidence CUMmt CUMmt
Marketing EMPt R&D,
PRES(t-1) 0.588691*** 0.588667***
SALES 0.205257 0.180283
NGP -0.000012** -0.024218**
CE -0.000007 -0.000007
MKT 0.000971 -0.004997
FH -0.000009 -0.017696
DD -0.000008 -0.01522
GPS -0.000055* -0.000055*
POP45_64 0.083528 0.083109
POP65 -0.867275 -0.866575
N 1633 1633
ml 0.001 0.001
m2 0.374 0.374
Sargan 1 1
See notes to Table 3.2.
The sign of the estimate of the clinical evidence variable CE is positive for statins and 
PPIs and negative for the SSRIs. However, the coefficients are not significant for any of 
the three therapeutical groups. The coefficient of the marketing variable is significant only 
in the statins case for both measures EMPt and R&Dt. The positive coefficient of EMPt 
found here confirms the same positive association observed for drug demand (Gonul et 
al., 2001; Azoulay, 2002; Berndt et al., 2003) also when the product is a new prescription 
drug. On the contrary, the R&Dt coefficient seems to have the reverse impact on the 
uptake of statins. A negative association between demand and marketing could initially be 
a sign of the informative role of marketing, although this aspect of the marketing variable 
is left for the next chapter. In addition, these are general marketing measures that might 
not capture the real advertising efforts as marketing levels are not product-specific. There 
are also a number of dynamics that may not be captured by the definition of the marketing 
variable under such general proxies. Further analysis on this variable is undertaken below 
in this section. There is no significant impact of the organisational variables on the 
demand for new drugs75. Under the initial hypothesis that organisational factors could also
75 The fundholding and drug dispensing practice characteristics present the peculiarities that are constant over 
time. The prescription data collected by IMS Disease-Analizer recorded at the beginning of the data collection 
whether the practice was classified as fundholder and/or drug dispenser; however, this information was not 
updated in the subsequent years. Although practices might have changed status, these characteristics 
indicate the managerial attitude that the practice might have. In the case of fundholding, in 1999 all GP 
practices were required to join into Primary Care Groups (PCGs) but this change can be considered to 
happen in a mature stage where the efficacy of the prescription drugs was better known.
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shape the uptake of new drugs, the results showed here point towards a diffusion process 
driven mainly as a learning process.
Tables 3.2 to 3.4 included general indicators of the pharmaceutical industry as proxies for 
the marketing variable. Although these measures are too broad in their definition they 
serve as a starting point in the analysis of the relationship between marketing and 
diffusion. At this stage, the analysis is taken one step further and the marketing variables 
are defined according to the employment figures that could be obtained from the Annual 
Accounts from the Companies House. As indicated in Section 3.6, the marketing variables 
are now measured by the employment in the sales/distribution department in the case of 
statins and the total employment figures by manufacturer in the other two therapeutical 
groups. The first measure considered is the employment figure of the manufacturer of the 
first molecule to be introduced (FIRST)76. The second variable is the employment by the 
manufacturer of each drug within the therapeutical group weighted by their market share 
(EINDEX)77. Results of the estimates obtained using these variables are presented in 
Table 3.5. The variable clinical evidence that was previously defined as the stock of 
articles published is now defined as the molecule stock weighted by the market share 
(ICEmt). The same specifications using the cumulative number of articles published (CUMt) 
were also estimated. Overall the results were very similar but the introduction of the index 
produced robust and significant estimates of the clinical evidence variable. Thus this was 
selected as the preferred model specification.
The first and second columns consider the percentage of employees in the distribution 
department in Merck (manufacturer of simvastatin, the first statin in the UK market) and 
the weighted index eindexd as indicators of the marketing efforts78. The third and fourth 
columns refer to the PPIs case and consider the total employment of the manufacturer of 
the first drug within the therapeutical group and the weighted index of all manufacturers. 
The last two columns in Table 3.5 refer to the SSRIs case and the variables are defined 
as in the PPIs case. In general, results are consistent to the estimates in Tables 3.2, 3.3 
and 3.4. The positive and significant coefficients of the learning by prescription estimate 
support the strong effect of GPs own experience as the leading informational factor on the 
demand for new drugs.
76 Note that FIRST and EINDEX will have the subscript d when the variables refer to sales/distribution 
information and the subscript te when they refer to total employment.
77 Although each manufacturer will have a different marketing strategy, this variable only intends to account for 
the total effect of marketing on diffusion. Note that the present analysis is interested the association between 
marketing and diffusion as a general trend for different therapeutical groups. In Chapter 4, the individual effect 
of the advertising efforts by each molecule manufacturer will be examined.
78 The variables FIRSTte and eindexte were also included as marketing variables in the statins regressions and 
gave similar results to those using the sales/distribution data. The exception was that the coefficient of 
eindexte is negative and significant.
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Table 3.5 Specification with Employment Marketing Variables
Statins PPIs SSRIs
Clinical Evidence ICEpprt ICEpnt O m 3. O m 3 ICEmt ICEmt
Marketing FIRSTd eindexd FIRSTte eindexte FIRSTte eindexte
PRES(t-1) 0.636175*** 0.636175*** 0.554807*** 0.554807*** 0.588667*** 0.588667***
SALES -0.54007 -0.557860* 0.527039* 0.550165* -0.308272 -0.231755
NGP -0.027890** -0.027890** -0.030172* -0.030172* -0.024218** -0.024218**
CE 0.001167*** 0.001051*** 0.000015 -0.000082 0.000173 -3.104589
MKT -1.385793** 0.728427** 0.886393 1.640953 -6.68E+01 0.000184
FH -0.01735 -0.01735 0.088074 0.088074 -0.017696 -0.017696
DD 0.093058 0.093058 0.05362 0.05362 -0.01522 -0.01522
GPS -0.000046 -0.000046 -0.000041 -0.000041 -0.000055* -0.000055*
POP45_64 -1.15118 -1.15118 -2.122821 -2.122821 0.083109 0.083109
POP65 1.002882 1.002882 1.878468 1.878468 -0.866575 -0.866575
N 1594 1594 1587 1587 1633 1633
ml 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001
m2 0.04 0.04 0.759 0.759 0.374 0.374
Sargan 0.998 0.998 0.996 0.996 1 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
m l and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
As opposed to the findings in Tables 3.2,3.3 and 3.4 the clinical evidence variable is now 
significant and positive for the statins results. The coefficient for the variable SALES in the 
PPI case becomes significant and positive whereas the same coefficient becomes 
negative for the statins case. The marketing variable is again only significant in the statins 
case but now it has a stronger effect. The marketing effort by the first manufacturer 
(FIRST) has a negative impact on demand whereas the indicator that accounts for the 
weight of all manufacturers (EINDEX) has a positive impact. As it was previously the case, 
differences in the sign of the coefficients for both variables may be explained by several 
factors that are related to the underlying dynamics in marketing efforts that cannot be 
captured by these variables79. For instance, the objectives that the first manufacturer is 
pursuing are likely to be different to the objectives followed by the producer of other 
molecules introduced after80. The introduction of the marketing index variable improves 
the specification of the demand equations. Therefore, the equations that include the index 
for both clinical evidence (ICEmt) and marketing variables (eindex) are the preferred model 
specifications.
According to the results in Table 3.5 the effect of fundholding and drug dispensing 
variables is not significant. A further possibility is inspected to detect whether the 
combination of these two effects may be strong enough to show a significant result that 
could support the hypothesis of organisational factors. This might indicate that in these 
cases the combination of having a budget could be counterbalanced by the additional set 
of incentives that can be derived from having extra revenue arising from selling the drug 
in-site. The results are not presented in this section but can be found in Appendix 3.4. The 
new estimates could not support the effect of the interaction of these two factors and thus 
corroborates the lack of influence of the managerial strategy that defined the activity of 
each practice.
In general, it has been argued that physicians are not aware of prescription costs. The 
question arising in a context of new drug diffusion is whether new drugs, usually highly 
priced in comparison with existing alternative treatment, may influence diffusion. Prices 
are next included in the estimation to test for potential moral hazard81. Table 3.6 presents
79 The joint effect of marketing may be the consolidation as a therapeutical group. Individually, the marketing 
effort may be addressed to capture market share.
80 As it is the case in the present chapter and also will be discussed in Chapter 4 the first entrant will use 
marketing as an informative tool to break the barriers imposed by the uncertainty regarding a brand new 
product.
81 Price data comes from IMS Health. It contains quarterly price data in local currency units. Yearly prices are 
obtained as the average per year and expressed in logarithmic terms. Price series were deflated using the
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the results with the diffusion equations including this variable (PRICE)82. Although there is 
negative price elasticity, the results are not significant and show no evidence of price 
responsiveness in the demand for new drugs. In general, coefficients for the other 
covariates are consistent with the results obtained in previous estimations. The level of 
aggregation at the therapeutical level might be a cause of the lack of price significance. 
The impact of prices in the individual drug diffusion as is examined in the next chapter 
may produce a more specific influence in the diffusion process. Thus, further research into 
the price elasticity for the demand of new drugs will be considered in Chapter 4.
Table 3.6 Diffusion Equations with Prices
Statins PPIs SSRIs
Clinical Evidence IC Emt ICEmt ICEmt
Marketing eindexd eindexte eindexte
PRES(t-1) 0.624707*** 0.539793*** 0.543152***
SALES 0.431009 1.161043 -0.025286
NGP -0.026837** -0 .031103* -0 .025385**
CE -0.000228 -0.000002 0.000386*
MKT 0.645698 6.251073 3.965292
PRICES -2.310596 -0.169452 -0.562569
FH -0.005221 0.100043 -0.021405
DD 0.087716 0.06486 -0.009337
G PS -0.000053 -0.000047 -0.000051
PO P45_64 -1.77288 -2.784254 1.026786
PO P65 1.31778 1.664751 -2.111905
N 1334 1325 1388
ml 0 0 0.004
m2 0.069 0.736 0.508
Sargan 0.733 0.702 0.958
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies are included in all specifications
CPI. The price of each therapeutical class refers to an average price of all the products within the 
therapeutical group.
82 Demand equations for pharmaceuticals consider prices as endogenous as in Ellison et al. (1997). Prices in 
this setting are not considered to be endogenous. Physicians practising in a context where there is a third 
party payer that covers almost the totality of prescription costs, thus price awareness is not expected to be an 
influential element during the diffusion process.
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The marketing variables used in the previous estimations are general measures that do 
not allow controlling for any changes in the objectives pursued by manufacturers. There 
are thus a number of interactions that may change the attitude of manufacturers with 
respect to the investment in marketing. Consequently earlier estimates may show results 
that confound these elements. As it was discussed in Section 3.2 the passage of time and 
the establishment of the therapeutical group may lead to a decrease in the advertising 
effort caused by a decrease in the return to the promotion investment of early entrants. 
The prescription growth observed in the sample across the three groups is indicative 
these drugs become part of the standard prescription practice. Regardless of whether 
marketing is informative or prescription habit enhancer, once the products are 
consolidated there might be a decreasing trend of the returns to advertising. Based on 
that assumption, the analysis considers a new definition of marketing. The new variable is 
broken into different time periods to test for potential decrease in the effects of the overall 
marketing effort. For that purpose, the new marketing variable is partitioned into three 
variables according to three periods and defined as the interaction of the employment 
index eindex (sales/distribution employment for statins and total employment for the other 
two groups) and the year:
M kt9 \_  95 = eindex * year if year <= 1995 
Mkt9\ 95 = 0 otherwise
Mkt96 _  00 = eindex * year if year > 1995 &  year <= 2000 
Mkt96 00 = 0 otherwise
M kt0 l_  04 = eindex * year if year > 2000 
MktOl 04 = 0 otherwise
Table 3.7 shows the results under the new model specification. Overall, the estimates are 
analogous to those presented throughout the results section. The estimates of the 
marketing variable for statins are shown in the first column. The coefficients show the 
presence of increasing returns to marketing only after 1995. The coefficient MKT91_95 is 
negative but then increases over time. There are long-lasting effects of the promotion
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efforts that are articulated through an increasing demand for this new therapeutical group. 
The effects of marketing on demand for PPIs have an inverted u-shaped impact although 
the estimates are not significant. As for SSRIs, only the marketing in the first period shows 
a significant effect on demand. Similarly to the statins case, the negative effect could be 
capturing an informative role of the marketing effort. The lack of significance on the other 
marketing variables does not allow conclusions regarding the effect of the presence of 
diminishing returns to marketing. Note that when the marketing variable is specified to 
control for any shocks over time, the results show that consumption externalities at the 
market level for statins and PPIs are helpful to physicians as a channel to find the overall 
acceptance of the market. Contrary to what it would be expected, the sign of the elasticity 
of demand to consumption externalities is negative.
Table 3.7 Diminishing Returns to Marketing
Variable Statins PPIs SSRIs
PRES(t-1) 0.600817*** 0.554807*** 0.588667***
SALES -0.583461* 0.549725* -0.230044
NGP -0.031150** -0.030172* -0.024218**
CE 0.001126*** -0.000082 0.000184
MKT91_95 -0.001309** -0.000055 -0.007113*
MKT96_00 0.000352* 0.000652 -0.002204
MKT01_04 0.000337* 0.00082 -0.001549
FH -0.019185 0.088074 -0.017696
DD 0.091278 0.05362 -0.01522
GPS -0.000046 -0.000041 -0.000055*
POP45_64 -1.003473 -2.122821 0.083109
POP65 0.383876 1.878468 -0.866575
N 1622 1587 1633
ml 0.001 0 0.001
m2 0.068 0.759 0.374
Sargan 0.996 0.998 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies are included in all specifications
Practice externalities have a significant and negative effect on the demand for new drugs. 
This result is consistent across all specifications presented in this section. Given that the 
size of the practice seems to have a negative impact on diffusion an additional test is 
carried out in order to draw robust conclusions regarding this covariate. As such the 
number of physicians in the practice is divided in three dummy variables. The first one
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(SOLO PRACTICES) indicates whether there is only one physician in the practice. The 
second variable (MEDIUM PRACTICES) take on value one if the practice has between 
two and five physicians. The last variable (LARGE PRACTICES) is equal to one if the 
practice has more than five physicians. The results are shown in Appendix 3.5 and 
suggest that being a solo practice is positively associated with the demand for new drugs. 
On the contrary, having a medium and larger size seems to be inversely correlated to 
diffusion. These results are only significant for the statins group. The overall lack of 
consumption externalities at both the practice and market level could be counterbalanced 
by the fact that personal experience plays a key role in the diffusion process. This seems 
to confirm a diffusion process characterised by a learning process in which only the 
individual information matters. Other external signals do not correct for the individual 
prescription behaviour.
Finally, the results presented in this section are country-specific. Given differences in 
health care systems, other diffusion patterns may arise. To check for consistency of 
results across countries the model presented in this chapter was replicated using German 
data from IMS Disease-Analyzer Germany. There are some qualitative differences 
between IMS Disease-Analyzer UK and Germany mainly determined by differences 
between health care systems. The UK includes data on organisational factors of the 
practice whereas for the German data there are a number of physician’s demographic 
variables such as age and gender but not regulatory variables. In Germany, practices are 
mainly solo practices and the figure of the leading prescriber could be matched with the 
figure of the actual prescriber. Despite the differences in covariates that are included in 
the specification of the diffusion equations, the informational variables of interest still offer 
some scope for comparison83.
Results are presented in Appendix 3.6 and include the system GMM estimators when 
using CUMmt and ICEmtas measures of clinical evidence. The marketing variable in the 
German case was only based on the aggregated figure for the total employment in the 
pharmaceutical industry (EMPmt). In general, the results obtained support the findings 
presented in this section with respect to the strong learning effects. Contrary to the results 
on consumption externalities derived from the UK estimates, market externalities have a 
significant and negative effect on diffusion. Practice externalities also have a negative 
impact on diffusion. Clinical evidence does not seem to have an effect whereas the 
marketing variable confirms its positive effect on diffusion only for the case of statins and 
partially for the PPI case. When testing the prevalence of diminishing returns to marketing, 
the German case reveals increasing returns to marketing for statins. As a final remark, it is 
interesting to see that the variables that capture the demographic characteristics of the
83 UK controls for organisational elements and Germany controls for individual physician characteristics.
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physician are not significant and thus do not influence the diffusion equations. Differences 
in diffusion patterns might be explained by differences in the vector of regressors included 
in the specifications but also due to differences in the health care systems that could not 
be accounted for here due to data limitations. Yet, the results show similarities in diffusion 
process.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines the diffusion of three new therapeutical groups: statins, PPIs and 
SSRIs. The diffusion process is modelled from the perspective of the physician as 
opposed to the majority of the literature examining demand from the overall market 
perspective. The diffusion process is inherently dynamic and hypothesized to be highly 
determined by the informational flows obtained to overcome the uncertainty associated 
with new technologies. Four elements have been identified as the main informative 
mechanisms available to physicians: advertising efforts, consumption externalities both at 
the market and practice level, experience through prescription and clinical evidence. 
Using all these mechanisms as drivers of the diffusion process the model is specified as a 
dynamic demand equation to test the role of information in the diffusion process. In 
addition to these informational elements, there are other factors mainly derived from the 
regulation imposed by the regulator responsible for the management of the health care 
system. The data used is prescription data from the UK NHS primary care sector as 
provided by IMS Health. This model specification presents the advantages over existing 
literature in that it provides a new modelling of the diffusion process as a learning process 
articulated through information acquisition. This is a new approach to diffusion analysis 
that includes all information sources that were previously considered individually in 
previous research.
The uncertainty associated with new drug classes seems to be overcome through a 
continuous information seeking process that provides the decision-maker with the 
information regarding the characteristics of the product. The dynamic aspect of the 
diffusion process is articulated through the introduction of past demand capturing the 
effect of learning by prescribing and the modelling specification that captures a process 
that evolves overtime. In general, informational elements are the most influential factors 
affecting diffusion as suggested by the results in Section 3.8. The strongest information 
source is the physician’s own experience through learning by prescribing as indicated by 
the significant effect of the estimates obtained across all results presented in the previous 
section. Elasticities of demand range between 50 and 70%. As experience goods, 
physicians learn about the drug after prescription. This is a continuous process in which
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physicians obtain feedback on the drug characteristics through the observation of the 
patients’ health outcomes.
The second of the informational factors hypothesized to determine diffusion are 
consumption externalities. There is an overall effect of consumption externalities at both 
levels, as the market acceptance and the acceptance by peers in the same practice. The 
signal offered by the general acceptance of the market has opposed signs in the elasticity 
of demand. The effect is negative in the statins case whereas it is positive in the PPIs 
case. This suggests that whenever the new drug represents a breakthrough the market 
does not provide strong signals and market externalities are not required in order to 
enhance the diffusion process. On the other hand, when the technology represents a new 
therapeutical group but potentially faces the competition of existing technologies, the 
market acceptance shows product superiority through general acceptance. This conveys 
a force that corrects for any individual deviation from standard prescription. The 
information exchange that could result from the interaction with peers in the same practice 
also has a limited effect. Consumption externalities do not operate at the practice level as 
the information obtained from the individual experience might overrule the information 
exchange within the practice. The degree of herd behaviour is thus partial and does not 
act as a main driver of diffusion.
The third factor included as potentially influencing diffusion is clinical evidence. Overall the 
scientific evidence published in professional journals does not seem to have a consistent 
and significant effect on diffusion across technologies. Of the two measures used to proxy 
clinical evidence, only the weighted index ICEmt seems to be significant for the diffusion of 
statins. A priori, this indicates that clinical evidence may have stronger effects at the 
individual drug level rather than at the therapeutical level. When the analysis is taken from 
the therapeutical approach the overall effect may be driven by specific drugs within the 
therapeutical class. This opens the possibility for further discussion in the next chapter 
where the individual behaviour of molecules within the statins therapeutical group is 
examined.
As for the last of the informational variables, marketing efforts, the findings support a 
positive association between marketing and diffusion, although this is again restricted to 
the statins group. Confounding results arise when the marketing is introduced by a 
uniform definition that does not account for any possible changes in the objectives 
pursued by manufacturer. When the marketing behaviour is examined overtime there is a
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long-term positive effect on demand. These results are limited to the statins case. This 
supports the presence of increasing returns to promotion. Whether this effect is due to 
long-lasting marketing effects over time through the individual drug promotion or it is 
derived from increased marketing efforts by later entrants is something that will be 
examined in the next chapter. There seems to be a negative effect of marketing on 
demand during the first period in which the process flows. The potential for informative 
role of marketing is thus already presented at the therapeutical analysis. This is shown by 
the results obtained for the statins and SSRIs case. These two therapeutical groups 
represent innovative technology at different levels. As pointed out above statins represent 
a real innovative technology. To a different extent, the superiority of SSRIs is shown 
through lower side-effects that define them as the best treatment option for depression. 
These two technologies thus embody innovation with clear advantages with respect to 
existing treatment options.
Organisational factors are initially expected to provide a number of economic incentives to 
practices that could modify the diffusion pattern. However, there is no evidence to support 
such hypothesis. None of the practice organisational variables have a significant effect on 
diffusion. In that manner, direct financial incentives do not seem to operate when new 
drugs are introduced. The introduction of drugs in these therapeutical groups brings new 
treatment options through their competitive advantage with respect to existing treatment. 
This effect is strong enough as to ignore the incentives that the practice managerial 
organisation could have. This shows that the underlying effect of diffusion is to meet 
patients’ needs using the state-of-the-art technology. If during the prescription drug choice 
there is a preference for new technologies, the objective is to improve patients’ health 
outcome. Finally, prices of new drugs are shown not to have any effect on demand. The 
presence of a third-party payer disregards any effect of the new drug cost on the diffusion 
of new technology.
Overall, the results for statins, denoting a type of technology showing a clear innovative 
product, as opposed to less innovative technologies, such as PPIs and SSRIs, show that 
information plays a key role in the diffusion process. Less pioneer technologies that face 
some competition from existing treatment options do not hinge upon the informational 
sources as heavily as breakthrough technologies. The latter group are the type of 
technologies that need to overcome the highest product uncertainty. Statins defined a 
new area of highly effective products to treat patients with cholesterol with unequivocally 
proven effectiveness enhancing an information seeking process to overcome product 
uncertainty. This acted as the mechanism that boosted the demand for new
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pharmaceuticals. Given that the evidence in this chapter concerns diffusion at the 
therapeutical level, the research in the next chapter extends the analysis of statins at the 
individual drug level. The objective is to check whether the same information process 
holds and to examine the potential factors that explain prescription differences among 
individual products within the same therapeutical level.
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Chapter 4
Diffusion of New Pharmaceuticals in a Competitive 
Context: Implications for Market Dominance
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined empirically the diffusion of new pharmaceuticals for three 
different therapeutical groups in the primary care sector. Diffusion was defined as a 
process by which drugs penetrate into the market and the uncertainty associated to them 
is gradually resolved through an information dissemination process. In Chapter 3 the 
analysis was assessed at the aggregated therapeutical level to examine the determinants 
of physician prescription behaviour during new drug diffusion. It did not differentiate 
among individual drugs under the assumption of the overall efficacy of statins, PPIs and 
SSRIs as a group in targeting the conditions for which they are indicated. The main 
characteristic of this form of product innovation is that the therapeutical group is 
comprised of different compounds that are close substitutes, although they have a specific 
composition that makes them eligible individually for patent protection. These molecules 
are introduced in time in a sequential order. The role of the first molecule is important in 
that it opens a new market: it is the first product to be introduced and defines the 
therapeutical group. It is also the product providing genuine technological advance given 
that the following molecules are not a pure innovation but a modified version of the 
incumbent product.
In addition to the analysis of diffusion at the therapeutical level, this chapter further 
explores the dynamics within the therapeutical group. Against this backdrop, the objective 
is to examine the diffusion process of new drugs under a competing environment. 
Although the therapeutical level inspects diffusion in a context with overall technology 
competitive advantage, the molecule level analysis is based on the product differentiation 
and the factors that determine different market penetrations. The examination of diffusion 
at the individual drug level provides the opportunity to examine pioneer markets and the 
behaviour dynamics of drugs that are all under patent protection but still competing with 
each other. Understanding the elements that consolidate different market shares has 
implications for the regulatory context and organisation of the markets in which these 
products diffuse.
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The present chapter is particularly interested in the diffusion of different compounds within 
the statins therapeutical class. After the first statin, simvastatin, was firstly marketed in the 
UK in 1989, several drugs within the same therapeutical class were introduced over time. 
Figure 1 shows the market share of each drug for the period 1991-2004. The market 
share is based on sales data available for each drug. The pioneer drug clearly enjoyed 
first mover advantage in this market with respect to later entrants as it is shown in Figure 
4.1. The two following entrants captured a very small share in comparison to the 
incumbent. It was only after the fourth competitor entered the market that the distribution 
of market dominance changed. This product followed a quick penetration with a market 
share converging towards the market share of the first entrant. Towards the end of the 
study period there are two products that dominate the market. This market thus 
represents a particular case of the presence of first-mover advantage undermined by the 
entrance of later products.
Figure 4.1 Statins Market Share
100%
■ Simvastatin □ Pravastatin ■ Flu\rastatin □ Atorvastatin
Note: Market share of the four drugs included in the study 
Source: IMS Health
As stated by Hurwitz and Caves (1988, pp.301) “A pharmaceutical drug that acquires a 
patent on a new ethical drug becomes a temporary monopolist who knows when its legal 
protection against entrants will expire. Theoretical analysis of such monopolists’ behaviour 
have stressed their scope for maximising wealth by building a goodwill asset while entry is 
precluded and by responding optimally to entry when it occurs. If the monopoly holds no
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durable goodwill asset, its position when legal protection lapses becomes no different 
from that of new entrants to the market [...]. If the monopoly holds a durable but wasting 
goodwill asset [...] the monopoly enjoys strategic options...”. This statement is based on 
the idea that patent expiry introduces competition between the incumbent monopolist and 
later entrants. Market competition in the pharmaceutical sector may have several 
definitions. First, the market may be examined through the competition of bioequivalent 
products. This is the case of branded drugs that face competition of other generic 
products. On the other hand, market competition can be approached looking at different 
branded drugs competing for the prescription of similar conditions. Typically, competition 
has been examined through the strategic behaviour of branded and generic products. 
Even prior to the branded-generic competition, the pharmaceutical market may face the 
second type of competition among branded products within the same therapeutical sector. 
These are products introduced at different points in time, they are all under patent 
protection and although they are not bioequivalent they are competing to treat the same 
medical condition.
The main characteristic of the market examined in the present chapter is that the 
manufacturer is a monopolist that holds patent protection for a branded product. However, 
there is competition among branded drugs within the same therapeutical market. The 
goodwill asset defined by Hurwitz and Caves is in this case specific to the branded drug. 
The interest primarily lies on the effect of the goodwill asset perpetuated by the first- 
entrant as compared to later entrants within the same therapeutical group and how this 
advantage may be taken over by later entrants. The literature offers empirical studies of 
the demand of different molecules within the same therapeutical group from an 
aggregated perspective and expressing demand as a function of prices and quality 
measures (Ellison et al., 1997; Berndt et al., 2003).The approach adopted in this chapter 
is also undertaken at the molecule level but it introduces a new approach in that the 
analysis is focused on diffusion and competition issues affecting new drug demand.
In view of the drug trends observed in the statins market, this chapter examines the 
diffusion of the first four statins. The main interest lies in the examination of the 
mechanisms that provide first-mover advantage in a diffusion context. The statins market 
is characterised by pioneer advantage being destabilized by later entrants. In a market 
where there are two products that share prescription dominance, the interest of the 
analysis is two-fold. In the first place, based upon the framework set in Chapter 3 the 
empirical model will examine whether the diffusion mechanisms explored in the previous 
chapter at the therapeutical level hold at the individual drug level. In particular, the focus
142
will be to examine whether differences in diffusion patterns can be explained by 
informational issues. The second objective is to test whether product differentiation is 
responsible for market dominance. The main difference with the specification in the last 
chapter is that the variable of interest is not defined in absolute terms but relative to the 
competing drug. As in Chapter 3, diffusion at the molecule level is examined within the UK 
NHS primary care sector at the practice level using IMS prescription data for the period 
1991-2004. The findings suggest that first-mover advantage is derived from demand 
inertia caused by product familiarity. Competition is only articulated in the market through 
higher product quality of the later entrant.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the relevant evidence from 
the literature on the first-mover advantage and the related approaches used in the 
literature on the diffusion process. Section 4.3 describes the market for statins in the UK. 
Section 4.4 outlines the economic specification of the diffusion model, with emphasis on 
product differentiation and informational sources. Section 4.5 describes the data used. 
Section 4.6 describes the econometric specification following the diffusion modelling 
outlined in section 4.4. Section 4.7 specifies the econometric methods used to estimate 
the demand equations. Section 4.8 presents the results of the estimation and section 4.9 
summarises the findings.
4.2 Diffusion and First-Mover Advantage
The pharmaceutical industry is characterised as a dynamic market with pharmaceutical 
companies engaging constantly in new drug development. The R&D process to develop 
new products and strategies followed by manufacturers have been extensively studied 
(Scherer, 2000; Sutton, 2001). There is a licensing process followed by new drugs before 
they are allowed to be prescribed that is common to all molecules. When a successful 
innovation is brought into the market there is a process framed within the supply-side in 
which manufacturer and insurer interact in order to pursue an agreement for the drug 
inclusion in the drug formulary and its reimbursement. The development of the new drug 
and its introduction into the market are the first steps of the technological change before 
medical innovations are incorporated into standard practice and diffuse over time.
As in the previous chapter, the early stages of technological change prior to market 
diffusion are treated as exogenous and the chapter focuses on the demand-side 
processes and physicians acceptance of close substitute products. However, the success
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of invention in R&D in new market areas may have an impact on the market share 
captured by the pioneer and the establishment as dominant product. If the entry in a 
market of an incumbent has future competitive implications this may feed back into the 
incentives for pharmaceutical R&D and serve as the basis to explain patent races. The 
statins market presets some stylised facts that illustrate first-mover advantage restricting 
competition with future entrants. Despite the high market share of the pioneer, this is a 
market in which competition is finally introduced reshaping the market structure. This 
section reviews some of the evidence on first-mover advantage and the implications for 
diffusion. The analysis of first-mover is mainly approached as the strategic behaviour 
followed by the manufacturer. This offers a new area of diffusion analysis to examine the. 
mechanism that shape physicians preferences regarding new drugs.
The entry of a new product in any market and especially in the pharmaceutical market has 
attracted interest in economics as a means to study first-mover advantage. Both demand 
and supply-related factors have been identified as maintaining the inertia of the leading 
producers in pricing and market shares. A number of studies have analysed the 
importance of being the first entrant in the market. Robinson et al. (1994) provide a survey 
of empirical evidence in a wide range of industries and highlight that the pharmaceutical 
market has actually received most of the attention in the analysis of first-mover 
advantage. In general, they conclude that first-entrants are commonly rewarded with long­
term market share dominance as caused mainly by brand loyalty and product familiarity. 
The existence of switching costs, network externalities, consumer persistence arising from 
uncertain product quality have been identified as demand-related factors that sustain 
market dominance; on the supply-side, the producer may have higher production 
efficiency that keep costs down, incumbent firms may have advantages with respect to 
the potential entrants due to network externalities and economies of scale or cost 
reductions derived from production experience (Mueller, 1997). Similarly, Robinson and 
Fornell (1985) categorize mechanisms such as product characteristics, advertising and 
relative price as supply-side factors providing market dominance. From the demand-side, 
consumer information may act as the mechanism that perpetuates market dominance 
through a learning process based on product utilisation that gives an informational 
advantage to the incumbent84. All these factors will force an upward shift of the demand 
curve.
84 Robinson and Fornell (1985) also mention distribution advantage and production costs as channels to have 
higher market share. However, these elements do not have an influence on the demand-side.
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Research and development in the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on private 
investment85. Pharmaceutical industry devoted three times more investment in R&D in 
basic research than other industries (Scherer, 2000). When new discoveries are marketed 
the manufacturer has two main mechanisms to recover the investment cost of developing 
new technologies: price setting and advertising strategy. Typically, price setting behaviour 
has been analysed in a context in which the incumbent firm sets the price with the long- 
run perspective of future entry by potential competitors. The incumbent firm would enjoy a 
monopoly position, established through patent protection for example. When the patent 
expires competitors will enter the market and the incumbent will face a racing strategy for 
profit maximising. As discussed in the previous section, a major difference in the 
pharmaceutical context is that competition works among close drug substitutes all under 
patent protection, not among incumbent products and post-patent entrants.
In early models by Schmalensee (1982) and Conrad (1983), the price setting strategy 
adopted by the pioneer brand is such that once consumers learn about the pioneer 
product quality they have no incentives to invest in gaining information on new entrant’s 
product quality. This acts as a barrier to entry for potential entrants and perpetuates the 
predominance of the incumbent firm. A stream of analysis looks at first-mover advantage 
as a strategic process in which prices are set optimally with the incumbent firm benefiting 
from learning by doing during the production process. The first mover is using the 
information gained through learning by doing in new product production to set the optimal 
price to avoid the threaten of potential competitors entry (Smiley and Ravid, 1983)86. The 
manufacturer’s price setting behaviour in the market has captured most of the attention. 
However, from the consumer’s perspective prices have had a marginal role. Although the 
models above refer to the manufacturer side, they highlight aspects as product familiarity, 
switching costs in information acquisition and learning process as elements that provide 
first-mover advantage. It is thus of interest to see if they hold when the analysis is 
approached from the demand-side.
The effect of first-mover advantage in the pharmaceutical industry has been largely 
focused at market behaviour when pioneer products face generic entry competition. 
Economic theory would predict a redistribution of the market composition through 
changes in prices and market shares when patent expiration allows the entry of generic
85 Scherer (2000) also points out that academic research and government agencies give substantial support 
for pharmaceutical research.
86 The learning process in this model includes the concepts of proprietary or firm-specific learning (Rosen, 
1972) and industry wide learning process (Arrow, 1962). This process hence benefits from the own production 
experience and from the experience gained in observing the competitors performance. Experience is used as 
a mechanism to reduce production costs that originate the incumbent’s competitive advantage.
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products. The anticipated decrease in price derived from a more competitive environment 
observed in other industries has not been proven in the pharmaceutical industry. On the 
contrary, empirical findings have shown that despite the entry of competitors, the pioneer 
branded products did not decrease their prices. The early work by Bond and Lean (1977) 
studied two drug markets in the US. They found that the passage of time could not 
displace the advantageous position of the pioneer brand and the first-mover retained a 
high market share. The same market behaviour was found in Gorecki (1986) in a study 
that looked at seven different drugs in Canada.
Empirical studies on the pharmaceutical industry find that prices show a tendency to 
remain stable or even increase as compared to their generic counterparts (Caves et al., 
1991; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Frank and Salkevener, 1997) and retain a substantial 
market share whereas competitors experienced a decreasing price trend over time 
(Grabowski and Vernon, 1992). This was possible due to a stratification of the market in 
which consumers with inelastic demand were targeted by the branded manufactures and 
the demand of generics was left for the price-sensitive consumers. Some manufacturers 
created branded generics before their patent expired with a lower price to satisfy the 
demand of price-sensitive consumers and thus establishing first-mover advantage within 
the generic market (Scherer, 2002). First-mover advantages have also been examined 
within the generic pharmaceutical market showing that the first generic to be introduced 
into the market will benefit from larger market shares (Hollis, 2002). Competition between 
products of the same therapeutical class has been shown to exist only among the first 
products to enter the market (Kanavos et al., 2007)87.
The manufacturer’s optimal advertising strategy has also been analysed in the literature 
as the mechanism used by the producer to obtain a return to the cost of bringing new 
technology in the market (Dorfman and Steiner, 1954; Nerlove and Arrow, 1962). When 
advertising has been examined from the demand side, this variable has been used to 
predict market behaviour (Leffler, 1981; Berndt et al., 1997; Azoulay, 2002). The 
examination of the influence of marketing on physician choice has been very limited. Even 
the scarce evidence presented by drug diffusion modelling regarding physician 
prescription did not account for marketing (Coscelli and Shum, 2004). It is clear that the 
goal of advertising is to introduce shifts in demand curve. Differences arise in the 
objectives pursued by manufacturers. Advertising in economics distinguishes two different
87 The product class they examine is statins. Their results suggest there is competition only among 
simvastatin, pravastatin and atorvastatin, and complementarity between simvastatin and atorvastatin. The 
findings here will suggest that competition only exists between simvastatin and atorvastatin, with pravastatin 
representing potential competition with no actual reflection in market share.
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objectives according to Tirole (2002). The “partial view” maintains the informative role of 
advertising about the existence of the product, its price and the quality. The “adverse 
view” on the contrary argues that advertising is aimed at influencing consumers’ 
preferences. “It creates differentiation that is not real. Rather than reducing real 
informational differentiation [...]. Thus it reduces product competition; it also increases 
barriers to entry” (Tirole (2002), pp.290).
As discussed in Chapter 3, the real purpose behind marketing efforts in the 
pharmaceutical market has also raised the same controversy. It is evident that advertising 
and information go hand in hand. Advertising provides information regarding the existence 
and/or characteristics of the product as well as information regarding the price of the 
product when applicable. Discrepancies arise in the ultimate goal that the firm is expected 
to achieve through advertising investment. Two positions that lie as opposite extremes 
divide the theoretical and empirical evidence. On one hand, advertising may be seen as a 
purely informative action to enhance rational choices. On the other hand, it may be 
perceived as a persuasive tool used by the firm to develop and promote habit persistence 
in drug choice. Despite the potential role of promotion efforts for information dissemination 
there is a generalised view promotion represents an uninformative activity aimed at 
securing drug prescription choice (Leffler, 1981). Empirical evidence in the particular case 
of pharmaceuticals is still ambiguous and findings support both explanations (Bond and 
Lean, 1977; Leffer, 1981; Hurwitzand Caves, 1988). Which of these two positions prevail 
is of special relevance at the molecule level because, as opposed to the therapeutical 
level, it may impose barriers to the market share captured by followers.
The discussion in this chapter concerns the examination of the role of manufacturer 
influence on the diffusion process of new drugs in order to explain the differences among 
prescription diffusion pattern. The main variable considered will be advertising although 
the analysis will partially explore the role of prices, as in the previous chapter. However, 
the difference with Chapter 3 is that the analysis examines differences on information 
versus persuasive marketing objectives. In combination with marketing, other 
informational sources are examined to explain the first-mover advantage first observed in 
the market and the shift to a competitive environment in which two products dominate the 
prescription market.
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4.3 The Market for Statins
The present analysis is particularly interested in the diffusion of statins, the type of 
cholesterol lowering drugs also analysed in the previous chapter. The choice of this class 
of drugs is based on different factors. Firstly, they exemplify a clear case of product 
innovation that has been shown to be highly effective in the primary and secondary 
prevention of cardiovascular disease and nowadays their advantages are extensively 
accepted. The second reason to choose statins as a case-study is more pragmatic and 
based on data availability. In particular, the marketing impact on diffusion will be again of 
special relevance in the current empirical specification. The data that could be retrieved 
from each of the statins manufacturer was the most reliable and accurate that could be 
obtained for the analysis at such level of dissagregation88. Given the role of advertising in 
the pharmaceutical industry it is important to proxy promotion in the most accurate way in 
order to obtain precise estimates and be able to draw conclusions on the role of drug 
promotion on diffusion. Finally, statins are also a good case for examination given the lack 
of generic competition for any of the molecules included. Generic competition in this group 
only started in 2002, when generic products for simvastatin were marketed. This is only 
two years prior to the end of the data used for the analysis. The presence of generic 
competition during the last two years of the study period will be discarded, as the analysis 
is not related to branded-generic competition but to the diffusion aspect of the new 
drugs89.
There are six molecules within the statins therapeutical class as shown in Table 4.1 that 
were introduced between 1989 and 2003 in the UK under a branded name. The 
effectiveness of statins generally is unquestionable although there are differences in their 
individual effectiveness (Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study Group, 1994; Shepherd 
et al., 1995; Sacks et al., 1996). Overall they reduce total and LDL-cholesterol but their 
effectiveness can be ranked according to their success in achieving cholesterol targets. 
Several clinical trials showed a positive effect of statins in primary and secondary 
prevention. The general characteristics are described in Section 3.3 in last chapter. Also, 
it has been shown that statins are cost-effective in lowering cholesterol and overall are 
well tolerated (Palmer et al., 2003; NICE, 2006). Palmer et al. (2003) shows that 
atorvastatin is the most cost-effective, followed by simvastatin, fluvastatin and pravastatin.
88 Note that marketing was proxied by the employment figures reported by manufacturers to the Companies 
House. It was for the statins group that data on sales/distribution could be obtained. As opposed to that, data 
for PPIs and SSRIs was on total employment numbers.
89 The lack of generic competition gives the opportunity to examine genuine product competition based on 
pure informational effects that cannot be confounded with competition of bio-equivalent drugs among products 
with the same active chemical ingredient.
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Table 4.1 Year of Drug Launch
Substance 
Molecule Brand Name
Launch Year
Simvastatin Zocor
Pravastatin Lipostat
Fluvastatin Lescol
Atorvastatin Lipitor
Cerivastatin Lipobay
Rosuvastatin Crestor
1989
1990 
1994 
1997 
1997 
2003
The overall increase in statins prescription indicates their success for cholesterol 
treatment based on product quality. This study examines the first four statins to be 
marketed: simvastatin, pravastatin, fluvastatin and atorvastatin. Cerivastatin is excluded 
from the analyses mainly because it was withdrawn due to safety issues. Rosuvastatin is 
not considered because it was introduced in 2003, the year prior to the end of the data 
available for this study and therefore rosuvastatin prescription does not present enough 
data periods to capture the dynamic nature of the diffusion process. Despite being close 
substitutes these molecules are not perfect substitutes and thus there will be some cases 
for which the prescription of one of them is indicated versus the prescription of another 
molecule.
Figure 4.2 shows the prescription trend for each drug as obtained from the sample data. 
The diffusion path moves slowly during the initial years of introduction. Over the first four 
years, and with the third statin just being introduced, the demand for this new class of 
drugs remained low. Despite being therapeutically equivalent and the short time gap 
between introduction dates, simvastatin seems to enjoy some degree of competitive 
advantage with respect to pravastatin. This situation seems to hold even when the third 
statin fluvastatin is introduced. There is a predominance of the first-mover simvastatin that 
is only threatened by the entry in 1997 of the fourth molecule atorvastatin. The figure also 
shows that despite the later entrance of the fourth molecule, the demand for this drug 
increases and reaches demand levels close to those for the incumbent drug. The entry of 
atorvastatin seems to place a real competitive product for the pioneer drug.
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Figure 4.2 Drug Diffusion Paths
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The market is thus dominated by two drugs, leaving the second and third entrant with a 
marginal role in the statins market. In 2004, the fourth entrant prescription share is slightly 
higher than the market share for the first-entrant, and these two products completely 
dominate the prescription market. Given that the study period does not go beyond 2004, 
the trend after that year could not be observed. Whether the last entrant maintained the 
increasing appropriation of the market is thus censored by the end of the data availability 
for this chapter. Note as well that another drug was introduced in 2003 and the existing 
situation in 2004 could be altered had the last entrant had a proven competitive 
advantage90. In any case, the years included cover an interesting period in which the first 
and the last entrant during the period 1991-2004 face a high degree of competition.
4.4 The Diffusion Process under a Competitive Setting
There is a clear simvastatin first-mover advantage in the statins market but this 
dominance is time limited by the entry of the fourth competitor, atorvastatin. After that the 
market dominance is shared91. Atorvastatin has been shown to be more cost-effective
90 This drug was rosuvastatin and by the time of its introduction there was some evidence that supported its 
higher cost-effectiveness (Palmer et al, 2003).
91 This stylized fact shows a similar picture of the interactions between statins examined in Kanavos et al. 
(2007) at the market level. They conclude that there is competition only between simvastatin, pravastatin and
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than any of the other molecules, followed by simvastatin, the first-entrant in the market. 
Despite this higher effectiveness, during the study period simvastatin does not experience 
a drastic prescription decrease. One would expect that atorvastatin product superiority 
would cause an overturn in the simvastatin prescription trend and see an intersection 
point in which the increasing atorvastatin prescription path would cross a decreasing 
simvastatin trend. Instead, there is a parallel and close trend between these two drugs as 
shown in Figure 4.2. Chapter 3 provides evidence of the key role played by information 
during the diffusion process at the therapeutical group level. However, the overall 
therapeutical demand does not discriminate among different statins and does not explain 
the divergence of drug diffusion paths in a competitive context. This motivates the 
extension of the research in Chapter 3 to analyse whether the role of information remains 
valid to explain differences in prescription behaviour. The fact that the market now shows 
product differentiation introduced a change with respect to the diffusion model examined 
in the previous chapter. The role of product characteristics becomes relevant to the 
analysis as potential determinant of market dominance. Thus, the specification is similar 
to the one depicted in Chapter 3 in that examines the same informational factors but also 
includes product quality as explanatory variables.
The model outlined in this section represents the diffusion equations as a pair-wise 
comparison. The objective is to determine the elements that are responsible for market 
dominance of the first entrant and the mechanisms whereby a later entrant introduces 
competition and reaches a dominant position that shares with the pioneer drug. In a 
sense, this is the analysis of the factors that explain the dominance of the two products. 
Thus the research presents pair-wise comparisons between the prescription of the two 
dominant drugs with respect to the competing product. The first entrant, simvastatin, 
dominates the market since its introduction. When the second product is introduced, the 
physician prescription choice is among two close substitutes. As the third entrant comes 
into play, the product choice increases, but still the first-mover dominates. The last 
competing product atorvastatin captures a large share of prescription, yet simvastatin 
prescription remains relatively high. Thus, from the perspective of the first entrant, 
diffusion is expressed as the relative demand with respect to later entrants to analyse the 
factors that give this dominance over the diffusion path as the number of competitors N  
increases. Take as an example the first two products in the statins market, simvastatin 
and pravastatin. Simvastatin had a higher prescription share than pravastatin, in 
expressing demand as a pair-wise comparison, prescription volume is expressed as the
atorvastatin. Using GP prescription data, similar conclusions can be derived. Competition arises between 
simvastatin and atorvastatin. Pravastatin is mainly a competitive drug for simvastatin mainly due to the short 
gap between their introductions. However, as it will be shown in the analysis section this short period is 
sufficient to physicians’ prescription habits.
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simvastatin demand over the demand for pravastatin. The model specification will capture 
the relative dominance as a function of covariates that explain the physician behaviour 
when he faces a prescription choice between simvastatin and pravastatin92.
As N  is expanded the one-to-one drug comparison remains as the model specification 
since the interest lies in the factors that explain physician preference for the dominant 
molecule relative to the other competing products. When the third statin is introduced, the 
pair-wise comparisons relate to the pairs simvastatin-pravastatin and simvastatin- 
fluvastatin. Note that the relative demand of the first-mover with respect to the total 
prescription of competing molecules is not considered as it would not specifically capture 
the aspects whereby simvastatin remains as the preferred product. Finally, when 
atorvastatin is introduced the analysis refers to the relative prescription of simvastatin with 
respect to atorvastatin. Although the portfolio of products includes four molecules, the 
one-to-one comparison between molecules has been chosen to emphasize the deviation 
of the dominant molecule with respect to the competing one that may explain the 
differences in market share. The relative diffusion equation is expressed as a dynamic 
demand equation of the following form
&  = « ' 9 w  + P ' +<*•/« + X -p q  + y d ,  +c, (4.1)
Where q f f  is the relative demand of the dominant product with respect to the competing 
drug by physician i at time t . The superscript d denotes the dominant product and c 
represents the competing product. The lagged values of the dependent variable and
qftf2 represent the first and second lag of the relative drug demand. These two
components capture the information acquired during the learning process through the 
doctor’s own experience. As in Chapter 3, in addition to this type of informational source, 
the vector I u includes other informative channels. The model now includes a variable pq
that captures product quality in order to represent product differentiation. The difference 
with respect to the model in the previous chapter is that the diffusion equations do not 
include organisational factors. The reason for excluding these factors is explained by the 
insignificance of the estimates obtained in the previous chapter when diffusion was 
examined at the therapeutical level. As it will be discussed below, this has been
92 The underlying assumption is that the patient is equally eligible to be treated with any of the available 
products. This abstracts away the problem of matching patient’s need with prescription.
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empirically tested and confirmed the lack of impact on diffusion. In addition, given that 
prescription choice is among close substitutes and physician choice among these 
molecules will be taken under the same practice, one would expect physician behaviour to 
be unaffected by organisational factors. Similarly to Chapter 3, the specification also 
includes a vector dit with a number of demographic controls and a time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity factor that captures differences across physicians in practice i .
The introduction of two lags to capture the effect of the learning through experience rests 
on the underlying assumption of product quality uncertainty that requires a long-term 
perspective to assess the actual differences across products. It intends to capture part of 
the dynamics of the diffusion process that can be thought as the adjustment process of 
the physician’s behaviour in the allocation of the prescription share to each drug. In 
studying the dynamics between products within the therapeutical class, the specificities of 
each product will present a delay in the actual recognition of the superiority of one drug 
over another product. As opposed to the analysis at the therapeutical group presented in 
Chapter 3, differences in products within the class may not be perceived instantly. This 
modification is related to product variety and the potential delay of the realisation of the 
product differentiation and its applicability into prescription. Also, because the process 
involves a comparison of two products, the diffusion adaptation process might be slower 
given that the physician is already prescribing statins.
4.5 Data
Data analysed in this chapter is the prescription data used in the previous chapter. Data 
was extracted from the IMS Disease Analyzer-UK. The data consists of prescription data 
from a sample of over 130 GP practices throughout the UK for the period 1991-2004. The 
datasets analysed in this chapter includes all patients’ visits to one of the participating GP 
practices in which a statin was prescribed. For a more detailed explanation of the data 
can be found in Section 3.5 in Chapter 3. The first two statins -simvastatin and 
pravastatin - were first marketed in 1989 and 1990, respectively, and the study period 
starts in 1991. Thus the data is left censored with a two year gap between the time the 
drug became available and the first prescription records in the data.
The initial dataset had 1,987,598 observations that included all statins prescription in the 
collected by IMS Disease Analyzer for the 14 years of the study period. This data covered 
all statins included cerivastatin and rosuvastatin. Simvastatin accounts for 48% of all
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these observations over all years, pravastatin, fluvastatin and atorvastatin account for 
11 %, 4 and 33%, respectively. The data were grouped to obtain a longitudinal dataset that 
includes the prescription volume of each statin type in practice i at time t . After some 
data management the final panel has 1,758 observations. This is an unbalanced panel 
with information on practices that provided information during consecutive periods.
The annual growth rate for simvastatin had been roughly 42%, a low growth compared to 
the 45%, 57% and 72% annual rates of growth for pravastatin, fluvastatin and 
atorvastatin, respectively. The rate of growth is indicative of the increasing trends for each 
drug but it does not provide a picture of the prescription levels of each molecule and their 
market shares. Pravastatin and fluvastatin account only for an 18% and 6% of the total 
simvastatin prescription in 2004. Atorvastatin reached 75% of the simvastatin prescription 
levels only after eight years of being in the market. This shows that atorvastatin achieved 
similar prescription levels that simvastatin in a shorter period and already facing the 
presence of other drugs in the market. Similar data issues and limitations to those 
described in the previous chapter apply. They are presented in the next section when the 
empirical specification is outlined and the particular model variables are discussed.
4.6 Empirical Specification
According to the model outlined in Section 4.4 the empirical specification is set up in the 
present section. The specific variables included in the model are described here. The 
dominance of specific drugs in the statins market has motivated the one-to-one 
comparison to examine their relative competitive advantage during the diffusion process. 
The diffusion equation is depicted by expression (4.1) as given by:
The dependent variable qft,c is defined as the prescription volume for the dominant drug
d over the prescription of the competing drug c (PRESd,c). Recall from Chapter 3 that the 
prescription volume at time t represents the average prescription per practice i . As it was 
discussed previously, prescription could not be identified with the actual physicians writing 
the prescriptions as all prescriptions were recorded under the “leading prescriber” 
identifier. The prescription volume was computed as total prescription volume divided by
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the number of physicians in the practice to give an average prescription measure. The 
dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic terms.
The first three components of the equation demand depicted in (4.1) refer to the 
informational elements identified in Chapter 3 as determinants of diffusion. Information is 
again tested as driving force in the diffusion of individual drugs. The approach in this 
chapter refers to whether informational aspects are responsible for the market share 
distribution of the statins market. Information gathering is now oriented towards specific 
drug information. It is related to uncertainty in the sense that product differentiation will 
determine product-specific characteristics that require specific information gathering to 
distinguish product quality among drugs. Thus, the physician will engage in an information 
seeking process that initially will provide the knowledge to determine drug preference. The 
informational sources identified in Chapter 3 are briefly described in this section. For a 
detailed description please refer to Section 3.2 in the previous chapter.
The use of a new product in health care requires learning about its functioning and 
characteristics. The first mechanism is the learning by prescribing effect. Recently some 
studies have emphasized diffusion as a learning process in which doctors learn about the 
drug only through direct experience (Coscelli and Shum, 2004; Crawford and Shum, 
2005). The second mechanism is through the presence of consumption externalities 
(Berndt et al., 2003). The signal is channelled through the external acceptance observed 
by physicians. If agents observe that a drug is more commonly prescribed than other 
products individual prescription may follow general acceptability to avoid for instance 
malpractice laws. Whether the product that is most commonly demanded is the one of 
higher quality or not may be a consequence of the order of entry and the establishment of 
preferences. Again the presence of externalities is examined at the market level and the 
practice level. The third mechanism examined is the publication of clinical evidence. 
Empirical evidence suggests that these publications do have an impact on the demand of 
new drugs and it is accepted that generally this information is objective (Azoulay, 2002). 
Publication of clinical evidence starts prior to the launch of the new product and 
accumulates over time. By the time a new product is marketed there will be evidence 
regarding the new drug performance and also comparisons based on the effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness among drug alternatives.
The fourth informative aspect included in the diffusion equations is marketing. It is one of 
the most controversial mechanisms. As it was discussed in Chapter 3 and in the present
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chapter two positions differentiate between the pure informative role of marketing and the 
persuasive effect that promotion has on physician’s behaviour93. Empirically the effects of 
the advertising efforts been shown to be mixed (Bond and Lean, 1977; Leffler, 1981; 
Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Azoulay, 2002). Marketing effort will be tested against these 
two perspectives to determine whether these factors coexist or there is a prevalence of 
one over the other one. First entrant marketing effort may be more aggressive given that 
they need to provide information not only abut product availability in a brand new 
therapeutical market but also on the product characteristics. Subsequent entrants might 
well benefit from these marketing efforts given that their product advertising may require 
only marginal information regarding product differences. Thus the effect of marketing may 
spill over across drugs and later entrants promoting their product to engage in habit 
prescription. In a context where the first product faces strong barriers and followers are 
required to emphasize product differentiation, the main hypothesis is that both effects will 
be present in the diffusion process.
In general, if drugs are close substitutes one would expect to detect informational 
spillovers. Individuals would not require full investment in information gathering and 
familiarisation with later entrants’ characteristics as compared to the first-entrant. The cost 
of information gathering may provide incentives to physicians to stick to the prescription of 
the first product, as this offsets the initial information gathering cost. Given that drugs 
compete for the prescription of the same medical condition and despite differences in 
product effectiveness, the preference for specific product does not prevent the fulfilment 
of the target of the medical condition. Once individuals become familiar with the first 
product and overcome product quality uncertainty there may be switching costs that 
restrict the prescription portfolio of the physician to the first product.
The first three components of the dynamic demand equation (4.1) capture the 
informational aspect of diffusion. The first and second component correspond to the first 
(PRES(t-1)d,c) and the second lag (PRES(t-2)d,c) of the dependant variable capture the 
information acquired by the physicians through the experience gained in prescription. 
Similarly, the vector I it includes the other information variables as expressed by
I„ = (meJ/ , p e l,cef*,m d?':) (4.2)
93 It has been argued, in a rational expectations manner, that the anticipation of competition from later entrants 
by the pioneer product manufacturer provides incentives for the incumbent to provide correct information on 
the product (Klein and Leffler, 1981).
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The first component me0/  represents the relative market externality expressed as the 
sales volume of the dominant drug with respect to the sales volume of the competing drug 
(SALEStc,d). This is expressed in logarithmic terms94. The second term in (4.2) pet
captures the practice externalities as the number of GPs in the practice (NGPj). The third 
element refers to the clinical evidence expressed as the relative cumulative number of 
scientific articles of the dominant product over the cumulative number of scientific 
evidence of the competing product (CEtc,d). The number of published papers of each drug 
was searched in PubMed using the same procedure to obtain the total number of 
scientific papers published for statins as a whole described in Chapter 3. The difference is 
that now the scientific papers are narrowed down according to the name of the drugs 
included in the study95. The last term in (4.2) m*'0 reflects the marketing effort by the
manufacturer of each drug (MKTtc,d). This variable is proxied by the percentage of the 
employees in the sales/distribution department over the total employment of each 
manufacturer96.
The third component in equation (4.1) pq is a vector that contains product quality 
characteristics. It is expressed as,
pq = (se,aget) (4.3)
94 Sales data was provided by IMS Health. It contains the total volume of retail sales for all forms and 
strengths for each drug. Parallel imports were also included in the sales data. Sales were deflated with the 
CPI and expressed in real terms. CPI series were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
financial series statistics.
95 The figures were obtained searching the papers that include the name of the individual drugs either in the 
title or the abstract. As it is explained in Chapter 3 the cumulative number of papers is used to indicate that the 
information provided by this source has long lasting effects (Azoulay, 2002). Using this search method the 
number of papers for each molecule might be duplicated due to the presence of two or more drugs being 
examined under the same study. However, as expressed in relative terms this duplication cancels out and the 
measure reflects the higher evidence of the dominant product with respect to the competing one. Note that the 
first molecule presents the highest number of articles published. This is partly consequence of being the 
product with the longest stay in the market as well as being a product with higher quality. As for the second 
dominant drug, atorvastatin, the publication of clinical evidence grows relatively fast in comparison to the other 
products. As such, this increasing trend will reflect the clinical importance linked to this product due to its 
higher competitive advantage.
96 This information was obtained from the Annual Accounts retrieved from the information submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies to the Companies House. Chapter 3 explains with more detail the date extraction. 
This measure it is arguably a crude proxy given that it is not product-specific; however, as it was argued in the 
previous chapter it was the only marketing information available that could be included to test to role of 
marketing in the diffusion process.
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The first quality variable included in (4.3) is captured by side-effects. All molecules have 
the same contra-indications and differences arise largely due to side-effects97. According 
to the British National Formulary (BNF No.43, 2002) there are common side-effects 
among statins; however, each product has additional drug-specific side-effects. The 
variable that measures quality by side-effects (SE) is based on the differential side-effects 
that are particular to each molecule and do not include any of the common side-effects 
shared by all drugs in the statins group. This expresses quality as a potential determinant 
factor strengthening the dominant position of a product. Differences among molecule side- 
effects are not only in their type but also in how frequently patients present them. BNF 
classifies the frequency as common, less common, rare and very rare. Therefore the 
variable is an indicator of the number of side-effects in each category adjusted according 
to frequency. The weights have been chosen such that the importance of side-effects 
decreases with frequency. For example, the most common side-effects have unity as a 
weight, the less common have a weight that divides it by two, the rare side-effects are 
weighted by one third and finally the very rare ones are weighted by one fourth. The 
selection of these weights are somehow arbitrary but it captures the idea that the less 
frequent the lower the weight. Thus, the quality variable is constructed as follows,
se =  ^  common + ^  lesscommon + rare + - -^^T veryrare (4.4)
Where common is the count of side-effects identified as showing commonly, 
lesscommoms the number of side-effects classified by BNF as occurring with less 
frequency, rare is the number of side-effects that appear infrequently and veryrare is the 
side-effects that unusually patients present98.
Based on this side-effects frequency-adjusted measure, the first quality is introduced into 
the model as the side-effects of the competing molecule (SEi). The second side-effect 
variable SE2 is measured as total side-effects of the dominant molecule relative to the 
competing drug. Although drug approval is accompanied by a listing of side-effects 
identified over the trial period, physicians may not observe them in patients during early
97 The British National Formulary was consulted for the contra-indications of each drug. The last version 
checked was BNF No.55 (2008) and there was no change in contra-indications. There were minor changes in 
side-effects for atorvastatin but when they were accounted for the side-effect adjusted indicator showed a tiny 
change in magnitude. Thus the side-effect indicator was accounted for to the information reported by BNF 
No.43 (2002).
98 Note that this variable is invariant in time and cross-sectional dimension. This will also be the case of other 
product quality variables considered.
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stages of diffusion but at more advanced diffusion stages. Thus, physicians might not be 
aware of this aspect of product quality at early stages of diffusion but this information is 
incorporated into their knowledge as patient progressively present these side-effects. In 
order to capture this, the variable SE is interacted with year to account for the growing 
physician’s awareness regarding the materialisation of side-effects presented by 
patients". Higher side-effects of the competing drug may lead to higher prescription of the 
dominant molecule. Conversely, the lower the ratio of the dominant/competing drug’s 
side-effects, the higher the benefits to strengthen the dominant drug position. If this holds 
dominant positions could be justified on the basis of higher product superiority.
The second component of the product quality vector in (4.3) refers to the age of the 
competing drug (AGEt) representing the potential advantage (disadvantage) of the 
dominant drug simvastatin (atorvastatin) with respect to competing products because of a 
lower (higher) familiarity with the product. This familiarity is the expression of the maturity 
of the drug in the market. The last components of (4.1) dit and c, correspond to a vectors
of demographic controls and the unobserved effect, respectively. The vector of controls 
includes the proportion of population between the age rage 45 to 64 (POP45_64it), the 
proportion of population over 65 (POP65it) and the number of GPs (GPsit) in the strategic 
health authority where the practice is located.
Appendix 4.1 contains the descriptive statistics of the data used in this chapter. 
Prescription volume in logarithmic terms is shown both as absolute measures and also in 
relative terms. As expected, simvastatin and atorvastatin have the higher average 
absolute prescription. The relative measures show a dominance of simvastatin and 
atorvastatin over any of the competing molecules. The comparison of simvastatin with 
atorvastatin illustrates the increasing share of atorvastatin. There is a clear disadvantage 
of fluvastatin with respect to simvastatin and atorvastatin as shown by the average 
relative prescription. Similarly, the average of sales volume is higher for the two dominant 
molecules. The average number of articles published is higher for simvastatin than for any 
other molecule. Given the time that simvastatin was in the market and that it was the first 
molecule to be introduced it is expected to have higher representation in scientific 
publications. Marketing proxied by employment in sales/distribution department is on 
average half of the total employment of the drug manufacturer with the exception of
QQ
In general, quality measures examined in this section will be based on parameters of the drug that are 
constant across practices and time periods. Quality variables are thus interacted with the year in order to give 
the covariate variability within the dataset across time periods. Intuitively, the interaction of the quality 
parameter and year will account for any shock that could affect the quality of the product but that it is not 
captured by the measure used to approach quality.
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atorvastatin for which this percentage is around 16%. The average practice in the sample 
has five doctors, about half of them are fund-holders and 20% are drug dispensers.
4.7 Econometric Issues
The dynamic demand equations for each pair-wise comparison are estimated using 
dynamic panel data methods. These econometric methods have been described in full in 
the previous chapter. Thus this section briefly outlines the main aspects of this type of 
methods, please refer to Section 3.7 for an extended overview of the methodology 
followed in the estimation procedure. The following AR(1) model is under consideration:
y u • J V i+ ^ + e , ,
where y it_x is the first lag of the dependent variable representing the past molecule 
prescription experience effect on diffusion. The cross-sectional specific unobserved effect 
is denoted by c, and et is the disturbance term. The unobservable element covers any
practice-specific factor that cannot be measured by the researcher and that may have an 
effect on the decision of the prescription share for each molecule. The individual effects 
and the disturbances are assumed to be independently distributed and have the following 
structure:
£[c,] = 0, E\eit\ = 0 , E\eitct] = 0 for i = and t = 2,...,T 
and under the assumption of lack of serial correlation among the errors
E[eitel,J = Ofor i =  and s *  t
Taking first-differences in order to eliminate the individual effect is required for a 
consistent estimation of the dynamic model,
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Ay,., = a  • A.y,,_i + Aeit i = 1,2,..., JV; t = 3
Where Ay„ = y it -  y it_{ and Aeit = eit -  eit_x. The correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the first differenced error component is corrected using an 
instrumental variable approach. The assumption of no serial correlation implies that there
are i ( r  - lX ^  - 2 )  ortogonality conditions:
E\yt_sAeit ] = 0 for t = 2 and s >  2
These conditions are exploited in the first-differenced generalised method of moments 
(GMM) developed in Arellano and Bond (1991). However, if the series are persistent there 
is a weak relationship between lagged levels and first-differences and the first-differenced 
GMM estimator will have poor finite sample properties. In addition to the moment 
conditions for the first-differenced equations, there are some extra conditions which 
identify possible instruments for the level equations.
£ k ,4 > V i]  = 0 for * = 3 ,...,r
These conditions are applied to the level equations together with the moment conditions 
for the first-differenced equations to give the so-called system GMM estimator developed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998).
4.8 Results
This section reports the results of the estimation of the dynamic diffusion equations 
outlined above. Inserting (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.1) the exact equation estimated takes the 
following form,
= a  ■ 9du-\ + P  ■ ??-2 + chme^ + a 2pe, + a,cef,'c + a Am dfc + a 5se + a 6age, + r - d „ + c ,
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As it was presented in the above sections the dependent variable represents the relative 
prescription volume of the dominant drug d with respect to the competing drug c . Given 
that there are two dominant molecules, d  = simvastatin, atorvastatin, the equations 
estimated contain the relative prescription with respect to the other competing drugs, 
c = pravastatin, fluvastatin. The exception is the equation that includes the relative 
prescription of simvastatin with respect to atorvastatin, in which d = simvastatin and 
c = atorvastatin. It is represented by q*™,ator. This relationship is analysed to detect the
factors that determine that both drugs share the dominance of the market. Particularly the 
pair comparing both dominant products represents an interesting case for examination as 
it depicts the forces in the market in which there is real competition. Note that the time 
periods included in each pair-wise comparison will be determined by the year of 
introduction of the competing molecule. As such, t = 1991,...,2004 for the diffusion 
equations that concerns the comparison between simvastatin and pravastatin, 
t = 1994,...,2004 for the simvastatin-fluvastatin pair. Diffusion equations concerning 
atorvastatin are restricted to the period t = 1997,...,2004.
Table 4.2  presents the estimates for the relative equations. The results presented were 
obtained using the system GMM estimator outlined in the previous section. This method 
was preferred to the first differenced GMM due to the presence of persistent prescription 
series. Appendix 4.2  reports the AR(1) specifications of the prescription series. The series 
are persistent although the estimates do not have a unit root. The estimates in this section 
consider marketing and consumption externalities (represented by sales) as endogenous. 
Endogeneity is caused by the simultaneity of the prescription by physicians with the 
volume of sales and the marketing variable. The additional moment conditions introduced 
by the endogeneity of these variables are tested using the Difference Sargan test shown 
at the bottom of Table 4.2. The test shows that the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
additional moment conditions is accepted at any significance level. The matrix of 
instruments will thus include not only lags of the dependent variable but also lagged 
values of these two regressors. In particular the diagonal of the matrix of instruments will
contain the lagged values (qff_2 qf{c; ,..., me*'c; m ff2,..., m *,c) for the equations in
differences and the instrument for the equations in levels will be (Aq ,bmedtfx, Am,If) for 
t = 4,...T.
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In tables throughout this section the heading at the top of each column refers to the each 
pair-wise comparison. The label Sim/Pra in the first column indicates that the relative 
performance of simvastatin with pravastatin is under consideration. Sim/Flu in the second 
column refers to the comparison for the pair simvastatin-fluvastatin. Similarly, the third, 
fourth and fifth column labelled as Sim/Ator, Ator/Pra and Ator/Flu correspond to the pairs 
simvastatin/atorvastatin, atorvastatin/pravastatin and atorvastatin/fluvastatin, respectively.
Table 4.2 includes the variable SEi measured by the side-effects of the competing 
variable100. The first three columns that report the simvastatin equations show that the 
lagged values for the dependant variable are all highly significant. The coefficient for the 
first lag is positive and high which indicates that the past prescription of simvastatin 
relative to their competitors is a determinant factor that has been consolidating its 
demand. This could reflect high prescription persistence of the first molecule explained by 
demand habit generation given the physician’s familiarity with the first product. The 
negative effect of the second lag is indicative that the experience effects decline over 
time, that is, although the experience acquisition is determinant in the diffusion path 
showed for simvastatin to explain its market dominance, this effect is fading with time.
The magnitude of the coefficient for PRES(t-1) decreases as the number of competitors 
increases. The fact that simvastatin is the first entrant is reflected in physician’s 
prescription behaviour in that the entry of other competitors only leads to competing drugs 
being partially prescribed. The time gap of one and five years for pravastatin and 
fluvastatin, respectively, after the introduction of simvastatin allows simvastatin to settle 
such a goodwill asset that market shares of the entrants cannot catch that of the first 
entrant. The interesting case arises when the two dominant molecules are compared. It 
seems that despite atorvastatin higher product quality, the prescription of simvastatin is so 
well established that it introduces barriers for a stronger competition. Past demand 
experience, although in a smaller magnitude than the other cases, still generates an 
increasing uptake of the first entrant.
100 All product quality variables are interacted with year. There are two reasons for this. First, generally the 
characteristics used to define product quality are listed when the drug is approved (with the exception of the 
dosage form that may change over time). However, the side-effects and other product characteristics will not 
be observed in patients immediately but as the diffusion process moves in time. Thus the interaction will 
capture differences in the observed product quality over time. Secondly, these variables are time-constant 
(except for the variable age) and when the dynamic equations were estimated with no year interaction there 
were multicollinearity problems arising and the quality variable was dropped from the estimation. Therefore, 
the interaction was used as an alternative method to estimate the coefficient.
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Table 4.2 Dynamic Equations: Quality Proxied by Side-effect of Competing Drug
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.707146*** 0.704435*** 0.679366*** 0.953234*** 0.843550***
PRES(t-2) -0.086439** -0.147830*** -0.140478*** -0.305875*** -0.159068**
SALES 0.413595 -0.46301 -0.17016 0.245708 0.666550*
NGP -0.00679 0.01122 -0.00095 -0.01063 0.020297
CE 7.459320*** 0.200339 -0.06879 0.015846 0.215078
MKT -0.529021** -0.60439 -0.02167 0.535869 3.206904
SE 0.005397 0.087416*** -0.0035 0.000002 -0.06236
GPS 0.00004 -7.5E-05 -1.4E-05 0.000061 -0.00005
POP45_64 3.773444* 4.801908 1.530228 1.982401 1.3501
POP65 -0.19706 3.357452 1.184347 -2.01502 1.395918
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.014 0.304 0.747 0.94 0.076
Sargan 0.915 0.729 0.375 0.069 0.335
Diff. Sargan 0.99 0.975 0.99 0.079 0.661
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2, Sargan and Diff. Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
Market consumption externalities are not significant at any confidence level and thus do 
not seem to provide any information to physicians. Similarly, the number of physicians in 
the practice does not seem to be related to the first-mover advantage since it is not 
significant at any confidence level. This is indicative of the role of private information and 
the fact that physicians do not consider external acceptance. The clinical evidence 
estimate is only significant for the simvastatin-pravastatin relation. The incremental higher 
evidence of simvastatin with respect to pravastatin gives an advantage to the first entrant 
simvastatin to capture a higher market share. Note that these are the first two products in 
the market and most probably physicians do require more information provided by 
scientific sources to discern between the additional characteristics of pravastatin with 
respect to simvastatin.
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The marketing variable is only significant for the simvastatin-pravastatin pair. As expected 
the promotion efforts for simvastatin are higher than for pravastatin. As first entrant, 
simvastatin will make a higher investment in advertising the product to overcome the 
higher barrier to entry in terms of a product that represents a breakthrough in a new 
market. The negative coefficient would indicate that the higher the simvastatin marketing 
relative to pravastatin the lower the relative diffusion. Although at first this seems a 
counterintuitive result the negative association could be interpreted as marketing of the 
first-entrant simvastatin having an informative role of advertising efforts. These results are 
preliminary to make this statement and should be taken with caution. Below, additional 
measures of marketing are examined to look at any dynamics that could support either of 
the two roles of marketing. The side-effects variable (SEi) only has a significant effect for 
the pair simvastatin-fluvastatin. In this case the adjusted number of side-effects for 
fluvastatin has a positive impact on the relative demand of simvastatin over fluvastatin. 
This effect is opposed to the expected effect as the product quality measure indicates a 
lower number of adjusted side-effects.
The last two columns of Table 4.2 describe the diffusion pattern of the pair-wise 
comparisons of atorvastatin with respect to pravastatin and fluvastatin. The only 
significant effects were the lagged values of the dependent variable. If the dominance of 
atorvastatin is to be explained by its superiority then one should expect indicators such as 
product quality or clinical evidence to be significantly related to the new drug. Also, note 
that the time gap between introduction and recognition of higher effectiveness may come 
too late as to have any effect on the prescription pattern of atorvastatin. Apart from the 
learning effects, the pair atorvasatin-fluvastatin has a positive and significant effect of 
market externalities. The small time difference between the introductions of these two 
drugs may be showing that physicians do look at market behaviour to differentiate product 
quality of atorvastatin with respect to the last product introduced in the market.
Note that all tables include the p-values of the tests for autocorrelation and overidentifying 
restrictions. The null hypothesis for the autocorrelation test is the lack of first- or second- 
order autocorrelation, that is, cov(w/,,w/,_1) and cov(w<Y,w//_2)are zero. Across all
equations there is evidence of first-order autocorrelation but not second-order 
autocorrelation. As pointed out in Arellano and Bond (1991) first-order autocorrelation will 
not give inconsistent results given that the dynamic panel data methods are estimated 
over the first-differences. The null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid 
is largely accepted at any significance level across all estimations.
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The diffusion equations were re-estimated using the second measure of the side-effect 
proxied by the ratio of the side effects SE2. Results are very similar to those reported in 
Table 4.2 and thus are not presented here. Appendix 4.3 includes the replication of Table 
4.2 when side-effects are expressed in relative terms (SE2). Also, a third measure of 
quality using side effects is examined. This variable again captures the relative number of 
side effects (SE3); however, side-effects now are not adjusted to the frequency and thus 
they refer to the total count of side effects. Results are shown in Table A.4.3.1 Additional 
product quality indicators are also tested. The number of indications (IND) for which each 
drug is approved and also the number of different strength forms available (STRENGHT) 
for each drug are considered. The results are very similar to those obtained for the side- 
effects quality measure and thus are not included in this section. These are presented in 
Tables A.4.3.4 and A.4.3.5 in Appendix 4.3.
As it was mentioned in previous sections, organisational elements were not considered to 
be relevant for the present analysis as they showed to be of no influence according to the 
results in the previous chapter. The findings in Section 3.7 could not support the initial 
hypothesis of the influence of specific organisation factors such as the practice being a 
fund-holder or drug-dispensing. This has been tested under the current specification. 
Demand equations have been estimated including the fundholding and drug-dispensing 
variables. Results are reported in Appendix 4.4. These variables were again not 
significant in any of the relative demand and thus were excluded from the equations. This 
confirms the lack of influence in the prescription of new drugs of factors that initially 
provide financial incentives that could distort prescription. If the drug presents competitive 
advantage, benefits to patients may outweigh any of the incentives that the structure of 
the practice may provide to restrict prescription spending or other mechanisms that give 
financial incentives.
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Table 4.3 Demand Equations with Age
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.7048900*** 0.6991782*** 0.6741188*** 0.9886072*** 0.8460071***
PRES(t-2) -0.0854356** -0.1487953*** -0.1404824*** -0.2762876*** -0.1562348**
SALES 0.6024709* -0.4277214 0.0443886 -0.3001131 0.6741883*
NGP -0.0067273 0.0114274 -0.0009539 -0.008369 0.0201079
CE 8.9034555*** 0.8484712* 0.1109929*** 6.5446070** -0.0495069
MKT -0.5685918*** -0.4248582 0.0217706 -2.25E+00 2.9490515*
SE! -0.0011921*** -0.0005551 -0.0000381** 0.0004892*** -0.000217
AGE 0.0000004 0.0001473*** 0.0000428*** -0.0002455*** -0.0000665
GPS 0.0000403 -0.0000765 -0.0000141 0.0000509 -0.0000498
POP45_64 3.7793268* 4.8543242 1.5409807 1.9201274 1.319054
POP65 -0.1851606 3.4024606 1.1951106 -1.96E+00 1.3893286
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.013 0.302 0.759 0.662 0.072
Sargan 0.943 0.703 0.345 0.216 0.272
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
The model was re-estimated including the age of the competing molecule as explanatory 
variable. This variable aims at capturing the relative lower maturity of the product in the 
market that may give an advantage to the first-entrant and it would have an expected 
positive sign. On the contrary age would initially be expected to have a negative effect in 
those equations that compare the dominant drug atorvastatin with the competing drugs 
c = pravastatin, fluvastatin. Results are presented in Table 4.3 and are similar to those 
presented in Table 4.2 verifying robustness criteria. Age is a variable that presents only 
time-variation. This introduced multicollinearity problems in the estimation and thus the 
variable was interacted with time. In that way, the aging of the drug also captures any 
possible shock that affects the drug. Including this variable improves the estimation 
results. The coefficients of the lagged values of the dependent variable corroborate the 
learning effects present in the diffusion process. The coefficient for market externalities is 
positive and significant for the simvastatin-pravastatin and atorvastatin-fluvastatin 
equations. This is indicative that the signal from the market acts as an actual informational
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source for the dominant drug (simvastatin and atorvastatin) with respect to the drug that 
has been most recently introduced (pravastatin and fluvastatin, respectively). No practice 
externalities are present in the diffusion process.
Under the specification in Table 4.3, clinical evidence becomes significant for all 
equations with the exception of the atorvastatin-fluvastatin pair. In these cases, the 
relative accumulated number of articles of the dominant molecule with respect to the 
competing drug has a positive effect on diffusion. This effect diminishes as the number of 
drugs in the statins therapeutical class increases. This might be indicative of the 
simvastatin establishment. As prescription preferences have been already shaped and 
simvastatin is the preferred drug, the need to access additional informative sources might 
be lower. In the gap year between the introduction of simvastatin and pravastatin the 
evidence provided for simvastatin was much higher than for pravastatin. In relation to 
fluvastatin the simvastatin market share is strong enough for the clinical evidence to have 
a smaller impact on diffusion.
The side-effect variable is now significant for three out of five coefficient estimates. 
Simvastatin and atorvastatin have both higher frequency-adjusted side-effects. Product 
quality of the competing molecule has a negative impact on diffusion of the dominant 
molecule as it is perceived as an improvement in quality of the competing drug with 
respect to simvastatin. There is an unexpected positive and significant effect of the lower 
side-effect coefficient for pravastatin showed in the fourth column. The age of the variable 
is significant for three out of five equations as shown by the estimates in the second, third 
and fourth columns. The age of pravastatin has a significant negative impact on relative 
atorvastatin diffusion: maturity of pravastatin has a negative impact atorvastatin relative 
prescription. Age of the competing drug can thus act as a potential channel for 
competition.
Before the analysis is extended to test the role of marketing in the diffusion process the 
role of prices is tested in the dynamic equations. Price and marketing are generally 
variables used as key instruments as part of the manufacturer’s strategic behaviour in 
pursuing profit-maximising objectives. These are variables that are generally examined 
from the supply-side. However, the demand-side is the main target of manufacturers, 
mainly in relation to the marketing efforts. The effect of prices is less clear as physicians 
have been largely unaware of the drug costs. Also, in the context of the UK primary sector
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the presence of the third-party payer and the fact that patients do not bear the full drug 
cost may originate some degree of moral hazard in the GP prescription behaviour.
Table 4.4 Demand Equations with Prices
Relative Price Price competing drug
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Pra Sim/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.650571*** 0.735082*** 0.650571*** 0.735083***
PRES(t-2) -0.088791** -0.139589*** -0.088791** -0.139589***
SALES 1.735012* -1.81511 1.429355** 2.556096
NGP -0.00563 0.004522 -0.00563 0.004522
CE -2.7254 2.200703* 1.359921 -0.93644
MKT -0.07538 -0.50978 -0.11278 0.509224
SE 0.036398 0.069025 0.012739 -0.03433
PRICE -2.58221 6.547788 0.767126 3.420294
GPS 0.000051 -8.5E-05 0.000051 -8.5E-05
POP45_64 3.186105 3.077461 3.186105 3.07746
POP65 -0.49523 5.136681 -0.49523 5.13668
N 925 533 925 533
ml 0 0.001 0 0.001
m2 0.077 0.261 0.077 0.261
Sargan 0.4 0.561 0.4 0.561
See notes to Table 4.3.
Drug diffusion is tested against the potential influence of prices to produce differences in 
prescription shares for each of the statins drugs101. Findings in Chapter 3 showed no 
significant impact of prices on diffusion. As was discussed, this could arise due to the 
analysis being undertaken at the therapeutical level. One could expect physicians to be 
aware of price differences across drugs. Results including prices are presented in Table 
4.4. Collinearity problems between some of the regressors caused the price and side- 
effects coefficients being dropped from the estimation. Only the pairs simvastatin- 
pravastatin and simvastatin-fluvastatin could be fully estimated. The first two columns 
show the prices expressed in relative terms and the last two columns show the results 
when the price of the competing drug is included. In all cases price elasticity is not
101 Quarterly prices for the period 1991-2002 are provided by IMS Health. Prices are expressed in logarithmic 
terms. The last two years of the prescription data are not included in the estimation as these are not covered 
by price data availability. Yearly data was calculated as the average for each drug and each package form 
available for the same drug. Because each package form and strength have different prescription shares, the 
final price was calculated as the price for each package form weighted by their share over the total individual 
statin drug prescription. Prices of parallel imports were not included. If physicians are price-aware it is likely 
they will know the official price as published for instance in the BNF.
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significant. The price of simvastatin being one of the highest among the product in the 
market and the fact that the relative prices does not have a significant effect, suggests 
that the cost of the drug does not affect diffusion. To justify the generalisation of price 
insignificance to the cases that could not be estimated, note that when atorvastatin is 
introduced its price is ranked first. If previously, high drug prices were not taken into 
account in new drug demand there is no reason to think that the prices would become 
significant at later stages when the number of competitors increases.
Table 4.5 Marketing of the Competing Drug
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.715649*** 0.709432*** 0.674987*** 0.991045*** 0.842322***
PRES(t-2) -0.085542** -0.146726*** -0.139990*** -0.274881*** -0.160193**
SALES 1.184624** -0.471968 -0.053456 0.073948 0.162328
NGP -0.0067 0.011163 -0.000952 -0.008234 0.020387
CE 13.198951*** 0.282247 0.096476*** 5.034721*** -2.000368
MKT 1.815664*** -4.378189 1.042636 0.783993* -6.922977*
SE! -0.001857*** 0.000082 -0.000033** 0.000345*** 0.000162
AGE -0.000059*** 0.000113*** 0.000024* -0.000228*** 0.000273
GPS 0.00004 -0.000074 -0.000014 0.00005 -0.00005
POP45_64 3.752505* 4.771776 1.54197 1.916323 1.364676
POP65 -0.24255 3.273981 1.187168 -1.956977 1.398201
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.018 0.315 0.691 0.622 0.068
Sargan 0.936 0.723 0.212 0.241 0.231
See notes to Table 4.3.
In what follows the analysis is focused on the examination of the marketing variable. 
Overall the estimates of the marketing variable shown above are only significant for the 
simvastatin-pravastatin and atorvastatin-fluvastatin pairs and they have a negative and 
positive association with diffusion, respectively. Table 4.5 shows the results when the 
marketing variable is defined as the marketing effort of the competing drug rather than as 
the relative marketing effort. Overall results are similar to those in Table 4.3. Diffusion 
seems to be driven by experience first as indicated by the strong effects of the lagged 
value of the dependant variable. Clinical evidence seems to have a significant effect on 
diffusion for the relative prescription of simvastatin with respect to pravastatin and 
atorvastatin. In general, age and side effects are quality characteristics that are valuable 
to the prescriber for the prescription process. Marketing is again significant for those
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cases in which there is a threaten either because the competitor is the second entrant 
(sim/pra) or because of competition enhanced by atorvastatin entrance (ator/pra and 
ator/flu). A priori it is expected that higher advertising of the competing drug will yield 
lower relative demand. However, the signs of the estimates are opposed to the 
anticipated effect. Pravastatin marketing appears to boost demand whereas fluvastatin 
marketing effort seems to deter demand. In particular, last results seem striking as 
atorvastatin is expected to have a more aggressive marketing campaign in order to 
secure a position in the market.
The mixed results showed by the marketing variable may be due to the definition of the 
variable not capturing the dynamics that are likely to be in place as diffusion proceeds in 
time. These estimates may not be a pure reflection of the objectives pursued by the 
manufacturer. Over the timeline there might be changes in the marketing strategy 
generated by the modified structure of the statins market. Given the divergence between 
the views supporting the habit generation objective and the pure information goal, the next 
step is to identify which of the effects prevail or if they coexist. The new marketing variable 
is defined according to the year. The time line is now partitioned in different periods in 
which the inflexion point is determined by the year of introduction of the competing drug. 
The underlying idea is that there might be changes in marketing behaviour motivated by 
the introduction of additional competing drugs in the market. If it is well true that this 
change in behaviour might be present before the introduction of the competing molecule 
when the first product manufacturer anticipates the entry of other molecules, choosing the 
time period when this happens would be rather arbitrary, whereas the competing molecule 
entry year delineates a clear breaking point.
The new definition of the marketing variable will clearly have as many divisions as 
prospective competitors. The exception is for the pair simvastatin-pravastatin. There is a 
limitation in that there is no prescription data prior to 1991 and thus it is not possible to 
study any behavioural changes between the introduction of simvastatin and pravastatin. 
Consequently, modifications in marketing objectives are examined for this pair with 
respect to future competition and first delimited by the entry of fluvastatin. For each of the 
equations, the number of stages dividing the marketing variable is determined by the 
number of competing drugs introduced in the future102. For the relative demand of 
atorvastatin with respect to its competitors c -  pravastatin, fluvastatin the marketing will
102 Cerivastatin was introduced the same year as atorvastatin. Although cerivastatin is not considered in this 
analysis due to its withdrawal, the fact that started being marketed the same year facilitates the variable 
definition.
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be examined with respect to the entry of of rosuvastatin in 2003103. Despite its late 
introduction, rosuvastatin could be a significant threaten to force a change or reinforce 
marketing objectives of atorvastatin manufacturer given that there were early studies that 
were revealing that rosuvastatin had a higher effectiveness in targeting cholesterol and 
this could provoke a deviation in the strategic behaviour of atorvastatin’s manufacturer.
The relative prescription of simvastatin with respect to pravastatin has a three-stage 
marketing variable. The rest of drugs will have a two-stage marketing variable given that 
they only face the entry of one competitor. If t0 is the time in which the dominant drug was
introduced (1991 is assumed for simvastatin and 1997 for atorvastatin), t is the year in 
which the competing drug(s) were introduced and t04 is the last year of the study period, 
the marketing variable is defined as follows:
mttn -  mkt * year if t0 < t  < t*  
m... = 0 otherwise
1 *04
After the following molecule is introduced the marketing variable is structured as:
m . = 0 if tn < t < t* 
m . = mkt * year if t > t*
t '04 J
Where mkt is a measure of the marketing variable depicted by the percentage of 
employment to the sales/distribution department of each drug’s manufacturer. There are 
two different marketing measure used to represent m kt. The first variable considered is 
the marketing efforts of the two dominant molecules, simvastatin or atorvastatin. The 
motivation for including this variable in the specification is that any difference between the 
habit generation and informational role will be more pronounced for those molecules that 
have a strong incentive to keep their prescription market share. In the case of simvastatin
103 Note that rosuvastatin was excluded of the analysis given its introduction only a year prior to the end of the 
study period.
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this will aim at maintaining the asset derived from being the first-mover and for 
atorvastatin will target to increase the market share. When mkt is defined as the 
marketing variable of the dominant drug is not possible to examine changes in marketing 
behaviour patterns of the competing molecules. With the objective to solve that limitation, 
mkt is alternatively defined as relative marketing. The purpose of exploring the marketing 
behaviour using this second variable is to provide a more complete picture of the 
alterations in marketing activities. Results for these estimations are presented in Tables 
4.6 and 4.7.
Table 4.6 Marketing Behaviour of the Dominant Drug
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.706450*** 0.697972*** 0.679366*** 0.993190*** 0.826861***
PRES(t-2) -0.083809** -0.145273*** -0.140478*** -0.279101*** -0.165750***
SALES 0.125315 -0.532773 0.160474 2.368648* 1.130554
NGP -0.006609 0.011338 -0.000952 -0.008197 0.021193
CE 4.391741*** 0.708641 0.052761 5.462055*** 1.083822
MKT I -0.000515* -0.000046 0.000073 0.007573** 0.005184
MKT II -0.000083 -0.000423 0.00013 0.006829** 0.005033
MKT III -0.000371**
CO m -0.000589*** -0.000441 -0.000024 0.000522*** -0.000188
AGE 0.000013 0.000149*** 0.000019 -0.000483** -0.000277
GPS 0.00004 -0.000077 -0.000014 0.000051 -0.000052
POP45_64 3.775872* 4.818399 1.530228 1.92543 1.497196
POP65 -0.193708 3.418324 1.184347 -1.971966 1.420478
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.011 0.312 0.747 0.62 0.068
Sargan 0.98 0.93 0.324 0.251 0.483
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
The variables labelled as MKT I, MKT II and MKT III represent the partition of the 
marketing variable according to the introduction of the next competing molecule. Only the 
pair simvastatin-pravastatin will have three partitions limited by the entry of fluvastatin in
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1994, atorvastatin in 1997 and the end of the study period104. In all other columns 
marketing is divided in two periods. In general, results are consistent across Tables 4.6 
and 4.7105. The learning by prescribing effect is again confirmed. Market externalities are 
negligible in the majority of the cases, the exception being the externalities derived from 
market acceptance when the competing drug is pravastatin. The same pattern is 
observed for the association between clinical evidence and diffusion: only when the 
prescription of the dominant drugs is considered with respect to pravastatin clinical 
evidence shows a positive association with relative prescription. The interpretation is 
different when the dominant drug is simvastatin or atorvastatin. In the first case, the 
relative higher evidence works in favour of higher simvastatin prescription with respect to 
pravastatin. In the second case, the atorvastatin to pravastatin ratio of clinical evidence is 
very low as justified by the earlier entry of pravastatin. Despite lower evidence, the 
information obtained for atorvastatin has a stronger effect on relative demand as the 
evidence unambiguously shows its higher effectiveness.
Product quality as shown by side-effects and age of the drug has also a significant 
association with diffusion, only when the dominant drug is compared to pravastatin. Side- 
effects are lower for pravastatin than for the dominant drugs. Interestingly, the effect of 
lower side-effects has a negative impact on relative demand of simvastatin over 
pravastatin. This effect is expected as both drugs are relatively new in the market and 
lower side-effects may be perceived as higher drug quality. The positive effect of the 
pravastatin side-effect on the relative demand of atorvastatin with respect to pravastatin 
may be a symptom that atorvastatin’s higher effectiveness offsets any perceived higher 
product quality through side-effects. This could be justified on the basis that drugs’ side- 
effects do not preclude the drug to target the medical condition for which the product is 
prescribed. The lower age of fluvastatin with respect to simvastatin seems to boost 
relative prescription of simvastatin whereas the higher age of pravastatin has the opposite 
on the relative prescription of atorvastatin with respect to pravastatin. This suggests that 
less mature the competing product is, the higher the advantage for the dominant drug.
The most interesting results are derived from the marketing variable. Coefficients are 
significant only when relative prescription of the dominant drug is compared to 
pravastatin. In both Tables 4.6 and 4.7 there is a negative but increasing effect of the
104 Although the entry of rosuvastatin in 2003 could define an additional partition for the definition of the 
variable, due to its proximity to the end of the study period 2004 is proxied as the year that defines an 
additional competing molecule. This will avoid having too many partitions that may not capture changes in 
marketing behaviour.
105 Indeed, results have not changed in general across all specifications.
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marketing variable on the relative demand of simvastatin with respect to pravastatin. This 
effect is reduced with the passage of time as indicated by a smaller coefficient of the last 
interaction term. This is in favour of an informational role at early stages of diffusion in 
which marketing is aimed at the release of information regarding the product attributes. 
Simvastatin is the first drug in the statins group that requires adopting a position whereby 
marketing is used to inform about product availability and information dissemination on 
product characteristics. Thus first-entry in a new therapeutical group provides marketing 
an informational role that plays a key role to overcome product uncertainty. The increase 
in the coefficient may be indicative of a change in objectives and marketing being directed 
towards a habit generation to ensure market dominance as the number of competitors 
increases.
The marketing effect over time shows a different picture for the atorvastatin-pravastatin 
specification. As shown in Table 4.6 there is a positive effect of atorvastatin marketing on 
relative demand with respect to pravastatin. This means that higher promotion increases 
demand. This is explained by the fact that pravastatin may be the only product that may 
represent certain degree of competition for atorvastatin. The effect shows there is a 
persuasive role that could be explained by informational spillovers appropriated by later 
entrants. This allows the manufacturer to devote marketing efforts to persuade physician’s 
prescription choice. Atorvastatin, as later entrant and real competitor for the first entrant 
benefits from marketing informational spillovers and devotes marketing efforts to secure 
an increasing market share. The market expanding objective followed by atorvastatin is 
facilitated by the consolidated stage at which statins are placed as a therapeutical group 
when this drug is introduced.
Results in Table 4.7 show a negative relationship between relative marketing measure 
and relative demand for atorvastatin with respect to pravastatin. Given the advanced 
stage of statin diffusion, marketing efforts devoted by pravastatin and atorvastatin’s 
manufacturers are likely to be committed exclusively to consolidate physicians’ 
prescription choice. The relative measure may cancel the persuasive objective of 
marketing and overestimate an information role of marketing, explaining the negative 
effect of the relative measure in relative atorvastatin demand. As later entrant, there is an 
expected higher atorvastatin advertising effort devoted to persuade drug prescription habit 
that is consistent with the marketing findings in Table 4.6. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that marketing is not significant when analysing the pair simvastatin-atorvastatin. This 
suggests that competition is independent of any marketing effort and based on the asset 
each drug possesses: simvastatin enjoys of market dominance derived from habit
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generation derived from being the first product and atorvastatin being the drug with 
highest competitive advantage.
Table 4.7 Marketing Behaviour according to Relative Marketing Measures
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.704889*** 0.699177*** 0.679366*** 0.993190*** 0.843550***
PRES(t-2) -0.085434** -0.148795*** -0.140478*** -0.279101*** -0.159068**
SALES 0.603203* -0.427709 0.289419 -0.638135* 0.828489
NGP -0.006727 0.011427 -0.000952 -0.008197 0.020297
CE 8.917969*** 0.849525* 0.017675 27.927849** -0.13519
MKT I -0.000367*** -0.000068 0.000015 -0.007027** 0.001691
MKT II -0.000098 -0.000212 0.000037 -0.007809** 0.001639
MKT III -0.000284***
SE, -0.001194*** -0.000556 -0.000019 0.001892** -0.000273
AGE 0.0000005 0.000147*** 0.000014 -0.000977** -0.000074
GPS 0.00004 -0.000076 -0.000014 0.000051 -0.00005
POP45_64 3.779329* 4.854338 1.530228 1.92543 1.350098
POP65 -0.185158 3.402469 1.184347 -1.971966 1.395917
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.013 0.302 0.747 0.62 0.076
Sargan 0.983 0.743 0.339 0.295 0.296
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
A closer inspection of marketing efforts leads to the conclusion that the non-informative 
role of marketing is accentuated as the number of competing products increases. The 
results here are more in line to those presented in Leffler (1981) in support of the 
existence of both informative and non-informative marketing objectives. However, from 
the results presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 it is possible to attach a timing element to 
these objectives and to locate the informative role of advertising at early stages of 
diffusion. The product loyalty consolidation objective appears in later stages whenever 
there is a product with superior product characteristics that may obtain higher market 
share. Papers such as Leffler (1981) and Hurwitz and Caves (1988) derive their 
conclusions from analysis based on manufacturer’s strategic behaviour and its impact on
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the overall drug market. However, the evidence presented here relies on individual data 
that reflects a closer look up on the effect of marketing at physician level.
4.9 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has expanded the research in Chapter 3 and further extended the analysis to 
examine diffusion of new drugs within the same therapeutical class rather than as a 
therapeutical group. If therapeutical diffusion is of interest under the hypothesis of the 
assumed overall competitive advantage of the new therapeutical group, diffusion at the 
individual drug level is relevant to explain the observed differences in prescription shares. 
Statins are the drug class examined in this chapter and new drug preference is examined 
from the physician perspective. The statins market represents an interesting case for 
diffusion analysis as it is a market in which there is a clear first-mover advantage; 
however, this advantage is reduced by the fourth entrant. The stylised facts observed in 
other industries of the first-entrant being the dominant in market share are thus only 
partially proven in the statins market. The second entrant offers some competition to 
dominant products but this is based on the temporal proximity between first-mover and 
second entrant. The second entrant is also an important benchmark for atorvastatin and 
the third entrant is left with a marginal role.
The interest lies primarily in determining the factors that explain these differences mainly 
in a market where competition in prescription share is among drugs that are close 
substitutes. In addition, these are drugs that are introduced in the market sequentially so 
the anticipation of prospect entry may lead to differences in the strategies followed to 
overcome uncertainty. As part of the information dissemination process there are 
informational spillover effects. Simvastatin as the first entrant faces barriers to drug 
demand by physicians represented by the uncertainty of being a breakthrough new 
product in a brand new drug market. From the perspective of the physician, the entry of 
other drugs may involve switching costs associated with changes in prescription choice. 
These costs would be originated by the acquisition of marginal information required to 
compare drug characteristics and define preferences regarding each drug.
Diffusion of new drugs is examined within a competitive environment to explain 
differences in diffusion acceptance and the presence of first-mover advantage. Based on 
the diffusion framework outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter examines differences in 
prescription shares explained by access to information. The same four informational
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channels are explored: own experience based on learning by prescribing, externalities, 
clinical evidence and marketing. Nevertheless, differences in prescription patterns may 
also be founded in the qualitative differences among drugs. Thus the analysis is further 
complimented with the inclusion of product characteristics. Differences in the model 
specification arise from the definition of the diffusion equations. Prescription volume is 
now defined in relative terms comparing prescription of the dominant drug with respect to 
the competing drug. The objective of this specification is to capture the elements that 
affect the prescription choice between two drugs. As the number of competing drugs 
increase in the market drug choices is increased.
There are a number of interesting findings derived from the analysis that shed light on the 
mechanisms that may perpetuate differences in drug share. The most important channel 
of diffusion of new drugs is the experience derived from direct learning through 
prescription. Elasticity of demand with respect to previous period prescription volume 
ranges between 67 and 71% for the case of simvastatin prescription as compared to its 
competing counterparts. This elasticity is even higher when the prescription volume of 
atorvastatin is taken into account. The learning effects diminish as the number of 
competitors increase due to the presence of informational spillovers originated by a 
decreasing marginal effort in information acquisition. The case of simvastatin represents 
an example of product with market dominance derived from the advantage of being the 
first entrant in the market. This advantage is a consequence of physician’s product 
familiarity with the first statin.
Uncertainty regarding the product may impose strong barriers to diffusion. The incumbent 
is responsible for breaking this barriers and facing lack of information within the pool of 
consumers. First-mover advantage is confirmed by the persistence in simvastatin 
prescription over time even when a competing drug with proved superiority such as 
atorvastatin enters the market. Yet the increasing atorvastatin prescription trend does not 
seem to remove simvastatin loyalty in physicians’ prescription preferences. This might be 
explained by a delay in the confirmation of the higher effectiveness of atorvastatin through 
the publication of clinical evidence and a long time period required for the materialisation 
of the benefits derived from atorvastatin prescription. This originates competition between 
first-mover and fourth-mover based on different grounds. The advantage of the first-mover 
is derived from habit generation whereas atorvastatin’s advantage is based on higher 
product quality. The high market share of simvastatin even after the introduction of 
atorvastatin suggests that there are high switching costs to the prescription of a later 
entrant.
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Clinical evidence also acts as a mechanism for the consolidation of the relative 
prescription of dominant drugs with respect to competing products. Clinical evidence is of 
special importance for the physicians’ choice when the dominant products are compared 
to pravastatin, which is the drug with highest potential for competition with simvastatin or 
atorvastatin. Interestingly enough, overall clinical evidence does not act as an 
informational channel when the relative prescription of simvastatin with respect to 
atorvastatin is considered. Product quality also determines the diffusion path. This effect 
is only accomplished when the dominant drugs are compared to pravastatin, possibly the 
only product that might present some potential competition. The maturity of the product 
also seems to be inversely related to diffusion. The less established a competing product 
is the more likely to impact positively the diffusion of the dominant drug. Consumption 
externalities have a negligible effect on new drug diffusion. This indicates that physician’s 
private information is the only valuable information source and that there might be a cost 
in using observational information of the type depicted by externalities. This would be in 
line with the importance of the own experience as the main driver of drug uptake. 
Physician’s drug prescription is thus delimited by their own beliefs and preferences. In 
addition, the perception of product quality points against the consolidation of the dominant 
drug in the case of simvastatin. If physicians ignore external signal there is no risk of 
generating informational cascades of the type depicted by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and 
Bikhchandani et al. (1998).
One of the most interesting results derived from this chapter is related to the contribution 
of the marketing effort to the diffusion process. The analysis has included two sets of 
variables. The first set captured the overall role of marketing on new drug diffusion. 
Across all results there has been a significant and negative effect of the relative effort of 
simvastatin on relative prescription of simvastatin with respect to pravastatin. The 
negative effect indicates that higher marketing efforts are not aimed at increasing the 
demand of the first drug. This would be in favour of marketing efforts pursuing the spread 
of information. It is not by chance that this happens to the pioneer drug. The uncertainty 
surrounding the introduction of a new product in a brand new therapeutical class is thus 
first approached by the manufacturer as a process that requires information 
dissemination. Can this marketing behaviour expected to be constant over time? These 
variables only capture the overall effect and do not account for any change in the 
objectives being chased by the manufacturers as the market evolves and more drugs are 
introduced.
179
The second set of marketing variables is aimed at capturing the existence of an 
informative or persuasive role of marketing. There is again a consistent and significant 
negative effect of the marketing variable on relative diffusion of simvastatin with respect to 
pravastatin. This effect decreases with the number of competitors indicating a change in 
marketing behaviour: as the first entrant adopts the role of knowledge dissemination, 
marketing effort turns into a persuasive role in later diffusion stages. After the initial 
information dissemination process, the pioneer drug has the incentive to consolidate 
prescription share and marketing changes to a dissuasive role. Consequently, there is a 
coexistence of information and habit generation role in the marketing effort of the first- 
mover. The interesting side of the results concerns the timing in their appearance 
sequence. As for later entrants, there is a pure habit generation process as depicted by 
the results on the atorvastatin marketing variable. This is possible due to informational 
spillovers obtained by later entrants through the information dissemination undertaken by 
the first entrant.
There is no significant effect of the marketing variable between the two dominant drugs. 
This suggests that manufacturers’ awareness regarding potential competition between 
two molecules provides no incentives to advertise the product neither to inform (the 
incumbent would have invested in advertising prior to that) or to persuade (real 
competitive advantage will surface and promotion cannot do much to ensure prescription). 
In general, simvastatin relative diffusion with respect to atorvastatin relies only in the 
physician’s personal experience. Other informational variables are discarded as 
explaining their market share. Under real competition among drugs the only factor that is 
representative of diffusion is the intrinsic asset they hold: product familiarity and habit 
persistence for the pioneer product and higher competitive advantage of the later entrant.
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Chapter 5
Diffusion and Competition in the Hospital Sector: 
Main Drivers and Impact on Quality of Care
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 and 4 were devoted to the empirical analysis of the diffusion of new drugs both 
at the therapeutical and individual drug level, respectively. The research was focused on 
the factors that were affecting the uptake of new medicines within the context of the UK 
NHS. Of special emphasis was the analysis of information as a key element in the 
diffusion process and highlighted the different information sources available to decision­
makers. The present chapter is again framed within the analysis of the diffusion of new 
health care technologies with a shift in the type of product innovation and the NHS sector 
analysed. Whereas the previous chapters dealt with diffusion within the NHS primary care 
sector, the present chapter considers technology diffusion within the secondary care 
sector. The same motivation that opened the interest for new drug diffusion within the 
primary care market is again driving the interest in the diffusion within the hospital sector. 
As it was noted in Chapter 1, diffusion analysis within the hospital sector has its origins in 
the increasing medical expenditure for which technological change is largely responsible.
This chapter will focus on the diffusion of two rather different hospital surgical procedures: 
carotid endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy. Carotid endarterectomy is a procedure 
used to prevent the development of cerebrovascular problems of the type of stroke and 
thus involves a certain degree of risk for the patient. Knee arthroscopy is currently a 
standardised procedure routinely performed as a day-case to diagnose and treat 
problems in the knee joint. Given the characteristics that define each procedure, the 
interest lies essentially in drawing, if any, any common patterns in the diffusion of 
technologies and to see the elements of diffusion that are procedure-specific. While again 
concerned with diffusion, the approach taken in the analysis of surgical procedures is 
slightly different to the approach adopted in the previous diffusion chapters. This is 
justified by the different elements that characterised the environment and the set of 
incentives established in each market. However, there are indeed some common grounds 
in the diffusion process that will provide the basis for general comparisons across 
technologies. This chapter looks specifically at diffusion in a context of the NHS reforms 
that happened during the late 90s and early 00s. These reforms were designed to create
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quasi-markets in the secondary care sectors. The impact of regulatory reforms on the 
diffusion process is thus an additional aspect analysed in this chapter.
This chapter also introduces a different context in which innovations are analysed. As 
opposed to the earlier example of individual level analysis of diffusion of new drugs, 
surgical procedures and their diffusion are examined from the perspective of the NHS 
trust that provides the service. The difference in the unit of analysis is determined by the 
interest in analysing the effect of competitive measures introduced under these reforms. 
The data used is discharge data from all patients admitted into hospital in England during 
the period 1996-2006106. The type of data used for the analysis of surgical procedures 
also allows assessing the impact of diffusion on quality of care107. This chapter thus 
bridges several areas of research into one: the diffusion of new surgical procedures within 
a context of NHS reforms that introduced competition among service providers and the 
impact this had on quality of care. Different specifications are derived for the modelling of 
diffusion and the evaluation of diffusion on quality improvements. For the first aspect, 
dynamic models are applied whereas for the second part survival analysis and competing 
risk models are specified. In general, the results support the learning effect as the main 
aspect of diffusion. Opposed to the findings in Chapter 3 and 4, organisational factors 
boost technology uptake. Similarly, the regulation introduced with the set of reforms 
derives in less competitive markets being more responsive to new surgery availability.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section provides a synopsis of the 
context in which diffusion is analysed. It also provides some evidence on existing surgical 
diffusion analysis in the literature. It also reviews some of the studies that examine the 
relationship between surgical volume and outcome in order to motivate the second part of 
the analysis on this chapter. Section 5.3 describes the surgical technologies and the 
particularities that make them good examples for diffusion analysis. Section 5.4 outlines 
the econometric specifications and Section 5.5 describes the data used. Section 5.6 
presents the methods adopted. Section 5.7 shows the results and the final section 
resumes the main points derived from the findings of the empirical analysis.
106 Although information on the consultant is available, they have a restricted access due to confidentiality 
issues. However, as mentioned above the interest of the present chapter regarding the competitive aspect of 
the market limits the analysis at the provider level. If the diffusion process is disaggregated at the consultant 
level then socio-economic variables become relevant. However, the research questions need to be 
reformulated and this constitutes a different piece of work that is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
107 Previous chapters could not evaluate the changes in patient’s health outcomes derived from the demand of 
new prescription drugs. The analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 was based on prescription data with no follow up 
after consultation and thus the analysis was entirely limited to the determinants of the process.
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5.2 Technology Diffusion and Quality of Care within the Hospital 
Market
This section intends to give an overview of the approaches taken in the literature 
regarding the diffusion process within the hospital care sector. Because diffusion is 
bounded by the regulatory setting in which it happens, the uptake of new surgical 
procedures within the NHS is necessarily related to the analysis of competition. In the 
context of diffusion, the effect of competitive environments in the provision of hospitals 
services is difficult to determine a priori. Findings in Sloan et al. (1986) point towards a 
negative effect of competition on diffusion. Although competition analysis has been largely 
related to free markets in which private and public stakeholders coexist there has been 
evidence that more commercialised insurance programs are related to a faster diffusion 
(Sloan et al., 1986). A possible explanation is the use of technology to signal higher 
quality providers. Overall, competition is introduced to improve efficiency with direct
effects on prices and costs as well as in the quality of the product provided.
The reforms in the UK NHS introduced in the early 90s were designed to improve 
efficiency. The reforms essentially introduced a quasi-market in which purchasers and 
providers of services within the hospital sector were separated creating the so-called NHS 
internal market. Purchasing powers were first given to District Health Authorities (DHAs) 
and GP fund-holders but this was changed in the late 90s. Purchasing figures were 
restructured and GPs were unified within different Primary Care Trusts (PCT) who 
became the purchasing organisations. The expected efficiency gain would come through 
purchasers shopping around and the introduction of competition between providers that 
would give incentives to offer better prices for secondary care services. The 
decentralisation of services was taken one step further and in 2004 the figure of 
Foundation Trusts was created. This change was not mandatory and required the 
application by trusts to become foundation trusts. The new status implied that trusts would 
become self-governing organisations with independence to manage their budgets and to 
meet patients’ needs. The description of these reforms as well as the assessment of 
reforms in the literature is extensively explained in Appendix 5.1.
Again the diffusion analysis is approached from the intra-level perspective as it was
extensively discussed in Chapter 1. In Chapters 3 and 4, the intra-firm term was used to 
define the acceptance of the innovation as the increase in prescriptions volume overtime 
by physicians. In the current setting, the intra-firm diffusion is related to the volume of new
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surgical procedures performed by each provider. In Chapter 1 the intra-firm diffusion is 
represented by the following expression
K J K , = K m/(K a + K j
Where K t is the total stock of capital, K ot is the old technology capital, and K nt the new
technology capital stock. Although this is the general representation of intra-firm diffusion, 
the case of the surgical innovations analysed in this chapter will have the peculiarity 
\hatKnt = K t . As discussed in Chapter 1, this means that intra-level analysis is
approached examining surgical volume but it does not account for the replacement 
process as represented by the expression above. The interest in carotid endarterectomy 
as a surgical technology lies in its unique nature as a procedure to prevent stroke given 
that the procedure itself was a breakthrough and had no surgery equivalent. Knee 
arthroscopy, as a minimally invasive procedure, does face competition of open procedure; 
however, patient eligibility for these treatment procedures causes that patients receiving 
the open procedure are not suitable for arthroscopy108. Thus diffusion of these procedures 
is examined as intra-firm diffusion under the assumption that they do not replace existing 
technology, instead they are gradually and increasingly used to treat patients. It defines 
diffusion as the acceptance of the new technology and diffusion is measure by the volume 
of surgeries performed. Before proceeding to the specification of the diffusion problem in 
the hospital sector, the next subsections review the evidence brought forward in surgical 
technology and examine the volume-outcome relationship as measurement of higher 
quality of care derived from higher volume of surgery performed.
5.2.1 Surgical Technology Diffusion
A number of factors have been responsible for the profound changes in procedure 
diffusion experienced in the hospital sector. Increasing hospital costs experienced over a 
prolonged period of time combined with the recognition of the general lack of efficiency 
have been the main drivers for reforms aimed at increasing efficiency and improving 
quality of care through market oriented policies. In particular, these changes have 
substituted cost-based reimbursement systems by fixed price per in-hospital service, of 
the type of the health care resource groups (HRGs) in the UK. Other reforms have also
108 Although open procedure and arthroscopy may have been under competition, the diffusion stage for which 
analysis in the current chapter is undertaken locates the diffusion process at a stage in which they are not 
competing technologies.
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been designed to introduce competition within the hospital market to boost allocative and 
technical efficiency over the last years.
Simultaneously, the health care market has experienced a fast rate of technological 
change through a number of scientific and technological developments. Diagnostic and 
treatment tools for specific conditions that were not previously available are now part of 
the routine practice. As an example take the case of minimally invasive procedures as 
laparoscopic cholecystectomy or PTCA that reduce the recovery time and the risk of 
adverse outcomes or the development of imaging techniques that opened a new era in 
the diagnosis of specific conditions. The hospital sector reforms and the development and 
diffusion of these new technologies have been running in parallel and it is of great interest 
to examine how they have been interacting. Specifically, interest rests on the impact of 
reforms increasing competition in the hospital sector and that may have changed the 
course of the diffusion path. Little is known of the impact of regulation on technological 
diffusion but there are a number of studies by the TECH investigators (TECH, 2001; 
McClellan and Kessler, 2002) that explore the effect of the different regulatory systems on 
technological diffusion across countries109.
Within the hospital sector the analysis of the adoption and diffusion of new medical 
technologies is largely based on a small amount of evidence provided by the uptake of 
innovations that represent capital-embodied technologies (Romeo et al., 1984; Lee et al., 
1985; Baker and Phibbs, 2000; Baker, 2001). These innovations are mainly “big-ticket” 
technologies that are high cost and require not only a large initial investment but also 
have a high unit cost. The installation of these medical device technologies usually involve 
additional investment in staff training because they require specialised human capital to 
supplement the technology. Although evidence on the diffusion process of capital- 
intensive, device-type, innovation is necessary to provide a comprehensive understanding 
of their up-take within the hospital, conclusions drawn from their particular diffusion 
experience may not be applicable to other surgical technologies because of differences in 
the stakeholders involved and the characteristics of the innovation.
There are important qualitative characteristics that differentiate equipment-based 
technological innovations from surgical technologies. These differences arise in all of the 
three stages of technological change pointed out by Davies (1979): invention, innovation
109 These studies look at factors such as the regulation on technology use, the ownership of hospitals, the 
effect of competition or the regulation in the labour market.
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and diffusion. The development of equipment is profit-driven as opposed to the case for 
the development of surgery that normally takes place in an academic environment more 
driven by the academic prestige and the publication of results in scientific journals rather 
than by a direct profit-maximisation component. The developers of medical devices are 
private companies that carry out their research outside the hospital environment whereas 
the developers of new surgical procedures are likely to be producers of health care 
themselves. Furthermore, the actual introduction of a new surgical procedure is not 
necessarily driven by any formal regulatory process and there is no pre-adoption 
evaluation process. Generally, surgical technology does not require costly investment in 
supplementary equipment and hence does not hinge on heavy investment decisions by 
surgeons and hospitals.
Within the hospital hierarchy different levels are likely to address technological uptake in 
different manners. Although both the surgeon and hospital level are valid units of analysis 
each of them addresses different research questions, present modelling specificities and 
are highly conditioned by data availability. Hospitals are the aggregation of specialised 
individual surgeons who perform the procedure (Lewitt, 1986) and thus it is representative 
of the average behaviour of individual surgeons. Differences in attitudes towards 
technology may arise both across hospitals and individuals within the same specialty as 
well as different specialties. If it is accepted that the decision to adopt surgical technology 
is a decision shared by the hospital and surgeons (Sloan et al, 1986, pp38) then any 
evidence based on both levels will share common aspects and differences will arise in the 
specific characteristics of each level. As such the characteristics of the individual surgeon 
are likely to be a determinant in the decision to perform the surgery (Escarce et al., 1995, 
Escarce, 1996). A part from a surgeon’s gender, age and training characteristics it is 
arguable that a surgeon’s interests and motivations will be largely in line with those of the 
hospital and thus reflect the same corporative behaviour. To a certain degree there is an 
expected commitment among these two parties to cooperate based on the financial 
restrictions and scientific knowledge required to incorporate surgical technologies into the 
hospital service portfolio.
The S-shaped curve has been typically used to graphically represent the diffusion process 
in many industries and the hospital sector is no exception. The early work by Russell 
(1977) empirically supported the logistic curve as providing a graphic approximation to the 
diffusion process of five different physical capital technologies. Although Russell (1977) 
followed the type of epidemic models that other authors like Griliches (1957) and 
Mansfield (1963) had used in other sectors, presenting the pitfalls of the epidemic models
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described above, it provided a basis to open the discussion about the diffusion process in 
the hospital sector. Russell findings point towards a key role of the characteristics of the 
innovation in terms of competitive advantage as the main factor influencing diffusion. 
Other factors as the role of hospital size and type of hospital ownership were shown to 
directly boost diffusion rates.
One of the early studies to specifically examine diffusion of surgical innovations was a 
comparative study of the adoption of five different procedures by Sloan et al. (1986). This 
study offers a comprehensive overview of technological change in that examines both 
adoption and diffusion of innovation and most importantly they include dynamic 
specifications of the type specified in this chapter110. The main variables of interest were 
the role of third party reimbursement payment and it is shown that the larger the share of 
patients with commercial insurance the faster the hospital diffusion process. Their findings 
support a negative association between competition and adoption and diffusion. Following 
the idea in Sloan et al. (1986) of substitution across technologies, Cutler and Huckman 
(2003) formally define this process and distinguish between “treatment expansion” and 
“treatment substitution” in the process through which PTCA replaced CABG. They argue 
that lower unit cost technologies may lead to higher expenditure as the new technology 
substitutes the old one, but also expands the patient population that potentially can benefit 
from the innovation. They find an initial strong expansion effect; however, over time the 
substitution effect prevails. This leads to an overall increase in expenditure that is offset 
by the improved medical quality. This relationship was shown to have similar trends in the 
UK however McGuire et al. (forthcoming) found higher treatment expansion and lower 
substitution in the UK than in the US.
The research in surgical procedures as a type of “disembodied product innovation” 
(Escarce et al., 1995) has been restricted to the study of a small number of surgical 
procedures mainly within the US health care context which is characterised by having a 
greater commercial orientation than European markets. It is reasonable to assume that 
the structure of incentives provided within each market is different. Yet, diffusion is a 
phenomenon that happens in both types of health care sectors and it is therefore 
important to analyse diffusion in other markets where financial incentives are not as 
strong as in the US. Two specific procedures have been largely used as case-studies in
110 It is one of the first studies to provide a complete analysis in that it examines the adoption process (inter­
level analysis), the diffusion (intra-level) and also to incorporate dynamics in the empirical specification. 
Although they have longitudinal data, their estimation method is different to panel data methods and potential 
bias could arise in the coefficient estimates. These biases will be stark specially when they introduce the 
dynamic specification. However, note that panel data models have been mainly developed and refined after 
the paper was published.
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the literature, laparoscopic cholecystectomy and PTCA111. Both bring tangible medical 
improvements arising from their less invasive nature than the existing procedures, with the 
corresponding cost and patient benefit implications.
With the exception of Sloan et al. (1986), surgical diffusion analysis has been mainly 
understood as the number of potential adopters performing the new surgical procedure at 
the inter-hospital or inter-surgeon level. Research on this front is mainly interested in the 
time elapsed from the availability of the surgical procedure to the first time of use adopting 
hazard models to estimate the effect of several covariates -  mainly surgeon and hospital 
characteristics- on the timing of adoption. Evidence on the factors that shape the evolution 
of the surgical procedure acceptance is generally scarce however. The intra-level 
diffusion process in the hospital sector in general and specifically in the diffusion of 
surgical procedures as addressed in the present chapter has not been much documented.
5.2.2 Diffusion and Productivity: the Volume-Outcome Relationship Revisited
The primary assumption in diffusion literature is that technologies have embedded a 
competitive product advantage for potential users that will be translated into consumer’s 
welfare gains only when the technology is diffused. Some models of technology adoption 
take into account the costs and benefits of adoption in the decision to include the 
technology in the production function (Reinganum, 1981; Ireland and Stoneman, 1986). 
Technological change in other industries typically brings a change in the production 
function that either lowers the production costs or changes the number of units produced. 
These are clearly identifiable indicators that can be measured quantitatively; however, in 
health care it is difficult to obtain accurate measures to assess outcomes given the multi­
dimension of the output and the vague definition of quality. In health care there is little 
assessment of the welfare gains derived from diffusion. Some evidence on the benefits of 
innovation for heart attack treatment has been highlighted by Cutler and McClellan (2001) 
in a study that compared the costs and benefits of PTCA.
In the current setting diffusion is measured as volume of procedures performed each year. 
As a second step of the analysis the aim is to examine the effect of the increasing volume 
on medical quality. Of widespread interest is the intuitive idea that higher surgical volume 
ought to be associated with better patient outcomes. Inherent in the observed increasing
111 Other types of surgical procedures such as laparoscopic cholecystectomy, hip replacement, cataract 
surgery or morbid obesity surgery (Sloan et al., 1986; Escarce et al., 1995; Escarce, 1996) have also been 
studied but these procedures have not been as popular and relevant for diffusion.
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trend of technology use is process whereby quality improvements are materialised in 
better health outcomes. The increase in observed carotid endarterectomy and knee 
arthroscopy volume growth poses the question of the effect that this will have on patient’s 
health outcome.
The examination of the relationship between surgical volume and outcome effect has a 
long trajectory. Starting with the seminal work by Luft et al. (1979), which was examining 
the “experience effect” and its implications on the regionalisation of operations, an 
increasing body of literature has explored the volume-outcome relationship. There is a 
generally accepted and empirically supported positive association between better health 
outcomes for patients treated in high volume hospitals as compared to hospitals 
performing lower volume of surgeries. This relationship has been reported within the 
health economics literature and also in a wider range of studies within the medical care 
research arena. A comprehensive systematic literature for the latter can be found in Halm 
et al. (2002).
Despite the assumed negative relationship between surgical volume and quality indicators 
(usually measured as mortality rates or length of stay), the volume-outcome relationship 
has been justified using two different interpretations. The first one, and the most 
commonly accepted in the first research papers in this stream of literature, is the “practice 
makes perfect” effect which is channelled through higher number of surgeries performed 
that lead to improved provider’s skills. This is then reflected in increases in knowledge and 
translated into productivity increases. Generally, the effect of improved productivity has 
been interpreted as a learning by doing process whereby surgical technique efficiency is 
gained with increasing volume levels. Alternatively, the observed increased efficiency 
originated by the “practice makes perfect” effect has been justified by the passage of time 
through a learning by watching process or improvements brought by the use of new 
technology (Ho, 2002)112. The second interpretation, the “selective referral” effect, 
supports the idea that the higher number of surgeries performed may be a reflection of the 
higher hospital quality characteristics. A high number of patients will thus opt for treatment 
in hospitals with high quality indicators as this acts as a signal for positive treatment 
expectations. Selective referral will arise in markets in which insurance arrangements 
favour mobility and patient choices. Contractual arrangements between insurers and
112 In her paper, Ho (2002) uses time dummies to capture technological changes as responsible for the 
improved productivity. However, the time variable can also capture influential elements other than technology 
such as the learning by watching and it is difficult to separate out both effects.
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providers will cause the patient to be referred to the provider that is known as high- 
quality113.
The negative coefficient between the number of procedures and quality measures found 
in early studies such as in Luft et al. (1979) does not allow distinction between these two 
effects. In general, the evidence provided is not conclusive and it has been shown that the 
effect of volume on outcome in some cases is dominated by the practice-makes-perfect 
effect and in some other cases by the selective referral hypothesis and that it is highly 
procedure-specific (Luft, 1980; Luftetal., 1987). Recent studies reveal however that the 
practice-makes-perfect effect does not prevail and that any effect on the outcome is due 
to quality differences between hospitals (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997)114.
It is important to note however that hospital total surgical volume may not be a good 
measure of the volume effect on outcomes as difference relationships across surgical 
specialties are likely to arise. The aggregated effect could be highly distorted if the 
number of procedures for a specific condition is very low, while another procedure exhibits 
a high volume. This suggests analysis of procedure-specific volume rather than overall 
volume (Hughes etal., 1987). In addition, the presence of diminishing marginal returns to 
increases in volume is to be anticipated. It is expected that the effect of volume on 
outcome would be exacerbated at lower levels of surgeries. In addition, what could be 
thought as a positive overall relationship between high hospital volume and outcome 
effect across hospital might not hold within hospitals when considering low volume 
surgeons. Thus, not only might low volume hospitals have a negative impact on outcome 
but also low volume of surgeons within a hospital can be a channel to undermine overall 
hospital productivity (Hughes et al., 1987).
113 Although, selective referral was an alternative explanation valid in markets with insurance arrangements 
between insurance and provider, this could also be articulated in the NHS as the selective referral effect could 
be introduced through competition enhanced by the set of reforms faced by NHS hospitals. Thus, the selective 
referral could exist not on the grounds of referral due to a strong presence of insurance companies in the 
health sector but on the grounds of competition among providers/sellers.
114 The dominance of one or the other effect will be accompanied by different policy implications. If the 
practice makes perfect assumption is valid then there are arguments for the regionalisation of services and 
concentration of specific in-hospital services by specialised providers. That is, concentration of services would 
increase the productivity and potential benefits due to economies of scale in production, especially in context 
of tight health care budgets, and there would be little support for the centralisation of services (Luft et al., 
1979; Luftet al. 1987; Gaynoret al., 2005).
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Improved health outcomes are generally measured as shorter length of stay and low in- 
hospital mortality rates. In some instances it has been argued that length of stay might not 
be a good quality measure given the differences across regions and non-clinical 
endogenous elements that might influence this variable (Hughes et al., 1988). These two 
outcomes have been examined as independent measures; however, there is a degree of 
inter-dependency between them that reflects the case-mix complexity. Hamilton and 
Hamilton (1997) account for potential correlation between post-surgery length of stay and 
in-hospital mortality using a competing risk model that considers the likelihood of being 
discharged dead or alive as two alternative outcomes. They and Hamilton and Ho (1998), 
introduce hospital fixed effects to control for time-constant hospital-specific effects that are 
not captured by the set of hospital characteristics variables normally specified in 
econometric studies in this area115.
With the availability of new longitudinal data available and the recognition that selective 
referral effect could be underestimated, research started controlling for hospital 
characteristics to eliminate the confounding effects of the practice-makes-perfect and 
selective referral alternative explanations for the volume-outcome relationship. In 
accounting for the fixed differences between hospitals the estimated direct volume- 
outcome relationship will be capturing differences within hospitals overtime. Findings in 
this newer literature that controls for hospital fixed effects were mixed. On one hand, 
Farley and Ozminkowski (1992) findings do not support the selective referral hypothesis 
and suggest that outcome improvements could be achieved merely through high-volume 
performance. On the contrary, Hamilton and Hamilton (1997) find evidence of the volume- 
outcome relationship reflecting differences in quality and case-mix between hospitals 
rather than within-hospitals differences thus sustaining the selective referral effect. 
Similarly, results in Ho (2002) support the selective referral effect in explaining better 
productivity gains. In addition, her findings suggest that better health outcomes are 
obtained not through learning by doing but through the use of technology and learning by 
watching acquired with the passage of time.
115 Early volume-output studies used cross-sectional data within a restricted static analysis (Luft et al. 1987; 
Hughes etal., 1987; Hughes etal., 1988). In line with the interest showed in whether quality differences exist 
between- or within-hospitals, or the prevalence of the selective referral effect, later econometric studies used 
longitudinal data to analyse volume-outcome causality (Farley and Ozminkowski, 1992; Hamilton and 
Hamilton, 1997; Hamilton and Ho, 1998). A new wave of research was particularly interested in the possibility 
of hospital quality differences being responsible for increases in volume based on likely biased estimates 
arising when not controlling for quality organisational differences. In empirical analysis this was articulated 
controlling for institutional characteristics through the use of hospital dummies that capture hospital-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. The selective referral effect would then operate through 
perceived hospital quality differences.
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Although the causality of the volume-outcome effect is important this chapter does not 
explicitly address which effect prevails. Instead, the objective is to confirm that providers 
using higher levels of new technology have better quality outcomes and assess the 
dimension of this effect116. Heterogeneity in provider characteristics are expected to lead 
different diffusion processes. As diffusion process is related to learning this will reflect 
improved skills in surgical performance. Consequently, both practice-makes-perfect and 
selective referral are expected to be at work and will be represented accordingly. Yet the 
interest lies primarily in the productivity gains that are achieved from technological 
diffusion.
5.3 Product Innovations: Carotid Endarterectomy and Knee 
Arthroscopy
As distinguished by Chang and Luft (1991) new procedures can be classified as “new 
themes and variations on a theme” although there might be cases in which the difference 
between these two types is not clear. Chang and Luft (1991, pp.97-98) define new themes 
as the “result from the invention of new techniques or application of existing techniques in 
a new context”. The surgical technologies examined in this chapter both represent a new 
theme. The first procedure analysed is carotid endarterectomy, a procedure that removes 
fatty clots from the carotid arteries, the two main arteries in the neck that supply blood to 
the brain. The process by which fat forms in the artery thickening the walls is called 
atherosclerosis and it is one of the main causes of stroke. As such, this is a condition that 
is observed mainly in older patients. Partial occlusion of the arteries may reveal carotid 
stenosis which means a reduction in the diameter of the carotid arteries. Depending in the 
degree of narrowing in the artery the stenosis may be mild (under 30% diameter reduction 
of the artery), moderate (30-69%) and severe (70-99%). This procedure is mainly 
performed as a mode of prevention to develop cerebrovascular disease and reduces the 
risk of stroke and transient ischemic attack (TIA). It was first performed in St. Mary’s 
hospital London in 1954 and its popularity has been growing over time. Although there 
was an increase in the number of procedures during the early 1980s at a time when there 
was still no formal evidence of the benefits of the procedure, the second half of the 1980s 
saw a reduction in the number of operations performed.
116 The fact that the chapter deals with new technologies, as opposed to any established technology, 
introduces an aspect in the volume-outcome relationship that had been ignored in the literature. In this case, it 
is easy to relate the importance of the practice-makes-perfect effect to a learning process that will show the 
expected superiority of the new technology.
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There are marked differences in the number of operations reported across countries. In 
the US this procedure is among the top five more common operations performed with over
100,000 procedures in 1985 (Dyken, 1986). Figures for the UK are in contrast with those 
for the US and the procedure did not enjoy the same level of popularity (Halliday, 2001). 
Despite similar stroke rates in these countries they show radical differences in the carotid 
endarterectomy rates, the estimated carotid endarterectomy rate in the UK was 24 per 
million per year in 1991 and 360 per million per year in the US (Irvine et al. 1996).
Characterised by an increasing popularity since its introduction, carotid endarterectomy 
was increasingly used despite the evidence provided by the first randomised controlled 
trials on the low effectiveness of this procedure and there was no study that could 
determine that surgery was more effective than medical management (Dyken, 1986). 
There was no direct surgical procedure that carotid endarterectomy was substituting as 
this procedure was introduced to treat a condition previously controlled with medical 
management. Recently evidence provided by two major randomised controlled trials have 
showed results in favour of carotid endarterectomy being effective and the procedure was 
beneficial for patients with an artery narrowing higher than 70% (North American 
Symptomatic Carotid Endarterectomy Trial (NASCET, 1991) and the European Carotid 
Surgery Trialists’ Collaboration Group (ECST, 1991)). Over the last years, although 
already in a mature phase in the diffusion process, there has been an increasing trend in 
the use of carotid endarterectomy as observed in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Carotid Endarterectomy Procedure Rate per thousands
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The nature of the diagnosis for carotid stenosis and its treatment with carotid 
endarterectomy generally defines the procedure as an emergency case and thus it is 
critical to be undertaken quickly. As a prove of that, only around 8% of carotid 
endarterectomy patients in the data are elective cases whereas the rest are admitted to 
hospital as emergency cases for a procedure that needs to be carried out generally within 
a short period of time after admission. The performance of carotid endarterectomy over 
the last years has lead to shorter post-surgery lengths of stay as shown in the Figure 5.2. 
The graph shows the average post-surgery length of stay for all hospitals included in the 
data. From an average of six days of in-hospital stay after surgery in 1996 there has been 
a significant decrease lowering the number of hospital stay to less than four in a period of 
over ten years. These figures are not adjusted by patient case-mix and do not reflect 
differences in hospital organisation. At a first glance, the observed reduction in post­
surgery length of stay may lead to think that there have been improvements in post­
surgery indicators as a consequence of increased familiarity with the procedure. 
Competition could be also liable for that, pushing providers to shorten lengths of stay as to 
keep costs down. After the NHS reforms providers were obliged to set prices equal to 
average cost and this could be an indicator of providers trying to lower costs as to offer 
competitive prices and attract more purchasers. Whether this reduction in length of stay is 
actually a result of improved procedure performance by the provider or if it is driven by 
competition is an aspect that will be reflected in quality.
Figure 5.2 Post-surgery Length of Stay
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Source: HES data. Carotid endarterectomy procedures 1996-2006.
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Carotid endarterectomy is a good case-study to examine for two reasons. The first one is 
the hazardous nature of the procedure in that it entails a certain risk for the patients. 
Carotid endarterectomy is thus a preventive procedure that has been capturing an 
increasing attention, especially after evidence on its effectiveness has been established. 
Carotid endarterectomy is accompanied by a risk of causing subsequent non-fatal and 
fatal stroke after operation. This may have boosted the increasing trend in procedures 
observed over the last years. Consequently, this risk for the patient might be a crucial 
factor in the speed of uptake given the existing evidence on the competitive advantage of 
this surgical operation and potential benefits in prevention of cerebrovascular diseases. 
The second factor that makes carotid endarterectomy an interesting example is that it 
represents what Luft et al. (1979) named as a new theme. As such the surgical procedure 
is considered as a technological innovation that covers a gap in the surgical area. 
Previous to the introduction of carotid endarterectomy only medical management was at 
hand for the treatment of carotid stenosis. Thus there was no technology that could 
compete with carotid endarterectomy directly.
The second type of operation included into the study is knee arthroscopy. Knee 
arthroscopy is a minimally invasive procedure used to diagnose and treat disorders within 
the knee joint. Knee arthroscopies are performed as a day case procedure and it is 
currently used as a diagnostic and therapeutic procedure. In general, meniscectomy is the 
partial or total removal of a torn meniscus performed by orthopaedic surgeons. The choice 
between minimally invasive arthroscopy or open procedure (arthrotomy or open 
meniscectomy) will depend on the injury and patient’s characteristics. Knee arthroscopy is 
not a suitable procedure for all patients however this is a small percentage of patients that 
require open meniscectomy as treatment for knee injury (Pettrone, 1982). Arthroscopic 
surgery is performed to examine the cavity of a joint using an arthroscope. Generally, 
arthroscopic surgery has the advantage of reducing the damage caused in surgery and 
implies faster recovery after operation. Arthroscopy is performed using a thin tube into 
small incisions for the assessment of the damage in the knee and therapeutic treatment.
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Figure 5.3 Knee Arthroscopy Procedure Rate per thousands
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Figure 5.3 shows the most recent trends in the number of knee arthroscopy procedures 
performed. The graph shows a slight decrease in the procedure rate from 1998 to 2001 
with a point of inflexion in 2001 followed by an increase in the rate of procedures 
performed. The data for these figures is obtained from the HES data using the O PCS-4  
codes. The decrease in the rate is not significant and it is approximately one percentage 
point. However, the increase in procedure rate from 2001 to 2006 shows the growing 
acceptance of the procedure by the medical community. It is thus interesting to examine 
this procedure given the opposed trends observed over the period 1998-2007. At the 
same time that there is an observed increase in procedure rates for knee arthroscopy, the 
trend for open procedures follows the opposite direction. Note that the rates are very low 
compared to those for knee arthroscopy as seen in Figure 5.4. Open procedures are still 
performed because there is a low proportion of patients who are not eligible for knee 
arthroscopy117.
117 The fact that open procedures are only performed in patients that are not eligible for minimally invasive 
surgery, removes the possibility to analyse substitution effects during the study period. The analysis of these 
effects is only suitable when patients are equally entitled for both procedures.
196
Figure 5.4 Open Knee Procedure Rate per thousands
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The main qualitative difference with carotid endarterectomy is that it represents a new  
variation of an existing theme, arthroscopy. In this case the variation is accompanied by 
improvements in recovery times and cost reductions due to the change from longer 
hospital stays from the open knee procedure to day-case surgery in the case of 
arthroscopy. Additionally, these are procedures that affect the daily living activity of 
patients but they do not represent any life risk. Thus, the examination of such two different 
procedures will shed light on the analysis of the impact of qualitative characteristics and 
surgical risk to patients on surgery uptake. Initially one would expect faster diffusion for 
carotid endarterectomy since it is a procedure used to treat a condition that may lead to 
fatal health outcomes.
5.4 Econometric Specification
This section develops a new perspective in the analysis of diffusion in health care 
markets. It brings together the effect of competition on medical technology diffusion 
framed within a quasi-market context, also examining the effect of diffusion on patients’ 
health. This provides an overall picture of the interaction between the regulator and the 
provider and the effects that the actions of these two stakeholders will have on the 
outcome of the production of hospital services. In previous chapters the objective was to
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look at the individual decision-maker, the GP, as the unit of analysis. This chapter looks at 
diffusion not at the individual surgeon level but at provider performance. Although a 
comprehensive analysis would ideally examine diffusion both at the surgeon and hospital 
level, the choice of the trust as the unit of analysis in the diffusion equations has been 
conditioned by the interest of the interaction between competition and diffusion. This 
section outlines the empirical specifications for the diffusion equations first and then the 
specifications for the volume-outcome relationship.
5.4.1 Diffusion Equations
As outlined above the analysis is based on the intra-provider diffusion behaviour. The 
main interest is on the effects of a set of variables in the volume of procedures performed 
by each individual provider using equations in levels. Diffusion equations are expressed in 
the following way,
spt =CC' spt_x + p  • Competition pt + S • Outcome it_x + y • xpt + c p (5.1)
where sht is the dependent variable, the second component of (5.1) represents different 
competition measures as defined in detail below, the third element corresponds to 
different measures of patient outcome, the vector xpt includes procedure-specific
variables, provider organisational characteristics as well as control variables. Finally, cp is 
an unobserved time-constant provider-specific characteristic.
The dependent variable sht captures the number of surgical procedures performed by 
provider p  at time t and s = C EA ,K L . The choice of volume as dependent variable 
allows for consistency in both diffusion equations and volume-outcome relationship. 
Volume is controlled for population at risk118. Given that the two types of surgical 
procedures affect population at different age bands, the volume figures are adjusted by 
population in the strategic health authority in which the provider is located. Because the
118 Provider volume is adjusted for population in each strategic health authority. This raises the issue of patient 
mobility within and between regions. Not all patients in each strategic health authority Will be travelling to any 
of the providers within the geographical delimitation and it is expected that patients located in the boundaries 
of the strategic health authorities could go to any of the closest providers that are likely to be located in the 
neighbouring region. However, under the assumption that the patient influx from other regions is 
counterbalanced with the patients exiting to other regions, controlling for the population gives a close 
approximation to population at risk.
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two surgical procedures affect two different population stratums, surgical volume figures 
are adjusted accordingly. The number of carotid endarterectomy procedures are thus 
adjusted by the population aged over 45, given that patients in this age band are the 
population at risk for presenting the diagnosis that requires carotid endarterectomy 
( CEApt). On the contrary, knee laparoscopy is a procedure performed to patients in any
age range and therefore the dependent variable in the diffusion equation is defined as the 
number of procedures adjusted by the total population ( KApt). The volume measures are
expressed in logarithmic terms.
The variables of interest can be divided in four sets. The first one is the lag of the 
dependent variable ( CEApt_x and KApl_x) that represents the learning effects present in
any diffusion process as it has been hypothesized in previous chapters119. In accordance 
with diffusion equations in Chapters 3 and 4, the equations that capture the diffusion of 
surgical procedures also follow a dynamic structure. Including the behaviour of the 
provider in the previous period allows controlling for any cost of adjustment arising during 
the “learning by performing” process. The presence of learning by doing effects exists if 
there is a positive and significant association between the volume in period t and the 
volume in period t - 1. This will reflect a continuous reduction in the degree of uncertainty 
channelled through the experience acquired over time.
The second variable of interest in (5.1) is the competition variable (Competitionpt). It 
reflects competition faced by provider p  at time t . Note that the degree of competition is 
allowed to change overtime. Given that the contracts between providers and purchasers 
(PCTs) are renewed yearly, any modification in the market competitive structure will be 
captured at each point in time. With the regulation introduced with the latest reforms PCTs 
are currently the buyers of the services provided by trusts. As a result, it is feasible to find 
different PCTs buying services to the same provider/trust. There are two different 
measures of competition: those that capture the extent of competition as defined by the 
interaction between PCTs and providers and those that capture the competition within the 
same strategic health authority.
119 As opposed to the case of other health technologies there is no commercial interest in promoting the 
surgical technology. For this type of innovations research in academic environments and prestige are likely 
mechanisms to push increases in volume.
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It has been argued elsewhere that administrative health regions do not represent a good 
area definition to describe individual markets in which potentially competition occurs 
(Propper, 2004). Although it might not be accurate, the strategic health authority measure 
will serve to check the robustness of the results obtained with the first group of 
competition variables. In addition to that, the definition of competition is likely to have 
embedded a geographical definition in itself. If PCTs are to buy services from providers 
the travel distance for patients under the PCT umbrella will be a factor taken into account 
before any contract agreement. Consequently, potential providers that the PCT may 
commission services to are likely to be within a determined geographical area. Both set of 
variables differ from the competition area commonly used in the literature defined as the 
number of competitors located within the geographical area within thirty minutes drive 
from each trust (Propper, 1996; Propper et al., 1998; Propper et al., 2004). These areas 
were defined using the trust postcode and the competition variable as the number of 
providers located within this catchment area. Postcodes were not available for the present 
study and thus the definition of geographical area relied on the boundaries imposed by 
administrative health areas.
The first competition measure is the Herfindahl index of those trusts providing services to 
the same PCT. Among all trusts providing services ioPCTi , the Herfindahl index accounts 
for the sum of the market shares of each trust at time t defined as
n
pt =  H P C T 't — ^  Ctpf
p =1
Where i denotes the PCT identifier, p  refers to the trust/provider and n is the total 
number of trusts providing services to PCTi . a pt is the share of surgical volume 
performed by provider p  over the total surgical volume provided to PCT i at time t . The 
second variable is defined as the number of trusts performing the surgery within each 
PCTn C2pt = n .  In comparison with the Herfindahl index, this variable represents the
count of competing providers and does not control for the volume of procedures supplied 
to the PCT. The same types of variables are generated at the strategic health authority 
level. As such, the Herfindahl index is now defined as the share of surgical volume of 
each individual trust over the total volume of surgeries performed in the strategic health 
authority,
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k denotes the strategic health authority and k = 1,...,10 as given by the last definition of 
health administrative area. N  is the total number of trusts in each strategic health 
authority. In addition to this, the count of trusts and the number of PCTs in each strategic 
health authority are included as competition variables, C4pt = N  and CSpl = I , where I
is the number of PCTs per strategic health authority. The last two variables only give a 
count of the number of potential competitors but they are not adjusted by the population in 
the area. In order to account for spare capacity Propper et al. (2004) suggest to adjust 
these measures according to population on the basis that any excess in capacity to 
supply services for a given population may offer more scope for competition. Thus, C4pt
and C5pt are transformed and corrected for the population and C6pt = N  / pop and
C7pt = 1 / pop . Propper etal. (2004) argue that the higher C6pt the higher the potential for
competition since there will be a higher than average number of trusts for a specific 
population. On the contrary, a higherC7p, will be indicative that there is less capacity for
competition to arise due to an excess number of purchasers/PCTs that will secure 
contracts with the providers.
A third variable of interest in (5.1) relates to the performance of the trust in the previous 
period (Outcome pt_x). During the previous period trusts will observe health outcomes
achieved after surgery. This will serve to validate improvements derived from surgical 
procedure performance. Observed good outcomes may boost the number of procedures 
performed in following years as a consequence of a positive assessment of product 
quality. This is a measure of the expectations generated with respect to the quality of the 
technology. Basically, mortality and readmission rates are the different indicators used to 
validate this hypothesis. If there are high rates of adverse outcomes observed there 
should be a negative effect on the volume of surgeries performed. These indicators are 
explained in detail in the next subsection when discussing the specification for the 
volume-outcome relationship.
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Finally, the vector of variables xpt indicates provider characteristics and some variables
that capture the risk in the carotid endarterectomy surgical performance. The first variable 
is a dummy that indicates whether the trust has a foundation status or not ( FoundationP). 
Although foundation status was introduced in 2004, in the dataset those trusts that applied 
to change their status were identified and categorised as foundation status throughout all 
periods included in the study period. For instance, if a trust became foundation trust in 
2004 this variable will be coded as one over all periods from 1996 to 2006. If it is true that 
this type of providers could not have the benefits of independent management provided 
by the foundation status, this variable may be a representation of a different managerial 
attitude and financial responsibility that the trust may have had in previous years before 
the new regulation was in force. A second variable that account for the characteristics of 
the provider is whether the trust has a teaching/university status {University p). University
trusts have been argued to be the more advanced in adapting technological innovation 
into their practice and thus a positive association between volume of procedures and 
diffusion is expected. Both FoundationP and University are time-constant variables.
Specific variables are also defined for each surgical procedure as a way to account for the 
idiosyncrasies of each particular case. A dummy variable is included in the diffusion 
equation for knee arthroscopy that specifies whether the trust is an orthopaedic 
specialised trust {OrthopaedicP). It would seem reasonable a priori to expect that 
specialised providers are faster in adapting their practice to the introduction of 
technologies. The nature of the technology could also explain the acceptance within each 
trust. If the technology is specially indicated for complex conditions it is difficult to 
establish a priori the expected sign between surgical volume and risk for the patient. On 
one hand, less risky cases may involve faster acceptance as the risk of adverse outcome 
after surgery may be lower. On the other hand, if the severity of the cases entails certain 
life-threatening degree there might be a faster uptake to avoid any outcome that 
terminates generating burden of disease or fatal outcome. Hence, the diffusion equation 
for carotid endarterectomy includes a variable Stenosispt that indicates the proportion of
patients that were diagnosed with carotid stenosis (moderate risk case) at the time of 
admission as opposed to those patients that were admitted with a cerebrovascular 
(severe case) problem. The stenosis rate would indicate that patients with this diagnosis 
represent a lower risk than those diagnosed with any advanced cerebrovascular problem.
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Because of the emergency nature of carotid endarterectomy surgery for those patients 
with carotid stenosis there is an additional variable included that captures proportion of 
cases admitted as elective {Elective ). Finally, a set of control variables are included. 
Two of them control for the percentage of the population in the strategic health authority 
where the trust is located that falls within an age cluster. Thus,Po/?45-64/7, and
Popover65 pt are the percentage of population aged between 45 and 64 years old and the
percentage of population over 65, respectively. In addition, time dummy variables are 
used to account for any time trends not captured by any of the variables above and that 
may affect the diffusion of the technologies.
5.4.2 Volume-Outcome Relationship
The diffusion equations outlined above are designed to explain the diffusion process 
under the effects of competition. The diffusion process is self-explanatory in that the 
impact of a set of organisational and regulatory variables and the process flows overtime 
under the assumption of the competitive advantage of the product innovation. Although a 
reasonable assumption, the superiority of the technology requires to formally test whether 
technological use actually brings improvements in quality of care. The second part of the 
analysis is thus focused on the relationship between the volume of procedures and its 
effects on patients’ health outcomes. There is a switch in the perspective taken regarding 
the unit of analysis. If previously the interest laid on the behaviour of providers in the 
uptake of technology, the analysis of the volume-outcome relationship is based on 
individual patients. The approach taken relates the patient outcome to the total volume of 
procedures performed as a means to test if the familiarity with the innovation is supportive 
of technological superiority of the innovation.
By and large, health outcomes have been generally measured using the length of stay 
and mortality rates at different points in time. Measures of quality of care have been 
subject to the criticism for their inaccuracy to capture quality however adjusted measures 
can be good proxies for the measurement of quality (Thomas and Hofer (1998) and 
McClellan and Staiger (1999), cited by Propper et al. (2004)). In this part of the analysis 
readmission and mortality rates are considered in the estimation of the volume-outcome 
relationship of carotid endarterectomy. Although this information is also available for knee 
arthroscopy, the nature of knee arthroscopy as a day-case and the associated low 
mortality and readmission rates imposes restrictions on the examination of the volume- 
outcome relationship for this type of procedure. No other measures are available and the
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assessment of the impact of diffusion of knee arthroscopy on quality of care assessment 
could be overestimated. Thus, the volume-outcome relationship is analysed only for the 
carotid endarterectomy case. In general, the volume-outcome relationship is expressed as
outcome ipt = a  • volume , + p  • Ppt + Pati + y • cp + 5  • v, (5.2)
Where the dependent variable outcomeipt represents the outcome measure for patient i 
admitted by provider p  at tim er, volume t represent the surgical volume performed by 
the trust where the patient is admitted, Ppt is a vector of provider variables, Pati is a 
vector of case-mix variables, cp are unobserved time-invariant provider characteristics 
and v, are time dummies.
The indicators used to measure the dependent variable are readmission within 28 days 
after discharge ( Re ad7%ipt), in-hospital mortality ( Inhospipt), mortality within 30 days after
operation (M ort30ipt), and one year mortality (M o rt\y ipt). The patient can be tracked in
time to detect whether he was readmitted not only within 28 days after discharge but any 
time between discharge and the end of study period. This renders the opportunity to also 
test whether technology also improves the readmission rates at any point in time. Long­
term readmission rates and one-year mortality share a common problem: they may not 
reflect specific surgery-related health adverse problems. Also there is a problem of right 
censoring if the surgery is observed to happen during the last year of the study period. 
One-year mortality and readmission at any point in time will be conditioned by the right 
censoring bounded by the study endpoint.
The variable volume volumeipt in equation (5.2) establishes a simultaneous temporal
association between volume and outcome: the causal relationship between quality and 
volume is determined by the number of procedures during the year when the patient was 
treated. This presents a methodological problem in that there is no discrimination 
regarding the time differences arising from surgery date at any point in time during year t 
and surgical volume volumeipt accounting for the total number of surgeries performed
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overall in r 120. In other words, if patient i received surgery at the beginning of period t 
and volume accounts for total number of procedures at year t the number of procedures 
that haven’t been performed yet by the time the patient receives the surgery will be 
considered as influencing patient’s health outcome. To account for this timing problem, 
the definition of the volume will be that used in Hamilton and Hamilton (1997) that defines 
volume as the number of procedures performed during the previous twelve months to the 
patient’s operation date (volumeX2ipt).
In addition to these contemporaneous measures of volume other measures are used to 
test dynamic versus level approaches as to support the learning effects hypothesized in 
the diffusion equations. In that fashion, alternative volume measures are included 
accounting for non-linear relationships or the cumulative volume (Cumipt). The majority of
empirical specifications in the literature have assessed the volume contemporaneously of 
the outcome measure of interest and only few studies include past levels as covariates. 
Yet the definition of the volume variable has strongly been determined by the data type 
available for each study. The first wave of research was limited to cross-sectional data. 
Only recently longitudinal datasets were accessible and allowed to have an introspective 
look at current versus past volume effects on outcomes (Hamilton and Ho, 1998; Ho, 
2002; Gaynor et al., 2005).
The vector of independent variables will also include a set of variables that control for the 
characteristics of the provider (P  ): whether the provider has foundation trust status or
university affiliation. A second set of variables Patt include case-mix controls which are
patient-specific: age at the operation date ( Aget ), sex ( Sexi ) and number of comorbidities
{Comorfy). The length of stay ( LOSt ) is used as a control of the complexity of the
patient’s case. Also, the specification will include dummies that indicate the severity of the 
patient when admitted into hospital: whether the patient was diagnosed with stroke 
( Strokei ) or transient ischemic attack ( TIAi ).
The main interest is to determine the relationship between the experience gained through 
the performance of new surgical procedures on improved quality of care received by the 
patient. This is in support of the practice-makes-perfect effect discussed in Section 5.2.
120 Several studies have used the annual volume of surgeries without taking into consideration this type of 
temporal inconsistency (Hamilton and Ho, 1998; Ho, 2002).
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The practice-makes-perfect effect has recently been hypothesised to be explained among 
other factors by technological change (Ho, 2002). However, differences in technology 
preference may be determined by differences across hospitals. Finally, note that the 
relevance of the selective referral might be partially limited by the emergency character of 
carotid endarterectomy. Nevertheless, both effects may prevail when the volume-outcome 
relationship is examined for new technologies. The volume-outcome specification given 
by equation (5.2) accounts for both effects.
5.5 Data
This chapter analyses hospital record data from the Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) 
provided by Dr Fosters Intelligence. HES data contains all episodes for patients admitted 
into hospitals in England and includes both patients admitted into NHS hospitals and also 
hospitals in the private sector delivering inpatient services commissioned by the NHS. The 
data includes all records from January 1996 to December 2006 for each patient admitted 
into hospital falling in the category of patients with operation codes reserved for carotid 
endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy.
The time period for which data was accessible determines the analysis of diffusion and its 
implications for quality of care in a mature stage. Introduction of these technologies 
happened before the start of the study period and thus could not be tracked down to their 
earlier stages of diffusion. Although data runs from 1996 to 2006, additional data from 
1989 to 1995 is available from HES statistics; however, the data provider had limitations 
that restricted data availability to the period 1996-2006. If we think in terms of the sigmoid 
shape of the diffusion curve showed in Section 1.3 in Chapter 1, the current research 
examines diffusion during the stage after the inflexion point of the S-shaped curve. 
Diffusion analysis at this stage also offers the opportunity to test diffusion in an 
environment in which the health care context is changing and although comparisons pre 
and post reforms are not possible, diffusion at this advanced stage will give an insight into 
the impact of the new regulatory setting.
Each record contains clinical information on the admission date, date of operation, 
discharge date, main operation and all other operations the patient might have had as well 
as the main diagnosis. Additionally, the dataset includes all the organisational and 
geographical information regarding the primary care trust in which the patient is 
registered, the primary care trust, trust and site of treatment as well the strategic health
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authority in which the patient was registered. Due to confidentiality issues the patient 
identifier was not included in the data; however, any readmission could be followed up 
through a set of variables that record readmission date, operation code and trust in which 
the patient was readmitted. These readmission variables are records for any inpatient 
hospital service the patient may require regardless of whether is related to the procedures 
used for the purpose of the present chapter. Miscoding in the treatment site/hospital field 
does not allow defining the cross-section based on actual site of treatment and thus the 
unit of analysis in this chapter refers to the trust. Hereafter the term provider will refer to 
the trust of treatment and both terms will be used interchangeably.
There are two issues that require definitional clarification with respect to the codes used to 
identify the trust and strategic health authority. The first data period is 1996, a year when 
the first wave of reforms was still in force. From 1998 onwards there were a number of 
reforms that restructured the geographical distribution of health region and changed the 
definition of purchaser and provider. There have been major reorganisations in the 
composition of hospital sites, trusts and primary care trusts due to changes in 
organisations, mergers between hospitals and changes in trusts status, all of which have 
changed the map of providers over time. For example, a provider that had assigned a 
specific code in 1996 might have gone through a restructuration process and be allocated 
a different code or recoded under the same code of existing providers. The provider code 
in the dataset as given by Dr. Fosters is given by the last code by which the provider was 
registered. Similarly, health region definitions have changed within the period 1996-2006. 
England was divided in 28 strategic health authorities at the beginning of the study period, 
but the structure was modified in 2006 and the number of strategic health authorities was 
reduced to 10. Thus, any administrative geographical codes included in the data refer to 
the most recent definition of strategic health authority121.
The dataset runs for over 11 years and introduces an important improvement in data 
availability with respect to earlier studies of both the diffusion and the surgical volume- 
outcome relationship for which more restricted number of time periods were available. 
Inter-firm diffusion, either from the hospital or the surgeon, has been generally based on 
either surveys or from shorter panels (Sloan et al., 1986; Escarce, 1996). In those cases 
in which survey data has been used the focus was on the timing of first time when the 
operation took place providing only cross-sectional information and thus limiting the 
analysis to static equations. Such surveys, however, had the advantage of including
121 These coding restrictions were determined by the data structure. The consistency in health regions and 
provider codes presents the advantage of having homogeneous codes throughout the period.
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detailed information on surgeons and hospital characteristics allowing for the analysis of 
those socio-economic and regulatory elements that influenced diffusion (Escarce, 1996; 
Escarce et al., 1995). Such a long study period also introduces improvements with 
respect to the analysis of the volume-outcome relationship in a context of diffusion. The 
majority of these studies were limited to either cross-sectional datasets or longitudinal 
datasets that were having relatively short time periods (Luft et al., 1987; Hamilton and Ho, 
1998).
For the analysis of the effects of diffusion on health outcomes the data records 
information on whether the patient was readmitted within 28 days after discharge, in­
patient mortality, whether the patient died within 30 days after the operation date, as well 
as the one-year mortality. Any readmissions happening after the 28 days after discharge 
are also recorded and permit a longer term follow up. According to the characteristics of 
each product innovation the effect of diffusion on health outcomes would require different 
outcome measures. Carotid endarterectomy is performed in patients that present carotid 
stenosis and that may lead to transient ischemic attacks (TIAs) and cerebrovascular 
problems. These conditions have an associated risk for severe disability and may even be 
life-threatening. Conversely, knee arthroscopy is a type of procedure routinely performed 
that may affect temporarily patient daily activity without representing any life risk. Also, the 
target population for each of these procedures is different with higher proportion of 
adverse outcome being more likely for carotid endarterectomy than for knee arthroscopy, 
as shown in Table 5.1 mainly due to the age of the patients and condition severity. 
Readmission and mortality rates are greater for carotid endarterectomy than for knee 
arthroscopy. Hence, as it was mentioned in Section 5.4 this makes carotid 
endarterectomy the only procedure eligible for the analysis of quality of care.
Table 5.1 Percentage of Adverse Outcome Occurrence after Operation
Day- 28 Days Any In-hospital 30 Days 1 Year
cases Readmission Readmission Mortality Mortality Mortality
CEA 0,15 5,54 28,72 1,24 1,03 3,52
KA 72,42 1,43 15,33 0,06 0,04 0,27
Source: HES data 1996-2006
Notes: CEA refers to carotid endarterectomy and KA to knee arthroscopy.
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As mentioned above the data tracks any readmission happening by the end of the study 
period. Of all readmissions happening to carotid endarterectomy patients only 2.1% 
correspond to the same operation the patient had the last time he was hospitalised. The 
percentage decreases if the readmission within 28 days after discharge is the reference 
measure. Even though it might not be the case that readmissions will record the same 
operation or the same diagnosis, any readmissions happening after surgery may be 
related to problems derived from the last hospital admission. All outcome measures 
abovementioned represent casualties occurring short after the discharge date with the 
exception of one year mortality. The longer the time span between operation date and 
occurrence of adverse outcome the less likely the adverse event will be directly related to 
the first surgery122. Despite these caveats, and the problems of these measures already 
raised in Propper et al. (2004), these are the only measures available for the purpose of 
this study.
5.5.1 Data for Analysis of Carotid Endarterectomy Diffusion and Volume Equations
The dataset used for the analysis of carotid endarterectomy diffusion initially had 37,690 
observations for the period 1996-2006. Carotid endarterectomy procedure data was 
extracted for all patients undergoing this procedure with the following OPCS-4 codes: 
L294, L295, L298 and L299. For the diffusion equations data was aggregated at the 
provider level and a count of the number of procedures per provider at each period of time 
was constructed. The longitudinal dataset had 1,193 observations that account for 116 
providers operating within 100 PCTs123. The potential for competition is seen through the 
disparity in number of providers as compared to the number of purchasers. Approximately 
72% of hospitals provide in-hospital services in a monopolistic setting and 21% are under 
a duopoly. Only 4.5% of hospitals compete in a market with three providers and 3.5% 
compete in markets with four hospitals. At the regional level, the average number of 
hospital per strategic health authority ranges from 5.5 to over 20 hospitals. In general, 
those hospitals that operate in a monopoly have a higher average number of procedures 
(adjusted by population) than those competing with other providers in the same market 
(PCT).
122 For example, readmission could happen without any further operations, be followed by another operation 
not linked to the main operation happening in the first episode or could actually be linked to the medical 
condition presented during the previous event.
123 Some cross-sections had an occasional occurrence in the data and accounted for a very low volume of 
operations. This was assumed to be an indication of miscoding or extremely infrequent cases performed by 
the provider. As a result these cross-sections were dropped from the data. The exclusion of extremely low- 
volume providers was to avoid biased results due to the presence of outliers that are likely to be occasional 
random providers. Providers that had non-consecutive observations were also dropped in order to make the 
use of dynamic panel data methods consistent given that they require the cross-sections to have consecutive 
observations.
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A description of the variables included in the diffusion equations and descriptive statistics 
can be found in Table A.5.2.1 in Appendix 5.2. The dependent variable is the number of 
procedures performed by each provider per year adjusted by the population over 45 in the 
strategic health region in which the provider is located. The different competition 
measures are included in the table. The average number of providers providing carotid 
endarterectomy surgery to the same PCT is 1.3 whereas the average count of providers in 
the same strategic health authority is almost 13. Differences between Herfindahl indexes 
at the PCT or strategic health authority are a reflection of the degree of competition that 
providers are facing. There is a large difference between these two sets of competition 
variables and this will capture whether proximity of potential competing providers 
determines surgery uptake. Although the number of competitors within strategic health 
authority may not reflect actual competition, the variables defined according to the health 
administrative area will serve to check whether there could be scope for competition in a 
wider definition of the market124. Approximately 20 % of providers were university affiliated 
and 30% had foundation status. As for the patients that were admitted into hospital, on 
average 80% were diagnosed with the less severe condition of carotid stenosis versus 
the average of patients admitted with stroke or TIA, 2% and 4% respectively.
The dataset structure used to analyse the volume-outcome relationship is different to the 
one used for the diffusion equations. Instead of having a longitudinal panel in which each 
observation represents a provider over a period of time, the volume-outcome relationship 
is examined using patient level data. The dataset accounts for approximately 37,338 
observations each one representing a patient admitted into hospital to be treated with 
carotid endarterectomy. For the purpose of this part of the chapter the array of 
explanatory variables include the volume variable, provider characteristics and patient 
case-mix covariates. Missing values in the operation date forced the deletion of 248 
observations. Without this information the post-surgery length of stay could not be 
calculated and thus not included in the regression analysis. This information is also 
required to estimate the duration model presented in the results section. Descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table A.5.2.2 in Appendix 5.2. University and foundation trust are 
dummy variables and refer to the hospital where the patient was treated. Approximately 
35% of cases were treated in teaching hospitals and 32% of them were foundation trusts. 
66% of patients are male and the average age is 69.5. 85% of the patients admitted into
124 Distance between providers may act as a barrier for real competition, especially for a type of surgery that is 
performed mainly as an emergency case.
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hospital were diagnosed with stenosis which indicates that it is a preventive procedure for 
stroke. The average length of stay is approximately 4.5 days although as it was seen in 
Figure 5.2 this has been changing over time.
5.5.2 Panel Data for Knee Arthroscopy Diffusion Analysis
The data analysed for the second surgical procedure was extracted using the OPCS-4 
codes W82, W85 and W87. The initial number of observations included was 826,858 of 
in-patient records over the period 1996-2006. A number of observations were deleted 
because of missing records in specific key variables. As a result, 572 observations were 
dropped because of the PCT and the provider being missing. In addition, 173 records 
were not included because the PCT could not be identified. The final number of 
observations in the data is 826,113. The final data is an unbalanced panel of 1,863 
observations that include 182 individual providers left operating under the responsibility of 
129 PCTs125. The larger number of observations for knee arthroscopy as compared to 
carotid endarterectomy volume of surgeries gives an initial indication of how frequently 
this procedure is performed. As for the number of competing providers in each PCT, there 
are almost 50% of providers that are the only providers of in-hospital services within the 
Primary Care Trust in charge of commissioning the services. Roughly in 24% of the cases 
there are two providers supplying services and the rest are in competition with three, four 
or five providers. At the regional level the number of providers varies from 7 to 30 
providers per strategic health authority.
Descriptive statistics of the data used for the estimation of the diffusion equation for knee 
arthroscopy are presented in Table A.5.2.3 in Appendix 5.2. Note first that the numbers of 
providers at PCT level and strategic health authority are higher than for the case of carotid 
endarterectomy. This is a result of the higher frequency of knee arthroscopy procedures 
performed compared to carotid endarterectomy. It is also worth noting that the Herfindahl 
indexes are slightly lower than those for carotid endarterectomy and the market is less 
concentrated. This shows that a greater number of providers have the capabilities to 
perform the procedure. The specialisation required is higher for carotid endarterectomy 
and thus the supply of services may be more concentrated than for the knee arthroscopy 
surgery. Adverse outcomes are also lower given the low severity of cases. In this case, 
there is additional information on provider characteristics with the variable that indicates 
whether the provider was specialised in orthopaedics accounting for 2% of the providers.
125 Originally there are 209 providers in the data but few of them are not included in the panel due to similar 
reasons to the carotid endarterectomy case (refer to footnote 123).
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Similarly to the carotid endarterectomy case, roughly 33% of providers are foundation 
trust but the university affiliated providers decreases to approximately 16%.
5.6 Econometric Methods
Diffusion equations are estimated using dynamic panel data methods offering the 
possibility to control for individual heterogeneity among providers. The inclusion of a lag of 
the dependent variable introduces correlation between the error term and the regressors. 
Under this specification standard panel data methods appear to give biased results. To 
control for this correlation, the first-difference GMM specification by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and the system GMM estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998) are used to estimate 
the coefficients of interest in the diffusion equations (5.1) outlined above. These methods 
have been described in detail in previous chapters and are not duplicated in this section. 
Please refer to the extended description presented in Section 3.6 in Chapter 3.
The volume-outcome relationship is examined at the individual patient level and different 
econometric methods used for diffusion equations are considered. The first approach 
used for the volume-outcome relationship is to assess the effect of volume on the 
probability of adverse outcome occurrence using the readmission and mortality rates 
presented in Section 5.4. Given the qualitative nature of the dependent variables of 
interest discrete response models are used. In this case the dependant variables are 
dichotomous taking value one when the health outcome measure is a positive response 
and zero otherwise. The interest in this type of models lie in assessing the effect of 
several covariates in the probability of the event occurring,
p(x) = P(y = 11 x )=  P(y  =  11 xl9x2,...,xK)
Where x is the vector of covariates and k = 1,2,..., K  is the number of covariates included. 
The covariates can be either continuous or binary explanatory variables. When the 
relationship is expressed as the linear probability model
P(y = 11 x, ,x2 ,...,xK ) =  P 0 + P ixx+... +  Pkxk
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OLS estimation of the covariates will produce consistent and biased estimators of the 
coefficients. However, it is common to find fitted values that are outside the unit interval in 
which probabilities lie. Appendix 5.3 offers a more detailed explanation of the linear 
probability model and the two main drawbacks that it presents. Given the restrictions 
imposed by the linear probability model, alternative types of models are explored. 
Following Wooldridge (2002) the interest lies in the models in which
p(y = \ \ x )  = G(x/3) = p(x)
Where x is a 1 x K  vector and p  is K  x 1. The function G(-) is generally a cumulative 
distribution function and hence it is bounded between zero and one. The response 
probability as a function of covariates can be expressed using the latent variable 
approach in the so-called index models.
y  = x p  + e, y  = 1 [y > 0]
Where 1[>] is an indicator variable and e is a disturbance process independent of x and 
symmetrically distributed around zero. The latent variable y* is unobservable but can be 
considered as the determinant of one of the binary alternatives available. This latent 
variable is not observed by the researcher, instead the outcome of the latent variable 
model is observed.
P(y  = 11 x) = p(y * > 0 1 x) = P(e. -  x/? | x) = 1 -  G (-  xp) = G(x0)
The goal is to study the effects of the vector of covariates on the response probability 
rather than the effects of the same vector on the latent variable. The general specification 
of the cumulative distribution function G(-) covers a number of alternative distributions for
which the most studied are the probit and the logit models that are based on the normal 
density function and standard logistic distribution function, respectively. Thus the probit 
model can be expressed as
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zG(z) = O(z) = jV (z) • dz
And (/>{z)= (2x)  1/2 exp(-z2 / 2) which is the standard normal density. Conversely, the 
logit model can be expressed as,
G(z) = A(z) = exp(z)/[l + exp(z)]
The parameters in discrete choice variables can be estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation and thus the log-likelihood function for each observation i is
f {y \x , \P )= [g (x,P)Y [1 -  G{x,P)Yy ■ y = °»i
and the log-likelihood for individual i is the
e-,(P)=y, i°g[Gfo /?)]+(1 -  y, )[i -  G(xtp)}
/V
being the log likelihood for the sample equal to L(p)  = ^  ^  (p)  • When differentiating with
;=1
respect to p  the maximum likelihood estimator is obtained solving the following first order 
condition (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005)
v  y ± z l^ £ )i f  L  rXc =0
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The analysis of the volume-outcome relationship as expressed above is limited to the 
examination of the impact of specific variables on the occurrence of the event. The 
analysis of the relationship between these two aspects is extended to see how a specific 
vector of covariates influences the survival time of the patient at the point of discharge. In 
single-spell duration models the interest lies on individuals entering a specific state during 
a period of time and either they are observed to leave or are censored. Letting T  denote 
the random variable that indicates the time an individual leaves a particular state then the 
hazard function in parametric models is specified as follows
(/) = P r [ / < r < / + A f | r > / ]  = f U )
A? S(t)
Where f ( t )  is the probability distribution function derived from the cumulative distribution
t
function of T ,  F ( t ) =  P r [ r < t ]=  j f{s)ds  and the survivor function is defined as
0
S(/)=Pr[iT>r] = l -F ( r ) .
Parametric models have been specified for the analysis of survival data using the Weibull 
or exponential distribution to define the hazard function. However, these methods impose 
some assumptions that will produce inconsistent estimates if the model is misspecified. 
Alternatively, semi-parametric models have been developed. Following the notation in 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) the hazard function in proportional hazard models is defined 
as
A(t \x ,p )=A,0(t)-<f>(x,p)
A0(r) is the baseline hazard and it is an unspecified function. On the contrary (/>{x,p) is
fully specified and generally takes the form = exp(x p ) .  The unspecified hazard
function defines the semi-parameterization of the proportional hazard models. The 
estimation of the coefficients was first suggested by Cox (1972, 1975) using partial 
likelihood estimation and does not require the estimation of the hazard function A0(f),
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which gives raise to the semi-parametric classification of this type of models. Denote the 
number of individuals at risk at time f . as R{tj), defined as the risk set, with the following
ordered failure times t] < t 2 < ... < t} < ... < tk for a number N  of individuals, N > k .  The
probability of an individual at risk exiting state of interest at time f . is
The probability for the risk set at time tj over all the individuals is
Where dj  is the number of individuals that exit at t - and £>(r; ) the number of spells that 
have exited at t . . The partial likelihood function is defined as the product of the individual 
probabilities over the k failure times
^ ) = n
y=i
i u ,)*-■*>
The coefficients are then estimated through the minimisation of the log of the partial 
likelihood function
y=i XmeD[tj
(*)
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As Cameron and Trivedi (2005) note, censored spells contribute to the partial likelihood 
function in the second term because they form part of the size of the population at risk 
although they are eventually censored. Defining 8t = 1 if the observation is not censored 
and zero otherwise, expression (*) can be re-arranged as
The coefficient p  obtained from the maximization of the partial likelihood function is 
consistent. As discussed in Lancaster (1990) the advantage of proportional hazard 
models is that the baseline hazard cancels out and does not need to be specified. The 
implications in terms of empirical analysis arise under the assumption that the unspecified 
baseline function is common to all individuals. Consequently inference about the vector of 
parameters p  does not require additional assumptions about the individual term (f>i (xip).
Duration analysis of single-spell data has been largely analysed in the literature. The 
semi-parametric methods of single-spell duration events abovementioned are restrictive in 
that they only account for the time of exit to a unique state. Recently, models of multiple 
failure events have been developed offering new opportunities in the duration analysis of 
time to exit to different types of states. For instance, many studies involve failure times of 
repeated events or failure to different states. In bioscience a common example of 
repetition failures is the recurrence of events such as the appearance of tumors after 
treatment. Another example of multiple failure events is the discharge destination of the 
patient after hip replacement: the patient could be discharged home, discharged to 
residential care or discharged to another institution (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997). These 
examples are illustrative of the potential for econometric analysis of multiple destination 
events. When analysis is restricted to a single event the relationship of interest might not
If the function </>(x,p) = exp(x/?), the first order condition is
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be representative of the underlying model of interest. Data available for this study permits 
to take the analysis of duration data one step further looking at different failure types. 
Recall that the data tracks any readmission and death date in case the patient presents 
adverse outcomes and also allows defining a patient as censored if no readmission or 
fatal outcome occurs.
When multiple failures exist these are competing in the number of individuals at risk at 
each point in time in addition to the mutually exclusive and exhaustive events that define a 
competing risk model. In a competing risks framework each individual is at risk of k types 
of failures k = 1,2,..., A". For each of the failures there are different latent durations 
denoted by the random duration variable T  composed of several duration times 
Tx,T2,...,Tk that refer to the time to each failure event. Each individual will have a unique
Tk that will define the time from entry to the failure event k and the other failure times will 
be treated as censored. If failure times TX,T2,...,TK are assumed to be independent then
the setting is that of independent competing risks. However, in models of multivariate 
failure times generally there are a number of restrictive assumptions regarding the 
dependence between the distribution functions of each failure type.
Semi-parametric methods for multivariate failure events have been developed with the 
main contribution that they do not impose any specific dependence structure between 
failure types or failure times in recurrence models. Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989) 
(hereafter WLW) propose a marginal approach to the analysis of multiple failure time. The 
marginal distribution of each failure type k is specified through a Cox proportional hazard 
function. There are n clusters or individuals that are indexed by the subscript i . Again the 
different types of failure are denoted by k for which there is either a censoring or failure 
time. Z ki(t) is a vector of covariates of dimension p x  1 at time t for the cluster i and
failure type k.  If X u is the failure time and Cki is the censoring time let 
Tki = m i n ^ , , Cki) be the time to the first event to occur, either one of the k failure types 
or censoring time. The hazard function for each type of failure takes the following form
K  ( 0 = 4h> ( 0 exp & z « (0 }
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When the baseline hazard function is failure-specific and
When the baseline hazard is common to all failure types. In both cases the baseline 
function is not specified and will drop out in the partial likelihood method used with 
proportional hazard distributions. Let ^ ( r )  be the at-risk set before time t . The partial
likelihood for the k failure type is
h(p)=n
i=1
exp(ftZt, ( x J
J^ cxp’f t Z j x J
/6»*(jra)
Maximisation of the log partial likelihood function will deliver the vector of/? coefficients 
for each k failure, (/?,, p 2 p k). The requirement for these coefficients to be consistent 
is the hazard function to be correctly specified (WLW, 1989). If the model is correct 
n}l2{ p -  /?) converges to a p  x n vector with mean zero and covariance matrix A~l (fi)
where A(j3) = -n~ld2 log l(/? )/d /?2 (Lin and Wei, 1989). When the assumption of the
correct specification of the Cox proportional hazard model is violated and the model is 
misspecified inference will not be robust. Lin and Wei (1989) propose a covariance matrix
A
that can be consistently estimated. If the model is not correctly specified /? will converge 
to a constant vector /?*. Consequently, n112 [ f i -  /?*) will converge to a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and covariance matrix given by t { f t )  = A ( p ) B ( f t ) A - ' ( f t )  where 
B(ft) = n~l 'YJWi(p)®2 which is the matrix of score residuals. For specific details of the 
n x p  matrix of score residuals please refer to the article by Lin and Wei (1989).
The competing risk model discussed in the empirical results section is estimated using the 
marginal probability specification by Wei, Lin and Weissfeld (1989). This model introduces 
several advantages with respect to conditional probability models. This approach does not 
presume any specific form of dependence among failure types. In addition, parameters
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are estimated by maximising the failure-specific partial likelihood. This is similar to the 
approach used by Honore and Lleras-Muney (2006) in a model in which failure types are 
assumed to be dependent although the underlying dependence is not assumed to have 
any particular structure. Because of the dependence between latent durations, they treat 
the identification problem using an estimation method that is a combination of a marginal 
distribution of the duration and the specification of a parametric or semi-parametric 
approach of the dependent durations.
The advantage of the WLW model is that allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
through the robust estimation procedure suggested by Lin and Wei (1989). The 
introduction of unobserved heterogeneity brings into the analysis of the so-called mixture 
models. Hamilton and Hamilton (1997), although using a non-parametric specification for 
the baseline hazard, specify a parametric form for the functional form of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. As pointed out by Sueyoshi (1992, pp.26) “recent work by Han and 
Hausman (1990) and Malton, Stallard and Vaupel (1986) suggest that the biases in the 
proportional hazards framework may be larger for misspecification of the baseline hazard 
than for misspecified heterogeneity distributions”. Consequently, the main reason for 
using the WLW competing risk model is its flexibility due to the non-parametric 
specification with respect to the hazard function and the unobserved heterogeneity. This 
brings a significant improvement in using this model in comparison to other models 
(Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997; Cutler, 1995) that make the procedure robust to 
misspecification.
There are some issues of identification arising in mixture models. The specification of the 
unobserved heterogeneity has defined two different positions regarding the distribution of 
the unobserved effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). On one hand, some support a 
parametric specification on the grounds that the baseline hazard function is well specified. 
On the other hand, other authors favour a flexible parametric or nonparametric 
specification of the type described by Heckman and Singer (1984). Some empirical works 
have used the last approach (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997; Cutler, 1995).
5.7 Empirical Results
This section presents the results for both the analysis of technology diffusion under a 
competitive setting and the effect of technology volume on the patient’s health outcome. 
These two stages of diffusion cover the process related to the supply-side both on their
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approach towards technology uptake as well as the effect of these technologies on 
medical productivity. Cost analysis is beyond the scope of the research; however, surgical 
technology diffusion and costs have been shown to be positively correlated. This 
relationship though has been proved to be offset by the increases in medical productivity 
(Cutler and Huckman, 2003).
5.7.1 Diffusion Equations Results
Several elements are of major interest in the diffusion equations. The first is the effect of 
lagged values of the dependent variable as the measure of how technology demand in 
previous period plays a key role as determinant of current technology demand. It captures 
any learning by performing effect that reflects any costs arising as a result of integrating 
technology into common practice. Had the lag of the population-adjusted volume no 
significant effect, the diffusion process would depend exclusively on the other covariates 
of interest. Tables 5.2 to 5.4 show the results for both types of procedures. Results 
presented in these tables include a set of similar explanatory variables common to both 
procedures (learning by doing effect, competition indicators, provider’s observation of past 
performance and provider’s characteristics) and variables that are procedure-specific. 
Table 5.2 shows the coefficient estimates for the carotid endarterectomy and knee 
arthroscopy diffusion equations. The results differ only on the indicator used to measure 
the outcome observed in the previous period derived from the use of technology. As such, 
column (1) and (3) show the estimates obtained using the rates for readmission within 28 
days of discharge and columns (2) and (4) the in-hospital mortality for carotid 
endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy procedures, respectively126.
Results presented throughout this section are one-step robust system GMM. This model 
is supported by several specification tests. Appendix 5.4 includes the AR(1) specifications 
for carotid endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy and the unit root test. In addition, 
Appendix 5.4 also includes the OLS, within, first-differenced and system GMM to see 
whether the parameter of the lagged value of the dependent variable lies within the upper 
and lower boundaries as argued in Bond (2002) and discussed in Section 3.6 in Chapter 
3. The Sargan test of the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid is 
accepted. The t-statistics for the null of no first-order autocorrelation fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. However, the null of no second-order autocorrelation is not rejected at any 
significance level. As showed by Arellano and Bond (1991) the presence of first-order
126 The other outcome measures, mortality 30 days after operation and one-year mortality, are not used as a 
proxy of the previous year performance. The underlying assumption is that the provider is not likely to observe 
them as these are events that may occur outside the provider premises.
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autocorrelation does not affect the consistency of the specification of the model as long as 
there is no second-order autocorrelation, as it is the latter the required assumption for the 
correct specification of GMM methods.
The lag of the dependant variable and the lag of past outcome introduce endogeneity. 
When taking first-differences lagged values they are simultaneously determined with the 
past value of the error term. The instruments required to control for endogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variable and the lag of the previous period observed outcome in each 
equations include those level instruments for the equation in first-differences are 
sjt_2,sn_3,...,sil;otcmtt_2iotcmit_3,...otcma and the difference of the variable as the
instruments for the equations in levels As/>M;Aotcmi t_x.
As it is shown in Table 5.2 the coefficient for the effect of “learning by performing” is highly 
significant in all equations confirming the strong learning effects associated with the 
volume of surgeries performed in the previous period. This is in support of the period-to- 
period adjustment costs that sequentially lead to a better understanding of technology 
functioning and characteristics. These effects seem to be even stronger for the knee 
arthroscopy case, a type of surgery that overtime is more and more routinely incorporated 
into practice. Also, given that it is a type of surgery to treat a common condition, higher 
volume of new technology performed may bring refinements and improvements of the 
innovation faster than if the technology was less commonly performed. The competition 
indicator included in Table 5.2 is the Herfindahl index at the PCT level which accounts for 
the market share of trusts providing services to each PCT. The coefficient is positive and 
significant in all four columns revealing that the higher the concentration in the market (the 
lower the number of providers) the faster the acceptance of the technology. This could be 
suggesting that there some degree of non-price competition based on quality of care. This 
is in line with the conclusions drawn from Sloan et al. (1986)127.
The coefficient Outcomeit-1) indicates that providers’ expectations regarding the 
technology performance are not based on the observed health outcomes during the 
previous period. As for the organisation variables, foundation trust status has a negative
127 Although the results are in the same line there are differences in the definition of the competition 
measures. Sloan et al. (1986) define the competition as the proportion of beds in other hospitals adjusted by 
population. They choose this measure on the basis that other traditional measures of monopoly power such 
as Herfindahl index and concentration ratios tend to present a strong correlation. They use laparoscopy 
cholecystectomy as case-study within the community hospitals in the US.
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but non-significant effect on diffusion in all specifications128. Provider affiliation to 
university only has a significant effect on the carotid endarterectomy equations. The 
uptake of carotid endarterectomy is faster in teaching hospitals maybe due to higher 
complexity of these types of procedures being performed in teaching hospitals. This could 
also be due to higher preference for state-of-the-art technology. Knee arthroscopy in 
comparison is a routinely performed surgery that does not require the same degree of 
specialisation than carotid endarterectomy.
Table 5.2 CEA and KA Diffusion Equations: Adverse Outcomes (t-1)
CEA KA
Readmission 28 
days rate(t-1)
In-hospital
Mortality
rate(t-1)
Readmission 
28 days 
rate(t-1)
In-hospital 
Mortality rate(t-1)
CEA(t-1 )/KA(t-1) 0.789148*** 0.776391*** 0.871455*** 0.859309***
Herfindahl PCT 0.003379*** 0.002875** 0.006757** 0.007442**
Outcome(t-1) -0.00027 -0.05187 0.000398 -0.40572
Stenosis 0.003637** 0.003025*
Elective 0.006057*** 0.008753***
Foundation -0.00024 -0.00035 0.000751 0.00084
University 0.002024* 0.002023* -2.7E-05 0.000078
Orthopaedic 0.010215** 0.010583**
Pop 45-64 0.037312* 0.039437* 0.246452* 0.262738*
Pop over 65 -0.000009*** -0.000009*** -0.07833 -0.08204
N 1077 1077 1681 1681
Sargan 0.467 0.219 0.213 0.235
ml 0 0 0 0
m2 0.961 0.896 0.83 0.842
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
System GMM estimators are reported.
P-value for the F-statistic, Sargan test and the first- and second-order autocorrelation tests 
Time Dummies included in all specifications 
CEA refers to carotid endarterectomy and KA to knee arthroscopy
There are also procedure-specific variables that reflect specificities of each type of 
surgery. Carotid endarterectomy is a more complex surgical procedure and it is likely the 
patient will be admitted into hospital as emergency case rather than as elective case. As
128 Note that the Foundation status is a required status that all providers are expected to adopt by the end of 
2008. This variable was intended to capture whether those providers who applied to change status earlier 
than the required data were showing an advanced managerial attitude that could reflect preference for 
technological advances.
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such the variables stenosis and elective rate are intended to capture the responsiveness 
of the provider to urgent and complex cases. Being carotid endarterectomy a preventive 
procedure, patients admitted with a diagnosis of stenosis are less severe than cases than 
patients already diagnosed with cerebrovascular disease129. The expected positive 
relationship between stenosis rate and diffusion is confirmed by the findings. The results 
are checked against the effect of other measures of case complexity. Appendix 5.5 
includes the results when the proportion of patients that were admitted with stroke is 
included instead of the proportion of patient admitted with carotid stenosis. The negative 
sign of the estimates support results in Table 5.2. They show a negative relationship 
between case severity and uptake. The rate of elective cases is very low for carotid 
endarterectomy procedures given the urgent character of the condition. This variable is 
indicative of the responsiveness of providers to case emergency. More urgent cases are 
likely to be more complex and this may deter uptake as technology has attached certain 
degree of uncertainty in itself. Thus the higher the elective rate the uptake is expected to 
be positively affected. This is relationship is confirmed by results as indicated by its 
positive and significant coefficient. This is consistent with the coefficient for the stenosis 
rate. Taken together these results determine a negative association between risk-case 
and uptake. In the knee arthroscopy equations the dummy that captures whether services 
are supplied by a specialised provider also presents a positive and significant relationship 
with diffusion.
Given the importance of the reforms experienced by the NHS secondary care sector the 
several competition measures described in Section 5.4 are used to check the robustness 
of their definition and compare it to the results presented in Table 5.2. It also renders the 
opportunity to compare the results with the conclusions in existing literature with a 
different definition of competition variable. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the results for the 
carotid endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy equations, respectively. Columns (1) to (6) 
show the estimates for the diffusion equations under the different competition measures. 
As discussed in Section 5.4 the competition measures differ to those used in the literature 
mainly in the definition of the competition area. The first one covers competition among 
those providers operating under the same PCT umbrella. The first competition variable 
was already included in Table 5.2 with the Herfindahl index at the PCT level. The other 
measure is the number of providers supplying services to each PCT as included in column 
(1) of Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The second set of variables is measured using the strategic
129 Note that stenosis is the thickening of the carotid vein and it only represents a major problem if it is not 
treated. Yet those patients admitted with a developed cerebrovascular disease such as stroke orTIA will have 
a more complex diagnosis caused by the lack of prevention and they still will require carotid endarterectomy.
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health authority as the definition of health area and coefficients shown in columns (2) to 
(6).
The measure of adverse outcomes included across the four specifications is the lagged 
value of the in-hospital mortality. In general, the sign and significance of the estimates are 
consistent and support the results obtained in Table 5.2. The strong effects of learning by 
performing are confirmed in the specifications presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
Foundation trust status of the provider does not seem to affect the uptake of the 
innovation whereas university affiliation is significant and positively associated with the 
uptake of carotid endarterectomy. Specialised orthopaedic providers also have a positive 
and significant impact of the uptake of knee arthroscopy. Orthopaedic specialised 
providers present higher volume of surgeries performed. The effect of the variables 
stenosis and elective rate are consistent with the ones reported in Table 5.2.
The effect of competition differs across technologies and competition variables. In the 
carotid endarterectomy case, only the number of providers within the PCT appears to 
have a negative and significant effect on diffusion. Interestingly, the set of competition 
variables that are defined at the strategic health authority are not significant. Knee 
arthroscopy equations show the same effect for the number of providers under the same 
PCT demand. However, competition variables defined at the strategic health authority 
level have a negative and significant impact on knee arthroscopy uptake. The last column 
of Table 5.4 that includes the Herfindahl index at the strategic health authority shows a 
positive and significant effect: higher concentration leads to higher demand for new 
technologies. There is thus a correlation between the catchment area for competition and 
the type of surgery. For complex procedures that require specialised care and patient 
mobility is restricted, competition only works in a market delimited by the closest PCT and 
the providers operating close to the trust. Surgeries that allow higher patient mobility may 
be subject to a wider competition area. In any case, these results point towards a negative 
relationship between competition and diffusion.
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Table 5.3 CEA Diffusion Equations: the Effect of Competition
Number of 
providers within 
PCT
Number of 
providers 
within SthA
Number of 
providers 
within SthA 
pop-adj
Number of 
PCT within 
SthA
Number of 
PCT within 
SthA pop-adj
Herfindahl
SthA
CEA(t-1) 0.785789*** 0.797412*** 0.798018*** 0.796217*** 0.795947*** 0.786812***
Competition -0.001172*** 0.000211 0.667178 0.000269 1.424954 0.010979
Outcome(t-I) -0.00429 -0.00441 -0.00433 -0.00431 -0.00421 -0.00427
Stenosis 0.003525** 0.003737** 0.003753** 0.003740** 0.003696** 0.003933***
Elective 0.006316*** 0.004938** 0.004950** 0.004838** 0.004785** 0.005413**
Foundation -0.00024 -0.00029 -0.00029 -0.00042 -0.00049 -0.00035
University 0.002020* 0.002035* 0.002015* 0.002083* 0.002152** 0.001866*
Pop 45-64 0.037227* 0.062277 0.035606* 0.070011 0.042958* 0.029482
Pop over 65 -0.000009*** -0.000013* -0.000009** -0.000013* -0.000010** -5E-06
N 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077
Sargan 0.367 0.418 0.447 0.4 0.398 0.424
ml 0 0 0 0 0 0
m2 0.967 0.977 0.976 0.98 0.972 0.992
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value reported for m l, m2 and Sargan test 
Time Dummies included in all specifications 
CEA refers to carotid endarterectomy
Table 5.4 KA Diffusion Equations: the Effect of Competition
Number of 
providers 
within PCT
Number of 
providers within 
SthA
Number of 
providers 
within SthA 
pop-adj
Number of 
PCT within 
SthA
Number of 
PCT within 
SthA pop-adj
Herfindahl
SthA
KA(t-1) 0.8590046*** 0.8306551*** 0.8473180*** 0.8400487*** 0.8591222*** 0.8339088***
Competition -0.0020921* -0.0010003*** -9.11e+00** -0.0009242*** -5.43e+00* 0.1618235**
Outcome(t-1) -0.40058 -0.37941 -0.37353 -0.38942 -0.38608 -0.41553
Foundation 0.000966 -0.00022 -0.00012 0.000652 0.001353 -0.00035
University -6.3E-05 0.001494 0.000505 0.001099 0.000076 0.001763
Orthopaedic 0.0106079** 0.0087391*** 0.0096210*** 0.0080985** 0.0083606** 0.0086429**
Pop 45-64 0.241334 -0.17683 -0.25948 -0.10021 0.016971 -0.02061
Pop over 65 -0.06004 0.149222 0.3832815* 0.01876 0.025642 0.103852
N 1681 1681 1681 1681 1681 1681
Sargan 0.212 0.336 0.323 0.269 0.268 0.191
ml 0 0 0 0 0 0
m2 0.855 0.831 0.847 0.804 0.812 0.849
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value reported for m l, m2 and Sargan test 
Time Dummies included in all specifications 
KA refers to knee arthroscopy
5.7.2 Estimates of the Volume-Outcome Equations
This section presents three sets of results that examine the volume-outcome relationship 
for carotid endarterectomy. The ultimate goal in this section is to assess whether patients 
benefit from medical technology diffusion. In this section quality is measured using 
readmission and mortality rates. As it was discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 it may be 
argued that readmission and mortality rates are crude measures of quality of care; 
however, they are the only measures available to use as a proxy to evaluate provider 
performance. Despite data availability for knee arthroscopy the nature of this procedure 
leads to low mortality and readmission rates that cannot account for improvements 
derived of technology use. Ideally, measures such as time of recovery from operation to 
complete functional mobility would be a good indicator. In the absence of good quality 
indicators for knee arthroscopy the analysis in this section is restricted to health 
improvements derived from diffusion of carotid endarterectomy.
There are several standpoints that can be used to approach the assessment of the 
relationship between the volume of surgeries performed and its effect on quality of care. 
As a first step, the volume-outcome relationship can be analysed by looking at the effect 
that volume will have on the likelihood of adverse outcome occurrence. This is a 
relationship that will assess the effect of volume and a number of patient and hospital 
characteristics in the response probability P(y = 11 x). This indicates the probability that 
the patient suffered one of the adverse outcomes used to measure improvements in 
quality. This is the approach mainly used in the stream of literature analysing the volume- 
outcome relationship.
Table 5.5 provides the results of the volume-outcome relationship using a probit model. 
The four adverse outcomes considered are readmission within 28 days after discharge, 
in-hospital mortality, mortality within 30 days after operation and one-year mortality. These 
estimations include time and provider dummies to control for shocks in time and control 
for the selective referral effect discussed in Section 5.2. The equations include a set of 
variables to control for the provider’s characteristics as well as a number of case-mix 
variables that capture patient characteristics. The length of stay is included to account for 
the severity of the patient after surgery. Higher lengths of stay are likely to be linked to 
more severe cases and thus increase the chances of adverse outcome. The measure of 
volume is the number of surgeries performed by the provider in the last 12 months before
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the operation (in logarithmic terms). The variables TIA and stroke are dummy indicators 
on whether the patient was admitted with transient ischemic attack or stroke, respectively. 
Sex is a dummy with value equal one if the patient is male and zero otherwise. The 
variable age is the patient’s age at the time of the operation and finally the specifications 
include the number of comorbidities that the patient presents at the time of the operation.
Table 5.5 Probability of Adverse Outcome Occurrence
Readmission 
within 28 days
In-hospital
Mortality
30 days 
mortality
1 year 
Mortality
V0I12 0.018312 -0.01051 0.000652 0.017105
Foundation 0.117352 1.031456 0.860249 0.476132
University -0.32686 -0.31578 -0.14693 0.361452
TIA 0.076058 -0.16204 -0.15222 -0.07483
Stroke -0.214850* 0.474268*** 0.614688*** 0.279836***
LOS 0.002900** 0.011790*** 0.002736 0.010496***
Sex -0.073205** 0.039616 0.006173 0.053056
Age 0.003125* 0.016492*** 0.013698*** 0.023514***
Comorbidity 0.070245*** 0.226567*** 0.252876*** 0.180914***
N 37183 35099 34526 37192
Log-likelihood -7556 -2161 -1903 -4989
Chi2 245 545 376 1097
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time and Hospital Dummies included in all specifications
There is no significant effect of volume on the probability of the adverse outcome 
occurrence. The characteristics of the provider do not have an impact on probability. The 
relevant variables that explain readmission and mortality are mainly the case-mix 
variables. Patients admitted with stroke are more likely to have a fatal outcome (mortality 
at any point in time) while having stroke reduces the chances of readmission. Males are 
less likely to be readmitted but more likely to have a fatal outcome. Older patients, 
patients with longer lengths of stay and patients with higher number of comorbidities are 
more likely to have unfavourable health outcomes. Alternative specifications for the 
volume variable have been tested to check the linearity of the causal relationship with the 
inclusion of a quadratic term and the accumulation of experience. With that purpose, the 
squared of the volume variable and the accumulated experience of the provider are
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considered as the covariates in the equations130. Results are reported in Appendix 5.5 
and support the general conclusions derived from results in Table 5.5. Under the 
alternative specifications any of the adverse outcomes do not seem to be affected by 
either the surgical volume or the experience gained in surgery performance by high- 
volume providers.
The fact that only case-mix variables affect the probability of occurrence does not imply 
that there is no effect of volume affecting the timing of adverse outcome occurrence. In 
other words, these results only give an answer to the question of the likelihood of the 
event happening but there is no timing effect included in the specification. The time 
elapsed between surgery date and discharge date as well as the destination at the end of 
the in-hospital stay are additional measures to test for quality improvements arising from 
new surgical technology usage. Controlling for the patient’s length of stay the question 
addressed now is the hazard of being discharged dead or alive. Some of the studies have 
highlighted the importance of accounting for the length of in-hospital stay when analysing 
if the patient has been discharged dead or alive (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997; Cutler, 
1995). In light of that, and opposed to the previous estimates where the length of stay was 
included as explanatory variable, now the hazard function is conditioned on the length of
stay this is depicted as X(t) = ^  < * *  ^  ~  , where A,(t) is the hazard of
a/—>o A r
transiting to a specific state conditioned on having survived in that state at least t periods. 
Table 5.6 provides the coefficient estimates using Cox-proportional hazard models. The 
model considered in column (1) presents the results of the estimation of the hazard of 
being discharged dead. Column (2) presents the estimates of the hazard of being 
discharged alive.
130 The accumulated experience is measured as the cumulative number of procedures performed from the first 
year of data availability up to the previous year to the operation date. For the first year this will count for the 
number of procedures performed from the beginning of the year to the operation date.
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Table 5.6 Cox-Proportional Hazard Model
(1) Discharged dead (2) Discharged alive
Vol12 0.018348 0.123066***
Foundation 27.466713*** -0.65834
University -2.45e+01*** 1.450797***
TIA -0.5185 -0.01431
Stroke 0.105811 -0.716162***
Sex 0.217823* 0.117521***
Age 0.020675*** -0.014567***
Comorbidity 0.310343*** -0.118070***
N 36970 36970
Number of failures 445 36525
Log Pseudo-likelihood -3572.17 -351365
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time and Hospital Dummies included in all specifications
The hazard of being discharged dead is positively affected by the surgery volume but this 
effect is not significant. On the other hand, the positive sign of the volume variable on the 
conditional probability of being discharged alive denotes that patients treated in high 
volume providers have a higher probability of being discharged alive conditional on the 
length of stay. This would indicate that those hospitals with higher uptake improve their 
surgery performance and this is reflected in a higher likelihood of being discharged alive. 
Provider characteristics are significant and indicate that being a foundation trust favours 
the probability of being discharged dead whereas being a university affiliated provider has 
a negative effect on the conditional probability of being discharged dead but a positive 
effect on the probability of being discharged alive. Again case-mix variables highly 
determine the conditional probability of each type of outcome. Male patients, older 
patients and patients with comorbidities are more likely to be discharged dead. As 
opposed to that, patients with stroke, older patients and patients with comorbidites are 
less likely to be discharged alive.
The evidence shown in Table 5.6 is only indicative of positive volume effect on conditional 
probability of being discharged alive. For those patients that are discharged alive, is there 
any tangible post-discharge effect? Any improvements materialised after discharge will 
not be captured by the analysis undertaken to obtain the results in Table 5.6 and thus 
health outcomes need to be examined after the patient is discharged. This analytical
231
procedure is similar to the one followed in Hamilton and Hamilton (1997). In their study 
they could find a partial effect on the conditional probability of being discharged alive but 
the greater effect was shown with the patient’s destination upon discharge.
In Section 5.3 it has been seen how the length of stay has been decreasing over time. 
The length of the period that the patient will be in hospital may be determined not purely 
on medical grounds but on managerial decisions to reduce in-hospital stay cost. This 
again points towards the need to further study the dynamics after the patient is 
discharged. For that purpose, a competing risk model with three types of failure is 
specified. The failure types are classified according to whether the patient dies after 
discharge, is readmitted into hospital or he is first readmitted and then dies. Two points in 
time are of interest. The first one looks at the occurrence of these events when they 
happen within four weeks after the patient has been discharged. The second time frame 
considered aims at capturing longer term dynamics and picks up the occurrence of these 
three types of failure at any time during follow-up, that is, from discharge date to the end 
of the study period. Table 5.7 describes the types of failure and the timing of interest. The 
method used for the estimation of competing risks models is the W LW  procedure 
presented in Section 5.6. The parameter estimates for each type of failure are computed 
separately maximising the failure-specific partial likelihood. This estimation method 
controls for patient unobserved heterogeneity. This unobserved heterogeneity will capture 
differences in patient severity that are not explained by the patient characteristics 
variables included in the model specification.
Table 5.7 Failure Time and Event Timing
k=1
k=2
k=3
Death
Readmission 
Readmission and death
Within four 
weeks after 
discharge
k=1
k=2
Death
Readmission
Any time from 
discharge to end 
of follow up
k=3 Readmission and death
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The estimates of the competing risk model that captures the risk of failure within four 
weeks after discharge are reported in Table 5.8. The first column presents the parameters 
for the hazard of death within four weeks after discharge, the second column reports the 
results for the readmission failure type and the last column provides the results for the 
third type of failure, readmitted followed by death. The relationship between volume and 
outcome is negative only for the death type of failure whereas for the readmission and 
readmission plus death outcomes the coefficient is positive. These results however are 
not significant and thus a strong causal relationship cannot be established. Only LOS, 
sex, age and comorbidities are the covariates that seem to have an impact on the hazard 
of these three failure types. According to the results, it seems that there is no short-term 
effect of volume on any of the adverse outcomes. Instead, there are quality differences 
across providers that could explain the conditional probability of each outcome. This is 
supported by the test of joint significance of provider dummies. The p-value is zero in all 
cases indicating that the null hypothesis that provider dummies are jointly zero is 
statistically insignificant. Adverse outcomes are the result of differences across providers 
and individual patient characteristics that reflect case severity.
Table 5.8 Adverse Outcome within Four Weeks after Discharge
Death Readmission Readmission + Death
LogVol12 -0.5805 0.036345 0.282137
Foundation -0.86734 0.319914 0.814794
University 0.672735 0.745299 1.991797
Transient -0.5366 0.1423 0.321384
Stroke -0.09187 -0.461215* 0.940576
LOS 0.023485*** 0.005404** -0.00262
Sex 0.18682 -0.143247** -0.30692
Age 0.040600* 0.007135** 0.052057**
Comorbidity 0.190762 0.155986*** -0.03078
N 36882 36794 36882
Failures 46 1819 54
Log Likelihood -409.36 -18826.6 -480.495
P-value 0 0 0
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time and Hospital Dummies included in all specifications 
P-value reported for the test that the coefficients of the provider dummies are jointly zero
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If carotid endarterectomy is initially used as a preventive procedure (recall that almost 
85% of the patients admitted into hospital were diagnosed with stenosis), the effects of 
the experience obtained through diffusion may become visible only in the longer term. For 
this reason, the competing risk model is also estimated taking into account the time 
elapsed from the discharged date to the occurrence date of the adverse outcome at any 
time during follow-up. Table 5.9 shows the parameter estimates. Only the coefficient for 
the readmission failure type is significant and negative. Patients treated in higher volume 
hospitals have lower probability of readmission than those patients treated by providers 
performing lower surgical volumes. This is explained by lower uptake providers being less 
experienced in surgery performance. The last row in Table 5.9 shows the test for joint 
significance that provider dummy coefficients are zero. The null hypothesis that provider 
dummy coefficients is equal to zero is only accepted for the first type of failure showed in 
the first column. For readmissions and readmission/death, the null hypothesis that all 
dummy providers are jointly zero is rejected.
Table 5.9 Adverse Outcome during Follow-up after Discharge
Death Readmission Readmission + Death
LogVol12 0.057668 -0.074375** -0.05592
Foundation -2.27e+01*** -0.82965 -2.32e+01***
University 22.871337*** -0.0639 23.983533***
Transient -0.3384 -0.03165 -0.19547
Stroke 0.2253 -0.13761 -0.00773
LOS 0.010324*** 0.002959** 0.005943**
Sex 0.278419*** 0.061085** 0.101655
Age 0.059477*** 0.004579*** 0.061804***
Comorbidity 0.167175*** 0.122523*** 0.368226***
N 36843 36843 36843
Failures 1204 9570 1175
Log Likelihood -11245.7 -98375.2 -11083.3
P-value 0.1463 0 0
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time and Hospital Dummies included in all specifications 
P-value reported for the test that the coefficients of the provider dummies are jointly zero
The acceptance of the null of provider dummies being jointly statistically zero in the first 
column indicates that the conditional probability of death does not depend on differences
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across providers. This result in combination with the lack of volume effect on the 
probability of death suggests that only patient characteristics explain the occurrence of 
this failure type. The surgical procedure is performed to avoid further development of 
cerebrovascular disease or the complication when this condition is already present. Given 
the complexity of the case, it seems that technology use cannot avoid this type of fatal 
outcome. The second column shows that conditional probability of readmission has a 
significant and negative relationship with surgical volume. However, differences in 
providers are also explicative of readmission failure type, as shown by the joint 
significance of provider dummies. The last column in Table 5.9 indicates that the 
probability of patient’s readmission followed by death is mostly determined by patient’s 
characteristics as well as differences across providers. The significant and expected signs 
of the covariates sex, age and comorbidities are robust to the results obtained in previous 
estimations. Length of stay has been included here to control for patient severity during 
hospitalisation and it is also indicative that longer in-hospital stays have a positive impact 
on the likelihood of death or readmission.
5.8 Concluding Remarks
The interest in Chapter 5 lies on the diffusion process followed by new surgical 
technology. The approached used in the chapter is different to the diffusion framework 
outlined in the analysis of new drug diffusion. These differences are justified on the basis 
of different agents in the surgery development, market introduction and definition of this 
technology type. New surgical procedures arise generally in an academic environment 
and they are introduced into the system without any approval process or regulation. The 
lack of formal introduction process may pose a stronger effect on the learning effects also 
based on the lower scientific evidence on the accuracy of the new innovation. Also, there 
is a shift in the health sector in which diffusion is considered. The uptake of new surgeries 
occurs within the secondary care sector. The change in the definition of the technology 
and the context in which the diffusion process flows opens the possibility to examine 
diffusion from a different perspective.
The chapter investigates the diffusion as a process in which learning effects are still 
assumed to be a key determinant. As diffusion is inherently defined as being a dynamic 
process, observed health benefit derived from surgery usage may generate expectations 
regarding technology quality. It is therefore of interest in this context to examine the 
relevance of the generation of expectations as a determinant of future surgery innovation 
usage. The secondary care sector in the NHS has been under a number of reforms that
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have modified the market in which in-hospital services were provided. These reforms have 
been mostly focused in the introduction of a quasi-market to enhance competition among 
providers through the division between the buyer (PCT) and the seller of the health care 
services (trusts). The representation of the diffusion problem seems incomplete if these 
reforms are left unrelated to diffusion and therefore the chapter pays special attention to 
the effect that such market-oriented tools will have on the uptake of surgical innovations. 
In addition to the interest for the diffusion process, this chapter also examines any health 
improvements appropriated by patients as a consequence of the use of relatively new 
surgical innovations. The rationale behind this is to test the accepted hypothesis that 
technology has embedded a competitive advantage that translates into improved quality 
of care. The departure point is that with the passage of time the experience gained 
through the learning by performing process brings improvements that are translated into 
better health outcomes. In line with the analysis undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4, this 
chapter also examines whether regulatory and organisational factors are predictors of 
technology preference.
There are a set of interesting conclusions that can be derived from the results obtained in 
this chapter. The first one relates to the presence of strong learning by performing effects 
present in the diffusion process. This is in line with the results obtained in the other two 
empirical chapters and highlights the relevance of the knowledge gained through 
experience. However, these effects are stronger for the case of surgical technology. This 
could suggest that for technologies with no formal introduction procedure or product 
assessment, experience acquired through technology utilisation has a greater role than 
technologies of the drug type with a monitored formal introduction process. With the 
passage of time the observation of any adverse outcome may have a reverse effect on 
uptake. Observed negative effects on patient’s health outcomes may introduce an 
element of uncertainty that may offset the increasing experience built through an 
increasing volume of surgeries performed. However, overall this effect is not shown to be 
significant for the process.
The competition aspect considered in the diffusion specification shows that less 
competitive environments favour technology uptake. Different measures of competition 
are considered. The first one relates to the competition present among different providers 
selling services to the same PCT. The second set of competition variables are defined in 
relation to the definition of health administrative geographical areas. Although the latter 
type of measures has been argued to be an imprecise variable for the measurement of
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competition, they offer an alternative to test whether competition is still relevant when 
broader areas than those most commonly defined are considered. In general, only the 
estimates for the knee arthroscopy case support the last type of measures. That is, 
competition variables defined at the strategic health authority level are only significant for 
the knee arthroscopy procedure type. Despite the wider definition of competition area 
according to health region, the findings are consistent in the results obtained for both 
types of measures and show that less competitive markets reinforce the surgical 
technology uptake.
The estimates for the Herfindahl index and the number of providers selling services to the 
same PCT show that lower competition is positively associated to diffusion. When the 
provision of services to PCTs is restricted to one provider, the increase in uptake may be 
a consequence of two effects. Firstly, the PCT will commission hospital services to the 
same provider and thus the provider is forced to accept all cases eligible for this type of 
surgeries. The second effect may work through non-price competition. If providers are 
restricted by binding contracts that are regularly renewed, the provider may have 
incentives to provide high quality services using the state-of-the-art technology in order to 
compete for future contracts with the aim of securing revenue. Even though the analysis 
does not examine the effect of competition on prices charged by providers, the results 
point towards the existence of non-price competition.
Medical condition severity and case complexity also seem to be a determinant of 
acceptance. The case of carotid endarterectomy represents an example of risky 
procedure; however, those providers having lower proportion of risky cases have better 
technology acceptance. This could be explained by the fact that the uncertainty 
associated to technology and the complexity of the condition for surgical treatment 
prevents innovation uptake. As opposed to the results obtained in the previous chapters, 
organisational factors are related to the demand for surgical technologies. The change in 
status from trust to foundation trusts does not seem to have an impact on diffusion. 
Nevertheless, university affiliation explains part of the diffusion in the case of carotid 
endarterectomy uptake. Teaching providers may have a preference for technology, 
especially when there is a risk involved in the procedure. Specialisation of providers is 
also a key element in the acceptance of technology as indicated by the positive and 
significant effect of orthopaedic specialised providers in the uptake of knee arthroscopy.
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The next step is to answer the question of the impact of the use of surgical technology on 
patient’s welfare. This part of the analysis was restricted to the case of carotid 
endarterectomy. The knee arthroscopy case had some limitations imposed by the health 
outcome measures used in the current analysis. Given the low rates of readmissions and 
mortality after knee arthroscopy surgery, the use of these measures would be overstating 
the impact of surgery in health improvements. The interest lies on the impact of the 
surgical volume in patient’s outcome. Several adverse outcome measures are considered: 
readmission within 28 days, in-hospital mortality, mortality within 30 days after surgery 
and mortality within a year. Only case-mix variables seem to be responsible for the 
probability of occurrence of any of these adverse outcomes and no significant association 
between volume and outcome is obtained. The lack of association between volume and 
outcome moved the analysis one step forward to examine the effect of volume on the 
conditional probability of being discharged dead or alive. Now those patients treated by 
providers that have a higher technology acceptance present a higher likelihood of being 
discharged alive.
Because of the preventive nature of carotid endarterectomy, the realisation of the benefits 
derived from technology utilisation may not show instantly. Thus the effect on outcome is 
examined after discharge through a competing risk model. Of the three different outcomes 
examined - readmission, death and readmission followed by death -  none is affected 
immediately after discharge. Once controlling for quality differences across providers, the 
negative relationship between surgical volume and health outcomes is only significant on 
the probability of readmission; however, this effect is only tangible in the long-term. The 
conditional probability of each adverse outcome is mainly explained by differences in 
provider quality and patient characteristics. These results are in accordance with the 
nature of the procedure. As a preventive surgery, any adverse outcome is likely to happen 
in the longer term rather than immediately after discharge. It is also interesting to note 
consistency across all results of the significant effects that case-mix variables have on the 
occurrence of any adverse outcome.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Policy Implications
6.1 Introduction
This thesis has examined the diffusion of medical technology within the health care 
sector. The aim was to identify the factors that determine the diffusion process taking into 
account the role of information and regulatory and organisational factors of the 
environment in which the uptake is taking place. The importance of the understanding of 
the diffusion process stems from the accepted role of technological change as the main 
driver in the expansion of health care expenditure. If new innovations are liable for this 
growth, then understanding the mechanisms at work during the uptake process will shed 
light on the elements whereby new technologies are gradually incorporated into the 
treatment options. This would allow for the delineation of different aspects of diffusion 
uptake, cost implications and patient’s welfare gains.
There are several sets of variables that have been of interest throughout the analysis. The 
first vector of variables refers to the information used by individuals to overcome the 
uncertainty inherent in any new technology. Diffusion is depicted as a learning process in 
which several sources are accessed in order to acquire information regarding product 
characteristics and effectiveness. A second set of variables comprises the managerial and 
regulatory framework delimiting the uptake process. The health care system restricts the 
characteristics that define the provision of health services. The design of the organisation 
may provide a number of incentives liable to change the path of technology diffusion. 
Finally, a number of product quality characteristics have also been considered as potential 
elements to prompt diffusion. All these elements have been examined in the previous 
three chapters. Specifically, Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with the diffusion of new drugs within 
the primary care sector at two different levels of analysis: therapeutical class and 
individual drug level, respectively. Chapter 5 explored the diffusion of surgical innovations 
in the secondary care market.
In this last chapter, the findings derived from the empirical analysis are summarised and 
discussed. The following section is summing up the results obtained in each of the 
empirical chapters. According to this, Section 6.3 derives general conclusions extracted 
from the common patterns identified across technologies and health sectors. It also
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discusses the differences that arise due to the nature of technologies and the context in 
which diffusion is restricted. Some policy implications are discussed in Section 6.4. The 
final section presents some limitations found during the analysis and proposes areas of 
diffusion analysis for future research.
6.2 Individual Conclusions from the Empirical Chapters
This section gives a summary of the findings obtained in Chapters 3 ,4  and 5. The aim is 
to give an outline of the key results in order to build the main conclusions resulting from 
the analysis in the thesis. In Chapter 3 diffusion analysis was undertaken for three 
therapeutical groups - statins, PPIs and SSRIs - and uptake was examined using 
prescription data by a sample of GPs throughout the primary care sector in the UK. The 
empirical specification was designed to estimate demand for new pharmaceutical as a 
function of the informational factors outlined in the chapter and the organisation of 
practices. Of the informational sources identified, physician’s own experience and 
consumption externalities at the practice level are the only two channels that prevail 
across the three therapeutical groups. Consumption externalities at the market level are 
also channels used by physicians to correct individual prescription patterns. Marketing is 
highly influential in the statins case. Of particular interest are the results of the marketing 
behaviour as the diffusion process moves in time where increasing returns to marketing 
for statins have been detected. The marketing effort at early stages suggests there might 
be an informational objective in the use of promotion; however, this is only significant for 
statins and PPIs. This is a result followed up specifically in the following chapter in which 
similar results were found. No organisational factors appear to significantly influence 
demand for new drugs. Overall the results found are mostly significant for statins. This 
therapeutical group represents the case of a truly innovative drug class, as opposed to 
PPIs and SSRIs for which there are existing similar products in the market.
The analysis at the individual drug level within the statins therapeutical group derived 
similar results to the findings obtained in Chapter 3 which considered a higher level of 
aggregation. In addition to information, product quality is included in the specification to 
explain differences in the observed prescription patterns for each statin as competition 
was held to influence within-class diffusion of innovative products. The objective was to 
explain competition through analysing the expected first-mover advantage derived from 
patent race advantage to capture and maintain market share. The market for statins has 
faced strong competition as a later entrant absorbed a large market share, indicating that 
at the product level drug diffusion can be affected by product quality. There are strong
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learning effects in the diffusion process. Yet consumption externalities were not seen to 
be fully effective mechanisms to explain differences between dominant and competing 
drugs. Clinical evidence is an important source to consolidate the prescription of the two 
dominant molecules - simvastatin and atorvastatin- with respect to pravastatin, the only 
drug that actually might provide some degree of competition. Product characteristics are 
significant in those cases where the differential in the characteristics of the product could 
induce a shift in favour of the dominant molecules. Marketing influence is tested against 
the presence or complementarity of the informative versus persuasive role of advertising. 
The evidence points towards an initial informational role of the first-mover in the market 
during the early period of diffusion. As the number of competitors increases and the 
process is entering more mature stages, there is a change in marketing objectives with a 
clear persuasive mission. These results are shown to be valid for the first entrant, the drug 
that faces the highest barriers to entry as generated by the technological uncertainty. 
Once the uncertainty faced by the first entrant is overcome throughout the diffusion 
process, the fourth entrant benefits from this and its promotion efforts pursue the 
consolidation of prescription volume. This advantage gives the fourth entrant the power to 
compete with the first-mover based on higher product quality. In summary, whereas the 
dominance of the first-mover is based on familiarity developed by prescribers reflecting its 
status as the first drug in the market, the dominance of the fourth entrant is product quality 
based.
The last empirical chapter explored the diffusion of surgical innovation. The unit of 
analysis is now the hospital/provider of health services and the surgeries explored are 
carotid endarterectomy and knee arthroscopy. The specification of the model still 
responds to a learning process in which experience has a key role. The model includes 
product quality assessment via the observation of possible adverse outcomes occurring 
after the surgery is performed. In addition, the regulatory and competitive environment 
and provider organisational characteristics were tested against the diffusion process. At 
the provider level there are strong learning effects in the uptake of surgical innovations 
that prevails across surgical innovations. This seems to be the only channel used to 
assess product quality as the observation of previous adverse health outcomes does not 
affect uptake. Riskier surgeries are subject to slower uptake most possibly to avoid post- 
surgical adverse outcomes derived from the combination of surgery complexity and 
uncertainty. Findings suggest that less competitive environments boost diffusion. In 
contrast to the previous two chapters, the structure of the provider is a determinant in the 
uptake. University affiliation is a determinant of carotid endarterectomy uptake while 
orthopaedic specialised providers seem to experience faster knee arthroscopy diffusion.
241
Finally, the analysis of the welfare gains obtained with the diffusion of carotid 
endarterectomy point towards improved outcomes materialised in the long-term after 
patient discharge.
6.3 Technology Diffusion in Health Care: Conclusions on the 
Mechanisms Driving the Process
The previous section summarised the specific results obtained in each of the empirical 
chapters. In this section more general conclusions are drawn. The main findings are 
grouped according to each of the aspects that were examined as potential factors of the 
diffusion process. This section presents any general diffusion response to the common 
factors analysed across technologies and sectors.
Information
Information plays a key role in the reduction of the uncertainty embedded in new 
technology. Both drugs and surgical procedures require a continuous process of 
technology utilisation to attain a degree of familiarity in order to integrate technology as 
standard practice. The effect of own experience is stronger for surgical technologies 
possibly due to the lack of a formal introduction process. New technologies are 
experience goods that require repeated demand for the diffusion process to proceed 
successfully. This has been strongly supported by the learning effect in the demand 
equations across both types of technologies and between the different innovations in each 
type of technology. The slow uptake observed in early stages of diffusion as depicted by 
the S-shaped diffusion curve can thus be explained by learning effects being responsible 
for information dissemination. Certainly, uncertainty is an uptake deterring factor and the 
own experience is what matters overall in the diffusion process. The rest of the 
conclusions on information channels described below is limited to the evidence provided 
on drug diffusion. Technology differences prevented the analysis of both technologies to 
share exactly the same type of information aspects.
Access to the evidence provided by scientific journals is a channel that is used by 
prescribers only in the case of truly innovative drugs. This effect works at two different 
levels of aggregation, the therapeutical level and individual product level. In a situation 
where a breakthrough technology is introduced, published clinical evidence is of high 
value to access information given that there is no benchmark product in the market. If on
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the contrary, there are similar products already being prescribed there may be 
informational spillovers that dominate over any access to evidence from clinical results. 
This effect is more pronounced at the individual product level when the drug is the first 
product of an innovative therapeutical group. In this case the drug faces issues of 
uncertainty derived from novelty and specific uncertain product characteristics arising from 
the lack of a close therapeutical drug class or no close drug substitute. In the prescription 
choice, clinical evidence is also required to compare product differentials that may prompt 
the consolidation of the product that has market advantage.
The behaviour observed by others through consumption externalities has confounding 
effects on drug diffusion. Consumption externalities are present at the therapeutical level 
but not at the individual drug diffusion process. In general, the low effect of consumption 
externalities may suggest that physician’s private information prevail over any other 
information derived as an external signal. At the therapeutical level there appears to be 
little influence of practice externalities in the demand for new drugs. The findings suggest 
the lower the number of physicians in a practice the higher the demand for new drugs. 
This leads to a situation where knowledge is increased through repeated demand for new 
drugs to acquire experience. Although proximity to peers and exchange of information 
does not derive any consumption externality, the market does offer the opportunity to act 
as a source of information. Market demand is absorbed by the individual physician as 
consolidation of product information and indication that drug prescription has become 
standard practice.
One of the most interesting results derived from informative sources affecting diffusion 
concerns the role of marketing. The behaviour of advertising seems to partly support the 
argument above that the first product in the market seems to play the role of overcoming 
the barriers generated by the lack of familiarity with the product. There is consistency 
across both levels of analysis to support this aspect. In the first place, there are observed 
increasing long-lived effects of promotion effort shown in the analysis at the therapeutical 
level. At early stages of diffusion marketing seems to affect negatively the demand for 
new drugs. It is interesting to see that this evidence is supported by therapeutical levels 
represented by statins and SSRIs. When talking about statins, the truly innovative 
technology, the manufacturer intervenes to provide information in early stages of diffusion. 
The same occurs in the case of SSRIs as this manufacturer may see the need to highlight 
the differential aspects of the claimed superiority with respect to alternative treatment 
options. As diffusion enters into mature stages the effect of marketing reinforces the
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demand for new drugs showing increasing returns to marketing promotion. This effect is 
however only shown for the case of truly innovative therapeutical class, statins.
Complementing these results, findings of diffusion analysis of individual drugs sheds light 
on the discussion in the literature about the informative or persuasive role of marketing. 
These two effects coexist and are timed in the sequence they follow. The first entrant in 
the market adopts the role of information dissemination to overcome the barriers 
generated by uncertainty when introducing a breakthrough innovation in a brand new 
therapeutical market. There is also a persuasive marketing effect followed by the first- 
entrant. This effect is observed as the number of competitors increases suggesting that 
the incumbent product manufacturer changes marketing behaviour to secure prescription 
market share. There is a second dominant product in the market that shows a clear 
persuasive role in marketing effort. This is possible because of the presence of 
informational spillovers. The marginal information acquisition cost to the physician is lower 
for later entrants and thus the manufacturer devotes promotion to capture market share. 
These results thus not only suggest the both marketing functions exist but it also adds a 
timing element to the appearance of each effect.
Product differences and quality
Differences in the technology under examination are key factors in shaping different 
aspects of diffusion. As it has been argued to be the case for the information mechanisms 
differences in characteristics between statins, PPIs and SSRIs have defined a different 
set of explanations for each of the diffusion processes. As such, the innovative character 
of statins requires the existence of a higher number of mechanisms to overcome barriers 
to entry. The other two therapeutical classes, facing pre-existing competing therapeutic 
groups in the market, have shown a diffusion process based mainly on information 
acquisition through experience.
At a lower level of aggregation, when looking at products that are close substitutes (those 
drugs within the statins group) product quality becomes relevant in how drug prescription 
share is distributed. In combination to the market dominance derived from being the first 
entrant, the pioneer was also among the top quality drugs. This partly justifies market 
dominance; however, quality of later entrants is a product differentiation characteristic that 
proved to have superior influence with respect to existing drugs and powerful enough to
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override first-mover advantage. The maturity of the product is also a key determinant in 
the diffusion process. The longer the presence in the market of a product the more likely 
demand for the new product is in comparison to other competing drugs. Consequently, 
product characteristics represent strong elements to consolidate market dominance. As 
for surgical innovations, complexity of the condition for which the surgery is performed 
acts as a barrier to technology utilisation. The riskier the procedure performance, 
combined with the greater uncertainty of the technology under study, shapes a slower 
technology uptake.
Competitive markets
Market competition is always assumed to involve low prices and higher quantities 
demanded. In the hospital market, competition was introduced through the creation of a 
market where the provision and financing of services are in different hands. The observed 
effect is that the lower the competition between providers the higher the uptake. This may 
suggest that lower number of providers in a market may force a commitment in service 
provision regardless of price. Non-price competition may be undertaken in such 
circumstances and channelled through the provision of state-of-the-art technology in order 
to secure future contracts with the purchaser. This effect was consistent across surgical 
technologies.
Organisation
Organisational elements have been shown to have different impacts across health care 
sectors. There was no association found between diffusion of new pharmaceuticals in the 
primary care sector and organisational characteristics. The benefit of the patient is 
considered an important aspect of interest by the physician irrespective of any structure 
designed to provide incentives to limit the use of financial resources. This may suggest 
that in the primary care sector the patient’s welfare may be a factor that physicians 
incorporate into their utility function in their assessment of the costs and benefits to 
determine the optimal allocation of service provision.
The organisation of the provider of hospital services has a different weight in the uptake of 
surgical innovations. Providers with university affiliation and specialised providers show an 
increasing acceptance of the technology. The fact that organisational factors are not 
important in the drug diffusion within the primary care sector but are relevant in the 
secondary health sector may suggest that complexity of the organisation reflects more
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difficult management and this is controlled via the definition of the institution. However, the 
influence of these factors was surgery-specific. If the surgical innovation involves a risk for 
the patient, university providers have faster uptake as a reflection of their interest in the 
progress of science. On the other hand, specialised providers have a better acceptance of 
surgical innovation maybe because of higher ability to catch up with the latest technology. 
Specialised hospitals will have highly skilled human and physical capital to absorb the 
knowledge required for faster uptake.
Prices
The final note concerns the role of prices on drug diffusion. When prices have been 
included in the analysis the estimated price elasticities were not significant. At the 
therapeutical level the analysis is limited to the acceptance of new technologies without 
drawing any comparison with other alternative treatment options. Thus the lack of price 
effect could be a consequence of the approach taken. However, the analysis at the 
individual drug level also reveals that price differentials existing between statins is not 
influencing diffusion. This may point towards the presence of moral hazard in prescription 
of new drugs. The prescription of new and costlier drugs is marked by a lack of cost 
awareness facilitated by a system where there is a third-party payer reimbursing the drug 
cost and patients face low copayments. Given that the prescription of new drugs has been 
increasing and prices have been fairly stable overtime, this would be suggesting that the 
increasing trend in pharmaceutical expenditure is likely to be partly driven by increases in 
volume.
6.4 Policy Implications
The findings on the informational channels and the organisational and regulatory factors 
open the possibility to incorporate these elements in the design of health care policies. In 
accordance to the benefit derived from technology use, the diffusion process could be 
targeted to narrow down the gap between availability and widespread utilisation. When 
the terms and conditions of new reforms are under consideration it is important to assess 
the impact they will have on adoption and diffusion. Generally, reforms are aimed at 
improving efficiency but the incentives provided may distort the process whereby new 
innovations are incorporated. As generally new technologies are priced higher than 
existing ones, there is a trade-off between efficiency-enhancing policies and technology 
utilisation patterns. Technology demand may be modified to meet the targets imposed by 
the reforms. For instance, if new schemes are being examined to control pharmaceutical
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expenditure there should be two streams of incentives under consideration. One directed 
to the substitution of bioequivalent products with price differentials to heighten prescription 
of less costly products and another to secure prescription of new innovative drugs that 
clearly show health advantages for consumers.
The identification of information as one of the main drivers of diffusion identifies an area in 
which there is scope for policy implementation. It offers the possibility to explore 
alternative options to promote the dissemination of public information in order to break the 
obstacles imposed by new product uncertainty. As seen above, the impact of the access 
of informational channels to acquire knowledge is stronger in breakthrough technologies. 
Regardless of the informative campaign, the agency responsible for information 
distribution should produce unbiased information based on independent assessment of 
technology. Although the experience acquired by first hand happens to have the main 
impact on the uptake of diffusion, there could be some mechanisms that could help to 
boost this direct type of informational source.
The development in recent years of independent health technology evaluation 
organisations, such as NICE, reveals the growing importance of technology assessment. 
As it has been the case of the drug types examined in this study, NICE guidelines provide 
evidence on best practice. Despite the fact that the analysis in the thesis does not 
examine the role of NICE for the reasons discussed above and in Chapter 3, and with the 
evidence provided by the publication of clinical evidence, NICE could play a determinant 
role to promote faster diffusion process. The guidelines related to the prescription of the 
drugs analysed here were published relatively much later than their introduction year. 
There may be a welfare loss as a consequence of this delay. Lack of prescription of the 
drug may translate into the development of the medical condition for those patients that 
did not have access to technology during early diffusion stages and bring higher demand 
burden than in the case the technology was readily available. Consequently, it is 
important to narrow the time difference between drug availability in the market and the 
guideline published by independent technology evaluation agencies. There is a lengthy 
period before evidence starts being available just because drug effectiveness requires the 
follow-up during a number of years. This impedes the immediate availability of clinical 
evidence to support prescription of new drugs.
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One of the main findings was that the organisation of the practice does not affect the 
diffusion of technology. If policies of the type designed for the fund-holding scheme do not 
influence prescription choice, then these scheme types should be tailored to each of the 
different technologies available. Mainly, it could differentiate between established 
treatment options and new treatment possibilities. In the former case, these policies would 
be directed to the efficient treatment choice among a number of substitutable options. In 
the latter case, there should be a broader scope for demand of new technologies to avoid 
potential financial incentives that restrict their use. In any case, when truly innovative 
technologies are not affected by organisational factors this might indicate that the process 
shows a net present value of technology demand higher than the costs associated. There 
may be an initial increase in treatment cost associated for that specific condition but this 
may be offset by future gains in improved health outcome.
With respect to the variable that has opened a large discussion among scholars in the 
literature, marketing efforts by manufacturers, the evidence showed here supports the 
informative role of the manufacturer when the first drug is introduced in the market as a 
mechanism to break any barriers to entry. The persuasive marketing strategy observed at 
later stages of diffusion may impose some restrictions in the free choice of the type of 
drug prescribed. Thus there is potential for the examination of the interaction between the 
technology supplier and physician. If the informative role can be constraint to the early 
stages of diffusion, there should be some intervention to avoid the persuasive role of the 
marketing efforts. If habit generation restricts the prescription choice to specific products 
this may introduce barriers to future competition when other competing or bioequivalent 
products are introduced. The exposure of the physician to a drug that is introduced in a 
brand new therapeutical market has a strong effect to generate preference for the 
prescription of that drug that may impede competition when other close substitutes are 
introduced. Some policies could be directed to monitor prescription patterns and 
manufacturer promotion efforts during early stages to avoid habit generation that is not 
purely based on product competitive advantage.
On the side of surgical innovations there are two main findings with potential policy 
implications. The fact that specialised providers are among those with faster uptake may 
be in favour of decentralisation and specialised care according to different specialties. 
Physical and human capital may have higher qualifications to accept and introduce new 
procedures as part of the hospital range of services. This may translate in a dedicated 
service provision that would meet patient’s needs and translate into improvements in
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quality of care. On the other hand, the risk associated to the procedure is a deterrent for 
new technology uptake in the secondary care sector. Procedures that entail some degree 
of risk to the patient makes difficult to experiment with the technology and this slows 
uptake. Surgical innovations, being technologies whose introduction does not follow a 
formal procedure, would require the introduction of policies targeting the formalisation of 
the process. The objective would be to track and monitor the development and 
introduction of the new surgical technology. This could translate into the publication of 
guidelines to provide information that eliminates the uncertainty related to risky new 
surgical procedures. In the UK NICE is in charge of the publication of this guidelines but 
improvements in the delivery of the guidelines would consist again on shortening the gap 
between guideline publication and technology availability.
6.5 Limitations and Future Research
Despite the interesting findings obtained in this thesis there are few shortcomings limiting 
the interpretability of the results. These limitations arise mainly in the restrictions imposed 
in the data availability. In the first place, both datasets analysed for the purpose of the 
research (IMS Disease-Analyzer and HES data) did not track prescription or hospital 
admissions to the first year of technology availability. This did not seem to represent a 
major problem in the case for drug diffusion because the comparison of the data with 
external data sources revealed that diffusion was still at a very early stage. The second 
data limitation lies on the data used in Chapters 3 and 4 to capture the marketing effect in 
the demand for new prescription drugs. The proxies used to approach the effect of 
promotion are general indicators that reflect either overall pharmaceutical industry 
behaviour or general behaviour of the product manufacturer. These advertising measures 
are not product-specific and thus they do not account for the particular marketing 
spending for each of the drugs analysed. This might induce to overestimation of the 
results given that the marketing variable is a proxy for the manufacturer overall marketing 
spending. Although this represents a shortcoming of the analysis, it allowed testing the 
effect of marketing using a different measure than the data commonly used in empirical 
studies. These limitations open the possibility for further future research as well as 
extension to the analysis undertaken in the thesis, as discussed below.
Inter-level diffusion of analysis
As it was noted in Chapter 1 the two differences in the level of diffusion analysis taken 
provide insight in the process at different points in time. The current research was focused
249
on the intra-level analysis; however, a more complete picture of the diffusion process 
would include the inter-firm aspect of diffusion. The lack of data availability from the first 
year of drug introduction in each therapeutical class limits the analysis to the intra-firm 
aspect of diffusion. The same applies to the case of surgical innovations as the data does 
not cover hospital admissions to the approximated time of innovation introduction. In the 
case of surgical innovations the introduction date is more difficult to establish because it 
might not be officially coded until several periods after its introduction.
With the current data on drug prescription the inter-level diffusion analysis could be 
undertaken only for those drugs within each therapeutical class that were introduced after 
the beginning of the study period (i.e. fluvastatin and atorvastatin). This would allow the 
examination of differences in leaders and followers in new drug adoption. These 
differences could be extended to the analysis of the intra-level diffusion as to examine 
whether differences in adoption time also affect the speed at which physicians uptake new 
prescription drugs into standard practice. In that sense, this analysis would give continuity 
to the analysis of diffusion as to explore if there are any changes in behaviour and 
attitudes with respect to technology.
Intra-level diffusion of analysis
As discussed in the first chapter the intra-level of diffusion was identified as the most 
appropriate for the research questions pursued in the thesis. However, the analysis was 
restricted to a specific definition of intra-level diffusion. The intra-firm analysis initially 
accounts for the percentage of output produced with the new technology. As it was 
argued this definition strictly refers to the substitution of technologies and measures the 
speed at which new technology replaces the old one. The intra-level definition of analysis 
used in this thesis deviated from the standard definition and accounts for the increase in 
utilisation of the new technology irrespective of any existing technology.
In addition to the intra-level approach adopted here, the analysis could be extended to the 
aspect of intra-level that strictly examines the substitution of the old technology by the 
new technology. This part of the analysis would be restricted to the group of drugs that did 
have alternative drugs for the treatment of specific medical condition. For instance, 
despite the increasing popularity of the PPIs and SSRIs there are a number of potential 
substitutes that could be prescribed as ulcer-healing and antidepressant treatment
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respectively instead. The overwhelming difference in prescription of these drug classes 
with respect to competing ones would also give the opportunity to further extend the 
analysis of the impact of product quality on the dominance of one drug class. The surgical 
innovations included in this study did not have direct competitors and thus this extension 
cannot be applied to the same type of surgeries. However, surgical innovations that are 
replacing old ones could be identified and analysed.
Marketing variable
The limited data availability for the analysis of the relationship between diffusion and 
marketing could be extended to include drug-specific marketing information. This would 
serve as a robustness check of the findings obtained for the drug case. The study of PPIs 
and SSRIs in particular has been restricted to very general measures of marketing and 
limited to the effect of marketing on diffusion at the therapeutical level. If more detailed 
data on drug-specific advertising efforts could be accessible, the analysis undertaken in 
Chapter 4 could be expanded to the individual drugs within these therapeutical groups.
NICE recommendations
The inclusion of clinical evidence as an informative channel was restricted to the 
publication of articles in scientific journals. There have been a number of NICE guidelines 
launched regarding the therapeutical drugs included in this study. The main limitation for 
the inclusion of this aspect of clinical evidence in the analysis was that the guidelines 
were published in an advanced diffusion stage and in some cases even after the end of 
the study period. If data is updated to include the most recent years there would be scope 
for the analysis that quantifies the impact of NICE guidelines on prescription patterns. It 
would be interesting to analyse in the future the responsiveness of prescription trends of 
demand for new drugs.
Technology adoption from the perspective of the consultant
Diffusion of surgical innovations has been limited to the volume of surgeries performed at 
the provider level. The interest in the competition variables made this unit of analysis the 
most appropriate for the diffusion analysis. However, the decision at the consultant level is 
also of interest to examine technological preferences at the individual level. Socio­
demographic variables and the restrictions imposed by the hospital in which surgeons are
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affiliated are additional aspects of diffusion that will shed light on the uptake of surgical 
innovations.
Extension to other technologies
Although some generalisations have been extracted from the results of the empirical 
analysis, they were based on the specific characteristics of the product innovations 
examined. To actually corroborate the extension of these results to other innovations with 
similar characteristics, additional analysis should be carried out to confirm the conclusions 
outlined in this chapter. In addition to the examination of other surgical procedures and 
drugs, it would be helpful to explore the diffusion (inter- and/or intra-level analysis) of 
capital-embodied technology. The hospital sector could be again a good-case study for 
diffusion of these technologies to confirm the impact of the regulatory and organisational 
factors. Of special interest is the diffusion analysis of new physical capital technologies 
that represent big-tickets innovations as the recent competitive environment introduced 
with the reforms in the secondary care sector may have had different effect on diffusion 
than the observed for the surgical innovations examined here.
Cost-effectiveness analysis of diffusion
The reflection of the impact of diffusion in the realisation of any improvement in patient’s 
health outcome is an important aspect of diffusion that seems to be highly restricted by 
data availability. If diffusion brings better health outcomes derived from utilisation of new 
technologies, higher cost derived from increases in quantity may be outweighed by 
welfare gains appropriated by the patient. Diffusion analysis focused exclusively on 
volume increases does not account for the benefits associated to technology diffusion and 
this could be undermining the importance of diffusion for not including both the benefit and 
cost sides of uptake. The recognition of the importance of this aspect offers the possibility 
to extend the analysis to case studies that incorporate both components.
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Appendix Chapter 2
Appendix 2.1 Sociological and marketing diffusion literature
Diffusion from the Sociological Perspective
At a time when economists showed interest in diffusion analysis, represented by the 
seminal research by Griliches (1958) and Mansfield (1961) discussed in Chapter 2, 
sociologists simultaneously started to analyse diffusion. Different perspectives divided 
these two disciplines. Economists mainly focused on the profitability aspect of the adoption 
of innovations whereas among sociologists, adoption of new technologies was centred on 
the role of interpersonal relations. As such they built a framework in which individual’s 
attributes were considered to affect the diffusion process, but the position of the individual 
in the social system was assumed to have the largest influence. As defined by Rogers 
(2003, pp.5), “diffusion is the process in which an innovation is communicated through 
certain channels overtime among the members of a social system”. Rogers distinguishes 
four main elements in the diffusion process: the innovation, communication and its 
channels, the time element and the social system. The diffusion literature distinguishes 
five adopter categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and 
laggards. Each adopter category is identified by common dominant attributes and values 
(Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). The seminal work by Ryan and Gross (1943) is perhaps 
the most influential diffusion study in the discipline. They studied the diffusion of hybrid 
corn in Iowa and already included the elements of diffusion mentioned in Rogers (2003) 
and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971).
In the early 60s, a debate between economists and sociologists regarding the elements 
behind the adoption process established opposite explanatory approaches. Sociologists 
argued that economic reasons alone could not explain diffusion since the economic 
advantage of some innovations did not have an immediate acceptance. Hence, they 
pointed out that sociological factors were the driving attributes leading the adoption 
process. In the economics literature, the profitability of adoption being the factor 
influencing adoption first proposed by Griliches (1957) in his seminal work was discussed 
by many sociologists. Havens and Rogers (1961) explicitly compared the importance of 
profitability and interaction effect for hybrid seed corn but their findings ruled out the 
profitability hypothesis. It was also suggested that the acceptance of a new technology 
was related to the existing use of similar innovations (Brandner and Strauss, 1959). 
Ultimately, the economics perspective was reconciled with the sociological perspective 
and Griliches (1960,1962) acknowledged the influence of interpersonal factors; however, 
he accepted them as a wider definition of his concept of profitability.
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Coleman et al. (1957) studied both individual and interpersonal relations attributes of 
doctors. Their findings support different influence on the diffusion path of doctor’s 
individual characteristics as compared to the degree of integration in the social network. 
Integration within the social structure could be represented by a “snowball process” (the 
number of adopters would depend on the percentage of already users). The influence of 
individual characteristics is regarded as an “individual process” (the number of adopters is 
a constant function of the number of users). They further analyse social networks by 
looking at whether “pairs of socially related doctors” adopted the drug at the same time. 
This hypothesis is rejected in favour of simultaneity of adoption only during the early stage 
of diffusion for the advisor and discussion networks. Friendship networks are also shown 
to be operative at the later stages.
Among sociologists there were two trends that despite the similarities were following 
different trends. On one hand, research in the mass media field diffusion was approached 
from the ability to use the media to change attitudes and demand for technology and it was 
regarded as an urban setting. On the other hand, there was a long tradition among rural 
sociologists for the analysis of adoption of new practices. Although there was a trend in the 
mass communication to accept the role of informal interpersonal relations among 
consumers it was until later than these two sociology areas converged in their approach to 
reveal the existence of common patterns. Mass media had an influence generally at early 
stages of diffusion whereas personal influence was identified as influential in later stages 
of diffusion (Katz, 1960). Some years later Rogers (1976), in a review of the diffusion 
research in the last few decades, in line with Katz (1960), pointed out that “diffusion 
research is a particular type of communication research” and identified a lack of focus on 
social network as the mechanism of spreading information on new products.
The publication in 1966 by Coleman, Katz and Menzel of the book Medical Innovation: a 
Diffusion Study was the culmination of research on a new drug’s (tetracycline) acceptance. 
The authors examined drug acceptance in four Midwestern cities using interviews with 
GPs, internists and paediatricians. The degree of integration of the doctor in the social 
community had an important impact on adoption. Doctors sharing the office were more 
likely to introduce the drug than those who were in solo practices. The survey included 
three sociometric questions to position individuals within the medical community of 
doctors. This information defined their position within the advisorship, discussion and 
friendship networks. These informal networks were effective in adoption with differences 
depending on the stage of the process. For integrated doctors the network worked best at 
the early stage of the process, while for isolated doctors they were effective later on 
(Coleman et al, 1959).
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Using the information given by the sociometric questions, Menzel and Katz (1955-56) 
study the channels of information used by doctors as it relates to their position in the social 
structure within the medical community. The more integrated doctors use journals as the 
main source of information and the less integrated individuals use more commercial 
sources. When adoption timing was considered there is a process whereby low-adoption 
periods were followed by high-adoption periods and simultaneity of adoption in 
concentrated periods is due to the integration of the adopters in one of the social network 
within the medical community. The overall common idea behind sociological research is 
that social contagion is the driving force of the acceptance of the new drug. Recently, it 
has been argued that social effect might be confounded with marketing efforts. Van den 
Bulte and Lilien (2001) proved that these two effects can be mixed using the same data 
available from Coleman et al. (1966) and some data on marketing effort. Although these 
theories were built at the early stage of diffusion within the sociological literature, this view 
has remained dominant.
The Marketing Approach to the Diffusion Analysis
The marketing literature devoted to diffusion research shares features in common with the 
sociological literature. They are both focused on the importance of communication to 
diffusion. Research on innovation diffusion has also been formalised in the marketing 
literature. Models in this field consider the product acceptance growth, i.e. what is the 
number of potential customers who will buy the product by a particular period of time. 
Communication theory is central to these models since information is transmitted to 
consumers using different communication channels. Mahajan and Muller (1979) review the 
diffusion models of new product acceptance in the marketing literature and the contribution 
to the field by some papers from the economics literature. The models of innovation 
acceptance in marketing by Bass (1969), Fourt and Woodlock (1960) and Mansfield 
(1961) served as point of departure for latere developments on the acceptance of new 
products by consumers. These are models of first-purchase diffusion, i.e. no repeat buyers 
and one unit purchased per buyer.
The Fourt and Woodlock (1960) model assumes that the growth rate of product 
acceptance depends on the number of consumers who have adopted in each period. They 
used this model to predict the penetration of new grocery products and the success of the 
product was modelled as a modified exponential curve. On the other hand, the Mansfield 
(1961) model proposed that the acceptance growth is based on an imitation process which 
can be modelled as the logistic curve. This model was outlined in section 2.1 in chapter 2 
as one of the first models contributing to the research on diffusion in the economics
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literature. The Bass (1969) model assumes that the new product acceptance is a function 
of both external and internal influences. The external influence is made by the media and 
affects those consumers considered to be innovators', internal influences are through the 
word-of-mouth affecting the group of consumers considered imitators. According to his 
model the probability of adoption is related to the number of existing users. This model 
contains as special cases the Mansfield (1961) and Fourt and Woodlock (1960) models. 
Bass (1969) empirically tested his model for eleven consumer durables products and the 
empirics were in accordance to the outline of his model.
These three basic models assume a two-step communication process (Robertson (1971), 
cited by Mahajan and Muller (1975)) in which the information about the new product 
reaches a group of consumers (opinion leaders, innovators) and are then passed by word- 
of-mouth to other consumers (imitators). In Lekvall and Wahlbin (1973) this assumption is 
questioned and they suggest that according to context of the analysis the external and 
internal forces will have different weights. Furthermore, the nature of the innovation is a 
crucial factor in the degree of influence in the adoption process by external and internal 
influences.
One of the criticisms of the models outlined above is that they only focus on the timing of 
adoption and the number of adopters in each period. They can not be used to predict the 
effect of any kind marketing policy. Robinson and Lakhani (1975) and Horsky and Simon 
(1978) introduce internal and external influence as a function of marketing variables. A 
common element that all these models share is that the number of potential customers is 
constant overtime. This assumption is relaxed in Mahajan and Peterson (1978) who argue 
that marketing programs will affect the number of potential customers. The pool of 
adopters is modelled as a function of a number of exogenous and endogenous variables.
Mahajan et al. (1990) provide a good review of the papers published after Mahajan and 
Muller (1979). The Bass model served as the basic model to review all papers, used as 
starting framework and extended to more refined cases. Tanny and Derzko (1988) 
propose that “potential adopters are divided in potential innovators and imitators, both are 
influenced by the mass media and only potential imitators are influenced by word of 
mouth”. Some authors developed diffusion models based on individuals who take their 
decisions according to a maximising process (Hiebert, 1974; Stoneman, 1981; Feder and 
O’Mara, 1982; Jensen, 1982; Oren and Schwartz, 1988) as distinct from the analysis of 
the aggregated market in the Bass model. Mahajan et al. (1990) provide a good summary 
of these papers. This approach shares common features with the models used in the 
economic literature.
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Appendix 2.2
Table A.2.2.1 Physical capital
Author(s) Year Period
covered
Technology Method Dependent variable Independent variables Findings Drawbacks
Russell 1977 1953-1974 
survey (s)
Postoperative 
recovering room, ICU, 
respiratory therapy 
department, diagnostic 
radioisotopes and EEG
Logistic curve Proportion of adopters 
among the non adopters 
classified by number of 
beds and type of 
community hospital 
(voluntary, for-profit, 
state and local 
government)
Rate of diffusion 
measured as the 
coefficient of time
Larger hospitals tend to 
adopt earlier and slower 
rate of growth slower for 
EEG and diagnostic 
radioisotopes. Introduction 
of Medicare accelerated 
adoption.
No insight in the 
diffusion process itself, 
only in differences in 
adoption rate according 
to the type of hospital 
and bed size.
Baker 1979 1972-1977
1977s
CT Descriptive
approach
Rate of adoption 
(percentage of CT 
adopted) disaggregated 
by -»
Geographical location, 
bed size, teaching 
responsibility, sources of 
information, motivation 
for acquisition and 
factors against purchase
CT mainly located in urban 
areas, higher hospitals 
adopted earlier, lower 
adoption rates in 
community hospitals, little 
variance in importance of 
source of information, 
regulation and high cost 
delayed adoption.
Limited in the scope of 
variables included and 
no quantitative 
estimation of the effect 
on rate of adoption.
Banta 1980 1973-1977 CT Descriptive
analysis
Number of CT scanners Geographic distribution, 
type of facility
Concentration in urban 
areas and community 
hospitals. Medical schools 
adopt earlier.
No inference of 
regression models of 
diffusion patterns.
Globerman 1982 1962-1974 Electronic data 
processing (EDP)
OLS Dummy equals 1 if 
hospital adopted by 
1974
Hospital size, teaching 
hospital, market 
competition, previous 
adoption behaviour, 
possibilities frontier, 
religious affiliation
Hospital size, 
concentration and early 
adoption of other 
innovations increase 
probability of adoption. 
Religious affiliation slowed 
adoption.
Estimation by OLS when 
binary models would be 
appropriate.
Romeo, 
Wagner 
and Lee
1984 1968-1980
1980s
EFM, VIP, END, ABS, 
CEM.
Probit and OLS Probability of adoption, 
delay in adoption, extent 
of adoption
Market and hospital 
characteristics
Prospective 
reimbursement (PR) 
system has an overall 
negative impact on the 
adoption of innovations.
Overall mixed results 
and no consistent 
results. No importance 
given to the adoption 
timing.
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Table A.2.2.1 Physical capital (continued)
Author(s) Year Period
covered
Technology Method Dependent variable Independent variables Findings Drawbacks
Hillman and 
Schwartz
1985 1973-1985 CT and MRI Descriptive
analysis.
Diffusion rate and 
pattern
Attributes of the 
technology and 
environmental factors
Higher rate of diffusion for 
CT than MRI. Uncertainty, 
cost of acquisition and 
profitability explain that. 
MRI diffusion under PR
They do not use 
explanatory models for 
diffusion analysis
Lee and 
Waldman
1985 1980 EFM, VIP, END, ABS, 
CEM
Censored normal 
estimator
Probability of 
adoption
Market and hospital 
structure
PR slightly affects 
diffusion and cost 
reducing innovations 
more attractive
Paper intended to 
reply Romeo et al. but 
they do not use 
similar variables
Caudill, 
Ford and 
Kaserman
1995 1977-1990 Dialysis machines Random
coefficient model
Rate of diffusion of 
dialysis machines
Certificate of Need 
regulation(CON)
CON control reduced 
diffusion
Model do not allow to 
control for additional 
covariates
Baker and 
Wheeler
1998 1994-1995 MRI Regression
analysis
MRI availability and 
utilisation
HMO market share; 
market, population 
and health system 
factors
Negative impact of 
managed care
No control for 
covariates other than 
market share
Baker and 
Phibbs
2000 1980-1996 NICU Hazard rate 
model
Probability of 
adoption
HMO market share; 
hospital and area 
characteristics
Adoption negatively 
related to managed 
care
Extensive control for 
area characteristics 
but limited in hospital 
covariates
Baker 2001 1983-1998 MRI Hazard rate
model
OLS
Probability of 
adoption, MRI 
availability and use
HMO market share; 
hospital and area 
controls
HMO affects negatively 
to dependent variables
Limited control for
hospital
characteristics
Chou, Liu 
and
Hammitt
2004 1993-1998 CT, radiation isotope 
diagnostic equipment, 
linear acceleration 
equipment, NMR 
tomography, shock 
wave lithotripsy 
equipment
Random effects 
probit model
Probability hospital 
owns a technology
Bed size, number of 
medical staff, number 
of specialties and 
Herfindhal structure
The more the generous 
the insurance coverage 
the more likely to adopt. 
Private hospitals more 
likely to adopt than 
public
Some hospitals may 
leave the sample, 
censored control 
required. Additional 
variables would help 
to explain the process
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Table A.2.2.2 Pharmaceuticals
Author(s) Date Period
covered
Technology Method Dependent
variable
Independent
variables
Findings Drawbacks
Ellison,
Cockburn,
Griliches
and
Hausman
1997 1985-1991 Cephalexin, cefadroxil, 
cepharadine, cefaclor
SUR
SURIV
OLS
Choice among 
four drugs. 
Choice between 
branded and 
generic version.
Revenues and prices 
of the four drugs
High elasticities 
between generic 
substitutes and 
some therapeutic 
substitutes
Choice among different drugs 
and generic vs. branded 
versions using aggregated 
data. Diffusion not addressed.
Lichtenberg 2003 1970-1991 Data on drugs approved 
by FDA and data on 
market share of various 
drugs.
Weighted least 
squares
Reduction in 
life-years lost
Pharmaceutical 
innovation measured 
as fraction of drugs 
prescribed in 1991 
approved in 1970 or 
later
New
pharmaceuticals 
reduced the 
mortality
How is the process of diffusion 
of drugs driven by 
demographics, socioeconomic 
and market characteristics?
Coscelli 1998 1991-1994 Anti-ulcer and cholesterol- 
lowering drugs
Duration models Months before 
first
prescription. 
Dummy equal 
one if doctors 
ever prescribes 
drug
Doctors’ 
characteristics, 
dispersion indexes at 
brand and molecule 
level, previous 
prescription behaviour
Past prescription 
behaviour affect 
adoption of new 
homogeneous 
drugs and new 
presentation forms 
by incumbent firms
Limited doctors 
characteristics, no regulatory 
or economic incentives. Study 
of new entrants of 
bioequivalent drugs and new 
presentations forms by 
incumbent firms.
Coscelli 2000 1990-1992 Anti-ulcer drugs: 
famotidine, ranitidine, 
nizatidine, roxatidine, 
omeprazole, misoprostole
Probit model 1 if brand 
prescribed as 
different from 
previous brand 
0 otherwise
Patient’s variables, 
doctor’s
characteristics (anti­
ulcer market and 
molecule-specific)
Doctors and patient 
persistence
It explains persistence in 
prescription behaviour but not 
how doctors adopt the drugs 
they are loyal to.
Berndt, 
Pindyck and 
Azoulay
2003 1977-1993 Anti-ulcer drugs: Tagamet, 
Zantac, Pepcid and Axid
OLS, GMM.SUR, 
3SLS, NLS
Hedonic price 
equations, 
equilibrium 
share equations 
and diffusion 
equation
Quality
characteristics, time 
dummies, product 
acceptance, process
Consumption 
externalities affect 
valuations by 
physicians and 
uptake rate, 
externalities at 
brand level
Diffusion rate measured as 
increases in sales and 
depends on aggregated data 
on product acceptance. 
Provides no information on 
micro aspects leading 
diffusion.
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Table A.2.2.3 Surgical procedures
Author(s) Year Period
covered
Technology Method
Dependent variable
Independent variables Main Findings Drawbacks
Sloan, 
Valvona, 
Perrin and 
Adamache
1986 1972-1981 hip arthroplasties, 
coronary artery 
surgery, morbid 
obesity surgery, 
retina repair and 
cataract surgery.
Probit regression 
OLS
Random effects 
model
1.dummy=1 if hospital 
performed procedure in 
year t
2.# of hip arthroplasties 
and coronary surgery
3. cataract and obesity 
procedures as % of all 
procedures
Insurance variables 
(third party 
reimbursement), 
d mographic and area 
characteristics, hospital 
variables, regulatory 
policies, competition
Greater diffusion in 
more commercially 
oriented areas, larger 
hospitals and more 
surgical specialists in 
the area lead to 
diffusion
Overall mixed results 
regarding the effects 
of covariates. Is each 
technology affected 
by different factors?
Fendrick, 
Escarce, 
McLane, Shea 
and Schwartz
1994 1989-1992 Laparoscopic
cholecystectomy
(LC)
Univariate 
analysis 
Hazard rate 
model
Timing of adoption Hospital size, urban vs. 
rural, residency training 
participation
Univariate analysis: 
higher bed size, 
urban and residency 
program lead to 
earlier adoption. 
Regression results: 
only residency 
program affect 
adoption
Multivariate analysis 
do not provide 
consistent results on 
diffusion. Limited 
number of covariates.
Escarce,
Bloom,
Hillman, Shea, 
Schwartz
1995 1989-1992 LC Hazard
regression model
Hazard of adoption at 
time t
Surgeon and practice 
characteristics, market 
variables
Fee for service 
payment to doctors, 
male and board 
certified lead to 
earlier adoption, age 
negative impact, 
mixed results for 
managed care
If time of adoption 
matters, no distinction 
made between early 
and late adopters and 
how the latter follow 
the former.
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Table A.2.2.3 Surgical procedures (continued)
Author(s) Year Period
covered
Technology Method
Dependent variable
Independent variables Main Findings Drawbacks
Escarce 1996 1992 LC Hazard model Timing of adoption Access to information 
sources, doctors 
characteristics, area 
factors and prior 
adoption indicator 
(informational 
externality)
Early adoption by 
some surgeons led to 
adoption to other 
surgeons in the same 
hospital, positive 
effect of fee for 
service and age, 
mixed result for 
manaqed care
Prior adoption by 
another surgeon need 
to be controlled by 
other informational 
sources. No area 
specific variables.
Cutler and 
McClellan
1996 1982-1991 Heart attack 
treatment
OLS, hazard rate 
models, sample 
selection 
correction
Share of patients 
receiving angioplasty, 
decision to acquire 
technology, use of 
technology conditional 
on ownership
Organisational factors, 
insurance generosity, 
technology regulation, 
malpractice pressure, 
provider interactions, 
demographic change
Insurance variables, 
technology 
regulation, and 
provider interaction 
affect diffusion
Demographics could 
include more 
information about 
population structure 
to control for 
prevalence.
How is diffusion 
related to the 
previous technoloqy?
Cutler and 
Huckman
2003 1982-2000 Coronary artery 
bypass graft 
(CABG) and 
percutaneous 
transluminal 
coronary
angioplasty (PTCA)
Panel data-fixed 
effect
CABG rate per 
population over 45 and 
older
PTCA rate per 
population over 45 and 
older and county 
demographic 
characteristics
75% of the expansion 
of PTCA due to 
expansion effect and 
costs of increase use 
of PTCA overcome 
by lower CABG use. 
Positive impact on 
health outcomes.
County-level analysis.
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Appendix Chapter 3
Appendix 3.1 Marketing indexes for the UK
The role of marketing in the diffusion process was first captured by the total employment 
in the pharmaceutical industry and the percentage of the employment devoted to R&D 
activities, as mentioned in Section 3.6. This data is released by the Association of the 
British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) and can be found on their website 
(http://www.abpi.orq.uk/statistics/intro.asp). Additional data on employment was obtained 
for the UK. In addition to the gross employment figures an index was created to account 
for the weight that each molecule might have. The marketing indexes are basically 
weighted averages of the employment figures of the manufacturer of each of the 
molecules in each therapeutical class with the market share of each manufacturer. The 
employment figures were retrieved from the Companies House which has a company 
registration that keeps the track of all limited companies in the UK. Tables A.3.1.1 to 
A.3.1.3 list the manufacturers of each of the molecules in each group of drugs.
For each manufacturer, its Annual Accounts were retrieved from 1991 to 2004 and the 
employment figures were checked. There were no figures that could be directly identified 
with employment that deals directly with marketing. Instead, data on employees working in 
specific departments that could be related to marketing effort were considered as such 
and computed as proxy for marketing employment. These departments were related to 
the sales or distribution activities mainly. There was no clear definition of these 
departments but they could be considered as proxies for marketing employment force. 
Statins manufacturers reported information on employment in different departments that 
could be used to measure marketing. In particular, Merck and Pfizer had in their labour 
accounts the percentage of employees in the distribution department. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb had the selling and distribution department and Bayer had the employees in either 
the manufacturing or the administration department and the marketing employees were 
proxied by using the number of employees in the administration department. Finally, 
Novartis changed the classification from “marketing and research” to “administration and 
marketing” and despite differences in these categories these figures were retrieved and 
used as proxy for sales force.
Total employment figures were also obtained for all companies in order to calculate the 
proportion of the employment of each company as a percentage of the employment in the 
pharmaceutical industry. This is not an approximate measure of marketing employment 
force but indicates the size of the company in the industry and thus the role they may 
have to control drug market share. Clearly, these are not accurate measures of marketing
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and the problem that may arise is that the manufacturer despite operating in the UK and 
be registered in the Companies House may not have its main activities in the UK and thus 
the employment figures might be underestimated. This would be the case for 
manufacturers located abroad that only have distributional activities in the UK.
Table A.3.1.1 Statins manufacturers
Molecule Y ear Manufacturer
Simvastatin 1989 Merck & co
Pravastatin 1990 Bristol-Myers Squibb
Fluvastatin 1994 Novartis
Atorvastatin 1997 Pfizer
Cerivastatin 1997 Bayer A.G.
Rosuvastatin 2003 AstraZeneca
Table A .3.1.2 PPIs manufacturers
Omeprazole 1989 AstraZeneca
Lansoprazole 1994 Wyeth Pharm
Pantoprazole 1996 Abbott
Rabeprazole Sodium 1998 Eisai, Janssen-Cilag
Esomeprazole 2000
I___________
AstraZeneca
Table A .3.1.3 SSRIs manufacturers
Molecule '  Year Manufacturer
Fluvoxamine maleate 1987 Solvay
Sertraline 1991 Pfizer
Paroxetine 1991 SmithKline Beecham
Fluoxetine 1991 Dista/Eli Lilly
Citalopram 1995 Lundbeck
Escilatopram 2002 Lundbeck
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The total employment index (eindexte) is calculated as the total employment in each 
company as a proportion of the total employment in the pharmaceutical industry weighted 
by the market share of each manufacturer for each molecule in the therapeutical class for 
each year from 1991 to 2004. The distribution index (eindexd) is similarly calculated using 
the percentage of sales forces over the total employment of each company weighted by 
the market share. These indexes differ in that the first shows the weight in the 
pharmaceutical market in their global production whereas the second index accounts for 
the importance given to the advertising efforts by each individual manufacturer. The data 
for the distribution information happened to be available only for the manufacturers of 
statins. The only statins manufacturer for which there could not be sales employment data 
was AstraZeneca, the producer of rosuvastatin. Given that this molecule was introduced 
in 2003, its employment data was not included in the index measure. At the same time, 
this manufacturer was the producer of two other molecules within the PPIs group.
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Appendix 3.2 Descriptive statistics: Table A.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics: Statins
Variables Description Abbreviation Mean Std Error 95% Cl
Pit Prescriptions
Average prescription per doctor in 
practice /' at year t PRES (log) 4.239432 0.0465622 4.148109 4.330756
meit Market Externalities Sales SALES (log) 18.9036 0.0307361 18.84332 18.96389
peit Practice Externalities Number of Doctors in the Practice NGP 5.12628 0.0524767 5.023357 5.229203
cet Clinical Evidence
Cumulative Number of Scientific 
Articles Published CUM 2636.746 46.26929 2545.998 2727.495
Index ICE 807.6191 10.04111 787.9253 827.3129
Employees EMP 68.80603 0.1700727 68.47246 69.1396
R&D employment R&D 32.71274 0.100642 32.51535 32.91013
Marketing
Distribution First Entrant FIRSTd 0.5934721 3.37E-03 0.586858 0.600086
mit Distribution Index EINDEXd 0.486826 0.0013176 0.484242 0.48941
Total Employment First Entrant over 
Total Employment Industry FIRSTte 0.0127352 0.0001656 0.012411 0.01306
Total Employment Index EINDEXte 0.0229615 0.0001691 0.02263 0.023293
Xit Organisational Factors
Fundholding FHj 0.5193402 0.0119195 0.495962 0.542718
Drug Dispensing DDj 0.2047782 0.0096272 0.185896 0.22366
Number of GPs in the StHA GPSjt 2460.916 20.77377 2420.172 2501.66
dit Demographic Controls Population between 45-64 in StHA Pop45_64lt 0.2280243 0.0005192 0.227006 0.229043
Population older than 65 in StHA Pop65rt 0.1603056 0.000385 0.159551 0.161061
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Table A.3.2.2 Descriptive statistics: PPIs
Variables Description Abbreviation Mean Std Error 95% Cl
Pit Prescriptions
Average prescription per doctor in 
practice /' at year t PRES (log) 2.822128 0.0321097 2.75915 2.885107
meit Market Externalities Sales SALES (log) 19.59965 0.0113107 19.57747 19.62184
peit Practice Externalities Number of Doctors in the Practice NGP 5.145518 0.0529732 5.041619 5.249417
cet Clinical Evidence
Cumulative Number of Scientific 
Articles Published CUM 3700.089 44.36837 3613.067 3787.111
Index ICE 1929.538 9.883278 1910.154 1948.923
Employees EMP 68.81141 0.1716743 68.4747 69.14812
R&D employment R&D 32.74505 0.1013374 32.54629 32.94381
nrijt Marketing Total Employment First Entrant over 
Total Employment Industry FIRSTte 0.1676695 0.0007198 0.166258 0.169081
Total Employment Index EINDEXte 0.1253601 0.0012812 0.122847 0.127873
xit Organisational Factors
Fundholding FHj 0.5168801 0.0120597 0.493227 0.540533
Drug Dispensing DDj 0.209546 0.0098218 0.190282 0.22881
Number of GPs in the StHA GPSit 2449.886 21.02526 2408.649 2491.124
dit Demographic Controls Population between 45-64 in StHA Pop45_64jt 0.2278661 0.0005302 0.226826 0.228906
Population older than 65 in StHA Pop65it 0.1600376 0.0003845 0.159284 0.160792
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Table A.3.2.3 Descriptive statistics: SSRIs
Variables Description Abbreviation Mean Std Error 95% Cl
q« Prescriptions Average prescription per doctor in practice /' at year t PRES (log) 4.762189 0.0366764 4.690255 4.834123
men Market Externalities Sales SALES (log) 19.05717 0.0207633 19.01645 19.0979
peit Practice Externalities Number of Doctors in the Practice NGP 5.129252 0.0522199 5.026832 5.231671
cet Clinical Evidence
Cumulative Number of Scientific 
Articles Published CUM 6823.964 80.60384 6665.875 6982.053
Index ICE 1644.149 12.74111 1619.159 1669.138
Employees EMP 68.87302 0.1684366 68.54266 69.20337
R&D employment R&D 32.61168 0.1010773 32.41343 32.80992
mit Marketing Total Employment First Entrant 
over Total Employment Industry FIRSTte 0.0025349 0.00000784 0.00252 0.00255
Total Employment Index EINDEXte 0.0506338 0.0002195 0.050203 0.051064
xit Organisational Factors
Fundholding FH| 0.5198413 0.0118988 0.496504 0.543178
Drug Dispensing DDj 0.2080499 0.0096673 0.189089 0.227011
Number of GPs in the StHA GPSjt 2466.99 20.69218 2426.406 2507.573
d» Demographic Controls Population between 45-64 in StHA Pop45_64it 0.227956 0.0005103 0.226955 0.228957
Population older than 65 in StHA Pop65it 0.1603026 0.0003768 0.159564 0.161042
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Appendix 3.2 Estimates
This appendix includes a number of estimation methods that provide a bound for the 
coefficient estimate of the AR(1) and also examines the persistency of the prescription 
series. Results include the OLS estimates, the Within group coefficient and the first- 
differenced and system GMM estimators. Tables A.3.2.1 to A.3.2.3 show the results for 
the estimation of the AR(1) specifications for the prescription series. The first column of 
the table reports the coefficients of the OLS. As expected the OLS estimate of the lagged 
dependent variable is upward biased since it does not take into account the correlation 
between the lag and the error term. The second column gives the Within Group estimates. 
The first differences of the Within Group introduce correlation between the difference in 
the lag and the difference in error. This estimator is downward bias. Both the OLS and 
Within Group estimates are inconsistent in a dynamic model. The third and the fourth 
column represent the first-differenced and system GMM estimators, respectively, 
estimated using as instruments lags dated t - 3  periods and earlier. The coefficients are 
within the boundaries of the OLS and Within estimators, as it is expected. The difference 
Sargan that tests the validity of the additional moment conditions added to the equations 
in levels when estimating the system GMM. It fails to reject the null hypothesis of the 
validity of the overidentifying restrictions. Although the series are persistent, they do not 
have a unit root as shown by the p-value of the unit root test in table A.3.2.4.
Table A.3.2.1 AR(1) specifications: Statins
OLS Within FD(t-3) SYS(t-3)
PRES(t-1) 0.792454*** 0.591089*** 0.683727*** 0.757482***
ml 0.001 0.001
m2 0.028 0.028
Sargan 0.48 0.619
Diff. Sargan 0.702
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
m l and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
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Table A.3.2.2 AR(1) specifications: PPIs
OLS Within FD(t-3) SYS(t-3)
PRES(t-1) 0.784700*** 0.497444*** 0.631670*** 0.705869***
ml 
m2 
Sargan 
Diff. Sargan
0
0.787
0.6
0
0.811
0.854
0.943
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
Table A.3.2.3 AR(1) specifications: SSRIs
OLS Within FD(t-3) SYS(t-3)
PRES(t-1) 0.742327*** 0.577464*** 0.582953*** 0.609909***
ml
m2
Sargan
Diff.
Sargan
0.002
0.323
0.199
0
0.355
0.183
0.285
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
Table A.3.2.4 Unit Root tests
OLS OLS OLS
Ho alpha=1 alpha=1 alpha=1
Statins PPIs SSRIs
p-value 0 0 0
The AR(1) specifications above check the time series properties of the prescription series. 
When considering the multivariate AR(1) model with the additional explanatory variables 
considered in Chapter 3 there are a number of considerations with respect to the 
endogeneity of specific regressors. In particular, the sales data that capture the market
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externalities and the marketing variables are endogenous variables. The potential for 
endogeneity is considered as a consequence of the simultaneity of the prescription 
volume with these two regressors. Tables A.3.2.5 to A.3.2.7 show the results of the 
dynamic demand equation as given by (3.9). The clinical evidence variable and the 
marketing variable included in the specifications correspond to the cumulative number of 
articles published and the employment in the pharmaceutical industry, respectively. The 
GMM coefficient estimates in all cases lie between the OLS and Within estimate. The third 
column reports the results for the one-step first-differenced GMM estimator. The 
coefficient is positive and significant. This supports the hypothesis that the personal 
learning process through the prescription experience in the previous year is an important 
factor of the demand for pharmaceuticals in the current period. The prescription pattern 
will be highly determined by the previous period prescription profile. The fourth column 
presents the results considering SALES and MKT variables as endogenous. The 
assumption that sales and promotion are strictly exogenous is relaxed and we assume 
that they are potentially correlated with the error term. Misspecification is tested using the 
Difference Sargan test suggesting that sales and promotion variables are better modelled 
as endogenous. The null hypothesis of the validity of the additional moment conditions 
introduced by endogeneity is accepted at any significance level.
As it was seen above the series are persistent. In autoregressive-distributed lagged 
models, the correlation between the lagged levels and the first-difference is weak when 
the parameter of the lagged dependent variable is close to one. Then, the series are 
highly persistent and the lags used as instruments for the first-differences become weak 
instruments. As Blundell and Bond (1998) show, in the presence of high persistent series 
there are additional moment conditions for the level equations that will improve the 
estimation. The fifth column presents the estimates of the system GMM if we assume 
exogeneity of the variables sales and marketing. The presence of first-order 
autocorrelation cannot be discarded; however we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation. The presence of first-order autocorrelation does not affect 
consistency of the estimates since this relies on the lack of second-order autocorrelation. 
The difference Sargan tests for the difference in moment conditions introduced when 
using the system GMM. The null hypothesis of the validity of the restrictions is accepted in 
all cases. The last column reports the system GMM estimates considering market 
externalities and marketing as endogenous. The Difference Sargan test computes the 
validity of the overidentifying restrictions compared to the case when these variables are 
considered exogenous. The test is accepted at any significance level. The test for 
persistency and endogeneity leads to define the preferred estimation method as the one- 
step system GMM with endogeneity of sales and marketing.
270
Note also that some of the variables included in the specification are time-constant (FH, 
DD and NGP) and hence the within groups estimator and the first-difference GMM method 
would drop them. Since they are part of the set of the relevant organisational and 
informational variables, they are first included in the model as an interaction with the 
variable year. These interaction terms are included only in the tables shown in this 
appendix. Given that time constant terms can be estimated using system GMM methods, 
results shown in Chapter 3 do not include the interaction term but the variable as a 
dummy regressor for the fundholding and drug dispensing variables and the count of 
doctors for the variable NGP.
The instruments used are the following:
FD GMM (p i t_2 p n; st_2 sx\mt_2 m,)
SYS GMM (p iJt_2,...,pa '9st_29...,sx\mt_29...9mx) for the equations in differences as above 
and for the equations in levels.
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Table A.3.2.5 Statins
Variable OLS Within FD GMM FD GMM End
System
GMM
System GMM 
End
PRES(t-1) 0.779232*** 0.589755*** 0.641532*** 0.663043*** 0.611040*** 0.636222***
SALES 0.198201*** 0.499121*** 0.355732** 0.369412** 0.283580* 0.278949*
NGP -0.000009** 0.001254 0.003931 0.003849 -0.000015** -0.000014**
CE -0.000004 -0.000034 -0.000034 -0.000054 0.000053* 0.000046
MKT -0.000681 -0.0017 0.003435*** 0.003672*** 0.002363*** 0.002461**
FH -0.000007 -0.005977 0.000234 -0.00034 -0.000009 -0.000009
DD 0.000029 0.006069 0.013509 0.015289 0.00005 0.000047
GPS -0.000034* 0.000315 0.000513* 0.000637** -0.00005 -0.000046
POP45_64 -1.215779 -3.593705 -3.889487 -2.537971 -1.214915 -1.150507
POP65 1.259801 1.404388 -4.443878 -8.450924 1.061644 1.002251
N 1594 1594 1464 1464 1594 1594
ml 0.001 0 0.001 0
m2 0.031 0.032 0.04 0.04
Sargan 0.136 0.878 0.239 0.998
Diff. Sargan 0.9 0.818 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
Table A.3.2.6 PPIs
Variable OLS Within FD GMM FD GMM End
System
GMM
System GMM 
End
PRES(t-1) 0.775719*** 0.495636*** 0.502458*** 0.521408*** 0.538921*** 0.554867***
SALES 0.025621* 0.527086*** 0.973062* 1.028586* 0.447955 0.456004
NGP -0.000008* 0.000013 0.006505* 0.005630* -0.000016* -0.000015*
CE -0.000033* 0.000006 -0.000158 -0.00015 0.000019 0.000013
MKT 0.012917*** 0.002658 -0.000908 -0.000613 -0.00107 -0.001147
FH 0.000014 -0.003884 -0.005931 -0.010405 0.000046 0.000044
DD 0.000011 0.004578 0.012965 0.012915 0.000028 0.000027
GPS -0.000019 0.000295 0.000527* 0.000687* -0.000043 -0.000041
POP45_64 -1.532914 8.098375 -5.340403 -18.5 -2.177865 -2.121946
POP65 1.19707 -12.7 -4.53923 6.148235 1.979228 1.877374
N 1587 1587 1456 1456 1587 1587
ml 0 0 0 0
m2 0.728 0.725 0.757 0.759
Sargan 0.284 0.862 0.139 0.995
Diff. Sargan 0.9 0.07 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
Table A.3.2.7 SSRIs
System System GMM
Variable OLS Within FD GMM FD GMM End GMM End
PRES(t-1) 0.728667*** 0.543475*** 0.570395*** 0.603318*** 0.593228*** 0.588691***
SALES 0.070122*** 0.306286*** 0.403608 0.353249 0.192091 0.205257
NGP -0.000008** 0.000182 0.001623 0.001184 -0.000012** -0.000012**
CE cummulative -0.000028** 0.000011 -0.000045 -0.000053 -0.000007 -0.000007
MKT employees 0.011791*** 0.002361* 0.001425 0.001597 0.000967 0.000971
FH -0.000006 -0.001111 0.001952 0.003302 -0.000009 -0.000009
DD -0.000008 -0.009761 -0.004775 -0.001921 -0.000008 -0.000008
GPS -0.000038** 0.000053 0.000308 0.000345 -0.000056* -0.000055*
POP45_64 -0.193337 5.991755 -2.099074 2.186393 -0.011564 0.083528
POP65 0.032379 0.413318 -5.073255 -6.818557 -0.778686 -0.867275
N 1633 1633 1502 1502 1633 1633
ml 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
m2 0.317 0.363 0.348 0.374
Sargan 0.305 0.949 0.323 1
Diff.Sargan 0.9 0.316 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
Appendix 3.3 Dynamic equations with additional lags
This appendix section includes the estimation results for the demand equation with 
different combinations of lagged levels of the prescription volume (indicating the learning- 
by prescribing effect) and lagged levels of the variable sales (representing the market 
consumption externality). The reason for exploring additional specifications that differ in 
the number of lags of these two variables is to capture any dynamics in the specification 
that might not be missed in the models presented in this chapter. The results are 
presented in Tables A.3.3.1 to and A.3.3.3 and overall the findings are similar to the 
results in the chapter. The results refer to System GMM considering sales and marketing 
variable as endogenous. The clinical evidence variable is the cumulative number of 
scientific articles and the marketing is proxied by the number of employees in the 
pharmaceutical industry as given by the ABPI. The first column includes the estimation 
results for the following equation:
<?„ = a, ' 9 ,1-1 + « 2  • ? # - 2  + « 3  • h  + P  ■ x„ + r  ■ du + C,
This specification intends to capture the demand for new prescription drugs as a function 
of the prescription levels of the two last periods. This equation is aiming to reflect the 
elasticity of demand with respect to the past period and also whether this elasticity is 
increasing or decreasing in the long-run. The vector /., includes the rest of additional
informational variables, xit represents the organisational factors and dit contains
demographic controls. The second column includes the lagged value of the dependant 
variable and the lag value of the market externality variable. The latter is aimed to capture 
whether the signal from the market is not currently effective but the past signal what 
matters:
<?„ = a, • 9„-i + a 2 ' me,-i + a 31„ + r - d „  +  c,
In the specification above, I it contains the rest of the informational variables. The third
column includes the last two lags of the dependent variable and the lagged level of the 
consumption externality variable.
= a \ ' 9u-1 + a 2 ■ me, + a ,  ■ me,_, + a 4I „ + / 3 ■ x„ + y - d u +  c,
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The last column includes two lags of the prescription variable and the current and past 
value of the sales variable:
?# = «i • ?«-i + a i ■ ?»-2 + «3' +  ff4' me,-\ + a 5I „ + P - x „ + y - d „  + e,
Overall, when including additional lags of the prescription and sales variables into the 
diffusion equations the findings reinforce the key role of learning by doing as the main 
informative mechanism. In general the coefficients of additional lags for both the learning 
by doing and sales are not significant. The exception is for the case of statins. The two 
lags of the statins prescription variable are significant and indicate not only strong learning 
effects but also the fact that these effects are decreasing over time. As for the lagged 
values of the sales variable, in comparison to the specification in which only the present 
value of the externality is considered, they market externality estimators are not 
significant. Because the majority of coefficients are not significant and in order to maintain 
consistency across the estimation procedure the model with one lag of the prescription 
variable and the current level of market consumption externality are considered.
Table A.3.3.1 Alternative dynamic specifications: Statins
Clinical Evidence CUMmt
Marketing EMPt
PRES(t-1) 0.835895*** 0.600817*** 0.600817*** 0.835895***
PRES(t-2) -0.083200* -0.083200*
SALES 0.223816* -0.617114 -0.352935
SALES(t-l) 0.874832** 2.757673 1.759692
NGP -0.017062* -0.031150** -0.031150** -0.017062*
CE 0.000017 -0.000128 -0.000524 -0.000354
MKT 0.002679** 0.000691 -0.00294 -0.000715
FH -0.01698 -0.019185 -0.019185 -0.01698
DD 0.06481 0.091278 0.091278 0.06481
GPS -0.000021 -0.000046 -0.000046 -0.000021
POP45_64 -0.189686 -1.003473 -1.003473 -0.189686
POP65 -0.057746 0.383876 0.383876 -0.057746
N 1488 1622 1622 1488
ml 0 0.001 0.001 0
m2 0.248 0.068 0.068 0.248
Sargan 0.961 0.997 0.997 0.961
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
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Table A.3.3.2 Alternative dynamic specifications: PPIs
Clinical Evidence 
Marketing
CUMmt
EMPt
PRES(t-1) 0.646625*** 0.536726*** 0.536726*** 0.646625***
PRES(t-2) 0.019836 0.019836
SALES 0.386898 0.512624 0.559798
SALES (t-1) 0.642142 -0.144812 -0.265427
NGP -0.018154 -0.031268* -0.031268* -0.018154
CE -0.00001 -0.000047 0.000044 0.000021
MKT -0.001347 -0.001099 -0.001102 -0.001348
FH 0.052925 0.072094 0.072094 0.052925
DD 0.068319 0.059794 0.059794 0.068319
GPS -0.000032 -0.000047 -0.000047 -0.000032
POP45_64 -1.982323 -1.993755 -1.993755 -1.982323
POP65 1.416852 0.833611 0.833611 1.416852
N 1471 1606 1606 1471
ml 0 0 0 0
m2 0.055 0.772 0.772 0.055
Sargan 0.991 0.996 0.996 0.991
See notes to Table A.3.3.1
Table A.3.3.3 Alternative dynamic specifications: SSRIs
Clinical Evidence CUMmt
Marketing EMPt
PRES(t-1) 0.686781*** 0.550083*** 0.550083*** 0.686781***
PRES(t-2) -0.011701 -0.011701
SALES 0.067491 0.470419 0.376521
SALES(t-l) 0.225441 -0.169435 -0.259404
NGP -0.017760** -0.024778** -0.024778** -0.017760**
CE -0.000011 -0.000013 -0.000006 -0.000007
MKT 0.001078 0.001558* 0.000124 0.000136
FH -0.012728 -0.023198 -0.023198 -0.012728
DD -0.008474 -0.010369 -0.010369 -0.008474
GPS -0.000038 -0.000046 -0.000046 -0.000038
POP45_64 0.217651 1.133425 1.133425 0.217651
POP65 -0.166856 -1.796244 -1.796244 -0.166856
N 1520 1654 1654 1520
ml 0 0.003 0.003 0
m2 0.332 0.384 0.384 0.332
Sargan 0.989 1 1 0.989
See notes to Table A.3.3.1
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Appendix 3.4 Estimation results for the interaction of the variable fundholding (FH)
and drug dispensing (DD)
Table A.3.4 Dynamic demand equations: interaction terms
Statins PPIs SSRIs
Clinical Evidence E
IDO ICEmt ICEmt
Marketing eindexte eindexte eindexte
PRES(t-1) 0.636133*** 0.553939*** 0.588740***
SALES -0.559489 0.552283* -0.223354
NGP -0.028144** -0.030383* -0.024405**
CE 0.001054*** -0.000085 0.00018
MKT 0.726079** 1.643702 -3.085266
FH -0.0371 0.06946 -0.031251
DD 0.040011 0.005418 -0.049883
FH*DD 0.105284 0.097928 0.070958
GPS -0.000048* -0.000044 -0.000057**
POP45_64 -1.340784 -2.306809 -0.084875
POP65 1.331276 2.21286 -0.603101
N 1594 1587 1633
ml 0 0 0.001
m2 0.04 0.759 0.374
Sargan 0.999 0.997 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
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Appendix 3.5 Solo vs. Multiple Practices: Table A.3.5 Dynamic demand equations: solo practices
Variables Statins PPIs SSRIs
Clinical Evidence ICEmt E
LUo O m 3 E
LUO ICEmt O m 3
Marketing eindexd eindexd eindexte eindexte eindexte eindexte
PRES(t-1) 0.635084*** 0.635532*** 0.551982*** 0.553438*** 0.587315*** 0.588124***
SALES -0.553873 -0.555847 0.549612* 0.550349* -0.272607 -0.242591
SOLO PRACTICES 0.276096*** 0.075593 0.126771
MEDIUM PRACTICES -0.244416** -0.028506 -0.089446
LARGE PRACTICES -0.317227*** -0.138588 -0.176264
CE 0.001043** 0.001047** -0.000072 -0.00008 0.000207 0.000191
MKT91_95 -0.001162* -0.001168* -0.000054 -0.000056 -0.007404* -0.007200*
MKT96_00 0.000392* 0.000386* 0.000636 0.000647 -0.002296 -0.00223
MKT01_04 0.000370** 0.000366** 0.000803 0.000815 -0.001604 -0.001564
FH -0.023488 -0.0186 0.072393 0.079575 -0.026676 -0.02131
DD 0.113026* 0.111911* 0.058742 0.059048 -0.004678 -0.0049
GPS -0.000033 -0.000041 -0.000024 -0.000037 -0.00004 -0.000051*
POP45_64 -0.981979 -1.055653 -1.843169 -2.006442 0.471318 0.23646
POP65 0.74943 0.977963 1.205951 1.63443 -1.284639 -0.944487
N 1594 1594 1587 1587 1633 1633
ml 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001
m2 0.04 0.04 0.758 0.759 0.372 0.373
Sargan 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 1 1
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
P-value reported for the Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time dummies included in all specifications
Appendix 3.6 Results from the German data
IMS Disease Analyzer -  Germany records any prescription issued by the participating 
practices in the data collection. It records all prescriptions in the 400 practices recruited in 
Germany. It includes around 1.3 million patients being the first data entry in 1992. The 
German health care system does not have the figure of the GP as a gatekeeper to access 
specialised care. Thus the practices included in the data are not exclusively to primary 
care but it also includes Internal Specialists. There has been a gradual addition of 
Specialist practices in the data collection recently. The data includes information on 
diagnosis and treatment received patient, doctor and practice information. 
Representativeness is checked comparing the age and sex of the patients in the sample 
with those of the population provided by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt Deutschland). Population and sample are pretty similar in gender and ageing 
structure.
Disease Analyzer -  Germany has detailed information on doctors characteristics because 
the majority of practice are single-handed and the figure of the leading prescriber matches 
with the actual prescribing doctor. In the case of multiple handed practices the 
characteristics of the doctor refer to the leading prescriber. This is still a good 
approximation of how personal characteristics shape the prescription behaviour because 
the leading figure is likely to exert certain power on the other prescribers in the practice. 
Unfortunately, there is no information on regulatory variables -as  it was the case for the 
UK on whether the practice was fundholding or drug dispensing- as indication of 
influences of the health care system in diffusion. Thus there are differences in the 
variables that could be controlled for in the dynamic demand equations for Germany. As 
opposed to that there is information on personal characteristics (information not available 
for the UK) and even though this will not allow to draw conclusions on how personal and 
regulatory variables influence diffusion it will offer a first rough estimation of their effect 
although in different contexts/health care systems.
As for the case in Disease Analyzer, an observation corresponds to the prescription of 
one of the drugs in the three therapeutical classes under study during the period 1992 to 
2004.To extract the data for the study, all patients for which one of the drugs were 
prescribed were identified and exported to the data file. The data sets were constructed 
aggregating the number of prescriptions of each practice in each year and averaging by 
the number of doctors in the practice. Because practices in Germany are mainly single- 
handed or with a maximum of three doctors practicing within the practice in the vast 
majority of practices the prescription of the practice will coincide with the prescription of 
the doctors. In those practices in which there are two or three doctors the prescriptions will
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go under the id of a “leading prescriber” and his socio-demographic characteristics will be 
included.
The majority of practices in Germany are structured as solo practices and the number of 
prescriptions per capita will reflect exactly the number of prescriptions of the doctor. Still 
there are practices with two or three doctors and in that case the dependent variable will 
reflect the prescription per capita. Regarding the advertising influence on diffusion, there 
are several measures used as proxies to capture this effect. No data on the marketing 
efforts was made available for this study and alternative measures were used. As a proxy 
we use the number of employees in the entire pharmaceutical industry in Germany 
obtained from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) and from the 
Health Care Personnel Statistics in the federal Statistics Office for Germany. This offers a 
rather crude measure because it takes into account all employees in the industry instead 
of those working in marketing departments. However, it gives an idea of how big the 
industry is and its potential influence in the advertisement of the products.
Tables A.3.6.1 to A.3.6.3 show the results for the demand equations using data from 
Germany. The first column uses the cumulative number of articles as measure of clinical 
evidence. The marketing variable is captured by the number of employees in the industry 
in the first and second column. The second and third columns are using the weighted 
average of the articles according to the relevance of each molecule within the 
therapeutical class as measure of clinical evidence. Finally, the last column is using the 
marketing variable defined in Section 3.7
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Table A.3.6.1 Dynamic demand equations: Germany Statins
Clinical Evidence CUMmt ICEmt ICEmt
Marketing EMPt EMPt MKT
PRES(t-1) 0.739527*** 0.739527*** 0.739527***
SALES -4.353458*** -4.337538*** -4.328804***
NGP -0.095555*** -0.095555*** -0.095555***
CE -0.000008 -0.000038 -0.000077
MKT 0.144328*** 0.144666***
MKT91 95 0.000042***
MKT96 00 0.000068***
MKT01 04 0.000072***
AGE 0.000312 0.000312 0.000312
SEX 0.000882 0.000882 0.000882
GPS 0.000018 0.000018 0.000018
POP45 64 -0.68356 -0.68356 -0.683561
POP65 -0.700096 -0.700096 -0.700097
N 2192 2192 2192
ml 0 0 0
m2 0.423 0.423 0.423
Sargan 0.99 0.99 0.99
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
ml and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests
P-value reported for the Sargan test
GMM results are one-step robust estimates
Time dummies included in all specifications
Table A.3.6.2 Dynamic demand equations: Germany PPIs
Clinical Evidence CUMmt ICEmt ICEmt
Marketing EMPt EMPt MKT
PRES(t-1) 0.632383*** 0.632383*** 0.632383***
SALES -2.801192 -0.791827 -0.808498
NGP -0.216298*** -0.216298*** -0.216298***
CE 0.000691 -0.000391 -0.000392
MKT 0.042883* 0.044607
MKT91 95 0.000015**
MKT96 00 0.000021
MKT01 04 0.000022
AGE -0.007069 -0.007069 -0.007069
SEX 0.040486 0.040486 0.040486
GPS -0.000004 -0.000004 -0.000004
POP45 64 9.370572 9.370572 9.370571
POP65 -2.632745 -2.632745 -2.632744
N 2074 2074 2074
ml 0 0 0
m2 0.575 0.575 0.575
Sargan 0.671 0.563 0.546
See notes to Table A.3.6.1.
Table A.3.6.3 Dynamic demand equations: Germany SSRIs
Clinical Evidence CUMmt O m 3 ICEmt
Marketing EMPt EMPt MKT
PRES(t-1) 0.517518*** 0.517518*** 0.517518***
SALES -13.7 0.477664 0.465672
NGP -0.211353 -0.211353 -0.211353
CE 0.001065 0.00061 0.00061
MKT 0.1116 0.017639
MKT91 95 0.000009
MKT96 00 0.00001
MKT01 04 0.000009
AGE 0.010717 0.010717 0.010717
SEX 0.107183 0.107183 0.107183
GPS -0.000062 -0.000062 -0.000062
POP45 64 -3.65e+01** -3.65e+01** -3.65e+01**
POP65 2.230797 2.230794 2.230794
N 532 532 532
ml 0 0 0
m2 0.752 0.752 0.752
Sargan 1 1 1
See notes to Table A.3.6.1.
Appendix Chapter 4
Appendix 4.1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Description Drug Abbreviation Mean
Std
Error 95% Cl
q»
Prescriptions
Average prescription per 
doctor in practice /' at 
year t
Simvastatin PRES 114.732 3.950 106.986 122.479
Pravastatin PRES 31.687 1.749 28.255 35.118
Fluvastatin PRES 15.787 1.012 13.802 17.773
Atorvastatin PRES 140.122 6.184 127.988 152.257
Relative prescription
Simvastatin prescription 
relative to the 
prescription of any of the 
competing molecules
Simvastatin/Pravastatin PRESsim,pra 12.630 0.708 11.242 14.018
Simvastatin/Fluvastatin PRESsim,flu 61.214 5.484 50.453 71.974
Simvastatin/Atorvastatin pp^gsim.ator 6.883 0.748 5.415 8.351
Atorvastatin prescription 
relative to the 
prescription of any of the 
competing molecules
Atorvastatin/Pravastatin PRESatorpra 8.768 0.541 7.706 9.829
Atorvastati n/F I u vastati n PRESator,flu 46.815 5.078 36.848 56.782
meit Market Externalities Sales
Simvastatin
SALES (log)
13.759 0.025 13.710 13.808
Pravastatin 12.498 0.028 12.442 12.553
Fluvastatin 11.024 0.029 10.968 11.080
Atorvastatin 13.880 0.035 13.811 13.948
pe( Practice Externalities # Doctors in the Practice NGP 5.134 0.053 5.031 5.237
284
Descriptive statistics (continued)
Variables Description Drug Abbreviation Mean
Std
Error 95% Cl
Simvastatin 1024.786 178.882 638.335 1411.236
cet Clinical Evidence
Cumulative Number of 
Scientific Articles 
Published
Pravastatin
CUM
810.500 141.522 504.761 1116.239
Fluvastatin 271.071 63.444 134.009 408.134
Atorvastatin 357.909 126.504 76.040 639.778
Percentage of 
employment in 
sales/distribution
Simvastatin 0.588 0.039 0.504 0.672
mit Marketing
Pravastatin
EINDEXd
0.520 0.044 0.424 0.616
department over total 
employment by 
manufacturer
Fluvastatin 0.511 0.026 0.453 0.569
Atorvastatin 0.161 0.014 0.131 0.190
Xit Organisational Factors
Fundholding FHj 0.522 0.015 0.492 0.552
Drug Dispensing DD, 0.202 0.010 0.183 0.221
Number of GPs in the 
StHA GPSit 2459.227 20.985 2418.068 2500.387
dit Demographic Controls
Population between 45 
and 64 in StHA Pop45_64jt 0.228 0.001 0.227 0.229
Population older than 65 
in StHA Pop65jt 0.160 0.000 0.159 0.161
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Appendix 4.2 Persistency of series and Unit Root test
In this section the time series properties are examined in order to use the adequate GMM 
method. Table A.4.2.1 shows the results for the AR(1) estimates for the five relative 
prescription series analysed. GMM coefficients are estimated using as instruments lagged 
values dated t -  3 and earlier. In general, the system GMM estimates are below the OLS 
estimator and above the Within group estimator. The system GMM coefficients are higher 
than the first-differenced estimates. This downward bias is a consequence of the finite 
sample bias introduced by weak instruments when the series are highly persistent. In all 
cases the Difference Sargan test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions. Only in the case of the series simvastatin/atorvastatin the 
Difference Sargan is rejected. However, the dynamic equations were estimated using 
instruments dated t - 4  and earlier and the Difference Sargan test accepts the additional 
moment conditions. Despite the series being persistent, the unit root test showed none of 
the relative prescription series had a unit root as depicted in Table A.4.2.2.
Table A.4.2.1 AR(1) estimates for the prescription series
OLS Within FD(t-3) SYS(t-3)
Simvastatin/
Pravastatin
PRES(t-1)
ml 
m2 
Sargan 
Diff. Sargan
0.785957*** 0.566854*** 0.378373**
0.026
0.004
0.478
0.685651***
0
0.004
0.152
0.026
Simvastatin/
Fluvastatin
PRES(t-1)
ml 
m2 
Sargan 
Diff. Sargan
0.829620*** 0.533959*** 0.257564*
0.067
0.435
0.478
0.819869***
0.001
0.258
0.082
0.043
Simvastatin/
Atorvastatin
PRES(t-1)
ml 
m2 
Sargan 
Diff. Sargan
0.665034*** 0.355759*** 0.483027***
0.029
0.021
0.379
0.786023***
0.011
0.008
0.815
0.001
Atorvastatin/
Pravastatin
PRES(t-1)
ml 
m2 
Sargan 
Diff. Sargan
0.903553*** 0.494992*** 0.277285
0.784
0.002
0.32
0.802425***
0
0
0.214
0.028
Atorvastatin/
Fluvastatin
PRES(t-1)
ml 
m2 
Sargan 
Diff. Sargan
0.868947*** 0.436770*** 0.326291*
0.108
0.357
0.288
0.971832***
0.021
0.368
0.062
0.01
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2, Sargan and Diff. Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Year dummies are included in all specifications
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Table A.4.2.2 Unit Root test
OLS
alpha=1 (p-value)
Simvastatin/Pravastatin 0
S i m vastati n/F I u vastati n 0
S i m vastati n/Ato rvastati n 0
Atorvastatin/Pravastatin 0
Ato rvastati n/F I u vastati n 0
Appendix 4.3 Results for the diffusion equations with alternative quality measures.
As discussed in the results section, alternative quality measures have been included in the 
regressions to check for the robustness of the results. Table A.4.3.1 below includes the 
estimates of the diffusion equations as the relative side-effect of the dominant drug with 
respect to the competing one. SE2 is defined as follows seq = (sed /sec) *  year where se
is the adjusted side-effects as defined in section (4.4). This variable is explained in detail in 
the results section in Chapter 4. Table A.4.3.2 shows the results when the quality variable 
is calculated as the relative number of side-effects when the side effects of the dominant 
and competing molecule are not adjusted by frequency (SE3). That is, the measure of side- 
effects is sem total = total, where m = sim ,pra,flu,ator and total refers to the total
number of differential side-effects. One could think that physicians will take into account 
the total number of side-effects associated to each molecule without adjusting by any 
frequency. There are no differences between these two tables with the exception of the 
SE2 coefficient. The signs of the coefficients and their significance are similar.
Table A.4.3.1 Dynamic equations: product quality
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.707146*** 0.704435*** 0.679366*** 0.953234*** 0.843550***
PRES(t-2) -0.086439** -0.147830*** -0.140478*** -0.305875*** -0.159068**
SALES 0.413582 -0.463004 -0.170121 0.245708 0.666550*
NGP -0.00679 0.01122 -0.000952 -0.010625 0.020297
CE 7.459237*** 0.200334 -0.068737 0.015846 0.215086
MKT -0.529022** -0.604383 -0.021658 0.535869 3.206908
s e 2 0.017397 0.131907*** -0.088616 0.000003 -0.049448
GPS 0.00004 -0.000075 -0.000014 0.000061 -0.00005
POP45_64 3.773444* 4.801906 1.530228 1.982401 1.350099
POP65 -0.197058 3.35745 1.184347 -2.015023 1.395917
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.014 0.304 0.747 0.94 0.076
Sargan 0.915 0.729 0.375 0.069 0.335
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
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Table A.4.3.2 Dynamic equations: product quality
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.707146*** 0.704435*** 0.679366*** 0.953234*** 0.843550***
PRES(t-2) -0.086439** -0.147830*** -0.140478*** -0.305875*** -0.159068**
SALES 0.413611 -0.46283 -0.170183 0.245708 0.666390*
NGP -0.00679 0.01122 -0.000952 -0.010625 0.020297
CE 7.459426*** 0.200557 -0.068791 0.015846 0.215331
MKT -0.529020** -0.604186 -0.021671 0.535869 3.206189
s e 3 0.043943 0.405813*** -0.146497 0.000005 -0.092126
GPS 0.00004 -0.000075 -0.000014 0.000061 -0.00005
POP45_64 3.773444* 4.801908 1.530228 1.982401 1.350098
POP65 -0.197058 3.357452 1.184347 -2.015024 1.395917
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.014 0.304 0.747 0.94 0.076
Sargan 0.915 0.729 0.375 0.069 0.335
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
An additional quality variable refers to the indications each drug was approved for. The 
count of indications was retrieved from the British National Formulary (BNF No. 43, 2002). 
This variable was defined with the underlying assumption that the higher number of 
indications the wider the range of specific conditions that can be covered with the 
prescription of a single drug. If the number of indications a drug is approved for is large 
physicians may choose to prescribe this drug to all his patients on the basis that the drug 
is suitable for several medical conditions. This may lead to persistence in prescription. 
Simvastatin has the higher count of indications the drug is approved for followed by 
pravastatin. Fluvastatin and atorvastatin have the same number of indications. Not only 
this is the case for simvastatin but combined with the fact of being first in the market, this 
may be a strong asset to dominate the market at least until atorvastatin is introduced. The 
indication variable (IND) is constructed as follows:
. . #indications(d) .
indication = ------------------------ * year
#indications(c)
Where #indications(d) is the number of indications for the market dominant drug. The 
denominator # indications(c) represents the number of indications for the competing 
molecule under consideration. The relative number of indications is interacted with year as 
to give time variation to the variable and to capture any shocks over time that may affect
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drug indications. Results for the estimation of the diffusion equations are reported in Table 
A.4.3.3. Results are similar tot hose presented in Chapter 4. The variable IND is only 
significant for the simvastatin-fluvastatin pair indicating that the higher the relative number 
of indications for simvastatin with respect to fluvastatin may generate persistence in 
simvastatin prescription. Thus, a higher range of conditions for which simvastatin is 
indicated provides physicians with the incentive to stick to the same drug.
Table A.4.3.3 Diffusion equations: indications
Sim/Para Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Para Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.707146*** 0.704435*** 0.571840*** 0.953234*** 0.843550***
PRES(t-2) -0.086439** -0.147830*** -0.115081*** -0.305875*** -0.159068**
SALES 0.413611 -0.463004 -0.189449* 0.245708 0.666550*
NGP -0.00679 0.01122 DROPPED -0.010625 0.020297
CE 7.459426*** 0.200334 -0.112709 0.015846 0.215081
MKT -0.529020** -0.604383 -0.03443 0.535869 3.206906
IND 0.021971 0.162344*** -0.060122 0.000013 -0.202669
GPS 0.00004 -0.000075 0.000289* 0.000061 -0.00005
POP45_64 3.773444* 4.801906 5.513385 1.982401 1.3501
POP65 -0.197058 3.35745 0.731425 -2.015024 1.395917
N 1181 753 621 730 602
ml 0 0 0.026 0 0
m2 0.014 0.304 0.724 0.94 0.076
Sargan 0.915 0.729 0.845 0.069 0.335
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
The count of the different dosage forms and strength available over time has also been 
tested as an alternative quality measure. The different strength forms available were 
obtained from the prescription information available in the prescription data from IMS 
Disease-Analyzer. Higher availability of the package forms with different strength levels 
might suit patients’ needs more accurately. Physicians may perceive this as an advantage 
over other drugs. The availability in the type of dosage forms has changed over time and 
thus the variable captures these changes. The variable is defined as the number of 
dosage forms available in each period interacted with year. For instance, simvastatin 
introduced in the market two new dosage forms that offered with higher drug strength in 
1996 and 2000. The increase in number of strength forms is thus incorporated into the 
variables according to the year in which the new form was introduced. Results are 
reported in Table A.4.3.5. Note that the table does not include the dosage form expressed 
in relative terms but the package form of the competing molecule.
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Table A.4.3.4 Package Forms
Atorvastatin
TABS F/C 10MG 28 1997
TABS F/C 20MG 28 1997
TABS F/C 40MG 28 1998
TABS F/C 80MG 28 2001
Fluvastatin
CAPS 20MG 28 1994
CAPS 40MG 28 1994
CAPS 40MG 56 1996
TABS XL 80MG 28 2000
Pravastatin
TABS 10MG28 1989
TABS 20MG 28 1989
TABS 40MG 28 1997
Simvastatin
TABS 10MG28 1989
TABS 20MG 28 1989
TABS 40MG 28 1996
TABS 80MG 28 2000
Table A .4.3.4 Diffusion equations: package forms
Sim/Para Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Para Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.7071458*** 0.7044348*** 0.6793663*** 0.9532336*** 0.8435497***
PRES(t-2) -0.0864393** -0.1478300*** -0.1404777*** -0.3058749*** -0.1590678**
SALES 0.4135949 -1.20e+00* -0.1167783** 0.2457077 0.4511414
NGP -0.0067898 0.01122 -0.000952 -0.0106255 0.0202969
CE 7.4593205*** -2.40e+00* 0.0062432 0.015846 -0.2653324
MKT -0.5290209** 3.2417662*** -0.0262199 0.5358694 2.2686367
PACK
FORM 0.0085454 -0.0010105*** 0.000017 0.0000028 -0.000046
GPS 0.00004 -0.0000755 -0.0000136 0.0000614 -0.0000499
POP45_64 3.7734439* 4.8019073 1.530228 1.9824015 1.3500982
POP65 -0.1970576 3.3574515 1.184347 -2.02E+00 1.3959174
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.014 0.304 0.747 0.94 0.076
Sargan 0.914 0.729 0.375 0.069 0.335
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
The coefficients obtained both in Table A .4.3.3 and A .4.3.4 are very similar to those in 
Table 4.4. All product quality estimates are significant only for the simvastatin-fluvastatin
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demand equations. In all cases the perceived product quality seems to have a positive 
effect on relative demand and consolidate the dominance of the first entrant. Note that the 
variables were also interacted with year due to collinearity problems. The interaction term 
provides variable time variability.
Appendix 4.4 Equations estimated with organisational factors
Table A.4.4.1 Demand equations including organisational elements
Sim/Pra Sim/Flu Sim/Ator Ator/Pra Ator/Flu
PRES(t-1) 0.706268*** 0.700589*** 0.680943*** 0.939301*** 0.842412***
PRES(t-2) -0.084602** -0.149014*** -0.141471*** -0.305583*** -0.163212**
SALES 0.414979 -0.468808 -0.169821 0.241728 0.664756*
NGP -0.00605 0.016163 -0.000194 -0.01327 0.022996
CE 7.453526*** 0.216898 -0.068027 0.042472 0.19273
MKT -0.528231** -0.607808 -0.021712 0.512004 3.200143
SE-\ 0.005324 0.087389*** -0.003476 0.000018 -0.060579
FH -0.017501 -0.187146 -0.018575 0.052734 -0.089877
DD -0.08458 -0.0065 0.046709 -0.173132* -0.052843
GPS 0.000046 -0.000054 -0.000014 0.000067 -0.000038
POP45_64 4.109551* 5.74146 1.518231 2.099897 2.032259
POP65 -1.029912 1.940864 1.39846 -2.963936 0.197117
N 1181 753 751 730 602
ml 0 0 0.003 0 0
m2 0.014 0.301 0.744 0.901 0.076
Sargan 0.948 0.708 0.417 0.075 0.34
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
P-value reported for the m l, m2 and Sargan test 
GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
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Appendix Chapter 5
Appendix 5.1 Reforms and Competition within the NHS
During the early 90s there were a number of reforms in the UK NHS designed to improve 
efficiency to lower costs and increase quality via the introduction of supply-side 
competition in the market. Prior to the reforms Health Authorities (HAs) had the dual role of 
hospital services providers and were liable for hospital financing. The reforms aimed at 
breaking this configuration and divided purchasers and providers of health care to create 
the so-called NHS internal market. In other words, the reforms re-structured the hospital 
sector separating the provider from the entity responsible for the financing of these 
services. Hospitals became independent from HAs and were constituted as NHS Trusts. 
They started operating as the sellers of services that had to compete for contracts that 
were purchased by two sets of buyers, District Health Authorities (DHAs) and GP fund­
holders. The DHAs were defined according to geographical area and were responsible for 
the services commissioned on behalf of the population under their responsibility. They 
were in charge of purchasing the services from competing hospitals both in the private and 
public health care sector. The second type of purchasers was the GP fund-holders. They 
were GP practices that opted to sign for the scheme and were allocated a budget for the 
provision of hospital services and prescription of drugs for the listed population registered 
with them. GP fund-holders were given complete independency in their budget 
management with the incentive that any surplus obtained could be re-invested in the 
health care provided by the practice.
The incentives of the purchasers and the providers in achieving one of the ultimate goals 
of the reforms -  lowering prices- have been discussed by Propper et al. (1998). On the 
purchaser side there has been evidence than DHAs were less willing to shop around than 
GP fund-holders. The main reason being than GP fund-holders could retain any surpluses 
derived from an efficient use of the budget through the purchase of services at competitive 
prices. On the provider side, regulation restricted the scope for price changes in that NHS 
Trusts were limited by a break-even condition and price had to be set such that revenues 
would cover total costs in addition to a 6% return on net assets. Their potential benefit of 
the internal market was largely through the services sold to GP fund-holders. Given that 
providers could not retain any benefit they had to make sure that there were not making 
any losses. Propper et al. (1998) argue that costs are fairly fixed and only through price 
increases they could achieve the zero profit condition. However, increasing prices could
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generate HAs to switch providers and they would have the incentive to increase revenue 
through service provision to GP fund-holders.
The underlying idea behind this initial set of reforms was to introduce a quasi-market that 
would lead to price competition among NHS Trusts to secure contracts with the 
purchasers. There have been several studies assessing the achievement of the objectives 
set by the new regulations of the internal market. The effect of competition on prices and 
costs has been the main focus in the literature, whereas evidence assessing the effect of 
competition on quality of care has been more limited. There is evidence of a significant 
negative association between prices and competition, that is, higher degree of competition 
has been associated with lower prices charged to purchasers. This relationship holds for 
specific procedures and was not possible to make the same statement for all procedures 
that were examined in these studies. In particular, across specialties competition seemed 
to decrease prices for low-cost procedures (Propper, 1996; Propper and Soderlund, 1998; 
Propper, 1998). Overall, there has been a distinction between prices charged to GP 
fundholders and those charged to DHAs, but the results have been consistent across the 
two types of purchasers. As for the effect of competition on the provider’s cost, Soderlund 
et al. (1997) find evidence of no association whatsoever between costs and the degree of 
competition. Overall the evidence of the impact of competition on pricing behaviour and 
costs has been documented but the effect of the internal market has been largely ignored. 
In their review of the empirical evidence offered in several studies, Le Grand et al. (1998) 
could not find strong evidence on the effect of competition on quality of care. Only recently, 
Propper et al. (2004) measured the impact of market competition on quality indicators. 
Their study particularly looks at the relationship between death rates in acute myocardial 
infarction and competition measures. Their results suggest that higher competition induced 
higher AMI mortality rates.
The organisation of the market was modified in 1998 with the abolition of the GP fund­
holder status and GP practices were re-configured and grouped into Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs) who were allocated budgets to purchase health care on behalf of defined 
populations. PCTs were later on transformed into the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). The 
geographical distribution of the health regions also changed and DHAs were replaced by 
28 Strategic Health Authorities (StHAs), the main change being that they no longer had
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any purchasing rights. As part of another wave of reforms, NHS foundation trusts were 
created in 2004 as a new statutory type of entities in an effort to further decentralise the 
decision-making. NHS Trusts could apply to change their status to foundation trusts as a 
way to become a self-governing provider with autonomy to manage their budgets and to 
meet patients’ needs. This reform was designed to be implemented gradually; however, in 
the meantime trusts that might be interested are required to apply for a status change. 
There were 83 foundation trusts by the end of 2007 and it is expected than the rest will 
change their status by the end of 2008. Monitor is the independent entity in charge of the 
regulation of foundation trusts and among other responsibilities it is liable for the 
assignment of risk ratings to each of them to monitor their performance.
The majority of empirical studies have examined the impact of the reforms introduced with 
the internal market although the time frame for these studies has been limited to the period 
between 1991 and 1997. The second and third waves of reforms have received less of 
attention than the first reforms that set up the internal market. This may be due to the fact 
that the major changes have been to redefine the figures of the purchaser and provider of 
services rather than transforming the market structure. To put it in other words, the 
organisation of providers and purchasers was changed but they were still operating in a 
quasi-market where the separation between buyers and sellers was not modified. In 
Chapter 5, price is not the variable of interest but quality is investigated in a two-stage 
analysis that first examines the effect of competition on the diffusion of innovations in a 
context of the latest NHS reforms.
In the second stage of analysis, there is an evaluation of whether the use of these 
technologies has had an impact on the quality dimension of the provision of in-hospital 
services. Providers are assumed to compete to secure contracts for services 
commissioned by PCTs who at the same time they are restricted by budget constraints. 
Trusts are structured as not-for-profit bodies with a break-even policy operating under a 
quite regulated price setting with strong incentives to avoid any loss making. The 
introduction of competitive elements through the internal market might have limited the 
diffusion of innovations as competition was driven by static notions of efficiency, driving 
prices down to the average cost of treatment in order to secure contracts with the 
purchaser (Propper, 1998). Consequently, impact on quality of care may be affected by
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competition, which is more difficult to observe and measure than prices and costs. If this is 
the case, and quality of care could be compromised against competition, then it is 
important to assess the impact of competition on diffusion of new technologies. It follows 
that if new technology use is affected by competition this may inevitably affect patients’ 
health outcomes. In doing so, there is scope to examine dynamic definitions of efficiency 
as opposed to the static definition underlying in the reforms1.
In the case that competition did not introduce the desired effect on prices and costs, 
providers could be using alternative tools as part of their strategy and engage in 
competition not based in prices but in quality of care. As it has been observed, competition 
was leading towards lower prices in low-cost procedures, and then certain degree of non­
price competition could exist for the high-cost procedures. Usually the type of procedures 
analysed in the chapter are designed to treat complicated diagnosis for which price might 
not be a valid mechanism. The trust may then use non-price competition as a signal of 
being a high quality provider. The extent to which competition is based on price or quality 
has not been clearly identified among providers. The current research does not intend to 
address these two types of competition tools but to assess the relationship between 
competition and quality of care through examination of medical technology diffusion.
1 This is also possible to the long time series for which data is available in this study. Empirical evidence has 
been limited to a short number of years, mainly using three years data and in many cases at very early stages 
of the reforms.
Appendix 5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.5.2.1 CEA: Diffusion equations
Variable Description Abbreviation
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St.Deviation 95% Cl
Spt Surgical Volume
Number of CEA procedures 
per trust adjusted per 
population over 45 (in 
thousands)
CEApt 0.01558 0.00047 0.01466 0.01650
Competitionpt
Herfindahl PCT Herfindahl Index at the PCT level C ip t 0.89323 0.00598 0.88150 0.90497
Provider Count Number of trusts providing services to the same PCT c 2p t 1.31685 0.01872 1.28013 1.35357
Herfindahl STHA
Herfindahl index at the 
Strategic Health Authority 
level
c 3 p t 0.16075 0.00253 0.15580 0.16571
Provider Count 
StHA
Number of trusts providing 
services within the same 
strategic health authority
C4pt 12.98910 0.13588 12.72251 13.25570
PCT Count 
StHA
Number of PCTs within each 
StHA C spt 11.31517 0.11745 11.08473 11.54561
Provider Count 
StHA Pop
Number of trusts providing 
services within the same 
strategic health authority 
adjusted by population in that 
StHA
C6pt 0.00233 0.00001 0.00231 0.00235
PCT Count 
StHA Pop
Number of PCTs within each 
StHA adjusted by population 
within StHA
c7pt 0.00203 0.00001 0.00201 0.00205
Table A.5.2.1 CEA: Diffusion equations (continued)
Variable Description Abbreviation
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St.Deviation 95% Cl
In-hospital In-hospital mortality rate Inhosppt 0.01524 0.00156 0.01217 0.01831
Outcomeit
Readmission 28 days Readmission rate within 28 days Read28pt 0.04954 0.00183 0.04595 0.05313
Mortality 30 days Mortality rate within 30 days after discharge Mort30pt 0.01294 0.00148 0.01003 0.01585
Mortality 1 year Mortality rate within a year after discharge Mort1ypt 0.03500 0.00194 0.03120 0.03880
Foundation Trust Whether the provider has Foundation Trust status Foundatiorip 0.31936 0.01350 0.29287 0.34586
University Whether NHS Trust has teaching status Universityp 0.21542 0.01191 0.19206 0.23879
Stenosis Proportion of patients with primary diagnosis stenosis at admission StenosiSp 0.80565 0.00593 0.79402 0.81728
Xpt
Stroke Proportion of patients with primary diagnosis of stroke at admission Strokep 0.02252 0.00162 0.01934 0.02569
TIA Proportion of patients with primary diagnosis TIA at admission TlAp 0.04066 0.00235 0.03606 0.04526
Elective Proportion of cases admitted as elective cases Electivep 0.07496 0.00342 0.06826 0.08166
Population 45-64 Percentage of population between 45 and 64 in StHA Pop45_64jt 0.23633 0.00051 0.23532 0.23734
Population over 65 Percentage of population older than 65 in StHA Pop65it 0.15842 0.00054 0.15735 0.15948
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Table A.5.2.2 CEA. Volume-Outcome equations
Variable Description Abbreviation
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. Deviation 95% Cl
In-hospital In-hospital mortality rate lnhosppt 0.01221 0.00057 0.01110 0.01333
Readmission 28 days Readmission rate within 28 days Read28pt 0.05252 0.00115 0.05026 0.05478
Outcomeipt
Mortality 30 days Mortality rate within 30 days after discharge Mort30pt 0.01018 0.00052 0.00916 0.01120
Mortality 1 year Mortality rate within a year after discharge Mort1ypt 0.03401 0.00094 0.03217 0.03585
Volume
Number of procedures 
performed during the year of 
operation (log)
Volumeipt 58.59002 0.19729 58.20332 58.97671
Volumept Volume 12 months
Number of procedures 
performed during the 12 
months previous to the 
operation date (log)
Volume12lpt 55.11586 0.19970 54.72444 55.50729
Cumulative volume
Number of procedures 
performed from 1996 to the 
operation year (log)
Cumipt 23.32096 0.06555 23.19249 23.44943
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Table A.5.2.2 CEA. Volume-Outcome equations (continued)
Variable Description Abbreviation
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St.Deviation 95% Cl
PPt
Foundation Trust Whether the provider has foundation trust status Foundation p 0.32886 0.00243 0.32410 0.33363
University Whether NHS Trust has teaching status Universityp 0.34812 0.00247 0.34329 0.35295
Pat,
Stenosis Whether primary diagnosis was stenosis StenosiSp 0.84643 0.00187 0.84277 0.85009
Transient Whether primary diagnosis was TIA TIA, 0.03742 0.00098 0.03549 0.03934
Stroke Whether primary diagnosis was stroke Stroke, 0.02006 0.00073 0.01864 0.02148
Length of stay Length of in-hospital stay LOSi 4.54593 0.04698 4.45385 4.63801
Sex Patient's sex Sexj 0.66434 0.00244 0.65955 0.66913
Age Patient's age Age, 69.47461 0.04649 69.38350 69.56572
Comorbidities Number of comorbidities Comorbj 1.34182 0.00403 1.33392 1.34973
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Table A.5.2.3 KA: Diffusion equations
Variable Description Abbreviation
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. Deviation 95% Cl
Spt Surgical Volume
Number of KA procedures per 
trust adjusted per population 
(in thousands)
KApt 0.08328 0.00126 0.08081 0.08574
Herfindahl PCT Herfindahl Index at the PCT level C ip t 0.79768 0.00568 0.78655 0.80882
Provider Count Number of trusts providing services to the same PCT C>2pt 1.68062 0.02056 1.64029 1.72095
Herfindahl STHA
Herfindahl index at the 
Strategic Health Authority 
level
c3pt 0.07534 0.00066 0.07405 0.07663
Competition#
Provider Count 
StHA
Number of trusts providing 
services within the same 
strategic health authority
C4pt 19.64251 0.13533 19.37710 19.90793
PCT Count 
StHA
Number of PCTs within each 
StHA ^5pf 15.20236 0.13907 14.92962 15.47511
Provider Count 
StHA Pop
Number of trusts providing 
services within the same 
strategic health authority 
adjusted by population in that 
StHA
^ 6 p t 0.00360 0.00001 0.00357 0.00362
PCT Count 
StHA Pop
Number of PCTs within each 
StHA adjusted by population 
within StHA
c7pt 0.00273 0.00001 0.00271 0.00276
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Table A.5.2.3 KA: Diffusion equations (continued)
Variable Description Abbreviation
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. Deviation 95% Cl
Outcome*
In-hospital In-hospital mortality rate Inhosppt 0.00060 0.00004 0.00053 0.00068
Readmission 28 days Readmission rate within 28 days Read28pt 0.01410 0.00025 0.01361 0.01460
Mortality 30 days Mortality rate within 30 days after discharge Mort30pt 0.00043 0.00004 0.00036 0.00050
Mortality 1 year Mortality rate within a year after discharge Mortlypt 0.00239 0.00008 0.00223 0.00255
Xpt
Foundation Trust Whether the provider has foundation trust status Foundatiorip 0.33494 0.01094 0.31349 0.35640
University Whether NHS Trust has teaching status Universityp 0.16532 0.00861 0.14844 0.18221
Orthopaedic Proportion of cases admitted as elective cases OrthopaediCp 0.02308 0.00348 0.01626 0.02991
Population 45-64 Percentage of population between 45 and 64 in StHA Pop45_64jt 0.23679 0.00040 0.23600 0.23758
Population over 65 Percentage of population older than 65 in StHA Pop65jt 0.15942 0.00043 0.15857 0.16026
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Appendix 5.3 The Linear Probability Model (LPM)
W hen the dependent variable is binary, it can only take values one or zero according to 
whether an event occurs, the dual association between the dependent variable and 
explicative variables is expressed as the probability of the event happening. For instance, 
in the volume-outcome relationship the analysis starts with the estimation of the probability 
of the patient suffering an adverse event. As an example let’s take as dependent variable 
the adverse outcome that represent in-hospital mortality. It is equal to one y =  1 if the
patient dies in hospital and zero otherwise. As Maddala (1993) notes the model can be 
written using the standard regression equation,
y = xp + u,  w ith p (w ) = 0  (1)
The interest is on the probability of the patient dying in-hospital as a function of a set of 
explanatory variables,
P(y = \ \ x ) = P ( y  = \ \ x l9 x2 xK ) = xp = J30 + p xxx + ... + p kxk (2)
W here x is the vector of k explanatory variables and p  is the vector of coefficient 
estimates. The interpretation of the coefficient is that a change in one unit in the variable 
xi will change the probability of in-hospital mortality P(y  = 1 1 x) in p t . As noted in
Wooldridge (2002) the estimation of equation (2) using the standard OLS method requires 
the specification of the conditional mean and variance
E(y  | x) =  xp  =  p 0 + /?,*, + ... + p kxk 
var(y | x) = jc/?(l -  xp)
302
The estimated coefficients will be consistent and sometimes unbiased. However, the main 
problem will arise in the computation of fitted values and the case in which the fitted 
probability P(y  = 11 x) will be either negative or higher than one falling outside the 
permitted interval for probabilities (0,1). Thus, to ensure this will not happen, the estimation 
for equation (2) will require functions and estimation methods of the type described in 
Section 5.6.
The fact that y  takes discrete values 1 and 0 rises the problem of heteroskedasticity. 
When y = 1 the residual will be 1 -  x/3 and when y  =  0 the residual will be equal to - x f l . 
Thus, OLS will not be efficient. Efficient estimates can be obtained using weighted least 
squares using the estimated variance derived from the OLS estimation equation (1) 
(Maddala, 1993). In addition to the fitted values problem, an additional disadvantage of the 
LPM is that one-unit changes in the explanatory variable x, will always have the same
impact on probability of in-hospital mortality. This does not seem to be plausible given that 
the additional one-unit changes could move the estimated probability outside the interval 
(0,1) (Wooldridge, 2002). Also, the fact that the residuals are not normally distributed 
causes the other nonlinear estimation methods to be more efficient than the least squares 
procedures (Maddala, 1993).
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Appendix 5.4. ARM) specifications. Unit root tests and Model Specification
This appendix includes the AR(1) specifications testing for the persistency of the series. All 
results are one-step estimators robust to heteroskedasticity. As it can be seen in Tables 
A.5.3.1 and A.5.3.2 the series are persistent indicating that the best estimation method is 
the system GMM. The system GMM coefficients are between the OLS and Within group 
estimator. They are higher than the first-differenced estimators indicating that weak 
instruments due to series persistency is causing a downward bias in the coefficient 
estimates. Table A.5.3.3 includes the p-value of the OLS tests for unit roots discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Section 3.6). In all cases the null hypothesis of a  = 1 is rejected.
Table A.5.3.1 AR(1) specifications: CEA
OLS Within
First 
Differenced 
GMM (t-3)
System 
GMM (t-3)
CEA(t-1) 0.961310*** 0.521727*** 0.506194*** 0.826938***
N 1077 1077 961 1077
Sargan 0.034 0.01
ml 0 0
m2 0.889 0.968
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value for m l, m2 and Sargan test 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
Table A.5.3.2 AR(1) specifications: KA
OLS Within
First 
Differenced 
GMM (t-3)
System 
GMM (t-3)
KA(t-1) 0.977059*** 0.527670*** 0.601202*** 0.935394***
N 1681 1681 1499 1681
Sargan 0.467 0.064
ml 0 0
m2 0.628 0.856
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value for m l, m2 and Sargan test 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
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Table A.5.3.3 Unit root tests
OLS CEA KA
Ho alpha=1 alpha=1
p-value 0.0087 0
Tables A.5.3.4 and A.5.3.5 show the results for the OLS, Within groups, first-differenced 
GMM and system GMM estimators. The competition measure is the Herfindahl index at 
the PCT level and the outcome rate is the in-hospital mortality. The estimation of the OLS 
and Within group coefficients was carried out as preliminary test to check the specification 
to confirm that the coefficients of a , the coefficient of the lagged dependant variable, lie 
within the boundaries of the OLS and Within groups. As explained in Bond (2002), a  
should lie within these two estimators, as the first is upward biased and the second is 
downward biased, or at least it should be very different to them. The Sargan test in Tables 
A.5.3.4 and A.5.3.5 fails to reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions 
are valid. The p-value corresponding to m2 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the 
presence of no second-order autocorrelation. Recall from Chapter 3 that ml and m2 test 
for first-order and second-order correlation in the first-difference of the residuals. In Tables 
A.5.3.4 and A.5.3.5 time-constant variables are interacted with year to facilitate the 
comparison across specifications. Note that the within and first-differenced GMM will drop 
any time-constant variables due to the first-differencing.
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Table A.5.3.4 Diffusion equations: CEA
OLS Within
First
Differenced
GMM
System
GMM
CEA(t-1) 
Herfindahl PCT 
Outcome(t-I) 
Elective 
Stenosis 
Foundation 
University 
Pop 45-64 
Pop over 65
0.9392741***
0.0018341***
-0.0030809
0.0020467
0.0018767***
0
0.0000001
-0.000001
-0.0000028
0.4800754***
-0.00122
-0.0021018
0.000623
0.0013638
0.0000361
-0.0006878**
-0.000037
0.000004
0.3600867***
-0.00273
-0.0183226
0.0011231
0.0021864*
0.0000262
-0.0008276**
-0.0000161
-0.0000092
0.7814655***
0.0026047*
-0.0520725
0.0071683**
0.0030814*
-0.0000001
0.0000010*
-0.0000036
-0.0000044
N
Sargan
ml
m2
1077 1077 961
0.074
0
0.748
1077
0.219
0
0.896
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value for m l, m2 and Sargan test 
Time Dummies included in all specifications
Table A.5.3.5 Diffusion equations: KA
OLS Within
First
Differenced
GMM
System GMM
KA(t-1)
Herfindahl PCT 
Outcome (t-1) 
Foundation 
University 
Orthopaedic 
Pop 45-64 
Pop over 65
0.9592516***
0.0021449
-0.1157032
-0.0000002
0
0.0000031**
-0.0000119*
0.0000081
0.5157008*** 
-0.0097059 
-0.2553699 
-0.0001091 
. -0.0004527 
0.001245 
0.0000612 
-0.0000067
0.5050735***
-0.0123369
-0.3701036
-0.0004038
-0.0009931
0.0009895
0.0000037
0.0000128
0.8323638***
0.0076965**
-0.418465
0
0.000001
0.0000050**
-0.0000341**
0.0000219
N
Sargan
ml
m2
1681 1681 1499
0.524
0
0.486
1681
0.238
0
0.826
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value for m l, m2 and Sargan test
Time Dummies included in all specifications
306
Appendix 5.5. CEA diffusion equations with stroke rate as measure of past performance
Herfindahl PCT
Number of 
providers 
within PCT
Number of 
providers 
within SthA
Number of 
providers 
within SthA 
pop-adj
Number of 
PCT within 
SthA
Number of 
PCT within 
SthA pop-adj
Herfindahl
SthA
CEA(t-1) 0.773613*** 0.783588*** 0.796689*** 0.797478*** 0.795248*** 0.795030*** 0.785921***
Competition 0.003141** -0.001286*** 0.000244 0.846294 0.000297 1.588394 0.010842
Outcome(t-I) -0.05221 -0.004848 -0.00504 -0.004943 -0.004913 -0.004802 -0.004888
Stroke -0.000347 -0.000229 -0.00029 -0.000294 -0.000429 -0.000506 -0.000333
Elective 0.002058* 0.002052* 0.002069* 0.002057* 0.002120* 0.002197* 0.001891
Foundation 0.008408*** 0.005801** 0.004267* 0.004257* 0.004147 0.004091 0.004673*
University 0.041593* 0.040103* 0.069303 0.039098* 0.076451* 0.046627** 0.032116*
Pop 45-64 -0.000010*** -0.000009*** -0.000014* -0.000010** -0.000014* -0.000010** -0.000005
Pop over 65 -0.005666* -0.003901 -0.004719* -0.004600* -0.004434* -0.004343* -0.004052
N 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077 1077
Sargan 0.21 0.325 0.341 0.347 0.331 0.339 0.397
ml 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m2 0.892 0.953 0.96 0.957 0.962 0.954 0.979
Notes: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
P-value for m l, m2 and Sargan test 
Time Dummies included in all specifications 
CEA refers to carotid endarterectomy
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Appendix 5.6 Alternative volume specifications
Table A.5.5.1. Non-linearities in the volume-outcome relationship
Readmission 
within 28 days
In-hospital
Mortality
30 days 
mortality
1 year 
Mortality
Volume12 0.73685 -0.60152 -0.7806 0.14149
Volume12A2 -0.16848 0.13964 0.18477 -0.02926
Foundation -0.50765 0.8486 0.81791 0.78182*
University 0.27938 -0.11553 -0.16343 0.0519
Transient 0.07707 -0.16304 -0.15417 -0.0747
Stroke -0.21527* 0.47585*** 0.61755*** 0.27961***
LOS 0.00293** 0.01177*** 0.00271 0.01050***
Sex -0.07321** 0.03935 0.00616 0.05305
Age 0.00313* 0.01650*** 0.01370*** 0.02351***
Comorbidity 0.06996*** 0.22663*** 0.25308*** 0.18091***
N 37183 35099 34526 37192
Log-likelihood -7554 -2161 -1903 -4989
Chi2 249 546 378 1097
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time and Hospital Dummies included in all specifications
Table A.5.5.2. Experience accumulation as alternative volume measure
Readmission 
within 28 days
In-hospital
Mortality
30 days 
mortality
1 year 
Mortality
Accumulated -0.00123 0.01468 0.01662 0.01095experience
Foundation 0.37849 1.18871 1.0257 0.82032*
University 0.60707 -0.33282 -0.25001 0.05346
Transient 0.06913 -0.247 -0.15464 -0.09939
Stroke -0.19127* 0.36136*** 0.50529*** 0.18915*
LOS 0.00308** 0.01261*** 0.00365* 0.01101***
Sex -0.07317** 0.03453 0.00466 0.04922
Age 0.00331* 0.01685*** 0.01402*** 0.02413***
Comorbidity 0.06816*** 0.22551*** 0.25178*** 0.17960***
N 35042 33052 32341 35048
Log-likelihood -7140 -1972 -1737 -4791
Chi2 233 515 346 1054
Note: Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time and Hospital Dummies included in all specifications
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